

IN THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT

INQUESTS ARISING FROM THE DEATHS IN THE LONDON

BRIDGE AND BOROUGH MARKET ATTACKS OF 3rd JUNE 2017

**WRITTEN RESPONSE ON BEHALF OF
THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE
REGULATION 28**

1. This is the response submitted on behalf of the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (MPS) to the Chief Coroner's Report to Prevent Future Deaths (RPFDF) following the inquests into the terrorist attacks on London Bridge and at Borough Market.
2. On behalf of the Commissioner may I once again express our deepest sympathies to those who were murdered and injured in these terrible attacks. The police work tirelessly to prevent all terrorist attacks and it is a source of profound regret when we are unable to do so. We are determined to do everything possible to protect the public in future.
3. This document provides the response both on behalf of the MPS and National Counter Terror Policing which includes the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO).
4. NaCTSO is a police unit that sits under the National Counter Terrorism Police Headquarters and reports to the National Coordinator for Protect and Prepare. NaCTSO is responsible for producing guidance and training materials for protective security in crowded places. NaCTSO also trains, licences and coordinates the CTSA network, NaCTSO falls under the Protect and Prepare strands of CONTEST.

MC1 – Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department and NaCTSO: I suggest that there be a review of the sensitive national criteria and tests for identifying sites as priority Crowded Places (or for otherwise designating sites at a national level as justifying proactive advice on protective security). In that review, one aim should be to ensure that the criteria are not excessively rigid so as to exclude sites which may be particularly attractive and vulnerable to terrorists. If and to the extent that the Secretary of State considers that any other Government agencies should play a part in addressing this concern, their assistance should be enlisted.

MC2 – Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department and NaCTSO: I suggest that consideration be given to putting in place systems of periodic review /

assurance to ensure that the criteria for identifying priority sites for protective security advice remain fit for purpose and that the list of such sites remains appropriate

5. Due to the close alignment of these recommendations, NaCTSO is responding to both collectively.
6. As it is not possible to deliver bespoke advice to every crowded place, access to guidance works on a process of scaled options and differing delivery mechanisms. It is important to note that CT security measures for crowded places do not only begin when a site is identified as a “priority site”. A huge amount of work has been and is being done across the sector. Free security advice is available to everyone as envisaged by the Lord West report. This is delivered in particular by NaCTSO and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI).
7. Protective security guidance and training operates on three broad levels; the first two levels provide access to information for sectors and individuals, whilst the third layer comprises bespoke CTSA engagement with specific sites (the priority crowded places identified by the Chief Coroner in MC1). These three levels are each addressed in turn below.
8. In terms of protective security advice available to all, the NaCTSO website provides access to an array of protective security advice, including the Crowded Places Guidance which can be accessed openly and without charge. It also includes a gateway to “ACT (Action Counters Terrorism) e-learning UK” which is specifically designed to provide information to those without direct access to a CTSA. ACT e-learning was initially launched for private sector organisations to use, and was free from the point of registration. From December 2019, the e-learning has been made freely accessible to anyone, removing the registration requirement. Currently nearly 2 million modules have been completed across the UK.
9. NaCTSO also provides communications and briefings for business and others with responsibilities or interest in this area. This includes regular protective security communications delivered under the brand “UK Protect” and disseminated through the Cross Sector Security Communications (CSSC) network to any business who has signed up. It also includes regular updates and specific messages at times of increased risk. Between January 2017 and December 2019, 110 messages were disseminated to the network.
10. Other measures include engagement with representatives of leading crowded places sectors (for example shopping centres, hotels, visitor attractions) through the Crowded Places Information Exchange. This is supported through ACT Corporate events where CT advice and guidance is delivered by experts directly into sector groups on both a national and regional basis.
11. Providing bespoke, site specific CT advice is the primary focus of the national Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) network which is overseen by NaCTSO. CTSA work under a framework to provide advice on protective security measures that could be taken to improve security at a specific site. CTSA delivery is predicated on identifying which sites are considered to be most at risk of attack. In the absence of

specific protective security legislation (covered in more detail in MC3 and MC4), these measures are implemented at the discretion of the owner subject to other non-CT legal obligations as imposed by for example the Crime and Disorder Act 1997 or the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. Sites are selected through a process of prioritisation.

12. The 2017 attacks have brought into focus consideration of which locations receive which level of advice. NaCTSO recognises that this is a complex area and not an exact science. The terrorist threat continues to evolve and is increasingly multi-layered, covering not just the iconic location targeting preferred by Al Qaeda and the IRA but new threats from extreme right wing terrorism and Daesh which promotes the concept that anything is a target and anything a weapon. It is not possible (in terms of CTSA network reach) or desirable (in terms of creating so called “barrier Britain”) to offer every location in the UK the same level of protective security advice or protection and therefore there must be a system of prioritisation and flexibility to ensure the advice provided is appropriate and proportionate to the intelligence and threat assessment.
13. Any system of prioritisation will require an assessment criteria which will result in risk based inclusion and exclusion. NaCTSO accepts that flexibility in this approach is very important and as such has been working closely with the government to review the crowded places policy and delivery model.
14. To address this challenge NaCTSO is seeking to expand both the advice and training we provide and how that advice is delivered. Since 2017 NaCTSO has worked hard to expand the range of products available and sought to adapt these to multiple audiences. The strategic approach is to reach as many people as possible with protective security advice. As outlined above, this ranges from CT awareness suitable for all members of the public, to detailed bespoke security advice appropriate for large corporations with professional security expertise. We will continue to grow and develop the advice and accessibility of these measures.
15. NaCTSO also recognises the need to develop a review process and for greater flexibility within the prioritisation model. The 2014 Crowded Places Model allows a degree of flexibility, such as for example the ability to add additional sites at a local level or to place a location into a maintenance phase once all desirable protective security solutions have been achieved. NaCTSO agrees with the recommendation to review the model to ensure the overall system, and prioritisation process addresses the threat from terrorism. The full details of this process are under consideration with Government and we refer the Chief Coroner to HMG’s response on this point.
16. Finally, it is important to recognise the limits of protective security. Protective security solutions provide the ability to deter, detect or delay a terrorist attack, but they cannot alone prevent every attack. We cannot protect everyone all of the time. Target hardening one area can deflect an attack into another as was seen in Halle, Germany in October 2019, when the attacker was unable to access his initial target, a synagogue, but then proceeded to attack people on the streets nearby. Protective security measures reduce rather than negate impact.

MC3 – Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department: I suggest that consideration be given either (a) to introducing legislation governing the duties of public authorities (including highway authorities) regarding protective

security or (b) to producing guidance indicating what existing legal duties require in practice of public authorities regarding assessment of sites for protective security needs and implementing protective security measures.

MC4 – Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department and NaCTSO: I suggest that consideration be given to producing guidance for CTSA explaining what existing legal duties require in practice of public authorities regarding assessment of sites for protective security needs and implementing protective security measures.

17. MC3 rests with the Secretary of State for the Home Department, but leads into MC4, so has been included for completeness.
18. The Chief Coroner notes the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1997 which require public authorities to exercise their various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent (inter alia) crime and disorder in its area. This has been interpreted by some authorities (including TfL) as including terrorism. The Chief Coroner has noted that there is reason to believe this interpretation is not uniform across the UK.
19. Counter Terrorism Policing has for some time supported the introduction of legislation to govern protective security standards. Moving from the current approach which is predicated upon persuading the owners and operators of crowded places to consider and implement protective security (including public bodies to which MC3 and MC4 are addressed), to one where this is mandatory would be game-changing and we believe is the most effective means to deliver protective security consistently across the country. Any legislation should reflect the key principles of our current approach of appropriateness and proportionality.
20. As outlined in MC3, there is an absence of specific protective security legislation. There is also an absence of case law or guidance in this area. Consequently, provision of clear, definitive guidance for the CTSA network is challenging. Ultimately we can provide as much CT advice as we want but absent a clear legal duty, implementation of that advice is optional. NaCTSO is currently reviewing the various legal provisions which might impose a duty in the public and private sector, but we can only provide (further) advice to the CTSA network internally. Providing legal advice directly to public authorities or others would fall outside the scope of our role. In the event that legal advice received by NaCTSO yields further useful guidance to CTSA and others then this will be provided as soon as possible and certainly in 2020, however, given the uncertainty as to the nature and extent of such a legal duty there is at present likely to be very limited if any guidance which NaCTSO can usefully provide.
21. As set out above, NaCTSO would welcome the provision of clear guidance from relevant Government departments as to the applicability of existing legislation.

MC5 – Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department and NaCTSO: I suggest that consideration be given to taking measures to make CTSA, police forces and local authorities aware of protective security equipment / infrastructure which can be installed in response to emerging threats (including

the criteria and timescales for making particular forms of asset available). I also suggest that consideration be given to encouraging highway authorities and other public bodies, especially in metropolitan areas, to adopt security boards similar to the PRSAB adopted in London, with a view to ensuring that there is good understanding of what measures can be taken in the short and longer term to protect sites and areas assessed to be vulnerable.

22. MC5 poses two recommendations. The majority of the first section sits with NaCTSO. With regards to the second section and the adoption of security boards, NaCTSO is likely to have a role but would not be the lead agency responsible. As such this sits outside the scope of this response and is better addressed by the government.
23. The CTSA network undertakes a comprehensive training programme which takes a minimum of two years to complete. This course is accredited to City and Guilds level and courses are delivered by both NaCTSO and CPNI trainers. All CTSA's must attain this standard and are supported and mentored until this is achieved. Some CTSA's also opt to continue to a further graduate level qualification. Both courses cover the security mitigations that are available in protective security. The course content is regularly updated and those undertaking that task will be fully briefed on all relevant matters including the Chief Coroner's report.
24. Advances in technology and capabilities present a need to ensure continued professional development of the network. This is achieved through a number of different channels. All CTSA's must attend an annual training event which provides a forum to deliver the latest innovations and share best practice. Additionally, NaCTSO operates a tasking process whereby any changes and developments are sent out to the CT network through the Protect & Prepare leads who also ensure that the network is aware of any relevant new publications by CPNI.
25. Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) and the National Barrier Asset (NBA) represent an evolving capability that is managed centrally within NaCTSO by the National Vehicle Threat Mitigation Unit (NVTMU). All CTSA's and officers working in CT policing are briefed on HVM and NBA capability. As set out above this is covered by inputs at the CTSA annual training event and as part of the formal CTSA training.
26. Additionally, a brief is distributed to all CTSA's, CT SecCo Leads (who support temporary events), and the Protect and Prepare network covering relevant changes in capability and procedure in relation to HVM.
27. Further, the NVTMU has recently presented directly to Protect and Prepare leads, the National CT SecCo board and nine of the eleven CTSA regions. The remaining two regions will receive presentations in early 2020. The subject matter of these presentations includes the types of asset available, information on the new, modular HVM, VAW attack methodology and VAW tactics. We will deliver updates and advice on other evolving capabilities in a similar manner.
28. We are therefore confident that the matters raised in MC05 are already in hand.

MC10: Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Director-General of the Security Service: The evidence in this case gave cause for concern that calls made by members of the public reporting on a significant SOI were not being communicated to MI5 and CTP officers working on the relevant investigation(s). In the continuing work to improve information management, efforts should be made to avoid recurrence of this problem.

29. Whilst MC10 is not addressed to the MPS, it raises concerns about calls from the public *not being passed on to MI5 and CTP officers working on the relevant investigation*. At paragraph 45 of the MPS submission dated 06.09.19, the following response was provided:

A learning point in relation to the call handling was identified by Lord Anderson and this has been implemented. Intelligence handling systems have been reviewed, and new processes are in place to ensure intelligence is recorded and disseminated appropriately. ATH technology has been upgraded including an automated answering system and messaging facility. SO15 has placed an extra level of supervision into the process of intelligence handling from the hotline which will ensure that in the event that a human and supervision error occurs again this will be picked up by the extra supervisory check and the intelligence will then be passed on to the appropriate team

30. In addition to the matters set out above, there have been other improvements in intelligence handling which are relevant to the matters the Chief Coroner raises in relation to MC10.
31. Since April 2019, SO15 intelligence has been governed by the National Standards of Intelligence Management (NSIM). Relevant data once received, will now be placed on a National CT database. Where intelligence is matched to the subject of an ongoing CT investigation, it will now be placed directly into that operational intelligence unit and flagged for assessment.
32. All staff working in intelligence assessment have completed NSIM assessor training which provides guidance on trace checks and development of intelligence. If for whatever reason (such as a missing “selector”) analysed intelligence is not matched with a subject in a CT investigation then sophisticated systems are in place for the matter to be escalated. Due to sensitivities involved in relation to this form of intelligence handling, it would be inappropriate to include further details within this document.

MC13 – Addressed to the LAS, MPS and CoLP: The evidence in these Inquests gave rise to concerns that procedures for emergency response to marauding terrorist attacks were inflexible. In particular, the evidence suggested that large areas could be designated hot and warm zones for long periods and formally placed out of bounds to most ambulance and paramedic staff. This feature of the procedures gave rise to a risk of delay in getting medical help to casualties. While this lack of flexibility has apparently been addressed in the revised Joint Operating Principles, I suggest that procedures generally be reviewed to ensure that they accord with the requirements of speed and flexibility of response which

appear to be recognised in that document. I also suggest that training exercises be devised which address demanding situations with features such as (a) hot and warm zones of uncertain extent; (b) a need for re-assessment of hot and warm zones; and (c) a need to locate and assist casualties in dangerous areas.

33. As recognised within MC13, changes were made to the MTA Joint Operating Procedures (JOPs) following the 2017 attacks. The changes reflected the broader range of attack methodology experienced and the applicability of the guidance to a wider range of circumstances than the previous Marauding Terrorist **Firearms** Attack (MTFA) guidance, which it replaced.
34. The revised MTA JOPs place greater emphasis on flexibility in applying the hot, warm and cold zones and in deploying non-specialist responders from all three emergency services within the zones where appropriate.
35. Operational Plato national guidance was also reviewed and is fully reflective of these changes. The new Plato guidance recognises that unarmed responders will play a vital role in the initial stages of the response and that this may include activity within each of the three zones. There is no rigid or inflexible approach taken.
36. CTPHQ staff have undertaken a national programme of assurance visits to all police forces (including the MPS and CoLP) to ensure that the new MTA JOPs and Operation Plato guidance have been fully embedded within local policies, procedures and practices.
37. The MTA JOPs and Operation Plato guidance are regularly reviewed, drawing on learning from major incidents and exercises. This is an ongoing process. The current edition of the MTA JOPs is the fifth edition to be produced, reflecting a continuous process of reviewing procedures and preparedness. We are satisfied that there is no learning from the 2017 attacks which requires further changes to the current edition of the MTA JOPs and Operation Plato guidance.
38. There has been, and continues to be, a significant amount of training and exercising conducted across the country on the response to a MTA. Individual police forces are regularly conducting joint MTA training and exercising with their local emergency service partners. CTPHQ agrees that it is important to ensure that this continues and regularly reminds forces of the importance of this. The matters the Chief Coroner raises at MC13 are reflected in this work.
39. In terms of the MPS; training, testing and exercising is a key focus of the MPS 'prepare' strand of CONTEST. The MPS carries out a wide range of CT testing and exercising. As the Chief Coroner would expect these are very significantly above the levels required of policing bodies by CTPHQ and OSCT. These tests and exercises frequently involve multiple agency participation and since 2017, learning from the attacks of that year has been incorporated.
40. Establishing, reviewing and operating within warm and hot zones under the "new" JOPs is a key feature of both the "live play" and "table top" exercises undertaken by both commanders and emergency responders.

41. The emergency services within London have made a significant investment to MTA training and exercising over recent years and are recognised by CTPHQ as being a model of good practice in terms of the quality, complexity and frequency of their MTA exercising programme.
42. We are therefore confident that the important matters raised in MC13 have already been addressed by existing policy and training.

MC15: Addressed to the MPS and CoLP: I suggest that the emergency services give serious consideration to enhancing first aid capabilities and equipment of either police officers generally or groups of officers (e.g. firearms officers or officers designated for advanced medical aid training). This should include consideration of training some officers in advanced life-saving procedures analogous to battlefield medicine. It should also include considering (a) wider provision of equipment such as tourniquets and “stop the bleed” kits and (b) the inclusion of more spare equipment in officers’ vehicles.

43. In the MPS all officers up to the rank of Chief Inspector have to complete standard emergency lifesaving training once a year. The training includes (but is not limited to) inputs on the use of tourniquets, defibrillators, compression bandages, dealing with cuts and lacerations, knife wounds and other penetrating trauma.
44. All armed response vehicle (ARV) officers are mandated to undertake ‘standard’ firearms officer first aid training set to national standards. The National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC) provides a list of learning outcomes that must be achieved, and the training must be provided within the context of an armed incident or operation to prepare officers for operational circumstances. Due to the specialist nature of the training the medical content is not detailed within the NPFTC. Each force is required to train officers to meet the identified NPFTC outcomes using material approved by the medical profession and with appropriate clinical governance. This ensures that the training and first aid provision given by armed officers is current and based on medical advice. In addition to a number of general first aid interventions, such as dealing with broken bones, convulsions, spinal injury and choking, officers are also required to ‘Identify ballistic injuries – primary, secondary and tertiary injuries, cavitation, exit and entry wounds and blunt trauma’.
45. In addition to this ‘standard’ level of first aid training provided to all ARV officers, individual forces may choose (based upon a local assessment of strategic threat and risk) to train some (or all) of their ARV officers to an ‘enhanced’ level. In addition to the ‘standard’ training, the ‘enhanced’ level provides the ability to undertake interventions such as; haemostatic dressings, airway management and oxygen therapy, stroke, abdominal wounds and anaphylactic reaction.
46. In the MPS once standard training has been completed, AFOs are required to undergo continuation training every five weeks (ARV officers) or six months (all AFOs). During this training officers will deal with a medical situation using these skills and associated equipment whilst under fire or in a simulated life threatening situation. This is akin to “battlefield medicine”.

47. The MPS also undertakes regular MTA tri-service exercises which includes participation by the London Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS). AFOs (and others) will in these exercises carry out realistic battlefield triage whilst commanders will receive tactical medical advice to test and improve their response.
48. The most highly trained AFOs are Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs). These officers receive an even higher level of medical training which includes the use of oxygen cylinders and casualty extraction. These officers spend a week with HEMS doctors in A&E.
49. Some of the most advanced AFO medics will also attend training events in Hungary every six months for advanced field medicine training where they learn procedures including needle thoracostomy. These officers then use that expertise in exercises and testing and to assist in the development of training in this area.
50. It is a nationally mandated requirement that all ARVs carry a suitably equipped first aid kit commensurate with the level of training of the officers crewing the vehicle. In August 2018 advice was provided to forces that consideration should be given to ensuring that all ARV officers have immediate access to tourniquets and haemostatic wound packing products. The Chief Coroner will recall the evidence from Dr Wrigley that tourniquets are being “rolled out” for use by police officers across London.
51. It should be noted that the primary role of armed police officers during a MTA will be to identify, locate and confront subjects in order to neutralise the threat. The provision of first aid may be a secondary role for armed officers once the threat has been neutralised, or where there is sufficient armed capacity to enable some armed officers to support other lifesaving activity. It is important that this role is not confused with that of the ambulance service.
52. The MTA JOPs make clear that the ambulance service retains the lead responsibility for casualty management. The ambulance on scene commander will direct and coordinate the casualty management process, including joint working with non-ambulance emergency responders to deliver life saving care. It is recognised that responders from the three services have received different levels of first aid training and will be tasked appropriately.

MC16: Addressed to the MPS and CoLP: The evidence in the Inquests raised a concern that there will often be communications difficulties in the early stages of a major incident, including difficulties resulting from multiple officers attempting to make urgent radio transmissions at the same time. In the ongoing work of reviewing and improving communications technology to address these difficulties, consideration should be given to whether it may be possible for control room staff to isolate and record messages so that they can be listened to separately.

53. This is a technical issue and one that should be considered by the NPCC Operational Communications in Policing (OCiP) portfolio as part of the Emergency Services Network Programme (ESNP).

MC17: Addressed to the LAS, MPS and CoLP: I suggest that consideration be given to introducing / improving technical measures to assist in identifying the

exact locations of emergency services personnel so that they can be communicated reliably to other first responders.

54. Police forces currently have the ability, within control rooms, to track the location of their own assets via their Airwave communication and command and control systems.
55. Work is currently underway, led by Chief Constable Simon Chesterman on behalf of NPCC, to enable all police force control rooms to have visibility of armed officers who arrive into their force area to provide operational support. However this is a complex technical area and the identification of a viable and affordable solution is challenging.
56. At this stage, owing to the technical limitations, it is not possible for all three emergency services to have full visibility in their control rooms of other emergency service assets.

MC18: Addressed to the MPS and LAS: The evidence at the Inquests indicated that life-saving efforts of the emergency services, especially in major incidents, are improved by better communications between them. Given the challenges of communications in the early stages of incidents, I suggest that consideration be given (including through the Blue Light Collaboration Programme) to the possibility of having a small number of LAS and London Fire Brigade staff stationed in the MPS control room at all times.

57. The 'core' Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP), the MTA JOPs and the Operation Plato national guidance all stress the importance of effective communication, sharing of information and joint working between the three emergency services. These documents identify the critical importance of establishing an initial 'tri-service' communication link between the control rooms, subsequent co-location of on-scene commanders and the establishment of combined tactical and strategic coordinating groups as soon as practicable during a MTA. This was the case during the London Bridge attacks.
58. The permanent embedding of (a small number of) representatives from the fire and ambulance services in police control rooms has been carefully considered but is not currently thought to present sufficient operational benefits. The critical requirement is to effectively link the relevant command points at all levels and during all phases of the response. During the control room based initial coordination of the response, it is critical that the activity being undertaken by the three emergency service control rooms is coordinated and information is shared effectively. This is delivered by the immediate opening of a conference call between the control rooms of the MPS, LFB, LAS, CoLP and BTP to share critical information and the dispatch of LFB and LAS officers to the MPS control room as soon as an Operation Plato declaration is made. However the co-location of appropriately qualified commanders from all three services, under the tactical and strategic coordinating group arrangements should continue to be a priority activity.
59. As the Chief Coroner notes these matters have been discussed between the emergency services under the auspices of the London Resilience structures. This includes a joint control room group which reviews inter-operability performance at major incidents and a "Blue lights Panel" which considers broader joint working arrangements at major incidents and last sat on 10.12.19.

60. Despite the above the MPS continues to seriously consider these matters to see whether there might be opportunity to improve communication between the emergency services. Work is underway to trial a “London Emergency Services Contact Centre”. This will involve representatives from the LFB and LAS being deployed within the Specialist Operations Room. A table top exercise will be conducted with real CADs to finalise working practices followed by a real life 7 day trial early in 2020.
61. The police will learn wherever possible from tragedies such as these evil terror attacks. We will never stop working to protect London and the UK from terrorism.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Neil Basu', written over a light grey rectangular background.

Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu