

OPUS 2

INTERNATIONAL

London Bridge Inquests

Day 29

June 19, 2019

Opus 2 International - Official Court Reporters

Phone: 0203 008 6619

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Wednesday, 19 June 2019
 2 (10.02 am)
 3 THE CHIEF CORONER: Good morning, Mr Hough.
 4 MR HOUGH: Good morning, sir. We return to the evidence of
 5 Deputy Chief Constable Gyford.
 6 DEPUTY CHIEF CONSTABLE JANE GYFORD (continued)
 7 Questions by MR HOUGH QC (continued)
 8 MR HOUGH: Good morning.
 9 A. Good morning.
 10 Q. I was just about to start on the sequence of Security
 11 Group meetings which preceded the attack when you
 12 finished yesterday. May we begin with a meeting on
 13 16 March 2017, the minutes for which we can see at
 14 {WS5031/8}. We can see that is a meeting chaired by
 15 you, and if we look at page 9, please, we will see the
 16 relevant extract {WS5031/9}. Do you see the minutes
 17 record that Detective Superintendent Shaw made a number
 18 of points, and a little over halfway down the text the
 19 minutes record that Detective Superintendent Shaw asked
 20 in the context of if the Corporation decided to remove
 21 entry point chicanes what could realistically be done to
 22 mitigate the risks of a vehicle-borne attack in the
 23 City, and he asked about potentially blocking roads with
 24 buses to create physical barriers.
 25 Then you advised, according to the minutes, that

1

1 there was a need to move towards red flag 2 in relation
 2 to a vehicular or multi-site attack and incorporate
 3 testing communications.
 4 Can you explain what that discussion was about in
 5 your response about working towards red flag 2?
 6 A. It was a discussion that was opened after getting the
 7 update from SRC around emerging threats and preferred CT
 8 options, and Detective Superintendent Shaw is referring
 9 to the strategic threat and risk assessment meeting
 10 which is bespoke to the City of London Police, actually,
 11 it's not for every force.
 12 The strategic threat and risk assessment is an
 13 advanced way of looking at the requirements of the force
 14 and the future demand and also the intelligence
 15 requirements, in other words intelligence gaps, that we
 16 need to be cognisant of, and it's something that we do
 17 over and above everything else that you've heard so far
 18 today.
 19 I'm referring to red flag 2, which is a testing and
 20 exercising event where it's a table-top but with
 21 live-play action within the room, where it's modelled on
 22 a military-style fashioned exercise where you have
 23 a body of people being the terrorists with injects and
 24 you have professionals from police and private sector in
 25 the room that react to the injects that they're being

2

1 told about to test the reactions, depending on what the
 2 scenario is.
 3 So what I'm saying there is let's move to start
 4 creating scenarios in relation to that particular type
 5 of attack scenario.
 6 Q. So when Detective Superintendent Shaw raised the issue
 7 about mitigating the risk of a vehicle-borne attack in
 8 the City, you raised the prospect of such an exercise in
 9 order to look at tactics to deal with such an attack?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. The Westminster attack then fell later that month on
 12 22 March 2017, and on that evening, after the attack,
 13 shortly after the attack, PC Hone sent you an email,
 14 which we can see at {WS5014/13}, and do we see that
 15 PC Hone, the counter terrorism security advisor, records
 16 that he has just returned from holiday, refers to the
 17 attack earlier in the week at the Paris airport and the
 18 attack at the Palace of Westminster, and makes
 19 recommendations to carry out more deployments rather
 20 than old-style patrols within Project Servator as a way
 21 of countering this sort of attack?
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.
 23 Q. And that's the recommendation he made at that time
 24 following the Westminster attack?
 25 A. Yes.

3

1 Q. Later that evening, an extraordinary meeting of the
 2 Security Group was held, and we can see the minutes of
 3 that at {WS5015/25}, if it assists you, you deal with
 4 this at paragraph 26 of your witness statement.
 5 If we move on to the next page, please, the minutes
 6 {WS5015/26}, do we see that the minutes record the
 7 comments PC Hone had made in that email earlier in the
 8 email?
 9 A. Yes. So the email would have been sent in to my staff
 10 office and then taken to the Security Group which
 11 I chaired and I recorded that observation from PC Hone,
 12 as he couldn't attend as the subject matter expert CTSA
 13 and as you can see, I made the following decision around
 14 the plans to mitigate threats will be:
 15 "... through good use of Servator tactics, sporadic
 16 patrols and an increased armed asset. These will also
 17 increase public confidence and reassurance."
 18 Bearing in mind the CT taskings that were being
 19 presented always, as I said previously, had
 20 London Bridge so it would apply to that decision that we
 21 use those tactics.
 22 Q. Over the page, please, to {WS5015/27}, sorry. Back to
 23 {WS5015/26}. So the decision which you made to mitigate
 24 the threat perceived after the Westminster attack was
 25 good use of Servator tactics, sporadic patrols,

4

1 increased armed asset, both to counter potential
 2 terrorist action but also to reassure the public that
 3 the police were on the streets?
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.
 5 Q. Is it right, based on the minutes of that meeting, that
 6 there was no consideration of bridges in particular as
 7 a focus of attack?
 8 A. I think as I previously said, the way -- certainly in
 9 the world of protective security and commanding
 10 operations, we use the national decision-making model,
 11 so in any set of circumstances we will be thinking about
 12 what the intelligence and information picture is and
 13 applying that to what the threat assessment is, and then
 14 thinking about what our working strategy is, and that's
 15 exactly what we do, and because there is a CT menu of
 16 tactical options which has therein physical barriers,
 17 that's always a consideration. It's tacitly there
 18 because you can't -- you would be talking through all of
 19 the tactics in the meeting which would take
 20 a considerable amount of time, but we all are aware of
 21 what is achievable where it comes to the intelligence
 22 picture tested against the threat assessment.
 23 Q. So you're aware of the option of hostile vehicle
 24 mitigation as one of the armoury of tactics?
 25 A. Absolutely.

5

1 Q. Your judgment on that occasion, bearing in mind all the
 2 intelligence you have, is that the right response was
 3 the decision which you've already referred to about
 4 Servator tactics and an increased armed asset?
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.
 6 Q. On the morning of the following day, PC Hone sent
 7 an email to his line manager, Superintendent Isaac. If
 8 we can see that at {WS5014/17}. Now this is an email
 9 that wasn't sent or copied to you, and in it, in
 10 summary, Mr Hone expresses frustration about seeing on
 11 the streets old-style patrolling tactics, officers
 12 patrolling in twos, not engaging with the public, rather
 13 than deployments of a kind he regarded as more
 14 effective.
 15 Did you see that email at the time, for example,
 16 forwarded from anybody?
 17 A. No.
 18 Q. The email also refers to London Bridge and describes it
 19 as:
 20 "... our most vulnerable location from marauding
 21 vehicle attack along with ..."
 22 And then another location understandably blanked
 23 out.
 24 Were you aware of PC Hone regarding London Bridge as
 25 the most, or one of the most vulnerable locations in the

6

1 City Police area from marauding vehicle attack?
 2 A. Not at this stage, no. However, I was aware it was
 3 a vulnerable location because it was on the CT taskings
 4 and it had been part of conversations that had been
 5 ongoing around all of our sites.
 6 Q. So although you didn't regard it as being especially
 7 vulnerable to this mode of attack, you understood it to
 8 be one of your priority sites for counter terrorism
 9 police taskings?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. We can take that off screen.
 12 In paragraph 27 of your witness statement, you tell
 13 us that also on 23 March 2017, the Deputy Assistant
 14 Commissioner, Ms D'Orsi, issued an advisory message, one
 15 of 17, recommending a review of deployments to reflect
 16 the nature and method of attack; is that right?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And in particular, did that require forces to review
 19 protective security for significant public events and
 20 for priority crowded places?
 21 A. It did, yes, and we undertook that within the 14 days.
 22 Q. And did your consideration of that include consideration
 23 of hostile vehicle mitigation as part of the menu of
 24 options you've referred to?
 25 A. Yes.

7

1 Q. During that consideration of the advisory message and
 2 your response to it, was there any discussion of
 3 London Bridge or other bridges in your force area as
 4 being vulnerable or in need of hostile vehicle
 5 mitigation measures?
 6 A. At this stage I don't recall any conversation
 7 specifically in relation to barriers at London Bridge or
 8 any other bridge.
 9 Q. Then if we look at {WS5015/28}, and we see that from
 10 this minute that you chaired an Extraordinary Security
 11 Group meeting on 23 March 2017 at 4.00 pm?
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. You deal with this at page 28 of your witness statement.
 14 If we move to the second page of the minutes,
 15 {WS5015/29} of the document, do we see that the minute
 16 records that tactics had been changed as of the previous
 17 day and there were further or different Servator-style
 18 high visibility patrols; is that right?
 19 A. Yes, that's right.
 20 Q. And do we see that there is also reference to the City
 21 of London Police having a number of armed response
 22 vehicles out as part of the pan-London response and
 23 further authorised firearms officers on foot patrol for
 24 public reassurance?
 25 A. That's correct, yes.

8

1 Q. Was that part of the response which Ms D'Orsi told us
2 about at a pan-London level yesterday?
3 A. Yes, and this is particular to the City of London Police
4 and how we looked at our own local footprint and
5 responded to the advisory message.
6 Q. Then can we see recorded a post-meeting update from --
7 sorry, before we get to that, in the final bullet point
8 under 5.1, we can see a discussion of the various
9 deployments, and then these words:
10 "This fits in with our tactics for Crowded Places as
11 defined by the Home Office. Temporary Commander Gyford
12 asked for clarification on the definition served through
13 Protect & Prepare and Detective Superintendent Dyson
14 explained it in full and said he would follow this up
15 via email."
16 Why were you asking for clarification of the
17 definition of crowded places?
18 A. I think I asked several times. My thought process here,
19 again, thinking about the information and intelligence
20 I had and trying to test it against the threat
21 assessment, was that actually the crowded places
22 definition didn't -- would mean that it precluded some
23 sites and I had a concern personally around crowded
24 spaces as well as crowded places, which didn't have
25 a definition, and that was my concern, as someone that

9

1 was looking after the City of London Police, opposed to
2 a Protect and Prepare specialist nature, I was asking
3 a question.
4 Q. So from the point of view of the senior officer but not
5 a specialist in protective security, you were asking
6 about the definition of crowded places partly because of
7 a concern that there wasn't clarity about the concept of
8 a crowded space, an area which didn't fit into the
9 definition of crowded places, but would nevertheless be
10 worthy of special action and consideration?
11 A. Yes. I felt that I needed clarity on that myself as the
12 chair of this meeting.
13 Q. Then we see the post meeting update from PC Hone the
14 following day recorded, with a reference to the various
15 tier 1, 2 and 3 sites. Then he describes at the bottom
16 of the page and over on to the next page the various
17 considerations he takes account of {WS5015/30} in
18 setting CT taskings, including, as we see on the next
19 page, page 30, current intelligence, terrorist
20 propaganda and attack methodologies, cross-referenced
21 against various significant places and sites in the City
22 of London area?
23 A. That's correct, yes. It actually shows, if you like,
24 the thought process that goes through a CTSA's mind and
25 shows a thoroughness that I mentioned yesterday around

10

1 PC Hone's approach.
2 Q. He then sets out a list of top five places more likely
3 to be hit by an attack, recognising that it is
4 difficult, but giving his selection of five.
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. We see one of those was London Bridge, which he
7 describes as a crowded place, an iconic site, with
8 predictable eastern pavement crowds at commuter times?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Was that something that reached you at the time?
11 A. This is the minutes of the Security Group meeting so
12 I would have seen these and checked the meeting minutes
13 off every time.
14 THE CHIEF CORONER: But I think that this is post the
15 meeting, so I think it's -- so the minutes are the 23rd
16 and we saw from the previous page this is what PC Hone
17 appears to add on the 24th. So I think the question is
18 did you see the annotations.
19 MR HOUGH: I think the point that's being made is when the
20 minutes were produced the update would be added into the
21 minutes.
22 THE CHIEF CORONER: Right.
23 A. Yes.
24 MR HOUGH: And therefore when Commander Gyford, as she then
25 was, reviewed the minutes, they would include this

11

1 update; is that the answer you gave?
2 A. Absolutely, yes.
3 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you, I just want to be clear.
4 MR HOUGH: Did it come as a surprise to you that
5 London Bridge was being identified as one of the top
6 five places more likely to be hit by an attack?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Did you agree with the view that this was an iconic site
9 with predictable crowds and vulnerable really for those
10 reasons?
11 A. It's definitely an iconic site. The crowded pavements
12 at particular times, during rush hours, albeit that that
13 makes it a crowded place but, again, the definition
14 didn't allow that to be included in either tier 1 or
15 tier 2, which would have been something the OSCT would
16 have told us about, so we had to apply it to see whether
17 or not it would be within the tier 3, and as
18 I understand it, the tier 3 category wouldn't allow it
19 to be within there and therefore we put it in there,
20 with good judgment around some of the areas that PC Hone
21 has talked about.
22 Q. At that stage being made aware that it was being listed
23 as a place that might be hit by an attack and having
24 recently seen an attack with a vehicle driven onto the
25 pavement of a bridge, did it occur to you at that point

12

1 that hostile vehicle mitigation might be needed for that
 2 bridge?
 3 A. It's always a tactic that could be considered. Did
 4 I consider it as something that needed to be put on the
 5 bridge, or any bridge, in a dynamic or in extremis set
 6 of circumstances at that stage, the answer is no,
 7 because the advisory message and the intelligence we had
 8 around Westminster Bridge attack was that it was more,
 9 or potentially could be, with regards to police officers
 10 being under attack or actually the seat of government.
 11 There hadn't been an attack involving a bridge before
 12 and, therefore, we were dealing with the circumstances
 13 after Westminster Bridge at that time in terms of it
 14 being close to the Houses of Parliament and that's the
 15 one route into the Houses of Parliament.
 16 If you think of any footway or bridge, they are
 17 footways, and that's what we were thinking about at that
 18 time, more so than it's a bridge so therefore we need to
 19 react, because there are many other sites with
 20 different, potentially in Cerastes' report they were
 21 telling us that other sites had other vulnerabilities as
 22 well.
 23 Q. Do we see one of the actions for the meeting at the end
 24 was that Detective Chief Superintendent Barnard
 25 suggested that Commander Woolford could provide

13

1 an update for the City of London Corporation and ensure
 2 that crowded places was linked into their Security
 3 Board?
 4 A. Yes. So this is -- I think I mentioned yesterday,
 5 PC Hone's, as I understand it, expert advice was about
 6 attack methodologies. As we saw that changing,
 7 certainly towards the back end of 2016 into 2017, those
 8 conversations with the Corporation of London started, so
 9 here in March Detective Chief Superintendent Barnard is
 10 suggesting that we speak to Commander Woolford because
 11 the Corporation of London also had a Security Board
 12 which, between the Security Group which is a police
 13 board and the Corporation, which is their Security
 14 Board -- forgive me, it's similar language -- we could
 15 cross-pollinate each other, and therefore police
 16 speaking to then Commander Woolford who was seconded
 17 would then start that conversation around the
 18 Corporation of London's matrix of sites with what they
 19 now call the Public Realm Board to understand how we
 20 could review that position and start thinking about what
 21 measures we needed on each of those sites.
 22 If there had been intelligence to suggest that that
 23 specific site could be under threat, then there would
 24 have been an in extremis, what we call a gold group,
 25 where not only myself would chair it, but the Town Clerk

14

1 would be involved. Because there wasn't that didn't
 2 trigger that usual mechanism for police and in this
 3 case, the Corporation of London to start those
 4 conversations.
 5 So the Security Board was to sit next in the June,
 6 which was post, unfortunately, London Bridge, and
 7 Security Group sat every two weeks and then would feed,
 8 and we would talk to each other in the margins in
 9 between. I hope that explains it, because it can be
 10 a bit confusing with the Security Board and the Security
 11 Group.
 12 Q. Was it the intention that these five most vulnerable or
 13 attractive places would be identified to Mr Woolford and
 14 through him to the Security Board of the City of London
 15 Corporation?
 16 A. Yes, and they were part of the matrix.
 17 Q. We'll come to the matrix and Mr Hone's involvement in
 18 it, because that comes, really, in April.
 19 May we then move to {WS5015/31}. We looked at this
 20 briefly yesterday. Is it right that following the
 21 Security Review Committee meeting at a pan-London level,
 22 the advisory message from that meeting on 23 March led
 23 to taskings from the National Counter Terrorism Security
 24 Office?
 25 A. That's correct.

15

1 Q. And if we go to the next page, page 32, can we see that
 2 the taskings resulting from the Deputy Assistant
 3 Commissioner's recommendation involved each CTSA
 4 identifying the top five crowded place sites for that
 5 person's region?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. And a request again resulting from the Deputy Assistant
 8 Commissioner's recommendation that there be confirmation
 9 that the sites had had contact from CTSA's, what the form
 10 of engagement was, whether advice had been given and
 11 appropriate steps taken to mitigate the threat?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. And then if we look at the return at the bottom of the
 14 page, the CTSA supervisor confirms good engagement with
 15 the identified top five sites, and then over the
 16 following page {WS5015/33}, a number of forms of
 17 engagement with local people and businesses identified
 18 by that supervisor?
 19 A. That's correct, and an explanation around Griffin is the
 20 use of security guards, again, something that was
 21 created within the City of London Police, to work with
 22 security guards within the business community, and you
 23 can see the weekly callout and the test as part of that
 24 return.
 25 Q. Yes, Ms D'Orsi described Project Griffin for us

16

1 yesterday.
2 We see under "Synopsis of what has been achieved",
3 the relevant part concerning London Bridge is that high
4 visibility Servator presence is available at key times,
5 and that's a reference to those unpredictable and highly
6 visible police deployments, is it?

7 A. Yes, and that's correct, this tasking form filled in via
8 the CTSA and Special Branch would have highlighted our
9 dynamic response and again, this underlines Servator was
10 the approach we were taking, amongst other -- bringing
11 up the armed response, as you've seen.

12 But also it shows that that's the dynamic response
13 but as we were moving forward, we were mindful of the
14 estate within the City of London Police which was being
15 debated and spoken about.

16 Q. So if we simplify this grossly, we have the Security
17 Review Committee chaired by the Deputy Assistant
18 Commissioner on the 23rd, sends out its messages giving
19 a recommendation for a top five list of sites to be
20 identified and consideration of ways of mitigating the
21 threat of those sites?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then that feeds through to each local region in the
24 case of the City of London Police, the local CTSA,
25 Mr Hone, identifies his top five list of sites?

17

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And consideration is given to how to mitigate risk on
3 those sites?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And in the case of London Bridge the answer is, with all
6 the intelligence we have, the best way to mitigate risk
7 of threat is through Servator deployments?

8 A. Yes, plus the increased patrols. Servator is not just
9 about high-vis either, it's about the messaging behind
10 it.

11 Q. And the reason that at that stage barriers weren't
12 thought to be the appropriate risk mitigation measure,
13 was that bridges weren't seen as a particular focus of
14 threat for vehicle-as-weapon attacks?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Any more than other roadways?

17 A. Any more than other roadways.

18 Q. Is that a fair summary of the approach that was followed
19 and the decisions that were made?

20 A. Yes, it is.

21 Q. Looking at your paragraph 31 of your witness statement,
22 was there then a further advisory group message the
23 following day, 24 March 2017?

24 A. Yes, there was.

25 Q. And in summary, what did that say?

18

1 A. It was asking us to review our marauding terrorist
2 attack plans, which is the Plato plans, which sit with
3 my chief firearms instructor.

4 Q. What was the response to that?

5 A. From memory, the response was the plans that we had in
6 place were fit for purpose and that we submitted that
7 return, but that's from my memory.

8 Q. Now, on 24 or 25 March 2017, the City of London
9 Corporation received an inquiry from a committee member
10 about safety on bridges in the City's area.

11 Mr Woolford, from whom we will hear later today or
12 tomorrow, will give evidence that he consulted you
13 before sending out an email in response. Can you
14 remember being spoken to by him around that time shortly
15 after the Westminster attack about safety in the bridges
16 in the City of London area?

17 A. Yes, around that time.

18 Q. Can you remember what he asked and what your response
19 was?

20 A. I can't -- I can give you a summary of the conversation,
21 but we were pretty much talking about -- the person that
22 had asked was, if you like, using the bridge commuting
23 and it was how we were going to respond and really that
24 was kind of it. There was a concern from a member of
25 the public, who was a member, and we often, in the

19

1 police -- and I'm sure in the Corporation now -- do get
2 concerns that we respond to accordingly in the same way
3 of understanding what the current intelligence picture
4 is.

5 So with sensitivity, a reply was put in. I think
6 the reply was pretty much along the same lines as what
7 I'm giving my account of now.

8 Q. Yes, in summary what Mr Woolford said in his email, and
9 we'll look at it when we get to his evidence, is that
10 there wasn't a specific threat to bridges, but a lot of
11 work was being done to respond to the terrorist threat
12 generally?

13 A. Yes, I don't think I was copied into the email --

14 Q. No, you weren't.

15 A. -- but I certainly remember speaking to Mr Woolford.

16 Q. Is it fair to say then that your message to him had
17 been: we're doing a lot to counter terrorist threats but
18 we don't perceive a particular threat to bridges as
19 bridges?

20 A. That's correct. The City of London Police and the
21 Corporation of London work hand-in-hand and that
22 relationship was ongoing, in what we would term a steady
23 state.

24 Q. Was there then, looking at your paragraph 32, a further
25 advisory message on 27 March 2017, advising forces to

20

1 return to the security stance they had had prior to the
 2 Westminster attack?
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.
 4 Q. May we then move on to the 29 March 2017, {WS5015/37},
 5 and by this email on 29 March do we see that Mr Hone
 6 emailed Security Group members and proposed counter
 7 terrorism police deployments for the next two weeks in
 8 the City area?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. And that was in advance, I think, of the Security Group
 11 meeting the following day?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Do we see that he was recognising that the taskings were
 14 heavily geared towards the top five sites, one of which
 15 was London Bridge?
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.
 17 Q. And do we see also that he refers to joint Servator
 18 deployments between the City of London Police, the
 19 Metropolitan Police and British Transport Police and
 20 says that they were going well?
 21 A. Yes, and part of the thinking behind that for me, when
 22 I read this back now, is that remembering Lord Harris
 23 and the indication of needing to look for collaborative
 24 opportunities within forces, I actually started and
 25 chaired the three-force Harris piece of work that was

21

1 focused particularly around firearms deployments, and so
 2 therefore -- this is in the same vein and is working
 3 with the Metropolitan Police and the
 4 British Transport Police who were taking this forward.
 5 Q. May we now look at {WS5015/35}. Can we see here that
 6 the Security Group meeting took place, as planned, on
 7 30 March, and the minutes are here?
 8 If we move over to {WS5015/36}, do we see that the
 9 discussions and decisions included one for PC Hone to
 10 review taskings by linking in with Assistant
 11 Superintendent or Acting Superintendent Duffy:
 12 "... to ensure Servator type deployments and
 13 ARV/AFOs linking with the MPS posture."
 14 Is that a decision concerned with the joint
 15 deployments?
 16 A. I believe it is.
 17 Q. And then there's another decision for CTSAs being tasked
 18 to visit the top iconic sites on the basis that with the
 19 improving weather, visitor numbers may increase?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. So does this evidence further focus on the top five
 22 sites which included London Bridge?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Then {WS5015/38}, please. The Security Group meeting
 25 then took place two weeks after that, according to the

22

1 usual schedule, and do we see the minutes here?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. If we go to page 39, please {WS5015/39}, item 4.2, do we
 4 see it recorded that you again questioned the definition
 5 of crowded places, this time in connection with the
 6 Government Security Zone, and asked about feeding that
 7 back to JTAC.
 8 Then there's reference to the Home Office definition
 9 of crowded places being quite rigid and not including
 10 one of your crowded places and iconic sites.
 11 A. Yes. The minutes read as if it may be Detective Chief
 12 Superintendent Barnard that said about it being rigid,
 13 but whether or not he had the same opinion, I certainly
 14 did have that opinion.
 15 Q. Were you here reiterating your concern that the
 16 definition of crowded places was rigid and that a force
 17 properly dealing with mitigation of terrorist threats
 18 needed to look beyond it to other sites?
 19 A. Yes, of course, as I've said, we had already included,
 20 particular to the Inquests, London Bridge, and therefore
 21 it wasn't being left out of the picture. My concern was
 22 the wider piece around crowded places and crowded
 23 spaces, so it was an observation and a query by me from,
 24 if you like, a local position up to regional and
 25 national position.

23

1 Q. Then there's a note in the minutes saying that you
 2 asked:
 3 "... that to underline the work being done by
 4 [Mr] Hone [you needed] to define the position on crowded
 5 places within the [Corporation of London Corporation]
 6 and discuss their responsibility for protecting public
 7 places including City streets and for better target
 8 hardening."
 9 Are you able to explain what you had in mind
 10 particularly by that comment?
 11 A. Well in terms of the police we are in an advisory
 12 capacity when it comes to target hardening which would
 13 include the physical barriers and therefore those
 14 conversations, as I've explained, in the times where we
 15 didn't have an intelligence picture that suggested
 16 a specific target, would mean that we needed to start
 17 engaging, and that's what you're seeing here.
 18 It's suffice to say not only do we have the Security
 19 Group/Security Board, we also started these
 20 conversations outside of those boards and also we had
 21 the Secure City Programme which I mentioned yesterday,
 22 and one of the strands -- so five strands in that work
 23 under a project or programme of work and one of those
 24 strands was something called physical infrastructure,
 25 which was led by one of the Corporation of London

24

1 members into a meeting that I chaired, particularly on
 2 Secure City .
 3 Q. When you made this comment did you have a particular
 4 concern that there needed to be conversations with
 5 people in the City of London Corporation about whether
 6 there were enough barriers on major roadways to protect
 7 against vehicle attacks?
 8 A. Yes, and the Corporation of London were equally saying:
 9 what else do we need to do? So the reference at 4.2
 10 around the Government Security Zone, that's not in the
 11 City of London, so I was, and as were the Corporation of
 12 London, thinking about probably one of the most densely
 13 populated places on the planet being the City of London
 14 at particular times, and how we needed to be cognisant
 15 of the whole Square Mile.
 16 Q. You've described the various channels of communication
 17 and engagement between the City of London Police and the
 18 City of London Corporation. Through all these channels,
 19 are you able to say whether any particular concerns
 20 about the need for barriers generally on roadways in the
 21 City were raised between the Westminster and
 22 London Bridge attacks?
 23 A. I can't be specific on that because I didn't go to the
 24 meetings; I would chair the meetings.
 25 Q. Did anybody in your conversations with them within your

25

1 force tell you that they had been speaking to people
 2 from the City of London Corporation about the need for
 3 more barriers on roadways or, indeed, bridges?
 4 A. Yes. So the conversation -- actually, I can't remember
 5 any conversations around the bridges, but I do remember
 6 conversations around physical infrastructure, so that
 7 doesn't necessarily mean barriers, but would do the same
 8 thing.
 9 Q. So you remember general conversations that areas in the
 10 City might need more forms of physical protection
 11 against attack?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Specifically vehicle attack?
 14 A. All sorts of attacks. Yes, not just vehicle attacks at
 15 all.
 16 Q. Is it fair if we draw from this the idea that you were
 17 at a high level setting policy direction and priorities
 18 for your officers, but you weren't having those sorts of
 19 conversations yourself because of your position in the
 20 organisation?
 21 A. Yes, so you shouldn't have too many chiefs, so it's
 22 a case of setting a working strategy, part of the
 23 national decision-making model that sets out a working
 24 strategy or strategic aims and intentions, and allowing
 25 the practitioners space and time to actually apply their

26

1 expert field and knowledge to bring back
 2 recommendations, proposals and some activity already
 3 generated working within the bounds of any strategic
 4 direction .
 5 Q. And do we see finally from these minutes that item 4.6,
 6 the meeting noted that you were continuing to focus on
 7 your top five iconic sites, including London Bridge?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And then if we move on into the chronology, may we look
 10 at {WS5015/42}. Was the next Security Group meeting
 11 held on 27 April 2017?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. If we go over to the next page {WS5015/43}, there is no
 14 specific reference to the Servator deployments, which
 15 are the subject of previous meeting minutes, but is it
 16 right to say that there was general discussion of
 17 counter terrorism taskings at this meeting?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Now, we know that Police Constable Hone received the
 20 Cerastes interim 2 report, I think that was after that
 21 meeting?
 22 A. I believe it was.
 23 Q. Was there any discussion of that report during the
 24 course of the meeting?
 25 A. Not to my knowledge.

27

1 Q. If we can move next to {WS5014/28}. On 3 May 2017,
 2 after he had had the chance to look at the Cerastes
 3 interim 2 report, PC Hone emailed some of his colleagues
 4 referring to the report and the places where Cerastes
 5 had covered, and he described London Bridge as probably
 6 his biggest concern in terms of low sophisticated
 7 attack. Were you aware that London Bridge was his
 8 highest concern in that regard?
 9 A. Not at this time. And I think the key here, if you look
 10 at this email, it's the biggest concern in terms of low
 11 sophisticated attack.
 12 Q. So he would have had other sites in his mind for concern
 13 about higher sophistication attacks?
 14 A. I believe so, having read the full Cerastes report.
 15 Q. We can take that off the screen now.
 16 There was a Security Group meeting on 11 May 2017.
 17 Based on your witness statement I believe you didn't
 18 attend that; is that right?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. PC Hone, according to his witness statement, says that
 21 he raised the Cerastes interim report at that meeting
 22 and said he would be producing a summary of it. Did you
 23 become aware that he had received the Cerastes interim 2
 24 report and would be producing a summary of it?
 25 A. No.

28

1 Q. On 16 May 2017, he emailed a summary of the Cerastes
 2 interim 2 report to his line manager, Superintendent
 3 Isaac; were you aware of that?
 4 A. Well, I am obviously subsequently, but I wasn't at the
 5 time.
 6 Q. On 22 May, the Manchester Arena attack took place. Did
 7 an extraordinary meeting of the Security Group take
 8 place the following day, 23 May 2017?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. May we go and look at the minutes of that, {WS5015/44},
 11 and if we go to the next page, please {WS5015/45}, can
 12 we see that an action was identified for all forces to
 13 review 14-day calendars of events with a view to
 14 mitigating risk?
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.
 16 Q. The summary of the minutes or the redacted version of
 17 the minutes we have suggests, then, that the focus was
 18 upon improving security at major events following that
 19 attack; is that right?
 20 A. Yes, but that doesn't mean that as a local force that
 21 you would stop doing everything else you're doing. So
 22 the CT taskings would continue, the posture that we
 23 required for the current intelligence and threat picture
 24 would continue. It's just telling us "You have more
 25 work to do, please submit this return for the events",

29

1 and we would have looked at all of the events.
 2 For clarity, around red events that's asking us to
 3 look at the intelligence around particular events and
 4 what we would call RAG status, red, amber, green them,
 5 because if something meant that it was a red event then
 6 we would take a higher posture of, probably, resourcing.
 7 Q. So you already had a heightened security posture in
 8 place following the Westminster Bridge attack, and that
 9 was remaining in place, was it?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. You were, in addition, looking at major events in the
 12 light of the Manchester attack?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Also on 23 May 2017, the national threat level was
 15 raised to critical, we know. What effect did that have
 16 in broad terms on deployment of your officers for
 17 counter terrorism purposes?
 18 A. Well, we went on to 24/7 12-hour shifts in an enhanced
 19 way. I would be reticent to talk about numbers of
 20 officers, because we are a small force it is very
 21 different, but a 12-hour stand up with a surge capacity
 22 from other functions allowing us to look at health and
 23 safety for our officers if they were deploying for long
 24 periods of time, so therefore we could be consistently
 25 policing a particular resource stance over a period of

30

1 time with 12-hour shifts.
 2 Q. Then on 25 May 2017, so two days later in the sequence
 3 of events, was there a further regular Security Group
 4 meeting which you attended?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. If we look at {WS5015/46} we can see the minutes, and
 7 you address it in paragraph 42 of your witness
 8 statement. If we move to the next page, please
 9 {WS5015/47}, according to your witness statement you
 10 tell us that at this meeting there was the usual
 11 discussion of counter terrorism tactics.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. And you also tell us that one of the specific taskings
 14 in respect of London Bridge was a night duty deployment
 15 on 3 June 2017; is that right?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. When would that night duty deployment have taken place,
 18 if you are able to tell us?
 19 A. I can't give you the time, but it would probably be some
 20 time in the late night, if you like. It would depend on
 21 the shift deployment at that time. It wasn't evening,
 22 if you will.
 23 Q. Would it have been after the attack?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. There's also reference in the minutes as we see to

31

1 extending the 14-day activity review to a 20-day period.
 2 Can you explain that to us, please?
 3 A. I believe that this was a decision from the security
 4 group with me formally signing it off. In policing
 5 terms, if we go beyond a 14-day recommendation we have
 6 to, as I've mentioned, consider the officers' welfare
 7 and fatigue, especially if they are carrying weaponry,
 8 and therefore we had to discuss if this was viable and
 9 we needed to review it at that point. So we extended it
 10 because we wanted to police at the higher level, provide
 11 resources on the streets, but it couldn't go on
 12 ad infinitum; it had to be reviewed.
 13 Q. Thank you very much. We can take that off the screen.
 14 I think that was the last Security Group meeting before
 15 the attack. As far as you are aware, were there any
 16 significant changes or developments in your counter
 17 terrorism plan, your deployments in the period between
 18 that meeting and the time of the attack?
 19 A. Not that I can recall.
 20 Q. If we look, please, at {WS5015/41}, can you see here
 21 that a bar chart has been produced showing the level of
 22 counter terrorism deployments to London Bridge in the
 23 period from 6 February to 11 June 2017?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And do we see a general upward trend?

32

1 A. Yes, we do.
 2 Q. And looking at paragraph 36 of your witness statement,
 3 what were the overall figures for increases in
 4 deployments of counter terrorism police officers or,
 5 rather, police officers for counter terrorism purposes?
 6 A. I think simply put, it was a 35% increase.
 7 Q. To London Bridge specifically?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. We can take that off screen now.
 10 May I ask now about hostile vehicle mitigation
 11 measures generally. We'll hear later this week that
 12 Transport for London is the highway authority
 13 responsible for the maintenance of the roadway on
 14 London Bridge, whereas the City of London Corporation is
 15 responsible, in broad terms, for the structure of the
 16 bridge; is that how you understand it?
 17 A. That's my understanding.
 18 Q. Would, therefore, any permanent installation of barriers
 19 which might involve engineering concerning the structure
 20 of the bridge, involve the agreement of both bodies?
 21 A. I believe so.
 22 Q. We've heard about the National Barrier Asset. Is that
 23 the only practical means by which temporary barriers
 24 could have been installed on London Bridge?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Before the London Bridge attack, what was your
 2 understanding of the circumstances in which the National
 3 Barrier Asset could be called for and used to install
 4 barriers temporarily on a roadway?
 5 A. So my understanding is that the National Barrier Asset
 6 at the time was governed by Sussex Police, I think
 7 that's changed now, we've heard that, and the criteria
 8 was that it was either for an event or that there was
 9 a specific intelligence threat against the site, and the
 10 submission would then be made into the barrier asset
 11 team who would then come out to do a feasibility study
 12 and decide whether or not it was possible to put the
 13 barrier asset on the bridge. They would obviously look
 14 at the criteria as well to see if it had been met, and
 15 that would happen only by using that mechanism.
 16 Q. So it wasn't possible for a senior officer or, indeed,
 17 a chief officer of a force to ask for some of the
 18 National Barrier Asset simply because he or she thought
 19 that a particular roadway in their area was vulnerable
 20 but without a particular threat or intelligence item
 21 relating to it?
 22 A. No, that's never happened at the point that
 23 London Bridge occurred.
 24 Q. After the Westminster attack was any consideration given
 25 to installing temporary barriers using the National

1 Barrier Asset anywhere in the City area?
 2 A. No.
 3 Q. Was specific consideration given to either temporary or
 4 permanent barriers on London Bridge at any time before
 5 the London Bridge attack?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. You've told us about the menu of tactical options which
 8 should be considered at every stage by the Security
 9 Group in response to each attack and each piece of
 10 intelligence .
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Was it the case that the potential for installing
 13 barriers in various places around the City was raised
 14 but rejected, or was it the case that nobody thought
 15 that that was something that needed to be specifically
 16 discussed?
 17 A. The criteria wasn't met, so unless there was an event or
 18 an intelligence picture on the specific area, it
 19 wouldn't be met.
 20 So although it's considered, I think I say in my
 21 statement, using the national decision-making model
 22 tacitly, you would immediately not be able to effect
 23 that option because there is no intelligence to suggest
 24 a specific area is going to be attacked, so therefore
 25 the case wouldn't be made out.

1 With events in the City, the National Barrier Asset
 2 has been used on eventing because that's part of the
 3 criteria you can use, but not for protective security
 4 measures in terms of this time between Westminster and
 5 London Bridge.
 6 Q. May we look, please, at {WS5014/30}. Now, this is
 7 a document which you didn't see prior to the attack,
 8 this is PC Hone's summary of the Cerastes interim 2
 9 report and his recommendations arising from it; do you
 10 see that?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. If we go to page 33, and the highlighted concern
 13 {WS5014/33}, PC Hone says that:
 14 "The location that causes most concern is
 15 London Bridge."
 16 And he highlights this location due to very
 17 predictable high crowd density, absence of vehicle
 18 mitigation in place, no specific guard force, long
 19 unimpeded direct routes along the pavement --
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. -- and overall attractiveness?
 22 A. Yes, and the guard force reference is security personnel
 23 at the site, and the reference to hostile vehicle
 24 mitigation, the correct standard, lends itself more
 25 toward a permanent fixture than it does to the National

1 Barrier Asset.

2 Q. So let 's look at his recommendation. He says:

3 "Consideration should be given to installing hostile

4 vehicle mitigation on London Bridge."

5 He describes the form, which is sensitive , but then

6 he refers to particular standards. Are you saying that

7 those standards and his reference to them suggest that

8 he is talking about permanent rather than temporary

9 barriers?

10 A. That's my interpretation of this .

11 Q. If you had been shown that summary, including those

12 recommendations, before the attack, what, if anything,

13 would you have done about it in a Security Group

14 meeting?

15 A. I would have asked for an update of the continued

16 conversations that were underway with the Corporation of

17 London to determine that they had seen this report and

18 that the work had continued in train around protecting

19 the City of London footprint, bearing in mind there were

20 other areas that were being considered.

21 Q. Do you think you would have said specifically : our CTSA

22 is saying that London Bridge is the location of highest

23 concern to him, at least in terms of the sort of low

24 sophistication attack of which we've seen a lot

25 recently, he is suggesting the installation of barriers ,

37

1 I really think we should be doing that?

2 A. I would be highlighting this because the report clearly

3 is talking about mainly London Bridge and the

4 highlighted concern, that is something to understand

5 exactly what work is underway on London Bridge and how

6 that was being effected and what the timeframes were.

7 But we would still have to remember there was no

8 intelligence case to suggest that London Bridge was

9 going to be the site of an attack, and the fact that

10 Westminster Bridge was a bridge, take it back to what

11 I said earlier , was the run through to the seat of

12 government. That's how that single fact was being

13 interpreted through the advisory messaging to local

14 policing .

15 Q. Knowing what you know about how local authorities work

16 and the City of London Corporation works, and about the

17 logistics of installing barriers on a permanent basis,

18 if you had gone to the City of London Corporation in May

19 of 2017 and said: look at this recommendation, I think

20 you should seriously consider installing permanent

21 barriers on London Bridge, do you think it would have

22 been conceivable that those barriers would have been

23 installed before 3 June?

24 A. No. The logistics of doing such a thing, in my opinion,

25 couldn't be effected within two, three weeks. In fact ,

38

1 you know, months, if not years.

2 Q. Given the absence of specific intelligence about

3 a threat to bridges, and your view of the Westminster

4 attack, had you received this summary from PC Hone,

5 would it have occurred to you to go to the City of

6 London Corporation and say: we can try to put temporary

7 barriers on London Bridge?

8 A. No.

9 Q. And why is that? It may be obvious, but why is that?

10 A. Because there was no intelligence to suggest it was

11 a likely attack site .

12 Q. We can take that document off screen now.

13 Some general questions, please: we know that

14 barriers had been removed from London Bridge some years

15 before the attack as part of a programme for removing

16 barriers for pedestrian safety reasons, and we

17 understand that may have been around 2009 that that

18 happened. Were you aware of that programme in general

19 terms in early 2017?

20 A. No, I wasn't.

21 Q. Had you been aware of that programme, would you have

22 considered that in the light of vehicle-as-weapon

23 attacks that were happening in Europe, the area of the

24 City needed to be reviewed to consider a limited

25 reversal of that programme, by reinstalling barriers?

39

1 A. It 's a hindsight question. I think that the barriers

2 installed -- and I know that this was said yesterday --

3 were not hostile vehicle mitigation . Having said that,

4 I do appreciate the visible presence of barriers does go

5 some way to public reassurance.

6 It no doubt is something that within a conversation

7 would be talked about by those who had knowledge of that

8 programme, and had I had knowledge of it, it would

9 probably be something that I would have mentioned.

10 Q. Now, we shall hear that in late April and early May of

11 2017, Mr Hone was asked by Mr Woolford, who was seconded

12 to the City of London Corporation, as you have said, to

13 review a matrix listing high-risk sites , and we'll hear

14 that PC Hone added London Bridge to the list of

15 high-risk sites at a high priority level .

16 Mr Woolford's evidence, based on his statement, is

17 that there hadn't been any recommendations from

18 a counter terrorism security advisor specifically about

19 London Bridge before that exchange in late April and

20 early May 2017; is that right to your knowledge?

21 A. To my knowledge, yes, and that would, if you consider

22 the timeline I have explained, the attack methodology

23 that PC Hone had seen in 2016 into 2017 meant several

24 things: that we had to consider the tactics of

25 terrorists , look at what the penetration testing was

40

1 going to give the CTSA's and what we were going to share
 2 with the Corporation of London, and that was happening
 3 early 2017 and that conversation referring to,
 4 I believe, was mid to late April and so the timeline is
 5 probably that building up towards recommendations, and
 6 bearing in mind PC Hone's recommendations from the
 7 Cerastes report, I think -- forgive me if I get the date
 8 wrong -- 16 May, the report that went to
 9 Superintendent Isaac, is because he only received the
 10 report at the end of April because of Cerastes'
 11 workload, needed time to look at it and understand it,
 12 and in the same time, talking to the Corporation of
 13 London around his own professional, if you like,
 14 concerns around London Bridge and other asides, so the
 15 recommendations were to be forthcoming.

16 Q. If London Bridge had been a crowded place, even a tier 3
 17 crowded place, in the period of, say, 2015, 2016, would
 18 it have received more engagement from a counter
 19 terrorism security advisor and more advice about, for
 20 example, physical and protective security there?

21 A. Not necessarily because in 2016 we were considering
 22 London Bridge within our CT task force.

23 Q. And certainly by 2017 when London Bridge was being
 24 regarded as one of your top five sites for those
 25 taskings, do you have any reason to think that it would

41

1 have been considered differently if it had been within
 2 the definition of a crowded place?

3 A. No.

4 Q. So despite your concerns about the rigidity of the
 5 definition of a crowded place, do you think that that
 6 rigidity actually had any practical effect on the way
 7 that you or the CTSA's dealt with London Bridge?

8 A. No, because we were highlighting it. We were vocal
 9 about it.

10 Q. In the days after the attack, we know that barriers were
 11 installed on London Bridge and very quickly.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. We've heard from the Deputy Assistant Commissioner about
 14 her views of the decision to install them. What, so far
 15 as you were aware, was the rationale for the decision to
 16 install them then?

17 A. So after Westminster Bridge, as I've said, that was one
 18 occasion where a bridge was involved. A second time
 19 around you have to think of the possibility of it being
 20 in a terrorist's mind to use a bridge as part of
 21 an attack site, for whatever reason, whether it's about
 22 crowd density or whether it's because it's
 23 a run-through, so the copycat and also is this a new
 24 methodology would be my take on why DACSO made the
 25 decision to put temporary barrier asset on the bridges.

42

1 Q. I can see that the copycat aspect of the concern was
 2 something which came to light particularly after the
 3 London Bridge attack, but the other aspect of the
 4 concern which you've highlighted that led to the
 5 installation, that bridges might be a good run-through,
 6 that they may be an attractive site for killing large
 7 numbers of pedestrians, those are concerns which had
 8 been raised by PC Hone before the attack, hadn't they?

9 A. In certain terms, yes. But the fact that London Bridge
 10 occurred means that we were then considering: well, we
 11 had Westminster Bridge and now we have London Bridge and
 12 we're taking it as a whole, so therefore the context and
 13 the build of the picture was increasing.

14 Q. Some final questions, please.

15 With your knowledge of the City and policing the
 16 area, what would you say are the best forms of
 17 protection against low sophistication attacks which we
 18 should be looking at in the years ahead?

19 A. Low sophistication attacks with a vehicle, because --

20 Q. Well, either with a vehicle or with bladed weapons
 21 because both are parts of the attack we're looking at
 22 within these Inquests?

23 A. So obviously looking at the security of the estate
 24 within my own Secure City Programme, or what was my own,
 25 forgive me, around being ahead of the game around cyber

43

1 opportunities and how we can build the intelligence
 2 picture, looking at the physical infrastructure aspect
 3 of any one footprint of any force, looking at how our
 4 control rooms can be centered and jointly work together,
 5 and understanding exactly how our CCTV cameras work
 6 together is really important.

7 I also believe that our armed response configuration
 8 works very well and we collaborate and understand each
 9 other's, particularly in London, working practices, and
 10 that can be enhanced, which is work in train as well.
 11 So they're the areas that I would, perhaps, concentrate
 12 on.

13 Often -- this is my own opinion, my own professional
 14 opinion -- I think although it's really important that
 15 we don't lose the ability to be part of the community as
 16 per the Peelian principles, that what I would term as
 17 pulse patrols, and you've seen, I think, in my statement
 18 around the authorised firearms officer patrols, which
 19 are a lower level, if you will, to ARV officers in
 20 training, but having paired armed patrols is a good
 21 deterrent if they are proportionate to those Peelian
 22 principles.

23 Q. To your knowledge, has there been in the City of London
 24 a general review of the roadways to determine which are
 25 most vulnerable or attractive to attack with a view to

44

1 considering bollards, barriers, other physical
 2 protection?
 3 A. That's been ongoing throughout, 2017 into -- I can't
 4 comment now, but...
 5 Q. I'm not asking you to say what are regarded as
 6 vulnerable sites.
 7 A. No, but I was more referring to the fact that I'm no
 8 longer in the City of London, so.
 9 Q. I see.
 10 As far as you know from your knowledge of City of
 11 London Police before you left, is there any further work
 12 that you think could valuably be done to study
 13 the roadways and any vulnerabilities that could be
 14 addressed with barriers and the like?
 15 A. From my knowledge of all the work that has been
 16 undertaken with the Secure City Programme, with the
 17 conversations between Security Group/Security Board, the
 18 new Public Realm Board, that's the Corporation of
 19 London's board, and those conversations that continued
 20 as daily practice, I think a huge amount of work was in
 21 train and I can't think of anything that would be
 22 required to continue that pace.
 23 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Those are all my questions.
 24 Questions by MR PATTERSON QC
 25 MR PATTERSON: Officer, I ask questions on behalf of the

45

1 families of six of those who died in the attack,
 2 including in particular the family of
 3 Christine Archibald who was killed on the bridge.
 4 Before I turn to the events on the bridge, just
 5 picking up on one of those points you made just now,
 6 specifically stating that the use of authorised firearms
 7 officers in pairs, I think you said, was a particularly
 8 good tactic. What are the reasons why they are, in your
 9 experience, a particularly good tactic?
 10 A. In my experience it's a visible deterrent, but also when
 11 I've used this tactic both in the Metropolitan police
 12 within events and also in the City of London, there's
 13 an incredible surge of public reassurance and confidence
 14 and engagement with the public, but as long as it's
 15 proportionate, because the Peelian principles still have
 16 to ring true in this country, I think.
 17 Q. And no doubt it's not just a matter of visibility and
 18 reassurance: it's also the practical efficacy of having
 19 authorised firearms officers out and about in our busy
 20 public spaces, available if something happens?
 21 A. That's correct, yes. It's -- you have to look at your
 22 resource complement and think about exactly what can be
 23 achieved.
 24 Q. Of course. And no doubt this is in partnership with the
 25 use of ARVs?

46

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Another very important resource, vehicles. So two
 3 different ways in which we can get armed officers to
 4 different places in our city?
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.
 6 Q. Turning, then, please, to the bridge. The family of
 7 Christine Archibald, you will appreciate, want to
 8 understand why there were no barriers on that bridge.
 9 Who do you say is responsible for the absence of
 10 barriers on the bridge on the night of that attack by
 11 Khuram Butt?
 12 A. I don't think there's any responsibility for barriers
 13 not being on the bridge on the night of the attack.
 14 I think the wider piece is about taking actions to
 15 consider the public realm and physical barriers within
 16 the bridge, and other areas within the City.
 17 I do understand that the families will think that
 18 having barriers on the bridges would have been something
 19 that would have saved lives, and I'm not suggesting in
 20 any way that that wouldn't be possible, but I'm taking
 21 the picture as we knew it then, which was the
 22 intelligence picture didn't say that London Bridge was
 23 the site of an attack.
 24 Q. Well, I will come to that in a moment, but just in terms
 25 of responsibility. As a general principle, would you

47

1 agree with this: it helps to have clarity of
 2 responsibility in public life, doesn't it?
 3 A. Yes, I do agree.
 4 Q. It focuses the mind of the decision-makers if it's their
 5 head on the block, to put it bluntly; do you agree?
 6 A. Yes, I do.
 7 Q. Make sure that you have the best possible
 8 decision-making if you are the officer who either puts
 9 them in or doesn't put them in and will answer for that
 10 decision in due course if something goes wrong; would
 11 you agree?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. And equally would you agree with this: that the more
 14 overlapping bodies we have and the more overlapping
 15 individuals with responsibility that we have, the more
 16 likelihood there is that things will fall between
 17 stools.
 18 A. Yes, that can happen, and I think that is part of life
 19 in the 21st century, and with respect, we find this in
 20 various areas, particularly policing, which is what
 21 I know best.
 22 Q. And of course all of these different organisations that
 23 are introduced into the picture and all of these
 24 acronyms that we all have to wrestle with and all of
 25 these overlapping responsibilities are well intentioned,

48

1 aren't they?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. They're put in place because of a desire to improve
 4 things and to protect the public, aren't they?
 5 A. Absolutely.
 6 Q. But the more overlapping responsibilities we have, the
 7 more likely it is that a decision as to whether do we
 8 need barriers or not after Masood's attack on
 9 Westminster Bridge isn't going to be properly made;
 10 would you agree?
 11 A. I'm not sure there were overlapping responsibilities in
 12 this case, in a dynamic case --
 13 Q. You weren't able to tell me who is responsible?
 14 A. Sorry?
 15 Q. You weren't able to tell me who is responsible.
 16 A. I think the question you asked: at the time of the
 17 attack, who was responsible for not putting barriers on
 18 the bridge, I don't think there was a case made out for
 19 a responsible person to put barriers on the bridge and
 20 if there had been intelligence then you already saw
 21 a decision taken by DACSO to put barriers on the bridge
 22 after London Bridge, and that's because she built the
 23 intelligence case around the copycat decision.
 24 Q. We'll come to the decision-making later and whether it
 25 was right or wrong and whether there was intelligence or

49

1 not and all of that, but in terms of responsibility, can
 2 you tell me who had the responsibility for deciding do
 3 we or don't we put barriers on the other London bridges?
 4 A. At the time of the attack?
 5 Q. No, before the attack.
 6 A. Before the attack. The responsibility of putting
 7 barriers on bridges depends on who the operator of the
 8 bridge is.
 9 Q. Right, so are you saying it's the City of London who the
 10 families need to fire questions at?
 11 A. You mean the Corporation?
 12 Q. The Corporation.
 13 A. I think the Corporation has responsibility for
 14 structures on some of the bridges, but I'm not sure all
 15 of the bridges, but you would have to ask the question
 16 around the other, I think, five bridges in the City, and
 17 you've got TfL as the highway agency that would also
 18 need to be a partnership in that conversation.
 19 Q. Right, so Mr and Mrs Archibald need to ask the
 20 Corporation, they need to ask Transport for London; do
 21 they need to ask you and your organisation, the City of
 22 London Police?
 23 A. The City of London Police and any police service in the
 24 country are there to advise on protective security
 25 measures and that's why you've seen the dialogue that

50

1 was happening through 2017, but, again, I reiterate,
 2 that is in steady state.
 3 Q. What about DACSO who yesterday was at pains to make it
 4 plain that she, even though she's the national security
 5 coordinator for protective security, that she didn't
 6 have responsibility for the decision as to barriers or
 7 not on London Bridge?
 8 A. She was right. So bearing in mind we've got the
 9 intelligence picture that didn't suggest there was going
 10 to be an attack on London Bridge or any other bridge
 11 between Westminster and London, and she was giving
 12 advice through her Security Review Committee back to
 13 local forces to operationalise exactly what she was
 14 saying.
 15 Q. You appreciate that the public need to be protected,
 16 don't they?
 17 A. Absolutely.
 18 Q. And they can't do it themselves when we're dealing with
 19 bridges and high streets and underground systems and all
 20 of these areas that we are commuting through or walking
 21 through, workers in the city getting to their desks and
 22 so forth. So they have to rely on authorities, don't
 23 they?
 24 A. Yes, they do.
 25 Q. And so from your answers it sounds as though there are

51

1 a whole host of people who had shared responsibility for
 2 the absence of barriers, particularly following the
 3 Westminster attack?
 4 A. Absence of barriers on the bridge --
 5 Q. Yes?
 6 A. -- or in other areas, because there are different
 7 responsibilities with different bodies of people.
 8 In terms of the bridges then I would go back to the
 9 structure being the Corporation of London concern, and
 10 TfL being the Highways Agency, and those conversations
 11 have started with both of those bodies of people. With
 12 the police being in their advisory role, as we were, and
 13 part of that partnership.
 14 Q. Yes, but the corporations of this world, they don't have
 15 access to the expertise of the security advisors, people
 16 like PC Hone?
 17 A. Well, they do, yes. So --
 18 Q. Forgive me, within their organisations, they have to
 19 rely on the police, don't they?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. They have to rely on --
 22 A. But they have to have access to --
 23 Q. May I finish?
 24 A. Sorry.
 25 Q. On the City of London Police, so people like you, people

52

1 like Matthew Hone, people like Sergeant Haddon, and so
 2 forth?
 3 A. Yes, so the access point is that there are regular
 4 communications between the two organisations: it is
 5 a close-knitted partnership of work, and therefore
 6 Matt -- PC Hone and Sergeant Haddon, would speak to the
 7 Corporation and particularly the protective security
 8 side of business on a regular basis to help with
 9 information sharing across the organisations. They are
 10 reliant on that feed from us.
 11 Q. Now, as soon as we saw the footage of Masood's attack on
 12 the pavement of Westminster Bridge, which was on the
 13 television on something like the next day or perhaps two
 14 days after, would you agree with this: many Londoners,
 15 many Londoners would have been considering what about
 16 barriers on other central London bridges?
 17 A. It's difficult to comment on what the public saw, but
 18 some of the concern no doubt was raised on the fact that
 19 members of the public were hit on bridges and no doubt
 20 there were concerns equally that there was an attack on
 21 Parliament and an attack on police officers.
 22 Q. Yes, I'm not asking you about the police attack, I'm not
 23 asking about Parliament, but the attack on the bridge
 24 pavement, four members of the public killed, many others
 25 injured, horrific footage showing the impact of that

53

1 vehicle on those people. You would agree, no doubt,
 2 that many people would have immediately been thinking
 3 about: well, what about other bridges and what about
 4 whether we might need barriers?
 5 A. I'm not sure that they would. I can't be the members of
 6 the public's minds, but I would suggest that there will
 7 be fear around attacks, which could include bridges and
 8 could include things like Christmas markets, and also
 9 main thoroughfares.
 10 Q. This wasn't a Christmas market, this was just a morning
 11 on March when he drove off and on, off and on that
 12 pavement on Westminster Bridge.
 13 A. Absolutely.
 14 Q. Now, your role as commander of operations and security,
 15 do you share responsibility for the absence of barriers
 16 on London Bridge on 3 June, you personally?
 17 A. No.
 18 Q. You don't have any responsibility for the absence of
 19 barriers?
 20 A. No.
 21 Q. But you had responsibility for security in the area
 22 covered by the City of London Police, which included
 23 London Bridge?
 24 A. Had there been an intelligence case to suggest that that
 25 area was going to be attacked and used by terrorists,

54

1 then I would have responsibility.
 2 Q. Yes, but you have mentioned Lord Harris, and you were
 3 clearly aware of that. He made the obvious point which
 4 doesn't, I might suggest, require a report from
 5 an independent reviewer, that the absence of
 6 intelligence isn't determinative of these things, is it?
 7 A. I can't remember the context, I would have to look at
 8 the particular paragraph you're referring to, but
 9 intelligence is all-important, it's everything that we
 10 are taught in policing terms, intelligence and
 11 information, and testing it against the current threat
 12 assessment and then devising your own working strategy,
 13 that is your plan, your intention for how you're going
 14 to take it forward and then consider options around
 15 a police approach to any one piece of intelligence.
 16 Q. But you, as somebody who had counter terrorism
 17 experience, knew that particularly Islamist-based
 18 terrorism involves typically a real attention to detail
 19 when it comes to avoiding detection, anti-surveillance
 20 measures and the like, often being used by those
 21 terrorist suspects?
 22 A. It's a complex area but, in a summary and in general
 23 terms, you're right.
 24 Q. Yes. And that's what Lord Harris was emphasising in his
 25 report when he said that a lack of specific intelligence

55

1 should not be used as a reason for the police to close
 2 their minds to other possibilities?
 3 A. Absolutely. If there is an intelligence gap, then
 4 that's something called an intelligence requirement, and
 5 we would make actions to ensure that we close the
 6 intelligence gap.
 7 Q. But there was no intelligence that Masood was going to
 8 carry out this attack but he successfully planned it
 9 without detection and executed it; yes?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. Likewise with Butt and his accomplices. So if I suggest
 12 that too much weight was attached to this issue of is
 13 there intelligence for something or not, would you
 14 accept that, with hindsight, there was too much weight
 15 being given to this issue of intelligence?
 16 A. No.
 17 Q. Now, your responsibilities involved protective security
 18 issues within the City of London Police; yes?
 19 A. Yes, that's correct.
 20 Q. Protect and Prepare. And you were the lead for all
 21 aspects of counter terrorism protective security; is
 22 that correct?
 23 A. No, that's not correct. In the City of London Police
 24 I think yesterday it was referred to that there was
 25 a counter terrorism unit within the City of London

56

1 Police. That's not quite right: we have an intelligence
 2 function within the City of London Police. We don't
 3 have the investigative capacity, that's a regional
 4 concern that sits within the Counter Terrorism Command
 5 within the Metropolitan Police, and that's our regional
 6 hub.
 7 Q. But you told Mr Hough yesterday:
 8 "Question: You were the lead for all aspects of
 9 operational policing and security?
 10 "Answer: Yes."
 11 Then when you listed them, they included counter
 12 terrorism.
 13 A. Counter terrorism in terms of Special Branch.
 14 Q. And you had been involved in revamping the Ring of Steel
 15 which you told us was an example of protective security
 16 arrangements to deal with the particular set of
 17 locations at the entry to the City.
 18 A. That's correct.
 19 Q. And that was against terrorist attack; yes?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. And you spoke about the "big gig", in other words that
 22 the City of London Police needed to ensure that it was
 23 serving the communities that were within its area?
 24 A. Yes, a small force, the smallest in the country, but as
 25 I suggested, a big gig, because we have the business

57

1 communities and the requirement to understand its
 2 position, both UK and internationally, for economic
 3 well-being.
 4 Q. And you led that committee, that Security Group
 5 committee, those meetings, the minutes of which we've
 6 been looking at?
 7 A. Yes, I did.
 8 Q. And Operation Servator was an example of one of the
 9 counter terrorist measures that you were involved in
 10 running?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. So you did have responsibility, didn't you, for
 13 protective security measures in the context of counter
 14 terrorism?
 15 A. I did.
 16 Q. Right. And that group, that Security Group, that was
 17 an important group, wasn't it?
 18 A. Exceptionally important, and to give some emphasis on
 19 how the City of London Police function, with my
 20 knowledge of the rest of the country, the regional
 21 position, those that feed into DACSO's SRC, would bring
 22 that back into their region to their local forces and
 23 wouldn't necessarily sit at a group like that, but in
 24 the City of London we always sat at Security Group and
 25 it was always a couple of hours after the Security

58

1 Review Committee.
 2 Q. Absolutely, so that's the committee that we heard about
 3 from DACSO yesterday with a national focus; yes?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And then typically you would meet after that to deal
 6 with things for the City of London area?
 7 A. That's correct.
 8 Q. And you told us that it was dealing with all counter
 9 terrorism and protective security matters in your area?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Managing security threats, providing strategic
 12 directions for Protect and Prepare counter terrorism
 13 activity?
 14 A. That's correct.
 15 Q. So that committee is focusing on these very issues of
 16 protective security?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And you would sign off on the taskings for, for example,
 19 the deployments, those Servator officers and their
 20 deployments?
 21 A. Yes, so we would look back to check the two weeks prior
 22 to the counter terrorism taskings to see that they were
 23 working, credible, and what they needed to do in advance
 24 and if they needed to be added to, and then look forward
 25 two weeks, and I would ask by committee any comments

59

1 from the room, check through them, and sign them off.
 2 Q. And you told us that the CTSA, the counter terrorism
 3 security advisor?
 4 A. That's right.
 5 Q. Mr Hone, PC Hone, who attended these meetings, was
 6 an officer with considerable experience in his area?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. He was very thorough, more than once you have told us --
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. -- in dealing with issues about crowded places and the
 11 like?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. He would go on courses. He had been accredited. He had
 14 many years of working in this line of work, hadn't he?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. I don't want to get too bogged down in this whole
 17 crowded places business, but you told us that
 18 London Bridge was a crowded place.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Right. But it wasn't on the list of crowded places, the
 21 Home Office list?
 22 A. That's right. It wasn't in the tier 1, tier 2 -- on the
 23 OSCT list.
 24 Q. And did that remain the position after the
 25 Westminster Bridge attack?

60

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And you told us that the reason it wasn't on the list of
 3 crowded places was because it didn't fit something
 4 called the density model?
 5 A. Well, that's as I understand it.
 6 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think that's a Home Office definition,
 7 as I understand it.
 8 A. I think so, yes. It's within the crowded places 2010
 9 document from memory.
 10 MR PATTERSON: And I will come in a moment to having an
 11 identifiable person, a professional security liaison
 12 person which you touched upon, but in terms of the
 13 numbers of people on that bridge, did the numbers who
 14 would be on it have any impact as to whether it would be
 15 on the list or not?
 16 A. I think the configuration of the density around the
 17 crowded places, but as I mentioned I'm not the
 18 practitioner in this area, there is a CTSA that would be
 19 able to give you a better answer than me, but the
 20 density of London Bridge and how it's configured plus
 21 the security professional absence meant that it fell out
 22 of the definition of crowded places, but I'm not sure
 23 how significant to us this is because we put it into our
 24 tiered sites and concentrated our efforts on it in any
 25 case.

61

1 Q. Yes, I will be coming to the bridge in a moment, but
 2 just since it's been raised, the families I represent
 3 would like to know. You told us, for example, that the
 4 City of London contains some of the most densely
 5 populated places, at times --
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. -- on the planet, you told us?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And those of us who have been over that bridge regularly
 10 know that every morning there are very large numbers of
 11 commuters and members of the public jostling, often
 12 shoulder-to-shoulder to get across the bridge.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Are you saying that there weren't enough people there to
 15 meet a numbers threshold?
 16 A. I'm not saying that. It's the definition that's being
 17 applied by OSCT, which is rigid, and again, going back
 18 to my point, I'm not sure how relevant that is because
 19 we included it.
 20 Q. It may be that Mr Adamson will return to this later.
 21 You spoke about engagement that did begin in terms
 22 of protective security with the Corporation --
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. -- and with TfL.
 25 A. Yes, I believe -- I can't be 100% sure when TfL became

62

1 part of those conversations, but certainly we can see
 2 from the minutes of the meeting that the Corporation of
 3 London was part of the conversations.
 4 Q. And the reason you'd been engaging with them presumably
 5 was because they had responsibilities for different
 6 areas including, as you've told us, London Bridge?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And Commander Woolford was seconded there from the City
 9 of London Police?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. Presumably to assist and to facilitate these sorts of
 12 issues?
 13 A. I think his role profile is something that expanded, but
 14 I think he would probably be able to give you more of
 15 an informed decision on that.
 16 Q. We know that certainly at an early stage, London Bridge
 17 was identified as having, I think in your statement you
 18 speak about a marker, a marker for vulnerability.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. So that was recognised, vulnerability to a vehicle
 21 attack?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And we looked at some documents earlier today in
 24 relation to that.
 25 So at that early stage, what was it that led to it

63

1 being identified as somewhere which was vulnerable to
 2 a vehicle attack?
 3 A. Can you -- can I go to my statement where I make that
 4 reference just for the timeline, please?
 5 Q. Well, yes, do you have a copy with you there?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Feel free to refresh your memory. At what stage did you
 8 first identify or recognise its vulnerability?
 9 A. Can you point me to the paragraph you're referring to,
 10 please?
 11 Q. Well, I was referring actually to a document that you
 12 were taken to on 23 March, which was the day after the
 13 Westminster attack.
 14 A. Could you show me what you're referring to?
 15 Q. Yes, of course {WS5015/29} and over the page at
 16 {WS5015/30}.
 17 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think the paragraph of your statement
 18 is probably paragraph 28, but I think this particular
 19 meeting was what was being described as an extraordinary
 20 meeting of the Security Group that took place
 21 immediately after.
 22 MR PATTERSON: Thank you, yes. Paragraph 28 in the
 23 statement.
 24 A. So 23 March is the date we're talking about, so it's
 25 around about that time we started thinking about the

64

1 vulnerability and the different attack methodology.
 2 Q. And the vulnerability was what?
 3 A. The vulnerability to a vehicle being used as a weapon
 4 and low sophistication attacks.
 5 Q. Yes, and the bridge was vulnerable why?
 6 A. Because the wideness of the pavement and the kerb
 7 structure at one end.
 8 Q. Just help me with the kerb structure at one --
 9 A. I think, from memory, a part of the kerb, without kind
 10 of pointing exactly where to, was lower and therefore
 11 a vehicle could mount the pavement.
 12 Q. We know that coming from the north, as the attackers
 13 did, the kerb wasn't particularly high. I can't
 14 remember what the height was, 10 cm or something, but it
 15 was easy to get up without tyres bursting?
 16 A. It was a lower kerb.
 17 Q. So those things were identified around this time. And
 18 the width of the pavement, why did that make it
 19 vulnerable?
 20 A. Well because the width means there are more people on it
 21 and therefore you can drive onto it.
 22 Q. More potential for larger numbers of casualties
 23 presumably?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And who was drawing this to your attention?

65

1 A. Well, it was in the Security Group that that was being
 2 put in the minutes.
 3 Q. So was this coming from Mr Hone or from somebody else?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Were there any other things identifying it to you at
 6 around this time or earlier or was it just Mr Hone? Any
 7 other individuals?
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. Because since January 2016, you told us that Servator
 10 officers were deployed on that bridge?
 11 A. CT tasking, so it wouldn't necessarily mean that we
 12 would put Servator, but different types of CT tasking,
 13 so where we had focused police asset in terms of sites
 14 that are, if you like, described in the CT tasking
 15 sheet. There could be anywhere between 20 and 30 sites
 16 depending on what was being reviewed at the time and
 17 being submitted by the CTSA.
 18 Q. Help me with that: you told the Coroner yesterday that
 19 CT taskings from around January 2016 included
 20 London Bridge?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. "We saw it as somewhere that we needed to deploy to
 23 around CT taskings and Project Servator."
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Those were your words at page 206 --

66

1 A. CT taskings can be -- we talked about armed policing, it
 2 could be that as well, it could be higher level foot
 3 patrols and it could be Servator.
 4 Q. So why was the CT tasking including Servator officers
 5 deployed to London Bridge from January 2016?
 6 A. I don't have that information.
 7 Q. Are you able to help us -- can you remember why?
 8 A. I don't remember why because I wasn't in post then, but
 9 I can give you my opinion. It's because all the things
 10 we've heard, that you have an iconic site within the
 11 City of London and you have many sites like that and it
 12 wasn't just London Bridge, but it would have been for
 13 all the factors you have heard about around
 14 London Bridge.
 15 Q. Right, so in terms of the timeline, we don't just begin
 16 within the City of London Police to identify
 17 vulnerability with this document on the day after the
 18 Westminster attack, over a year earlier it was being
 19 identified for reasons such as it being iconic and
 20 officers were deployed there?
 21 A. As I said, there are many locations within the City
 22 tasking documents. We're focusing on London Bridge
 23 because quite rightly that is the topic matter here, but
 24 to give context, there are other locations that would
 25 have the same rationale and narrative applied to it.

67

1 Q. Yes, and can I make it plain that all of my questions,
 2 we all know that of course there are other areas and we
 3 all know there are resource issues and all of that, my
 4 questions are focusing, perhaps for obvious reasons, on
 5 London Bridge. So that's January 2016, and throughout
 6 the whole of 2016 did the force continue to deploy
 7 Servator officers onto London Bridge?
 8 A. As I said, it wasn't just Servator and I can't answer
 9 that without having the detail behind it. But, as
 10 I understand it, to the best of my knowledge, through
 11 2016, London Bridge was part of CT taskings.
 12 MR PATTERSON: Thank you.
 13 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Patterson, I was going to suggest we
 14 took our break.
 15 MR PATTERSON: Yes, that's as good a time as any.
 16 THE CHIEF CORONER: Because I think you still have a few
 17 topics to cover.
 18 MR PATTERSON: Quite a few, yes.
 19 THE CHIEF CORONER: We will sit again in 15 minutes' time.
 20 (11.44 am)
 21 (A short break)
 22 (12.04 pm)
 23 MR PATTERSON: Officer, we were looking at January 2016 and
 24 the commencement of the deployment of CT tasking and
 25 Servator officers on the bridge and you told us that the

68

1 force had been aware of issues such as its iconic nature
2 and so forth.

3 Then, of course, in the middle of 2016 on
4 Bastille Day, 14 July, we had the Nice attack. Was any
5 consideration given at that stage when that terror
6 attack and the methodology had involved targeting the
7 public with a lorry to whether any of the pavements
8 needed to be protected with barriers?

9 A. No.

10 Q. And then in October of 2016, Lord Harris, who you've
11 referred to already, specifically addressed the issue,
12 didn't he, of bollards and anti-vehicle mechanisms?

13 A. I believe he mentioned in his recommendations. I can't
14 remember the context of it, but ...

15 Q. And we looked at this yesterday, where he referred, and
16 for the lawyers this is paragraph 5.39 of his report,
17 about the lessons of the Nice attacks and flexible
18 barriers and the need to address funding and
19 consideration should be given by the GLA and relevant
20 local authorities to the wider installation of
21 protective bollards in areas of vulnerability around
22 London and to explore the case for retractable bollards
23 in certain areas?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So in light of Nice, in light of the pre-existing

69

1 vulnerabilities that had led to the deployment of
2 officers on the bridge, in light of Lord Harris'
3 encouragement, at that stage, did the City of London
4 Police consider bollards?

5 A. On London Bridge? No.

6 Q. And of course it doesn't have to be large barriers of
7 the type that ultimately were put up: it can just be
8 staggered bollards along the edge of the pavement as we
9 see in many places in the city centre?

10 A. Yes, that's a permanent, what we would term as hostile
11 vehicle mitigation.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. But also there are other ways of protecting footways and
14 that's Titan Kerbs, for instance, so there are other
15 options that can be debated and considered as we move
16 through, understanding what the protective security
17 stance should be in any one force area.

18 Q. So in response to his recommendation about consideration
19 to wider installation, did the City of London Police
20 give any consideration?

21 A. I think all the time we were considering the whole of
22 the City of London Police footprint and understanding
23 what needed to be done in certain areas and that's why
24 we started maturing our thinking around securing the
25 City and the Ring of Steel and the need to refresh that.

70

1 Q. Why wasn't consideration given to London Bridge, given
2 that it was obviously wide open and attractive for
3 a vehicle attack?

4 A. I think Nice was, to my knowledge, the first vehicle
5 attack of that kind, and therefore the attack
6 methodology that we saw from the summer of 2016 and then
7 certainly the Christmas market attack in December 2016
8 started showing us that the attack methodology was
9 changing, and that is the direction that the counter
10 terrorism network was talking about at the time.

11 Q. So as you rightly observe, in December we then had the
12 Berlin attack with, again, a large vehicle, large
13 numbers of people killed and injured. And so
14 in January, in February, was consideration given to the
15 need to put some physical protection in on
16 London Bridge?

17 A. No.

18 Q. So the follow-up question is perhaps the obvious one:
19 why not?

20 A. Because there was no specific intelligence to
21 dynamically put it on there that it was being considered
22 at the time through remembering the penetration testing
23 that was happening at that time, and through PC Hone's
24 work to develop the thinking around the attack
25 methodology in early 2017 to work to what the private

71

1 company was going to advise us on and then set out some
2 recommendations, albeit that we were in steady state,
3 meaning that we were working towards looking at the
4 public realm as a whole, so it was London Bridge and
5 other areas that were part of our tiered matrix.

6 Q. But did you apply the advice of Lord Harris not to
7 attach too much weight to the absence of intel?

8 A. No, I didn't, but the weight of intel is significant
9 when you're going to take dynamic action and I'm not
10 sure he was thinking about that, I think he was -- my
11 reading of it is that he was thinking about for the
12 future of public realm safety as opposed to acting
13 dynamically in extremis.

14 Q. Yes, but it's an obvious point, isn't it, that
15 an officer who is considering intelligence will need to
16 consider how much coverage is there such that I can
17 weigh the absence of intelligence?

18 A. Yes, and you could say that about many of our other
19 sites too and therefore you would end up putting
20 protective barriers or other assets, as I've said, the
21 kerb raising, for instance, around the whole of, in
22 terms of the City, the City of London, and that is not
23 a proportionate approach.

24 Q. But this particular location was crying out for
25 protection, was it not? It was iconic, it was

72

1 attractive , it was highly vulnerable; do you agree?
 2 A. "Crying out" is a difficult term to use. I would
 3 suggest that all the facts that you've heard is what we
 4 were working towards in early 2017.
 5 Q. Well there was nothing in the propaganda from the
 6 terrorists that had been focusing on vehicle attacks for
 7 many years that limited the locations within which they
 8 would be using vehicles , was there?
 9 A. I can't comment on that because there's much
 10 intelligence that obviously is of a sensitive nature,
 11 not all of it that I'm party to either, but in broad
 12 terms, yes.
 13 Q. Yes, I mean, I'm talking about the propaganda, the well
 14 known Dabiq and Rumiya and Inspire, the things that do
 15 encourage would-be home-grown terrorists on their
 16 internet, on their laptops to themselves try to emulate
 17 what Isis are suggesting?
 18 A. Yes, you're right.
 19 Q. And barriers were specifically mentioned in January
 20 before we even get to Westminster, {WS5031/4}, please.
 21 19 January, this is one of those meetings. In fairness
 22 you weren't present on this , if we look at the list of
 23 attendees, and if we go to the next page, it looks as
 24 though apologies had been received from you; is that
 25 correct?

73

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. But you would have seen these minutes, no doubt, some
 3 time afterwards; is that right?
 4 A. I've seen them obviously afterwards. I don't remember
 5 seeing them at the time.
 6 Q. Yes, but you would have seen them on 20 or 21 or
 7 22 January, something like that, presumably?
 8 A. I can't remember seeing them.
 9 Q. Why not?
 10 A. Because I was in a different role and although I would
 11 attend, you're asking me to recount an email of 100
 12 emails in a day. So if you want me to look at these,
 13 I'm happy to accept them, but I can't recall exactly
 14 seeing them, and I was aware, if it does help, that CPNI
 15 had been working on lightweight movable barrier assets.
 16 Q. Yes, and the reason why you in January you knew there
 17 was work in relation to barriers was as a potential
 18 means of protecting the public from terrorist attack?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. The word "movable" makes it plain that everyone was
 21 alive to the fact that it can be a temporary or
 22 a movable form of protection?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Which doesn't need months and months of installation but
 25 can go in in fairly short order; would you agree?

74

1 A. I agree.
 2 Q. And over on to page 6, please {WS5031/6}, on 2 February
 3 another meeting of this important protective Security
 4 Group. Again, in fairness to you, you were absent,
 5 although we see Mr Hone's name; is that right?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. And then if we go, please, to {WS5031/7}, apologies have
 8 been received from you but again, you would have been
 9 aware no doubt that around this time that consideration
 10 was being given to the National Barrier Asset, these
 11 existing and available barriers that can be used?
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. And there was a review being undertaken on their
 14 availability ?
 15 A. Yes, and Superintendent Roney, I believe , was working at
 16 the National Centre for Counter Terrorism.
 17 Q. Which officer is that, sorry?
 18 A. Superintendent Roney, if that helps, was advising on the
 19 National Barrier Asset.
 20 THE CHIEF CORONER: The context of this document, it's
 21 obviously talking about the use of the asset for
 22 specific events.
 23 A. That's correct, yes.
 24 THE CHIEF CORONER: So at the bottom line we can see
 25 Carnival and the Lord Mayor's Show being mentioned as

75

1 potential, subject to ...
 2 A. Yes.
 3 THE CHIEF CORONER: But I think the point that
 4 Superintendent Roney is making, it seems to me, is that
 5 actually the funding for it being provided by the
 6 organisers of a specific event.
 7 A. That's correct, yes.
 8 MR PATTERSON: And these temporary or movable assets, these
 9 would be intended and capable of preventing a vehicle
 10 from getting across the barrier?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. And then over on to {WS5031/8}, please, so on 16 March,
 13 so this is all still before the Westminster Bridge
 14 attack. You were present on this occasion?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. We see you were --
 17 A. I'm the chair.
 18 Q. -- the chair, Temporary Commander of Operations and
 19 Security. We see the others present.
 20 Over on to the next page, please {WS5031/9} and you
 21 looked at this with Mr Hough this morning, the
 22 references to Superintendent Shaw?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And, again, the general topic was the threat from
 25 vehicles, wasn't it?

76

1 A. Yes, we were discussing the threat from vehicles and the
 2 wider context, as you can see from what Detective
 3 Superintendent Shaw is saying, and also the reference to
 4 the ATTRO actually being in place which is important.
 5 Q. I'm so sorry?
 6 A. The ATTRO, forgive me, the ATTRO where in the City of
 7 London we have a permanent one?
 8 Q. Yes, and we see the reference to MTFAs threats, so
 9 marauding terrorist firearms attacks?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. "We do such great work with things such as Servator but
 12 may now need to revisit the potential threats from
 13 articulated lorries or HGVs ..."
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. So no doubt you were alive to things like Nice, Berlin,
 16 Lord Harris, and these sorts of issues.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Further down, mitigated the risk of vehicle-borne
 19 attacks and references to physical barriers and you told
 20 us today talk of a table-top exercise?
 21 A. That's Red Flag 2.
 22 Q. Yes.
 23 A. It's a table-top exercise that has more -- it's not just
 24 a paper feed and for discussion, it actually had people
 25 playing terrorists within the table-top exercise, so

77

1 it's a true test of whatever scenario we want to write.
 2 Q. And you told us that you regarded the City of London
 3 Police as being a force that was engaged in pretty
 4 advanced thinking in terms of protective security?
 5 A. I believe that. In everything they do, they're pretty
 6 advanced, especially thinking that I've now got
 7 experience in three forces, I do feel that City of
 8 London use their agility to the best effect and their
 9 willingness to look forward and learn and ask for debate
 10 on certain subjects is second to none.
 11 Q. So then we get on 22 March to the Westminster attack,
 12 the vehicle on the pavement of that bridge, and even
 13 though that was not a lorry, not a van, but just a 4x4,
 14 no doubt you gave consideration to the four members of
 15 the public and all those others killed on that pavement?
 16 A. Yes, of course.
 17 Q. You had the DACSO advice that you received, you told us,
 18 was it that day or was it the following day?
 19 A. Was it on the same day?
 20 Q. The advisory message? You deal with this, I think, in
 21 your report at page --
 22 THE CHIEF CORONER: It's either the 22nd or the 23rd.
 23 A. I think I held a Security Group -- Extraordinary
 24 Security Group on the same day.
 25 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think you did on the same day.

78

1 MR PATTERSON: Paragraph 27, officer, of your statement, the
 2 advisory message is the 23rd, so the next day --
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. -- in your statement, and if we could just have this on
 5 the screen, {WS5015/7}, please, and this is what led to
 6 the further work that you told us you carried out and
 7 the tasking and on forth; is that right?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. But specifically that advisory message coming into you
 10 from DACSO, if we look about five lines or six lines
 11 down:
 12 "The message recommended that the Forces review
 13 their operational deployments and security posture ..."
 14 And then these important words:
 15 "... to reflect the nature and method of this
 16 attack."
 17 Further down, reference to "hostile vehicle
 18 mitigation", one of the tactics is considering hostile
 19 vehicle mitigation and this has been highlighted in
 20 a menu of tactical options from December. HVM, as you
 21 understood it, generally involved physical barriers?
 22 A. That's correct.
 23 Q. And so that was being specifically considered at that
 24 stage. You were specifically considering barriers at
 25 that stage; is that correct?

79

1 A. The CT menu of tactical options has that as one of the
 2 tactical options and therefore we consider it when
 3 attacks happen and then we apply that to the
 4 intelligence picture at the time.
 5 Q. Yes, but you were specifically considering barriers and
 6 whether barriers needed to go in?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And in your statement at paragraph 48, please, forward
 9 to {WS5015/12}, thank you very much, paragraph 48:
 10 "I can confirm that temporary HVM was considered as
 11 part of the CT Menu of Tactical Options following the
 12 Westminster attack."
 13 And it:
 14 "... was considered at every Security Group
 15 meeting."
 16 Yes?
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.
 18 Q. So if it were suggested that you didn't consider
 19 barriers after Westminster, from the receipt of the
 20 advisory message and from then on you were
 21 considering --
 22 A. I think I've explained --
 23 Q. -- temporary barriers. I appreciate you say there was
 24 no need, but you were giving thought to it?
 25 A. Every Security Group, the CT menu of tactical options is

80

1 something that frames our thinking, which includes the
 2 input of the CTSA and the CT taskings, and one of the
 3 options within there is hostile vehicle mitigation, and
 4 therefore whether it is tacit or otherwise it is
 5 considered, because it's part of our options as the
 6 police to consider to mitigate any threat against the
 7 intelligence picture that we have, and that wouldn't
 8 just be for London Bridge, it was for the whole of the
 9 City of London area, and all policing style follows the
 10 same model, so a national decision-making model, and
 11 that's how the CT menu of tactical options is
 12 approached.

13 Q. Yes, but I appreciate your evidence is that you didn't
 14 see a need, but you were considering that question, do
 15 we or don't we advise the installation of barriers on
 16 London Bridge?

17 A. As the process I've described says.

18 Q. And at page 31, please, {WS5015/31}, this was the NaCTSO
 19 tasking sheet that you told us about earlier so this is
 20 after the advisory message about the need to reflect the
 21 nature of the attack and the method of the attack, which
 22 obviously included the use of the vehicle on the
 23 pavement; yes?

24 A. Yes. No specific intelligence that would suggest
 25 further attacks were imminent and that forces were to

81

1 review their marauding terrorist firearms attack
 2 response plans in line with the current Plato guidance.

3 Q. Yes. And so this document that we're looking at is the
 4 follow on from that advisory message asking you to
 5 reflect the nature and method of the attack; yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And over on to {WS5015/32}, please, DACSO, as we saw,
 8 was requesting reassurance about the activity that was
 9 being undertaken to engage with the top five sites; yes?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you have told us that one of them was London Bridge.

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And at 4, that you had to confirm that appropriate steps
 14 had been taken by the security advisors, the CT security
 15 advisors, to ensure that the sites or locations'
 16 protective security stance was configured to mitigate
 17 the current threat.

18 So the specific issue in relation to London Bridge,
 19 if we go to page 33, {WS5015/33}, in relation to
 20 London Bridge which was being considered, the specific
 21 focus of attention included mitigating the risk on
 22 London Bridge; yes?

23 A. Yes. You mean the second section of that page, where it
 24 says:
 25 "The top 5 identified locations in the City of

82

1 London are ..."

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. And then London Bridge, yes.

4 Q. Some of it has been redacted, but London Bridge
 5 featured.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So London had just been proved on 22 March to be a very
 8 real terrorist target, hadn't it?

9 A. Well, that's subjective, really.

10 Q. It was chosen by Masood, wasn't it?

11 A. It was chosen by Masood to undertake a terrorist attack
 12 at the seat of Parliament, at the seat of government,
 13 and there's lots of complex intelligence pictures that
 14 sit behind that that can't be disclosed, obviously.

15 Q. And vehicles as weapons had, yet again, been shown to be
 16 a very real threat to the public: Nice, Berlin,
 17 Westminster Bridge; yes?

18 A. Westminster being the first time on UK ground.

19 Q. And over a year earlier your force had identified
 20 London Bridge as being an attractive or vulnerable
 21 location?

22 A. Yes, amongst many other sites.

23 Q. A Mumbai-style marauding terrorist attack of the type
 24 that had happened on several occasions in the past was
 25 really what happened when Masood got out of his car. He

83

1 got out of his car with his knife and he set forward and
 2 began attacking people with a knife in a second stage of
 3 his terrorist attack; that's right, isn't it?

4 A. I don't think it's the same methodology completely.
 5 I think that might be misleading to say it's similar to
 6 Mumbai, but I agree with the circumstances --

7 Q. No, it wasn't similar to Mumbai, of course, in terms of
 8 the details, but two stages: vehicle first, knives
 9 second?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And then if we go to {WS5010/10}, you told us that there
 12 was a telephone conversation with Mr Woolford?

13 A. Yes. Well, a telephone conversation with myself and
 14 Mr Woolford.

15 Q. Yes, that's what you told us.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And what he tells us is, if we go back, please, to
 18 page 5 to introduce this, what he says about this is as
 19 follows. At paragraph 22, this is his statement:
 20 "In addition to above, in the immediate aftermath of
 21 the terror attack on Westminster Bridge, on Friday 24th
 22 [so two days afterwards]... a non-police Committee
 23 member of the City of London Corporation contacted
 24 Carolyn Dwyer, Director of Built Environment, asking
 25 about safety on bridges, with Carolyn referring this to

84

1 the Commissioner of [City of London Police]."
 2 He goes on to state that:
 3 "The Commissioner asked [him] to respond as [he] had
 4 been part of the City of London leadership response
 5 immediately [after the] Westminster Bridge attack, under
 6 the command of Commander Jane Gyford and [then he was]
 7 seconded into [City of London Corporation]."
 8 So is that correct: he had been working with you in
 9 the period around the Westminster attack?
 10 A. Absolutely.
 11 Q. And then over on to the next page, please, {WS5010/6},
 12 paragraph 24. He consulted with you prior to replying,
 13 he agreed the response because "she was the police
 14 lead". Is that the phone call that you told us about?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And he said he replied, telling her that:
 17 "... the current threat was not just to bridges ...
 18 multiple guises. All the London forces working together
 19 ... crowded places, transport hubs, access egress to
 20 work, including bridges and the night-time economy."
 21 Yes?
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.
 23 Q. And if we go, please, to the email of {WS5010/10}, he
 24 copied you into the email?
 25 A. Yes.

85

1 Q. And you would have seen this, therefore, at around that
 2 time?
 3 A. I would have done, but, you know, the level of email
 4 traffic, as I'm sure everyone's aware, is 100s, 200
 5 emails a day, easily, but I'm aware of it.
 6 THE CHIEF CORONER: Too many, I think, is the short answer.
 7 A. Too many, absolutely.
 8 MR PATTERSON: I wish someone would tell that to the people
 9 who send me my email. But what he says is that we are
 10 learning from the attacks. Is that right: were you
 11 learning from the attacks?
 12 A. Yes, as I've explained, the City of London Police and
 13 the Corporation of London working together were always
 14 working hand-in-hand as to how we could learn and move
 15 forward, which includes the joint working, the Secure
 16 City Programme, the testing and exercising regime, the
 17 penetration testing, which, you know, singularly the
 18 City of London probably lead on in UK policing terms.
 19 So we were always learning, moving forward.
 20 Q. And he speaks about a holistic partnership approach?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. He says the City is outstanding at that. Would you
 23 agree that there is a holistic and outstanding
 24 relationship between the City of London Police and, for
 25 example, the Metropolitan Police?

86

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And further down he talks about a London region police
 3 response, if we look at the second paragraph up from the
 4 bottom; yes?
 5 A. Yes. Yes.
 6 Q. And in the next line he says:
 7 "This does include the bridges."
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Then at the bottom he talks about the work with the City
 10 of London Corporation who are:
 11 "... instrumental in supporting and driving
 12 a proportionate target hardened approach to the threat
 13 of terrorism ..."
 14 And about the security culture across the
 15 Corporation, so he's talking about what the Corporation
 16 is doing to address these issues?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Patterson, just before we -- I know
 19 we're going to come back to this document with
 20 Mr Woolford, I suspect, but just the sentence after the
 21 "This does include bridges", it seemed to me one should
 22 read the next sentence in context, because it then says:
 23 "However the threat of the act can occur anywhere so
 24 we risk assess and prioritise tasking accordingly."
 25 MR PATTERSON: Yes.

87

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. That's right, and then he talks about Project Servator,
 3 what you told us about officer, that had led to the
 4 presence of those officers on London Bridge
 5 since January 2016?
 6 A. And the prioritisation is a good point to raise because
 7 the matrix actually puts London Bridge at number 6.
 8 Q. And then over the page, when dealing with what the
 9 Corporation, he says, are doing about protective
 10 security, he speaks about capturing learning and
 11 focusing on future threats and protecting the City
 12 {WS5010/11}.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 THE CHIEF CORONER: And just, acronym overload, just remind
 15 me what ATTRO is.
 16 A. It is the anti-terrorism traffic regulation order which
 17 basically is restricting the movement of traffic in any
 18 one area. They're often temporary but extraordinarily
 19 in the City of London we have a permanent one so we can
 20 enact it when we would like.
 21 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes, we saw it earlier on, I was just
 22 trying to remember what it was.
 23 MR PATTERSON: And so officer, in relation to all of those
 24 things: the advisory message from DACSO, the reference
 25 in the message to Ms Dwyer about the focus does include

88

1 bridges, your confirmation in your statement and in your
2 evidence that at the time and in the period that
3 followed you were considering temporary barriers as
4 hostile vehicle measures, and you also mentioned that
5 there were conversations around this time about physical
6 infrastructure in relation to attacks.

7 So it's plain, isn't it, that you were considering
8 whether or not to advise that barriers be installed?

9 A. Yes, we were considering barriers and other physical
10 infrastructure not only on London Bridge but across the
11 City of London estate.

12 Q. The decision, however, was taken not to install any kind
13 of physical protection on London Bridge?

14 A. The decision hasn't been taken to that effect because
15 it's work that's ongoing and so those debates continue.
16 I don't know where they are now because obviously
17 I'm not at the City of London Police anymore but the
18 fact --

19 Q. Forgive me, I am going to interrupt you, not because
20 I am being rude but because you have misunderstood my
21 question, my fault, not yours.

22 At that time you've told me you were considering the
23 issue of barriers and London Bridge, but the decision
24 was taken not to install barriers at that time?

25 A. Yes.

89

1 Q. So in the aftermath of Westminster?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And as I understand your evidence, what was done was
4 that the Servator patrols continued; is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Their deployment on the bridge, but was there any kind
7 of physical mechanism, physical barrier of any sort that
8 was introduced?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Mr Hone made the point that there was only limited
11 effect from those patrols, didn't he?

12 A. Is that the email that he talks about being frustrated?

13 Q. Well, if we go to {WS5014/13}.

14 A. Ah, a different email, sorry.

15 Q. What he said in this message to you, which was on the
16 day of the attack, so we see it's an email from Mr Hone
17 to you on 22 March, at about tea time, and he spoke in
18 that middle paragraph about:

19 "... independent research that we've carried out
20 that officers patrolling either alone or in pairs ..."

21 And then these are the important words:

22 "... does very little in terms reassuring members of
23 the public and more importantly does even less as
24 a deterrent to would be attackers ..."

25 And he goes on and makes this additional point:

90

1 "... in fact if the presence, posture and profile of
2 the officers is wrong, it can actually act as
3 a motivating factor to any attackers".

4 MS BARTON: Could you read on the next paragraph, please,
5 because it puts out the distinction between deployments
6 and patrols.

7 MR PATTERSON: Certainly, I'll come to that in a moment, but
8 just on that officer, that very day, of course, everyone
9 had seen that Police Constable Keith Palmer had been
10 murdered at the tail-end of the attack; yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. A horrific reminder of the fact that police officers are
13 often targeted in terrorist attacks?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And so the fact remained, didn't it, that officers
16 themselves deployed on the bridge may not deter
17 a vehicle attack; would you agree?

18 A. I agree.

19 Q. And secondly, officers deployed on the bridge can
20 positively, if they are identified and are not acting
21 covertly, they can be an additional target, can they
22 not?

23 A. Yes, they can. I'm not sure that we were deploying
24 people in pairs on London Bridge.

25 Q. Yes. But in any event, given, therefore, that nothing

91

1 was done physically on the bridge, despite the threat
2 that had been identified, and given that there were
3 these difficulties with the deployment of officers on
4 foot on the bridge, what actually was done to address
5 the problem?

6 A. Well, we have Project Servator which is a different
7 method, and also an enhanced position with our armed
8 response vehicle and armed officers.

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. That's quite significant, I think.

11 Q. Well armed response vehicles will get as quickly as they
12 can to an attack after it begins; yes?

13 A. Yes, but they also are part of the posture for, you
14 know, any resourcing plan, so they will, if you like,
15 get out of cars if they're tasked to do so and be part
16 of what I opened today with around being a visible
17 carrier of a weapon, if you will, which I think what
18 I was trying to highlight is, does give public
19 reassurance, which is the opposite of what we've seen
20 around the patrolling of unarmed officers. So it is
21 a resource plan that we can put in place around armed
22 policing patrols.

23 Q. I've been asked to read out the next paragraph,
24 I'm happy to do so:

25 "My recommendation would be to carry out more

92

1 'deployments' (not patrols) with the Project Servator
 2 messaging run by ... [redaction] Their role is crucial to
 3 the deployments. Matt Timms can provide a list of
 4 trained [something] that can be utilised. The
 5 deployments could be [something] (at some locations) and
 6 [something] deployments at one time."

7 So, officer, in relation to what was actually done
 8 in terms of protective security or hostile vehicle
 9 methodology, nothing was done in terms of hostile
 10 vehicle installations?

11 A. Not installations, but the tactic that was then decided
 12 upon I think is in the Security Group minutes that
 13 follow this with this actual paragraph embedded into it,
 14 shows the decision I took out of that meeting, which was
 15 in line with what PC Hone had recommended.

16 Bearing in mind PC Hone was, at the time, part of
 17 penetration testing and talking to Cerastes around
 18 London Bridge and his view of the vulnerability of
 19 London Bridge. His recommendation here is about the
 20 deployments of Project Servator.

21 Q. So what was done if no barriers were put in?

22 A. I think I've answered that question.

23 Q. So more Servator officers deployed onto the bridge?

24 A. Yes, and also you had the enhanced position around armed
 25 response.

93

1 Q. Meaning what, to get there more quickly?

2 A. No, you would have more officers available within the
 3 armed capability and to go into the numbers would be
 4 probably not very prudent to do that.

5 Q. Well, Police Constable Duggan told us there were only
 6 two ARVs on the night on duty with the City of London
 7 Police?

8 A. Yes, but there are other areas of enhancing armed
 9 response that we were looking at and that was on 2 June,
 10 we're talking about in March.

11 Q. So following Westminster and everything that had gone
 12 before and all the alarm bells that I suggest had been
 13 ringing, what was done was more officers on foot on the
 14 bridge; yes?

15 A. Yes. No. You're talking about the patrolling on the
 16 bridge in pairs?

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. I think my direction was to take up the Servator
 19 patrols.

20 Q. Right, more unarmed Servator officers on the bridge?

21 A. Yes, and I think there was an armed and unarmed
 22 complement as well.

23 Q. Right. And trying to improve your capabilities with
 24 ARV, so the vehicles?

25 A. Yes.

94

1 Q. None of which would prevent the public from being killed
 2 or injured by the vehicle attack, would it?

3 A. Well, you could argue that you could disrupt and deter
 4 terrorists by being present and using Project Servator
 5 tactics, but if a terrorist was on the bridge, quite
 6 rightly, you can't jump in the way of a car, it's a case
 7 of using the tactic to detect and deter and disrupt.

8 Q. But we've just seen you were being told that they do
 9 little to deter and they can positively encourage
 10 an attack?

11 A. Project Servator doesn't. I think the reference was to
 12 patrolling uniformed officers in pairs, which is
 13 a different stance.

14 Q. I mean, on that Saturday night when those three
 15 terrorists launched their attack, nothing that you had
 16 done provided any protection to the public walking over
 17 that bridge that Saturday night, did it?

18 A. No.

19 Q. And as we know, when the decision was made, even though
 20 there was no intelligence, when the decision was made
 21 in June to install barriers, they went up, we've been
 22 told, in something like about six days?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And if you had advised or recommended that they go up
 25 following Westminster, that could have been done in

95

1 a short period of time, couldn't it?

2 A. It wouldn't have met the criteria.

3 Q. You, with your leadership, coming as you did as the
 4 chair of the relevant police force security group, you
 5 with the command of -- with responsibility for
 6 protective security, if you had said there's a need for
 7 barriers on London Bridge, it would have happened,
 8 wouldn't it?

9 A. No.

10 Q. And my suggestion is that neither Transport for London
 11 nor the Corporation would have refused to do what you,
 12 with all your expertise and experience, would have been
 13 telling them or advising them to do?

14 A. It wouldn't have been their responsibility to do that.
 15 So it -- at the time if you are in a dynamic situation,
 16 the recourse I would have is to the National Barrier
 17 Asset, which was with Sussex at the time, and that would
 18 be the submission in those terms, which is different
 19 from talking about protective security measures in
 20 steady state.

21 Q. [DC8333/1], please. The public and the BBC, the press
 22 were analysing the need for barriers on the bridge. You
 23 must have been aware of that at the time?

24 A. Well, I read the news and I don't recall this article,
 25 but yes, of course.

96

1 Q. This is on 28 March, so six days afterwards, at a time
 2 when you've told us that you were considering whether or
 3 not barriers were needed on the bridge?
 4 A. Yes, I'm not sure the relevance of press articles
 5 though.
 6 Q. If there's a clamour from the public saying "We feel
 7 unsafe and we think there's a need for barriers", you're
 8 not suggesting that you would ignore that, would you?
 9 A. Well, if I was going to look at police intelligence and
 10 information, of course we want to be aware of what the
 11 news are reporting on and public sentiment, but I'm not
 12 sure that this particular article gives me that and, in
 13 any case, I have to be aware of the actual facts and the
 14 intelligence and the evidence that has to be part of my
 15 decision-making. So although, of course, it's relevant
 16 and it's fair reporting, when you bring it into police
 17 decision-making, we have to be careful what facts we're
 18 drawing on.
 19 Q. Of course. And we see some of the issues that were
 20 raised on page 1 about whether officers should use
 21 tasers and things of that sort.
 22 Over onto the next page, please {DC8333/2},
 23 a specific question was raised about the fact that
 24 railings had been removed from London Bridge, something
 25 that Mr Hough was asking you about earlier today:

97

1 "Will the pavement safety barriers removed from...
 2 London Bridge be restored?"
 3 Do you see that?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And there's a reference to the police and others
 6 discussing where to install extra measures to protect
 7 the public and how the Mayor's office was considering
 8 where more barriers could be installed. Were you
 9 liaising with the Mayor's office about where to install
 10 more barriers?
 11 A. I think the Mayor's office has been in contact with,
 12 from memory, the Corporation around having someone
 13 present at their meeting, but that's from memory.
 14 Q. And the suggestion was made about building a barrier on
 15 bridge pavements to protect pedestrians, and there's
 16 a reference to Lord Harris' review, recommending more
 17 bollards in busy parts of London to protect pedestrians
 18 from a Nice or Berlin-style attack, and the reminder of
 19 temporary barriers, Lord Harris calling on authorities
 20 to make more use of temporary barriers?
 21 A. I think that's why there were conversations around the
 22 National Barrier Asset and also CPNI's work around
 23 temporary barriers had continued at that time.
 24 Q. Is there a written document or notes where you set out
 25 your thought processes and reached the conclusion that

98

1 barriers should not be installed?
 2 A. No, it's -- the Security Group is a minuted meeting with
 3 actions and decisions. You're obviously not seeing the
 4 whole minute because it's redacted, but that's where we
 5 record actions and decisions.
 6 If I was running a live critical incident or a major
 7 incident, then I would complete what we would call
 8 a decision log, but in these cases it's a regular
 9 business-as-usual meeting that sat every two weeks which
 10 was fully minuted with actions and decisions.
 11 Q. So has the Inquest team been shown documents where your
 12 reasons and decision are all set out and written down?
 13 A. Well, the decisions were in there, yes. Whether or not
 14 the rationale reasons are, if you like, subjectively
 15 looked at and think that they're full enough, I'm not
 16 aware of anyone who has had a look at that for me, but
 17 I would know why I've made those decisions, yes.
 18 Q. Yes. You appreciate that what the families are
 19 interested in is, is there a document somewhere where
 20 you listed the advantages of having them, the
 21 disadvantages, the funding issues, the intelligence,
 22 whatever these relevant factors might be, so that they
 23 can see that it was carefully considered; is there
 24 anything along those lines?
 25 A. There are documents that sit behind the minutes of the

99

1 meeting that we refer to, and one of them is the CT menu
 2 of tactical options, which I know that's not for public
 3 viewing, but that is a document that's considered, for
 4 instance. And also you've got the Security Group
 5 meetings and you've got the Security Board meetings, all
 6 of which are fully minuted and actioned. It's very
 7 rigorous.
 8 Q. But my suggestion is whether it was very rigorous or
 9 not, the wrong decision was clearly made.
 10 A. Well, I don't agree.
 11 Q. And the unreasonable decision was reached not to install
 12 barriers; that's my suggestion.
 13 A. I disagree with you.
 14 Q. Cerastes, you've been asked questions about the Cerastes
 15 material. Twice before they had been used by the CPNI;
 16 is that correct?
 17 A. What has been used by CPNI, sorry?
 18 Q. Cerastes.
 19 A. Cerastes, yes, I think in 2011 and 2014, I think.
 20 Q. And then on the third occasion the City of London Police
 21 chose to use them?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. There had been no reason to doubt their reliability or
 24 the assistance that they could provide?
 25 A. No.

100

1 Q. So now the City of London Police was funding their work
2 and their research; is that correct?
3 A. That's correct. It's a -- something that we invested in
4 because of the learning organisation that the City of
5 London Police is.
6 Q. And if the details had reached you, obviously -- you
7 obviously would have read them and would have taken them
8 into account?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Particularly since you knew that London Bridge was in
11 Police Sergeant Haddon's top five list?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Something that you said you weren't surprised to note?
14 A. No.
15 Q. And if you had seen it, you would have discussed it with
16 your staff, such as Mr Hone, presumably, the expert?
17 A. Well, we would have discussed it at Security Group.
18 Q. And Mr Hone was arguing for HVM measures to be
19 installed, wasn't he?
20 A. He was, but I don't think he was arguing for them to be
21 put in dynamically. I think it was for work to progress
22 around exploring what we needed to do around protective
23 security measures.
24 Q. And you would have discussed it, presumably, with
25 Sergeant Haddon. If Sergeant Haddon had expressed

101

1 an opinion; you wouldn't have ignored his opinion, you
2 would have taken that into account as well, wouldn't
3 you?
4 A. Of course.
5 Q. No doubt you would take into account anything said by
6 the others at your protective security meetings, your
7 Security Group meetings?
8 A. Yes, I always hold boards and meetings in terms of it
9 being a draw from the floor around a committee view and
10 then I make the final decisions.
11 Q. And we know that sergeant -- Constable Hone had a lot of
12 telephone contact with Cerastes, he had face-to-face
13 meetings with them?
14 A. Well, I know that now, I didn't know that at the time.
15 Q. And they were specialists in hostile replication
16 activity?
17 A. They were specialists, and are specialists.
18 Q. He states in his statement that he was confident that
19 the management would support him in his decisions; would
20 you agree with that? He was an officer that you
21 trusted?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And my suggestion is that if you had read the contents
24 of the report and spoken with him and others, you would
25 have taken steps at that stage to have barriers

102

1 installed?
2 A. No, I wouldn't, but I didn't -- I hadn't read the
3 report, obviously, because I hadn't been sent it, and
4 drawing from the Cerastes report, the two
5 recommendations they make, bearing in mind that's from
6 the private company into the CTSA, firstly, it was to
7 continue Project Servator deployment, as we were, and
8 the second one was around hostile vehicle mitigation,
9 but the terms they use, I believe, is much more round
10 towards the permanent fixtures and structures and
11 Cerastes, I'm sure, will be well aware, as DACSO said
12 yesterday, there's a lot of complex matters around
13 putting barriers that are permanent features in any
14 area, in any part of the country.
15 Q. But if increased officers on foot weren't addressing the
16 problem, if trying to beef up your ARV resource wasn't
17 addressed as a problem, if Cerastes still had all these
18 concerns, the only remaining thing that you could have
19 done to mitigate the problem was barriers, wasn't it?
20 A. I don't think it is the only option, there were other
21 options as well, so I think I talked about the
22 heightening of kerbs, there are other things you can do
23 around the footprint of any one site, depending on what
24 that site is.
25 Q. There was an 11 May meeting when he mentioned Cerastes,

103

1 but I think you told us that you were absent, but
2 presumably you would have seen the minutes of that
3 meeting in the days that followed?
4 A. The Cerastes meeting?
5 Q. A meeting where the fact that he had received this
6 significant report was brought to the attention of the
7 committee, of the Security Group?
8 A. Security Group, and this is interim 1?
9 Q. No, it's the one that deals with the bridge,
10 {WS5015/24}. No, you had better go back to the previous
11 page, so we can get our date. So 11 May, I think this
12 is the meeting that you told Mr Hough about, which you
13 were absent. We don't see your name on the list of
14 attendees.
15 A. No, I think I sent apologies.
16 Q. Yes, and Mr Hone was present, as we can see, and then
17 over onto the next page, yes, your apologies are noted,
18 and no doubt it's been redacted but a reference is made
19 to PC Hone providing a shortened version of the report
20 to highlight points and recommendations. Is that
21 a reference to this report that had come in from
22 Cerastes?
23 A. I believe it is.
24 Q. Were you not interested in getting your hands on this
25 important report that dealt with so many different

104

1 aspects of protective security?
 2 A. I wasn't aware it was going to come into the force as
 3 a report form. I didn't know if it was going to be
 4 something that PC Hone would just brief directly into as
 5 a CTSA into Security Group, so at that point we were
 6 just waiting for an update because any penetration
 7 testing of this kind would then be interpreted by the
 8 CTSA because the recommendations have to come from the
 9 expert in the field and therefore how it was going to
 10 come into Security Group was a matter of time and how
 11 PC Hone was going to turn that into recommendations.
 12 Q. But were you not curious to see what they said about
 13 your arrangements for protective security?
 14 A. Well, I would have been curious but I wasn't at this
 15 meeting, and then following it up, unfortunately within
 16 a matter of weeks the London Bridge attack occurred.
 17 Q. So we've been told it reached him, Mr Hone, in
 18 late April, something like 27 April, and then we get
 19 into May and all those weeks that go by in May, and it's
 20 mentioned in that meeting on 11 May. Why did you not
 21 asking for a copy of the report?
 22 A. I didn't know it was going to come in as a report.
 23 Q. And we can go through all the contents if necessary, but
 24 I think you'll agree that it deals not just with
 25 London Bridge but with a whole host of locations and

105

1 issues?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. It deals with how effective Servator patrols are,
 4 doesn't it?
 5 A. It deals with the whole host of issues that you would
 6 look at a location and want to try to undermine that
 7 location and give a steer around attack planning which
 8 on multiple sites that we gave Cerastes, they then did
 9 back to, through the CTSA, PC Hone.
 10 Q. You were paying a lot of money for this report, weren't
 11 you?
 12 A. I don't know how much, but I'm happy to say yes.
 13 Q. But I'm just wondering, were you not keen to read it?
 14 It makes interesting reading. It's exactly your bread
 15 and butter work as the head of the protective security
 16 team and you were the commander with overarching
 17 responsibility for these issues for the City of London
 18 Police.
 19 A. I would have been keen to hear PC Hone's recommendations
 20 back into the Security Group.
 21 Q. You spoke about how advanced you all were in terms of
 22 protective security issues and you spoke about the
 23 forward-thinking and proactive approach of you and the
 24 group and the team. Isn't it at the very least possible
 25 that if you had seen that report and seen what they were

106

1 saying and their real concerns that they were expressing
 2 that you would have taken steps to have something done
 3 about it and barriers installed?
 4 A. I would have taken steps to make sure, put checks and
 5 balances in, if you will, that PC Hone and some of the
 6 team, like Chief Superintendent Barnard at the time, was
 7 talking with the Corporation of London and other
 8 partners around what we need to do to share that
 9 information and to take forward a plan, because it
 10 wasn't just about London Bridge, it was about other
 11 areas within the City of London estate and footprint.
 12 Q. If you had spoken with Mr Hone, can we, for example, see
 13 the sorts of expressions that he was coming out with at
 14 that time, if we go, please, to {WS5014/29}. He is
 15 speaking to a superintendent from whom we'll hear,
 16 Helen Isaac, about an attached document, and if you go
 17 forward, please, {WS5014/33}, if you had been speaking
 18 to him you would have learned about his real concern,
 19 wouldn't you, about London Bridge, and about the crowd
 20 density, and the absence of vehicle mitigation, and
 21 about the kerb issues and there's the longest unimpeded
 22 direct route along the pavement, nowhere for pedestrians
 23 to escape to, the length of the pavement over the
 24 bridge, the energy that can be created by a vehicle
 25 attack, one of the most attractive targets in the City

107

1 for low sophisticated attacks, for these points,
 2 consideration should be given to installing hostile
 3 vehicle mitigation on the bridge. If you had been
 4 speaking to him it's at the very least possible --
 5 I would suggest probable -- that with your proactive
 6 approach you would have been driven to the conclusion
 7 that you had -- you had -- to install barriers?
 8 A. As I said, dynamically this wouldn't have made me go to
 9 the National Barrier Asset and ask for temporary vehicle
 10 mitigation. It would have meant that I was checking
 11 that those conversations were being had with the
 12 relevant parties with us advising and making sure that
 13 we were party to those particular activities.
 14 But it has to be said, this email is not marked
 15 urgent, and the reference to hostile vehicle mitigation
 16 seems to me to, if you like, confirm that it is
 17 permanent barriers that we would be looking to design in
 18 and also the email is sent for Superintendent Isaac to
 19 review, not to action, but to check because other
 20 parties were going to be involved in that. So, quite
 21 rightly, PC Hone wants to quality assure what he's
 22 saying before speaking to the Corporation of London and
 23 other parties.
 24 So that is not the action of something that is
 25 urgent in anyone's mind because the intelligence picture

108

1 isn't there.

2 Q. At page 21 in this same section, speaking to
3 Mr Woolford, that's the commander who has gone on
4 secondment; is that right?

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 Q. Saying to him around this time, this is earlier, this is
7 8 May:

8 "It should be considered the most vulnerable to low
9 sophisticated attacks using a vehicle."

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. So you may say there's an absence of the word "urgent",
12 but the facts speak for themselves, surely, that in
13 terms of the risk and the vulnerability, he's not
14 suggesting "but it can wait 6 or 12 months", he's saying
15 that vulnerability is there presently, isn't he? That's
16 the effect of all of this?

17 A. He's not saying either way around timing so I think that
18 to put hostile vehicle mitigation and other physical
19 barriers into locations around the City or anywhere else
20 takes time.

21 Q. Yes, well the temporary barriers were something you were
22 all considering back in January; you've agreed that,
23 weren't you?

24 A. Around the CT taskings and how the CT tactical menu of
25 options is taken forward within the Security Group using

109

1 the national decision-making model.

2 Q. Are you seeking now, in light of what actually happened,
3 that horrific attack, are you, officer, seeking now to
4 minimise the effects of the decision not to install
5 barriers?

6 A. In what way?

7 Q. Well --

8 A. The facts are the facts.

9 Q. -- the Cerastes material, I suggest, would have made it
10 plain that you would have installed barriers. But
11 you're suggesting that if you had read it, it wouldn't
12 have changed your opinion, essentially?

13 A. I'm not saying my opinion has changed, I'm saying that
14 the material that's sitting within Cerastes and then the
15 recommendations that came out of PC Hone's report mean
16 that that gets fed into the longer term piece of work
17 around protecting the City of London and other locations
18 as well.

19 Q. So do the public need to recognise that whenever serious
20 vulnerabilities are identified, that the police will act
21 at a very slow pace, often involving many, many months;
22 is that right?

23 A. That's not what I'm saying.

24 Q. Well, it appears to be that you are suggesting there
25 will be a long delay?

110

1 A. There are dependencies in everything we do in certain
2 areas, and one of them, if you are looking at physical
3 barrier asset, it takes time to install, for all of the
4 reasons I think DACSO spoke about, around, you know,
5 depending on the location, the weight of the asset, for
6 instance, and other measures which architects advise on.
7 So it's not as simple as that for any one authority to
8 be able to press the button and say it will happen
9 tomorrow.

10 Temporary HVM is different, that's the National
11 Barrier Asset.

12 Q. Finally this -- I see the time, but finally this, at
13 page 28 {WS5014/28} if you had spoken with Mr Hone at
14 the time you would have inevitably learned that he had
15 real concerns about this bridge given the way he was
16 expressing himself to other colleagues in this email
17 about it being "probably my biggest concern in terms of
18 low sophisticated attack". That's what he was saying on
19 3 May, exactly a month before the attack.

20 A. Yes. I'm sure that as the recommendations were put
21 together, PC Hone was going to bring them to the
22 Security Group for me to hear because, again, we are not
23 in extremis, we were using Security Group governance to
24 make sure that we were picking up all the views of the
25 CTSA. What Matt is doing here is telling two of his

111

1 line managers his views, but of course, there's
2 a redacted version of this on the screen and there are
3 other views to take into consideration as well.

4 But I appreciate the low sophisticated attack is
5 what you're flagging there, and that was Matt's view.

6 Q. And that's what Masood had done just two months earlier?

7 A. Well, yes, that's correct, it's the same methodology.

8 MR PATTERSON: On another London bridge?

9 A. Yes.

10 MR PATTERSON: My Lord, would that be a convenient moment?

11 THE CHIEF CORONER: It would. I know we have various other
12 witnesses, can you just give me an idea, Mr Patterson,
13 of how much longer you've got, because I'm conscious
14 there are others to follow you.

15 MR PATTERSON: About five minutes, I think.

16 THE CHIEF CORONER: Right.

17 (1.03 pm)

(The Luncheon Adjournment)

19 (2.04 pm)

20 MR PATTERSON: Officer, we looked earlier at the Cerastes
21 report and what you would or wouldn't have done had you
22 received it and known about its contents before the date
23 of the attack on London Bridge. But a separate
24 question, of course, that arises, is why didn't it reach
25 you or the committee, the Security Group, and get

112

1 actioned in that period between it coming in on 27 April
2 and that date of the attack in early June; what was the
3 reason why it didn't reach those important people, you
4 and the group?
5 A. The report came in to PC Hone on 27 April, I think, and
6 he took his time to look at the report and obviously put
7 the recommendations forward around what work needs to be
8 done out of the Cerastes report.

9 The mechanism would be for him to send it to his
10 superintendent at the time, who was leading on
11 Project Servator, to understand the actual contents and
12 also seeking a quality assurance around where to send it
13 next, and that was in train.

14 Superintendent Isaac -- sorry -- Superintendent
15 Isaac, as I understand it, hadn't opened the email at
16 the time of the London Bridge attacks. That's because
17 of the volume of emails coming in and actually it wasn't
18 marked urgent and it was a matter of getting to it, as
19 I understand it.

20 What would have happened, bearing in mind this is
21 a matter of two weeks to 16 May and then another two to
22 three weeks until the attack time, that would have been
23 looked at and the recommendations would have come into
24 Security Group and then I know that it would be planned
25 to go into the Security Board in the June, which is the

113

1 Corporation of London's version of the Security Group.
2 Q. So an essential problem, really, when we analyse all of
3 that, is the volume of emails, the systems that would be
4 in place, the procedures that would be in place for
5 actioning emails?

6 A. Yes, there's always a problem with volumes of emails,
7 but at that time it wasn't formally put into governance
8 because it was still being reviewed in terms of the
9 recommendations that Matt wanted to get quality assured.

10 It's a bit like when PC Hone spoke to Sergeant
11 Haddon, his supervisor, about: can you look at this for
12 me, please, because it's just checks and balances and
13 then it would have gone into formal governance.

14 Q. Would you agree that really what's needed when
15 an important report is coming in that has been
16 commissioned that addresses issues like risks and
17 vulnerabilities, what's needed is that there are
18 procedures or systems to make sure that it is quickly
19 looked at and identified by the relevant people?

20 A. Yes, and I think we have those systems and processes
21 through the Security Group.

22 Q. But it didn't reach the group in that period between it
23 coming in on 27 April and the attack some six weeks or
24 so later, on 3 June?

25 A. That's correct, for the reasons I've given.

114

1 Q. And finally this: we looked earlier at that email that
2 was sent by Mr Woolford to Ms Dwyer, the non-police
3 member of the committee of the Corporation of London who
4 had raised concerns about bridges and security, and the
5 reply that was copied to you in which it was said that
6 there was a lot of -- my words, not his -- but a lot of
7 joined up policing and joint work between the various
8 organisations, an "outstanding holistic cooperation" was
9 how it was phrased in that email.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. {DC7849/1}, please. I would like your help if you could
12 give it, please, with this: we've been given these
13 agenda documents for something called the London CONTEST
14 Board Sub-Group dealing with hostile vehicle mitigation,
15 and we can see that this one in May, for example,
16 included on the agenda issues in relation to the current
17 HVM landscape, so hostile vehicle mechanisms?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Mitigation, I'm grateful. And the reference to the
20 changes to the landscape following the Westminster
21 attack; do you see that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then in the next agenda item, item 3, references
24 again to barriers that might need to be overcome such as
25 funding and we can see some of those who were involved,

115

1 the Head of Operational Oversight of MOPAC, is that the
2 Mayor of London's organisation --

3 A. Yes, that's his office.

4 Q. Thank you, the Mayor's office, and then Mr Aldworth,
5 Superintendent Aldworth from the Metropolitan Police?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did the City of London Police attend these meetings?

8 A. No. I think you heard from DACSO when she put her
9 wiring diagram up around how the regional response or
10 regional London capabilities work, and the protective
11 security office represents the London region and
12 therefore Nick Aldworth would be thinking about the
13 London region and strategically considering that and
14 then would feed back to the City of London Police.

15 Q. Now, we know that the Metropolitan Police, not a single
16 person within the Metropolitan Police, we are told, was
17 aware of the Cerastes learning that had come into your
18 force on 27 April?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Doesn't the fact that the City of London Police weren't
21 attending these sorts of meetings, doesn't the fact that
22 the Metropolitan Police weren't receiving that very
23 important information from Cerastes in relation to
24 things like mobile deployments and vulnerabilities on
25 the bridges, and all the other very relevant information

116

1 in Cerastes, don't those two examples just demonstrate
 2 that there were things that were falling between the
 3 different agencies and in particular, between the two
 4 police forces, the Met and the City of London?
 5 A. Well, firstly, the short answer is no, but just to put
 6 some context around this, we were represented at that
 7 meeting through Nick Aldworth because he is the regional
 8 responsible person, if you will, strategically for the
 9 London region for protective security, and therefore
 10 those links were already in train. We have -- regional
 11 capabilities and discussions through the protective
 12 security office were always there, and therefore we are
 13 represented.
 14 Falling through the gaps, the Metropolitan Police
 15 weren't aware of Cerastes at the time, and for us, we
 16 were operationalising it locally because it was
 17 particular to the City of London Police, so our actions,
 18 as you heard DACSO say, is based on the advice we're
 19 getting for national and regional position and
 20 operationalising it locally.
 21 Q. You referred earlier to the words of warning from
 22 Lord Harris back in 2016 about interoperability in the
 23 context of the Metropolitan Police and the City of
 24 London Police.
 25 A. Yes.

117

1 Q. And that the Home Office should assess whether it would
 2 be better not to have a separate area of London carved
 3 out under the aegis of a different force. Doesn't this
 4 area, protective security, highlight exactly his fears
 5 back in 2016 that things can be missed when you have
 6 additional forces covering the same city?
 7 A. I think since that recommendation, 39 from memory, and
 8 then 40, to the collaboration piece, I think since then
 9 work has been done to show that actually the regional
 10 capabilities work very well in London and are second to
 11 none.
 12 So I would suggest that actually we have a very,
 13 very strong relationship where we are communicating on
 14 a daily, weekly, monthly basis in different areas where
 15 actually we're very effective.
 16 The armed response police that I referred to, which
 17 was around how we can deploy collaboratively around
 18 firearms and also train together is the work that I took
 19 forward and I actually chaired that meeting and the Met
 20 and BTP were part of that, and I took that forward and
 21 there's a huge amount of work that has now taken place
 22 where we've seen emergency trauma packs put throughout
 23 the City of London, and also that's been taken forward
 24 nationally now, and also we are looking at how we can
 25 understand each other's force area with critical

118

1 planning and that's part of our testing and exercising
 2 which the Metropolitan Police and the BTP have been
 3 involved in and vice versa, so it's a huge amount of
 4 work together as a collaboration.
 5 Q. You're not suggesting, are you, that the contents of the
 6 Cerastes report, covering a number of very significant
 7 issues that apply equally to the Met as well as the City
 8 of London Police, wouldn't have assisted people like
 9 Superintendent Aldworth and others with responsibilities
 10 in the Met for protective security?
 11 A. Well, I don't know what their sites are and how they
 12 were looking at their sites, so I'm not sure it would or
 13 wouldn't help, but the discussions that are put forward
 14 within Cerastes are not unknown tactics or physical
 15 measures or anything there is an unknown to police
 16 forces, it's just particular to any one area and
 17 therefore I don't know what their sites look like and
 18 how they are approaching them.
 19 MR PATTERSON: Well, we can see the contents of the
 20 document.
 21 Thank you for your help.
 22 A. Thank you.
 23 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Adamson.
 24 Questions by MR ADAMSON
 25 MR ADAMSON: Good afternoon, my name is Dominic Adamson,

119

1 I act on behalf of the parents of Xavier Thomas and
 2 Xavier's partner, Christine Delcros. Xavier, as you are
 3 aware, the evidence suggests, was struck by the vehicle
 4 on the bridge and ended up in the Thames, and his
 5 partner, Christine Delcros, was also struck by that
 6 vehicle and suffered serious injuries as a result. So
 7 you can understand from their perspective why the issue
 8 of barriers on the bridge is an important one?
 9 A. Of course.
 10 Q. Yes. And you can understand from their perspective that
 11 the timing of this event, as it was, two and a half
 12 months or so after the Westminster attack, would
 13 indicate to them that there was time to take action to
 14 protect pedestrians on that bridge?
 15 A. I understand their perception, yes.
 16 Q. Yes. And you can understand that when they discover
 17 from the documents that there was active consideration
 18 of that issue but nothing was done, they might be
 19 concerned about that?
 20 A. I think it's a document that's been explored and
 21 explained and hopefully that's helped the understanding
 22 behind it.
 23 Q. Can I ask, please, to have up on screen {WS5014/33}.
 24 This is the section of Mr Hone's summary of his
 25 recommendations --

120

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. -- which you have been taken to before.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And I don't want to go over old ground. What I would
 5 ask that you consider is, do you agree with me that on
 6 its face, that is a potent argument in favour of the
 7 installation of hostile vehicle mitigation?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And given that it is a potent argument in favour of the
 10 installation of hostile vehicle mitigation, and that it
 11 is the highlighted concern, as we can see there from the
 12 document --
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. -- that my clients would think that this ought to be
 15 a matter of the utmost priority.
 16 A. I understand their perception.
 17 Q. Yes. Would you agree that that's a reasonable
 18 perception?
 19 A. I do.
 20 Q. Yes. Do you also understand that they would be
 21 concerned at the prospect that implementation of this
 22 recommendation, based on your evidence, might be
 23 a matter of months, or possibly years, I think is what
 24 you were saying?
 25 A. Yes.

121

1 Q. And that doesn't seem very satisfactory, does it?
 2 A. You have to put context on everything that I have said.
 3 Q. I understand context is important. Context must always
 4 be considered.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. But any system that enables a potent argument like this
 7 to go unresponded to for possibly a matter of years
 8 needs to be given very real consideration, doesn't it?
 9 THE CHIEF CORONER: Just pausing there, Mr Adamson. There's
 10 a difference, is there not, between implementation,
 11 taking a number of years to take effect, and
 12 implementation being decided straightaway? The
 13 distinction I'm drawing is that you can make a decision:
 14 I'm going to put barriers on tomorrow --
 15 MR ADAMSON: Of course.
 16 THE CHIEF CORONER: -- but the implementation of that could
 17 be many months or years in terms of planning, getting
 18 the consent, and it seems to me important to make that
 19 distinction and that's the only reason I'm interrupting
 20 your question because I think one has to get the
 21 question right.
 22 MR ADAMSON: Yes, so there's decision and there's
 23 implementation periods, and the learned Coroner is, of
 24 course, correct to make that distinction, but do you
 25 agree with my central proposition, which is where

122

1 a potent argument is being made, and the solution which
 2 is being identified is being planned for years ahead,
 3 that is going to leave a prolonged period of time where
 4 people are at risk?
 5 A. Yes, there are many vulnerable sites in the country that
 6 are being planned for in terms of public realm.
 7 Q. Yes.
 8 A. And when we talk about this one aspect, it's just one
 9 aspect.
 10 Q. Yes.
 11 A. There are other measures that are being taken -- sorry.
 12 Q. No, I am sorry, I cut across you, that is rude of me,
 13 I'm sorry.
 14 A. And we continue to take action in those terms. Where it
 15 comes to hostile vehicle mitigation, you can see from
 16 this report it's highlighting that this is
 17 a recommendation by the CTSA to suggest permanent
 18 fixtures on London Bridge. There are other areas that
 19 we would be doing that as well. Just the way that you
 20 effect that does take time.
 21 Q. Yes.
 22 A. There was no intelligence picture to suggest
 23 London Bridge was going to be the site of an attack, and
 24 therefore we were looking at the current picture as
 25 a whole and looking at the tiers that we had, where

123

1 vulnerable sites needed to be looked at and we were
 2 taking action.
 3 Q. And I don't want to traverse territory that Mr Patterson
 4 has already covered, he has made the point that
 5 Westminster was an attack for which there had been no
 6 intelligence suggesting that there was going to be
 7 an attack on that bridge, and intelligence isn't
 8 a panacea. Just because there is no intelligence
 9 doesn't mean that you should assume that there's
 10 therefore going to be no attack.
 11 A. Intelligence does perhaps suggest what pace you take it
 12 at, which is a different thing.
 13 Q. Yes. But where we have a problem, ie an area which is
 14 unprotected, and a solution which might be years in the
 15 making, is there not an argument for interim measures?
 16 A. In the case of -- if you're talking about temporary or
 17 the National Barrier Asset, which is what was
 18 available --
 19 Q. Yes.
 20 A. -- there's a criteria for it, and I think I've already
 21 explained that around how you would apply for it. There
 22 is no case in this country where the National Barrier
 23 Asset has been used without intelligence or to do with
 24 an event, and that's what we were faced with before --
 25 in between Westminster and London Bridge.

124

1 Q. Yes. You, I think, were the person who in the meeting
2 in April, the Security Group review in April indicated
3 that you thought that the crowded place criteria were
4 rigid?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And we heard from Ms D'Orsi yesterday, DACSO yesterday,
7 about the requirement for a particular level of density?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. In order for a place to be designated as a crowded
10 place.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. That's not the only criteria, there were other factors
13 to bear in mind, but if you didn't get over the
14 requisite density threshold, that was the end of the
15 story in terms of whether or not you were or were not
16 a crowded place?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. We've also heard that there were tiers?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And there's tier 1 and 2, there are 2(a) and 2(b) and
21 tier 3. And the resource that's dedicated towards
22 tier 1 and tier 2 sites, I assume is likely to be
23 greater than it is in relation to tier 3 sites?
24 A. It depends on the environment that is being looked at.
25 Q. Yes. So in relation to tier 3 sites, is it fair to say

125

1 that they're likely to receive less active attention,
2 less analysis in terms of the need for further and
3 additional security measures because of their status as
4 tier 3 as opposed to tier 2 or tier 1?
5 A. I think it was described in DACSO's document around the
6 engagement, it might be helpful.
7 Q. Yes. I think the document you're referring to, is it,
8 {WS5032/34}.
9 A. So the actions are different from one another if you
10 look at the right-hand side.
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. So I'm not a practitioner in this, so --
13 Q. Which is why I'm trying to keep it as high-level as
14 possible, because I'm conscious that you've indicated
15 that others may be more on top of the detail of crowded
16 places status or not?
17 A. Yes, so the actions at the side would be what the CTSA
18 would consider --
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. -- were required once a site was designated in any of
21 the tiers.
22 Q. Yes, but in terms of an organisation's urgency, or sense
23 of urgency, is the tiered status of a particular
24 location likely to have an impact on the sense of
25 urgency in relation to implementation of -- or making

126

1 a decision followed by implementation of a security
2 measure?
3 A. No, not necessarily. I think without disclosing some of
4 the sites it's difficult to give you a complete picture,
5 but depending on the site and what activity is required,
6 it may be that some of the actions you see in the tier 1
7 have already been completed and there needs to be
8 a series of engagement meetings just to maintain that.
9 There's no urgency in doing that, it's just a series of
10 meetings, engagement with protective security personnel
11 and a conversation to ensure, for instance, one of the
12 red flags we did at one of the tiered sites and that was
13 part of our engagement.
14 So we did a testing and exercise of a red flag
15 within a site. So -- but we planned that six months in
16 advance, so there wasn't urgency in doing it; we just
17 planned it, if that helps.
18 Q. In terms of London Bridge, your evidence is: well, it
19 didn't really make any difference the fact that it
20 wasn't a crowded place as defined because you treated it
21 as a tier 3 site in any event?
22 A. We treated it as a vulnerable site, yes.
23 Q. Yes. But that did not culminate in the implementation
24 of barriers prior to this event.
25 A. No.

127

1 Q. No.
2 A. No.
3 Q. And so from my clients' perspective, they wish to know
4 what can be done to ensure that when events such as
5 Westminster happens at a tier 3 site, the organisation
6 responsible for that tier 3 site is compelled to take
7 action to ensure that a similar event cannot take place
8 subsequently, so that barriers would be installed
9 subsequently?
10 A. I'm not sure why the reference to tier 3 in particular
11 to your question has been made, because it could be any
12 site. So tier 1, tier 2, tier 3, you could apply that
13 question to.
14 What could be done is that we need to understand the
15 intelligence picture and the specific threat, as I've
16 already explained. In terms of what could be done in
17 relation to London Bridge, we already had started
18 progressing the conversation around hostile vehicle
19 mitigation, it's just it wasn't in a dynamic or in
20 extremis phase because we didn't have any intelligence
21 to suggest it was under -- had some intelligence
22 attached to it that meant it was going to be an attack
23 site.
24 Q. And in terms of the fact that this was a crowded -- or
25 this was a space rather than a place --

128

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. -- in your view, did that make any difference --
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. -- to the approach to security on the bridge?
 5 A. No, because we included London Bridge in it, so our
 6 approach was to think about it as a vulnerable site.
 7 The fact that crowded places is something I've
 8 challenged a couple of times is the wider context of it,
 9 so how can we improve the Crowded Places Model and, you
 10 know, forgive me, I'm not the expert in it so it was
 11 a question I posed upwards to understand if we needed to
 12 look at it as a country, and if we needed to consider
 13 what our crowded spaces looked like as well. So it was
 14 a question.
 15 Q. You asked for clarity on what was a crowded place?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Did you feel that you were given clarity in the response
 18 to that answer?
 19 A. I got back from, I think it was SRC, through one of
 20 those that attended on my behalf, I think it was
 21 Trevor Dyson, he just gave me the crowded places
 22 definition back.
 23 Q. And did that assist you or not?
 24 A. Well, it didn't assist me resolve the issue of my
 25 question, but, as I said, it was, if you like, something

129

1 of a smoke screen where it comes to London Bridge
 2 because we were including it as a vulnerable site, so we
 3 were treating it as such.
 4 The one thing we couldn't do on London Bridge is
 5 engage any security personnel on the site because there
 6 weren't any.
 7 Q. I have been asked by Ms Delcros to ask you this
 8 question: do you have any regrets about the decisions
 9 that were taken prior to 3 June in relation to the
 10 security on the bridge?
 11 A. My decisions?
 12 Q. Whether your decisions or the decisions on the part of
 13 the organisation that you were then representing?
 14 A. In a professional stance, no, I do not have any regrets
 15 with the decisions I made. From a personal stance, the
 16 attack is horrendous, three terrorists committed murder
 17 and hurt people, and of course I have human being
 18 regrets, I'm part of the human race and, you know, in
 19 policing, 27 years' service, it's something of
 20 a terrible fact that we live in the environment that we
 21 do so, of course, I'm not unfeeling to the concerns or
 22 the perceptions, absolutely understanding, but from
 23 a professional capacity, I made some decisions that
 24 I believe were the right ones.
 25 MR ADAMSON: Thank you very much.

130

1 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 2 Questions by MS BARTON QC
 3 MS BARTON: I've just got one or two issues I would like to
 4 deal with, if I may. The Lord Harris report has been
 5 put to you, a number of paragraphs from it, and one of
 6 them is that the lack of intelligence should not be used
 7 as a reason for police to close their minds to other
 8 possibilities.
 9 Did you or the City of London Police close your
 10 minds to the vulnerabilities of London Bridge?
 11 A. No, we did the opposite: we opened our minds.
 12 Q. And are some examples of the way that you opened your
 13 minds to the vulnerabilities the fact that even though
 14 it didn't fall readily within the Crowded Places Model,
 15 it was nevertheless one of the vulnerable sites?
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.
 17 Q. CT tasking was arranged for London Bridge from 2016?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And you invited Cerastes to conduct a critical analysis
 20 of your vulnerable locations including London Bridge?
 21 A. Yes, that's correct, and we gave them the locations.
 22 Q. Would you describe in any way, is it fair or accurate,
 23 to say that City of London closed their minds to the
 24 risks on London Bridge?
 25 A. No, absolutely not.

131

1 Q. I want to just take you, if I may, to one or two
 2 documents which I would like you to help me with. Could
 3 I have {WS5015/31}. This is the NaCTSO document you
 4 have been taken to earlier and I just want to look at
 5 what was going on in terms of London Bridge in real time
 6 before the events of 3 June without the benefit of
 7 hindsight. Could we go, please, to -- this is the
 8 document that requires you to identify your top five
 9 crowded places.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Could we go to page 32, please {WS5015/32}. We see
 12 there the questions that are asked about the top five
 13 crowded places, and could we please go over to the next
 14 page, {WS5015/33}. London Bridge was identified as one
 15 of the crowded places; is that correct?
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.
 17 Q. Notwithstanding that, in fact, it didn't sit within the
 18 model?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. But in addition to that, if you have a look up at
 21 point 6 above the top five identified locations, would
 22 you just read that for us?
 23 A. "We are currently working with various sites including
 24 Corporation of London regarding [hostile vehicle
 25 mitigation] options/measures."

132

1 Q. So in real time, there is a contemporaneous record of
2 the work that was being done with your key partner, the
3 Corporation of London, on HVM measures?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. But this is across the City of London footprint as
6 a piece, not in relation to individual sites?
7 A. No, it's across the whole of the City of London Square
8 Mile.
9 Q. But London Bridge is one of the sites which was on your
10 radar?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And in the context of HVM?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Can I then go, please, to page 39 of this same document
15 {WS5015/39}. These are Security Group minutes for
16 13 April 2017. If we look at paragraph 4.3 --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- I think we see here:
19 "Temporary Commander Gyford asked that to underline
20 the work being done by PC Hone, we need to define the
21 position on crowded places with the [Corporation of
22 London] and discuss their responsibility for protecting
23 public places including City streets and for better
24 target hardening. This links to a conversation
25 Detective Chief Superintendent Barnard has already had

133

1 with Temporary Commander Woolford and follows a meeting
2 that Temporary Commander Woolford had with the Town
3 Clerk and Chamberlain yesterday."
4 So is this a recognition that there is ongoing
5 dialogue?
6 A. Yes. And there was a review of the matrix that the
7 London Bridge site was part of.
8 Q. And as part of that dialogue, target hardening was being
9 discussed?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. So it's not a case, is it, of the City of London Police
12 after the event saying "Yes, we were discussing it", we
13 see in real time contemporaneous documentation which
14 underlines that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Would you say that it's fair to say that PC Hone had the
17 confidence at the relevant time to express his opinion
18 to senior officers in a fairly forthright way?
19 A. Yes. City of London Police has certain values and one
20 of them is empowerment, and therefore it's a positive
21 culture for any rank or grade to be able to express
22 their opinions into senior leaders.
23 Q. And I just want to have a look at the emails that
24 PC Hone sent in case it's suggested that the importance
25 of the Cerastes report and his summary is being played

134

1 down after the event. So could I have a look, please,
2 at {WS5014/13}. This is an email that PC Hone sent to
3 you on 22 March at 17.43 and copied in a number of
4 others?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. And a number of those who were copied in were part of
7 the Security Group?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And also copied in was his line manager, Helen Isaac?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. And do we see that that email is marked "Importance:
12 high"?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And it is talking about tasking which he wants
15 immediately changed, isn't it?
16 A. Yes, that's correct.
17 Q. No reference in that email to hostile vehicle
18 mitigation, is there?
19 A. No.
20 Q. If we have a look at the email which we then see at
21 {WS5014/34} of that same document, please. Again
22 an email this time not to you but to his line manager,
23 Helen Isaac, marked "Importance: high".
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Again talking about deployments of CT tasking?

135

1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. Nothing about HVM on that one?
3 A. It's interesting because "any units deployed on CT
4 tasking should be Servator in style", so it is picking
5 up what I was trying to say: CT taskings doesn't just
6 mean Servator, but he's saying Servator style, so he's
7 defining his recommendation.
8 Q. And just to be clear, Servator is not about two officers
9 patrolling in pairs without particular expertise, is it?
10 A. No, it's not. It's sophisticated and it works.
11 Q. Yes. And it's a tried and tested tactic?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Let's just compare and contrast those two emails, if we
14 may, with the one that he sent to Helen Isaac,
15 {WS5014/29}, so the same document, page 29. This is the
16 email that he sent to his line manager to which he
17 attached the summary of the Cerastes report.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. No high importance on that one?
20 A. No, no high importance.
21 Q. Would you have expected to see a high importance if he
22 had wanted the sort of reply that he got in relation to
23 the earlier two emails?
24 A. Absolutely, yes, and it's frequently used because of the
25 volume of emails that you would mark something high so

136

1 the person opened it.
 2 Q. And you have looked, haven't you, at the content of both
 3 PC Hone's summary and, indeed, the Cerastes report?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And in particular the recommendations that have been
 6 made in relation to the measures that are to be put on,
 7 or recommendations in respect of London Bridge?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Could I just have, please {WS5015/16}, which is the
 10 summary that has been prepared for the purpose of these
 11 proceedings of the Cerastes report. Looking at the
 12 bullet points, Cerastes, it's about just under halfway
 13 down the page, and this is a lift, a direct lift from
 14 the report:
 15 "To disrupt vehicle ramming attacks two
 16 recommendations should be of use."
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. The first one was Project Servator deployments; yes?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And they were indicating what the focus should be; is
 21 that correct?
 22 A. That's correct.
 23 Q. And then the second recommendation is referred to as
 24 follows:
 25 "Although a more costly option ..."

137

1 A. Yes, it's an option.
 2 Q. And not only is it as an option, but Cerastes are saying
 3 consideration should be given to the placement of
 4 vehicle mitigation measures?
 5 A. That's correct.
 6 Q. Was that already effectively, because we've seen the
 7 minutes, an ongoing piece of work?
 8 A. Yes, you could say that both of these recommendations
 9 were already being taken forward, and what's interesting
 10 again about the Cerastes terminology, these could either
 11 form a hard barrier between pedestrians and vehicle or
 12 consist of individual smaller structures placed at
 13 regular intervals along the pavement. That's not
 14 referring to National Barrier Asset vis a vis temporary
 15 hostile vehicle mitigations. It's referring to
 16 a permanent fixture.
 17 Q. And we will ask PC Hone, I'm sure, when he gives
 18 evidence, what his state of mind was when he sent the
 19 emails that he did and compiled the report that he did,
 20 but did you have any sense at the time that he was
 21 inviting senior officers in quick-time, or fast-time, to
 22 make a decision on temporary HVM on the bridge?
 23 A. Absolutely not.
 24 MS BARTON: Thank you very much.
 25 MR HOUGH: Deputy Chief Constable, I have no further

138

1 questions for you. Those are all the questions for you,
 2 thank you very much for giving evidence.
 3 A. Thank you.
 4 May I just say to the families and friends of those
 5 involved in the terrorist attack, my personal
 6 condolences to you all.
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you, and I'm sorry we've
 8 inconvenienced you by having to come back a second time
 9 but you will understand timetabling isn't always that
 10 straightforward, but thank you very much indeed.
 11 A. No problem, my Lord.
 12 MR HOUGH: The next witness is Police Sergeant Matthew Hone.
 13 PS MATTHEW HONE (sworn)
 14 THE CHIEF CORONER: Good afternoon, Mr Hone.
 15 A. Afternoon.
 16 THE CHIEF CORONER: Please make yourself comfortable, take
 17 a seat if you wish to.
 18 A. Thank you.
 19 THE CHIEF CORONER: And the important thing is just to speak
 20 nice and loud and clearly into the microphone.
 21 A. Yes, sir.
 22 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you.
 23 Questions by MR HOUGH QC
 24 MR HOUGH: Will you please give your name and rank for the
 25 court.

139

1 A. Sergeant Matthew Hone of the City of London Police.
 2 Q. Mr Hone, you understand I ask questions on behalf of the
 3 Coroner and then you will have questions from other
 4 lawyers?
 5 A. Absolutely.
 6 Q. You made a witness statement on 27 February 2019.
 7 Please refer to that as you wish.
 8 A. Thank you.
 9 Q. What is your current role within the City of London
 10 Police?
 11 A. I am currently assigned to Project Servator, the
 12 national team delivering that tactic nationally.
 13 Q. In the first half of 2017, so the time we are concerned
 14 with, were you a police constable in your current force,
 15 the City of London Police?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Had you joined the City of London Police originally in
 18 2000?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. From 2004, were you trained and licensed as a counter
 21 terrorist security advisor?
 22 A. Yes. Sorry, 2008. 2004 is a counter terrorism search
 23 officer.
 24 Q. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. So 2004 you were trained and
 25 licensed as a counter terrorism search officer and then

140

1 from 2008, a counter terrorist security advisor?
 2 A. Yes, sir.
 3 Q. And so you had been accredited as a CTSA for around nine
 4 years by the time of the events we're concerned with?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And for that purpose, had you undertaken a range of
 7 courses required for the accreditation process described
 8 by DAC D'Orsi?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. How long did they take to complete?
 11 A. About two years.
 12 Q. They included a wide range of subjects. Was one of
 13 those subjects, one of those core subjects, hostile
 14 vehicle mitigation?
 15 A. It was, yes.
 16 Q. Was another integrated security?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. What sort of things does that cover?
 19 A. That looks at perimeter intrusion detection systems,
 20 lighting, CCTV, a myriad of things.
 21 Q. Did it also include specific training in risk assessment
 22 from a counter terrorism standpoint?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. As part of your training, were you trained to conduct
 25 physical surveys of sites?

141

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. With a view to identifying their vulnerabilities?
 3 A. Absolutely.
 4 Q. Were you trained to advise the owners of sites about
 5 things they could and should do to address those
 6 vulnerabilities?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Were you also trained to give training and provide
 9 awareness to members of the public and businesses and so
 10 on about counter terrorism measures generally?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Since accreditation, have you undertaken regular
 13 professional development work?
 14 A. I have.
 15 Q. And did you also complete a graduateship in counter
 16 terrorist security management with NaCTSO in 2017?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Is it fair to say that by 2017, that you were a very
 19 experienced and highly trained CTSA?
 20 A. Yes, I was an experienced CTSA, yes.
 21 Q. Project Servator next, please. We have heard that
 22 Project Servator was a tactic well developed by 2017
 23 which involved unpredictable and highly visible police
 24 deployments, assisted by public relations activity to
 25 disrupt attack planning; is that a fair summary?

142

1 A. Yes, that is.
 2 Q. Because it's been raised just recently, what does
 3 a Project Servator deployment look like if
 4 I'm a pedestrian standing across the road from one?
 5 A. The key -- one of the key parts of Servator, in fact
 6 it's the first word in the definition, is the
 7 unpredictability. So it can be four or five uniformed
 8 police officers engaging with members of the public at
 9 certain locations at certain times for an unpredictable
 10 time, or it could be 20 officers with helicopter, armed
 11 support, dogs, mounted branch, a myriad of different
 12 tactics, and that unpredictability is key to disrupt
 13 hostile attack planning.
 14 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think one of the phrases we heard
 15 yesterday, Mr Hough, was about flash, and I think we're
 16 all familiar with the way that's used as a flash mob,
 17 you know, something happens.
 18 A. Absolutely, yes, and it's quite important to say that it
 19 appears like a flash mob. The timings, it can be very
 20 short or it can be for a long time, and in one location
 21 we can return multiple times in one shift. Just because
 22 we've been there once during that day doesn't mean we
 23 don't return.
 24 MR HOUGH: Give us an impression, because it's unpredictable
 25 doesn't mean it's random.

143

1 A. Absolutely, not, no. There is a framework that sits
 2 behind that that I created.
 3 Q. Without going into detail which we probably don't need,
 4 and which may be sensitive, is there a lot of thinking
 5 about precisely what size of teams should be sent in
 6 like a flash, to where and when?
 7 A. There is, yes, and as I say, to keep it unpredictable,
 8 we don't say "this location needs X amount of officers":
 9 we keep that unpredictable as well.
 10 Q. What are the particular proven benefits of this tactic
 11 in achieving its objective?
 12 A. We know through, because of the style of deployment, ie
 13 engaging businesses, small and medium size enterprises
 14 and members of the public, that it reassures members of
 15 the public, and it is there to do is not only just
 16 reassure them, but inform them of what we're doing and
 17 hopefully recruit them as well, and what I mean by
 18 recruit them, recruit their eyes and ears and for them
 19 to report suspicious activity to us.
 20 But most importantly for the hostile, it's there to
 21 disrupt them, and we know through various -- from years
 22 of research from 2011 onwards that if it's done
 23 correctly it has a significant impact on hostiles and
 24 causes them great anxiety and fear.
 25 Q. So if someone like Masood is reconnoitring

144

1 Parliament Square, as we know he did, he may be made to
 2 think twice if suddenly a large number of equipped
 3 police officers turn up?
 4 A. Yes. At the end of the day the people who carry out
 5 these attacks not just in the UK but across the world,
 6 they are human at the end of the day and they have
 7 those -- the same fears and anxieties that we do. It's
 8 amplified in them because they totally believe in what
 9 they want to do and they have that fear of failure that
 10 can't go away, and during the attack planning we know,
 11 without giving too much away, that that fear of failure
 12 is at a heightened state, and that not only disrupt, but
 13 hopefully we can detect them and stop them at that
 14 attack planning phase.
 15 Q. Thank you. Now, since when have you been involved in
 16 the development and implementation of Servator?
 17 A. From the very start, so 2011 it was a partnership with
 18 CPNI, the Centre for Protection of National
 19 Infrastructure, and we developed this tactic, their
 20 scientific approach and some academics within CPNI and,
 21 in essence, I operationalised what they wanted to
 22 achieve, and from 2014 that's when the City of London
 23 Police went live with Project Servator, from there we've
 24 developed it further and continued to develop it and now
 25 it's seen as one of the national best practice.

145

1 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think a number of other police forces
 2 have followed in your steps.
 3 A. Absolutely, and that's why we've got a national team now
 4 within the City of London Police to assist forces
 5 nationally and internationally in developing this
 6 tactic.
 7 MR HOUGH: So there was an R&D phase from 2011 to 2014.
 8 A. A pure R&D phase before we launched and obviously we
 9 don't sit still, there is still learning to be had and
 10 we are still developing it as well.
 11 Q. A sort of soft launch from 2014 onwards?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Moving now to early 2016, did you take on a new role at
 14 that point?
 15 A. I left the counter terrorism security advisor's team,
 16 CTSA, and became -- a new post was created by
 17 Superintendent Helen Isaac in uniformed policing to
 18 carry out CT deployment and basically recommend to
 19 Security Group, the primary role is to recommend to
 20 Security Group where we put our uniformed assets and
 21 covert assets as well in terms of counter terrorism
 22 policing.
 23 Q. So was your new role title "Counter terrorist tactical
 24 coordinator"?
 25 A. Yes.

146

1 Q. We've heard about the Security Group meeting every two
 2 weeks and deciding on counter terrorist deployments.
 3 Was it a major part of your role to prepare taskings
 4 before those meetings and effectively recommend what
 5 deployments of officers there should be for counter
 6 terrorist purposes in the City?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Did you prepare notes of those taskings in advance of
 9 each meeting and email them to the secretariat for
 10 onward transmission to the members of the group?
 11 A. I did.
 12 Q. And they were your recommendations for discussion, were
 13 they?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Would you then typically attend the meetings of the
 16 group to give the reasons for the locations and
 17 deployments you had suggested?
 18 A. I went to as many as I could get to, yes, sir.
 19 Q. If you couldn't get to one, would you communicate your
 20 reasons by other means in advance?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. To help identify locations for deployments, did you
 23 prepare your own process or model to help?
 24 A. Yes, I did.
 25 Q. If we can look at {WS5014/3}, and maximise the bottom

147

1 half of the page under the heading "Rationale for CT
 2 taskings", can you just explain to us the model you
 3 created?
 4 A. This is, I felt, the best way to open up and have a best
 5 -- through the research with Project Servator, the best
 6 way to do it. So, as you can see, the national
 7 criteria, there's various national criteria: there is
 8 the CPNI and OSCT recommendations, major thoroughfares
 9 and transport hubs, and then intelligence. For
 10 intelligence it gave me a good idea of the sort of
 11 locations and what was attractive, but I felt I need to
 12 move out of that area as well, so local intelligence
 13 such as hostile reconnaissance reports, but the two key
 14 things I think helped me most were the propaganda from
 15 Isis, which -- the online publications, as well as open
 16 source monitoring of actions and terrorist attacks
 17 across, not just the UK, but globally, filtering out the
 18 ones that are not possibly relevant to the City of
 19 London Police at that stage, ie if there was
 20 a surface-to-air missile attack in a foreign state, that
 21 would come quite far down in terms of someone with
 22 a surface-to-air missile standing at Bank junction
 23 trying to bring down a plane is unlikely, I think.
 24 Q. So you would take account of national criteria governing
 25 things like crowded places, but that wasn't the whole

148

1 story when it came to deployments?
 2 A. No, so you had the crowded places workstream PSIA the
 3 critical national infrastructure, radiological sites and
 4 substances and pathogens and toxins, those national
 5 criteria which were relevant, I believed, but I wanted
 6 to widen that scope.
 7 Q. To take account, as you've said, of intelligence
 8 nationally, locally and other information of terrorist
 9 efforts?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. We can take that off screen for the moment.
 12 When deciding on locations, did you positively take
 13 the approach of putting yourself in the mind or shoes of
 14 a potential terrorist?
 15 A. This is a really important part of Project Servator and
 16 not just the actual deployments of what we do around it,
 17 is the sort of spin-off learning from that was this
 18 hostile mindset training that we now deliver, and by
 19 doing that, we no longer look at sites as police
 20 officers or when we train security managers as security
 21 managers, you look at it as a hostile, and certain
 22 locations lend themselves to be more attractive than
 23 some, less attractive than we first thought, and so that
 24 piece of learning was really important.
 25 Q. Can we turn to Cerastes now. We've heard from Deputy

149

1 Chief Constable Gyford about studies commissioned over
 2 the years from Cerastes?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. No doubt, given your work on the development of
 5 Servator, you would have been very familiar with those
 6 early studies?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. The third study we know was commissioned in late 2016.
 9 In short, what was the purpose of that third study?
 10 A. The third study was, again, a confirmation of tactics,
 11 really, to see where we were in the development, see how
 12 effective our deployments were, but also I was
 13 interested in certain locations and I tasked Cerastes to
 14 the locations. They didn't choose where they went,
 15 I chose where they went and where they deployed to,
 16 because I had either certain concerns around those areas
 17 or wanted to test the tactic in those areas as well.
 18 Q. Initially were Cerastes tasked to test three or four
 19 locations?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Did you provide those locations in November 2016?
 22 A. I did.
 23 Q. Did they include London Bridge?
 24 A. The -- if that was the first report, they didn't. It
 25 didn't -- London Bridge didn't feature in that.

150

1 Q. Was there a second stage of this third Cerastes study
 2 from January 2017?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Was it extended to further sites?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. What additional considerations did you bring to bear in
 7 choosing these further sites?
 8 A. Again, these locations I chose because I felt they were
 9 attractive to hostiles, that hostile mindset, or it
 10 would be prudent to test the tactic in those areas.
 11 Q. Was London Bridge included in that list of sites?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Are you able to say without trespassing on any sensitive
 14 material why London Bridge was included in that second
 15 stage of the study?
 16 A. This was down to, thinking back to two years ago, my
 17 mindset around knowing the ground and the hostile
 18 mindset, and certain areas which sat outside of national
 19 criteria become more attractive to me and London Bridge
 20 was one of those areas.
 21 Q. And we'll come to your documents later, but at that
 22 stage, when tasking Cerastes, what was it about
 23 London Bridge that you regarded as making it attractive
 24 from the point of view of a terrorist?
 25 A. At that stage it's what -- the same things as I mention

151

1 in my report, and with my recommendations the fact that
 2 it had very straight, direct access, half a kilometre,
 3 nearly half a kilometre long with zero street furniture,
 4 high footfall at predictable times of the day, and
 5 a couple of other points.
 6 It wasn't the fact -- and it's quite important --
 7 that it was a bridge. The bridge, the fact it was
 8 a bridge added one factor, one more factor to the
 9 hostiles, and that factor was that there was no escape
 10 for people in terms of marauding vehicle attack. That's
 11 the only other factor that came into consideration that
 12 it was a bridge.
 13 Q. If you had seen at that stage in your area an ordinary
 14 roadway --
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. -- with similar characteristics and high buildings on
 17 either side, similarly ruling out escape, might you have
 18 identified that as one of the sites?
 19 A. A streetscape has areas where you could escape into.
 20 Equally, most streets, not all, but many streets have
 21 street furniture, lights, telephone boxes, street light
 22 boxes, street signs, maybe the odd bollard, all --
 23 street lighting control boxes, all sorts of stuff.
 24 London Bridge didn't have any of that, and that's what
 25 made it attractive, and more attractive to me than other

152

1 streets .

2 Q. So although you didn't identify it because it was

3 a bridge, there were aspects of the roadway which made

4 it attractive for terrorist attack which you wouldn't

5 normally see on another roadway?

6 A. There are -- there are streets and roads in London as

7 well as the UK that do have the same characteristics ,

8 but this one, in terms of the City of London, it stuck

9 out for me.

10 Q. Now, was the first interim report from Cerastes, which

11 dealt with the early testing, it didn't include

12 London Bridge, produced and provided to you at the start

13 of February 2017?

14 A. I believe so, yes.

15 Q. 6 February. If we look at {WS5014/16}, we can see

16 an email you sent attaching a summary of that first

17 interim report, and providing it to colleagues. Were

18 the addressees members of the Security Group and the

19 CTSA team?

20 A. Absolutely, yes.

21 Q. We see that it was also copied to Superintendent Isaac.

22 Why was it copied to her?

23 A. At that time -- Ma'am Isaac was my basic direct line

24 manager. She sat outside of Security Group and outside

25 of the Crime Directorate within the City of London

153

1 Police which held counter terrorism Special Branch. She

2 was critically important in terms of for Servator and

3 the development of Servator, and basically Servator

4 wouldn't exist if it wasn't for her, because she sat

5 within uniformed policing. Under her command she had

6 community policing and uniformed police assets which are

7 critical to Servator, so that's why she was involved in

8 terms of I was just making sure that she had awareness

9 about what work I was involved in as my line manager.

10 Q. So just to understand Superintendent Isaac's position,

11 she was your line manager?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. She was also responsible for uniformed policing and

14 therefore had some responsibility for the officers who

15 would physically deliver Project Servator?

16 A. Yes, I'll clarify, not the whole of uniformed policing,

17 but an important part, ie the community side of policing

18 and uniformed policing, and as you can imagine with

19 Project Servator has been spoken about before, community

20 engagement is a key function of Servator and so she

21 picked it up and ran with it and that's why I came under

22 her direct command.

23 Q. Was she responsible for specifically counter terrorism

24 work and the work of the CTSA's?

25 A. No. I don't believe she would have had a deep

154

1 understanding around CTSA work or counter terrorism,

2 that wasn't her field .

3 Q. Was she a member of the Security Group?

4 A. No.

5 Q. In copying your summary for her, were you copying it to

6 her because she was your line manager and so she knew

7 what you were up to, or were you copying it to her

8 because she had this responsibility for officers who

9 would be involved with some of the taskings or a bit of

10 both?

11 A. No, I didn't expect her to action anything within that,

12 it was just an awareness for her to make sure she knew

13 the progress I was making.

14 The role that I was given in 2016 was a role

15 created, basically -- you know, it didn't exist before,

16 and the position came up, Helen, Superintendent Helen

17 Isaac gave up a position within her directorate and

18 created the post, because she saw the need for it and

19 the benefit, hopefully, and it was from there, that's

20 why it sat within that area.

21 Q. A few questions, please, about the advisory work of

22 a counter terrorist security advisor. While you were in

23 that role, was part of your responsibility to give

24 advice about protective security at premises?

25 A. Yes.

155

1 Q. Now, we saw with DAC D'Orsi the types of engagement

2 expected from different tiers of crowded places?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. We also saw details of the level of police engagement

5 with Borough Market, which was a tier 3 crowded place.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. As we understand it, London Bridge didn't fit the

8 criteria for a crowded place at all?

9 A. No, not at all .

10 Q. However, did you or your CTSA and CT focus group

11 colleagues ever engage with Transport for London or the

12 City of London Corporation about security measures on

13 that bridge before you had your communications with

14 Mr Woolford of late April 2017, to which I'll come?

15 A. I didn't but, as I stated, by 2016 I wasn't a member of

16 the CTSA department, I was purely doing the CT taskings

17 and Project Servator, developing Project Servator. So

18 I don't know what engagement the CTSA office had with

19 the Corporation or TfL with regards to that site. All

20 I'll say is, it didn't fit -- London Bridge did not fit

21 in any national criteria, whether that be crowded places

22 under PSIA, critical national infrastructure or any

23 other national criteria .

24 Q. So might the fact that it didn't fit within any of those

25 boxes have meant that TfL and the City of London

156

1 Corporation didn't get day-to-day advice about
 2 protective security on the bridge from the CTSAs?
 3 A. I can't answer that. I don't know the answer to that.
 4 Q. Now, if we can now move to the chronology of events from
 5 early 2017, please, and if we can go to {WS5014/9} of
 6 this document, do we see here on 24 February 2017 you
 7 sent an email to various colleagues suggesting internal
 8 communication about the conclusions from friendly
 9 hostile reconnaissance work?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Were those conclusions which had been reached in
 12 Cerastes interim 1 report? The one which had been
 13 provided to you a few weeks earlier?
 14 A. Yes, it would have been, yes.
 15 Q. At the bottom within the suggested communication you
 16 identify the key findings of note from that report:
 17 "Project Servator related online messaging had
 18 a significant effect ...
 19 "Direct exposure of the hostile teams to
 20 Project Servator deployments was limited; where it was
 21 encountered by the novice team, it had a notable
 22 disruptive effect."
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Then over the page, please {WS5014/10}:
 25 "The lack of any significant or notable police

157

1 presence by the experienced hostile team reduced the
 2 level of disruption caused."
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. So were you drawing on the conclusions of that first
 5 part of the study to identify some positive and negative
 6 features seen in the Servator deployments?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Now, in the heading to that email you copied
 9 Superintendent Isaac?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And you asked for her approval at the start of the
 12 email -- if we can go back to the previous page,
 13 {WS5014/9} and see that:
 14 "Mr Woolford/Ma'am Isaac -- please check to make
 15 sure you're happy with what I have written ..."
 16 A. In that -- I must say, in that, it's about making sure
 17 basically spelling and grammatical errors. If they had
 18 any points in terms of they thought I was wrong or
 19 wanted something different, then that would have been
 20 a different point, but I was expecting basically a sound
 21 check by them, and just in case they wanted anything
 22 added in terms of a statement from them as a senior
 23 officer to add weight to it.
 24 Q. So those are the reasons why you copied your email to
 25 those two individuals?

158

1 A. Yes.
 2 THE CHIEF CORONER: And I think just above that, just on the
 3 body there, we see you're talking about somebody:
 4 "... can formulate a piece out of my ramblings
 5 below?"
 6 A. Absolutely.
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: That's the sort of thing I send to
 8 people, hoping they can put it into better English than
 9 me.
 10 A. Absolutely, sir.
 11 MR HOUGH: Then next we move on to the start of March,
 12 {WS5014/11}. Now this, I think, is an example of one of
 13 those emails supplying counter terrorist police taskings
 14 ahead of a Security Group meeting; is that right?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And do you, in your second paragraph, explain the
 17 considerations going into your method of selection in
 18 just the way you did for us a few moments ago?
 19 A. Absolutely, the three main things: the intelligence, the
 20 propaganda and open source basically looking at attacks
 21 that happen not just UK-wide but globally.
 22 Q. In the following paragraphs do we see that you are
 23 recognising that Project Servator deployments are now
 24 being conducted jointly with the Metropolitan Police and
 25 British Transport Police as at March 2017?

159

1 A. Yes, and Ministry of Defence Police, yes. So the four
 2 services then, and it has been developed further now,
 3 deploy side-by-side, business-as-usual, week-on,
 4 week-out.
 5 Q. We know, of course, that the tragedy of the Westminster
 6 attack took place on 22 March.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. If we can move to {WS5014/13} of this same document,
 9 please. Can we see here you wrote an email to then
 10 Commander Gyford at 5.43 that evening, so shortly after
 11 the attack had taken place?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. You state that you had just returned from holiday. In
 14 fact, were you still on annual leave when you wrote
 15 that?
 16 A. Yes. The first time I heard of the attack was on my
 17 radio in the car that -- driving down the M25, along the
 18 M25, and basically I got in and did that email once
 19 I had established as many facts as I could through open
 20 source and through colleagues, communications with
 21 colleagues.
 22 Q. Did you in that email give a recommendation for some
 23 additional counter terrorist deployments?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And just to be clear, what were you recommending for and

160

1 against in this email in your own words?
 2 A. I was recommending that Project Servator-style
 3 deployments should be the chosen tactic and not sort of
 4 pairing patrols, high visibility patrols, and -- yes,
 5 and they should be unpredictable, highly visible,
 6 engaging members of the public with various assets as
 7 well.
 8 Q. You refer to the potential for traditional patrolling
 9 methods acting as a motivating factor for an attacker.
 10 What did you mean by that comment?
 11 A. So patrolling -- high visibility patrols is still
 12 a tactical option that we can deploy, however, what
 13 research has shown in terms of through Project Servator
 14 is we can -- we're far more effective, our resources are
 15 far more effective if they are Servator-style in
 16 presence and posture, so that's what that was about.
 17 Q. Is it the case that if two unarmed officers patrol
 18 an area like clockwork, they might actually be targeted
 19 by a terrorist?
 20 A. I think if you've got predictable deployments then --
 21 and the demeanour and the activity of the officers are
 22 not the best, then yes, they can become vulnerable
 23 themselves, and so I obviously was advising against
 24 that.
 25 It doesn't mean to say that officers in pairs

161

1 patrolling is a poor tactic: on the contrary, it can be
 2 a very, very good tactic, it's just got to be done
 3 correctly.
 4 Q. And then can we look now at a document at {WS5014/17}.
 5 The next day, 23 March, in the morning, you were back at
 6 work, I think?
 7 A. Yes, I may have been, I'm not too sure if I was still on
 8 annual leave. I have access to my laptop at home so
 9 I'm not too sure if I was actually on annual leave that
 10 day or whether I was actually at work.
 11 Q. We know that there had been an Extraordinary Security
 12 Group meeting the previous evening and you hadn't
 13 attended that?
 14 A. No.
 15 Q. You sent this email to Superintendent Isaac, your line
 16 manager, and did you, in the first paragraph, express
 17 frustration about apparent reverting to old-style patrol
 18 tactics?
 19 A. Yes, I'm by nature quite impatient, an impatient person,
 20 and I was keen, through speaking to colleagues who had
 21 been on duty during the day of the attack, that we
 22 weren't going back to this tactic that, now we had the
 23 ability and the trained staff in Servator, because there
 24 is a significant training package for all different
 25 types of levels of police officers within the

162

1 organisation, that we use those assets and use them to
 2 the best of our ability, and by that it was
 3 Project Servator deployments.
 4 Q. And you expressed a certain amount of disappointment
 5 about seeing some officers patrolling in twos without
 6 paying much attention to the public?
 7 A. Yes, and that frustration -- in fact, actually, sir,
 8 I was back on duty that day because I do remember now
 9 walking through Liverpool Street and seeing the two
 10 police officers, and it's that demeanour that can create
 11 vulnerabilities or motivate attackers, or would-be
 12 attackers, so that's why I was frustrated.
 13 Q. Then in the third paragraph you say this:
 14 "I really do not understand the thinking about the
 15 locations that have been considered for the
 16 deployments -- are they crowded places as designated by
 17 the Home Office ...? What about London Bridge during
 18 rush hours? Apparently, London Bridge wasn't even
 19 mentioned during last night's [Security Group] and
 20 I believe that this is our most vulnerable location from
 21 marauding vehicle attack along with ..."
 22 And then you mention another place.
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. "I have mentioned various times when emailing the CT
 25 taskings to [Security Group]."

163

1 A. Yes. Some of the locations that were used, I didn't
 2 understand why officers were being deployed to those
 3 locations and it basically comes down to the officers in
 4 the command structure at that time were not aware, were
 5 not Project Servator-trained. We only had a finite
 6 amount of resource trained, especially in the senior
 7 management area, so I was keen to get across that there
 8 is a structure in terms of sites, Home Office, PSIA, and
 9 also through my methodology, ie the propaganda, attack
 10 methodologies and other locations that had been attacked
 11 globally, that there was a better way, or a more
 12 scientific way of actually deploying our assets.
 13 Q. Now, before you sent this email you said you had
 14 mentioned the vulnerability of London Bridge in taskings
 15 to the Security Group?
 16 A. I would have done that along with other areas. What it
 17 shows is London Bridge, without giving any other
 18 locations away, obviously, London Bridge sat outside of
 19 any national criteria, however, because of our
 20 forward-thinking and because of the way we operate in
 21 the City, I was given that freedom to enhance, in my
 22 opinion, the deployments, be more -- in a more
 23 intelligent way of deploying, not intelligence-led, but
 24 more intelligent way of deploying, and I had other sites
 25 that didn't fit the national criteria, including

164

1 London Bridge, it wasn't the only location that didn't
 2 fit in national criteria that I was talking about at
 3 various Security Groups.
 4 Q. Had you mentioned to others in the Security Group over
 5 the preceding months your particular concerns about why
 6 London Bridge was vulnerable, as you've said the open
 7 pavements, lack of escape routes, high congestion at
 8 certain times of day?
 9 A. At that stage I can't say 100 per cent, but I would say
 10 probably not, I probably wouldn't have mentioned it
 11 because I probably at that stage wouldn't have looked
 12 into that specific site in that much detail.
 13 Q. Can you recall you or CTAs, or in fact anybody else,
 14 mentioning any need for barriers or bollards or other
 15 physical protective security measures on London Bridge
 16 in the period up to this point?
 17 A. I think it's probably important to clarify that CTAs
 18 both in the City and nationally would have been tasked
 19 to national criteria, and that's what they would have
 20 been working on. They wouldn't have been working on
 21 it -- they can work on areas outside, you've heard about
 22 the tier 3 sites, and other sites of interest, however,
 23 they wouldn't have been working towards London Bridge,
 24 there wouldn't have been any -- I don't believe, but
 25 again, I wasn't in the CTA at the time, but I don't

165

1 believe there would have been -- may be any work towards
 2 that.
 3 Q. Had you mentioned London Bridge as being a peculiarly
 4 vulnerable location within the Security Group meetings,
 5 for example, before this point in time?
 6 A. I can't remember, I'm sorry, sir.
 7 Q. Moving on to the following day, {WS5014/14}, now we've
 8 heard that a Security Review Committee meeting after the
 9 Westminster attack recommended that each force identify
 10 a top five list of sites for additional deployment.
 11 Were you ultimately given that job?
 12 A. I wasn't, no, but I was asked and I can't remember who
 13 asked me to come up with the top five as well.
 14 In reference to the previous document, as it were,
 15 my previous email, I should mention that within a very
 16 fast time, because I think that email probably
 17 accompanied a phone call, maybe, I can't be
 18 100 per cent, sir, to Helen Isaac, the deployments
 19 changed and were very much in line with exactly how
 20 I would have expected them to be and there was a huge
 21 change in the way we operated fast-time.
 22 Q. Did that include deployments to London Bridge
 23 specifically?
 24 A. That would have been -- absolutely included deployments
 25 to London Bridge.

166

1 Q. And looking at this email of 24 March 2017, did you use,
 2 as we see from the body of the text, the same
 3 considerations that you had applied to choosing areas
 4 for CT taskings to come up with those top five
 5 locations?
 6 A. Yes, so you can see the sort of matrix that I use, the
 7 three things there, the current intelligence, the
 8 propaganda and attack methodologies, and then
 9 cross-referencing it to our local environment, ie the
 10 City, crowded -- national products and then other bits
 11 and pieces, ie main arterial routes, transport hubs and
 12 operation lightning reports, and lightning reports are
 13 where we have reports of suspicious activity or
 14 suspected hostile reconnaissance.
 15 Q. London Bridge, did you describe that as a crowded
 16 place, an iconic site with predictable eastern pavement
 17 crowds as the reasons for including it in the top five
 18 list?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. We can bring that down, please, now.
 21 In late April 2017 were you aware of the City of
 22 London Corporation completing a review of the City of
 23 London estate?
 24 A. I was.
 25 Q. Were you asked as part of that to review a risk matrix

167

1 produced by Temporary Commander Woolford who was then
 2 seconded to the Corporation?
 3 A. I believe the actual matrix was completed by
 4 a consultant who then obviously went to Richard Woolford
 5 who then asked me to cross-check it, basically.
 6 Q. Mr Woolford was responsible for it, but hadn't drafted
 7 it himself?
 8 A. No, yes, absolutely right.
 9 Q. And if we bring up {WS5014/18}, and over to page 19,
 10 {WS5014/19}, we see the matrix that had been produced by
 11 the consultant and supplied to you by Mr Woolford, which
 12 included in the columns a whole series of considerations
 13 for prioritising places, including whether it was
 14 a crowded place, whether it was iconic, whether there
 15 had been a previous security breach?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And scoring levels were given for the different columns?
 18 A. Sorry, I didn't catch that?
 19 Q. Were scoring levels given for the different columns?
 20 A. Yes. Well, not so much a scoring system but crosses
 21 which then added up to a column at the end.
 22 Q. Exactly, so if we look at the first line, "critical
 23 building x 3", if the venue included a critical
 24 building, then three points would be added to the score?
 25 A. Oh yes, yes. Sorry, yes, some of the points are more,

168

1 yes.
 2 Q. So that was the matrix you were provided with. We can
 3 take that down now.
 4 On 27 April 2017 did you receive the second interim
 5 report from Cerastes?
 6 A. Sorry, on what date, sorry, was that?
 7 Q. 27 April?
 8 A. Yes, I believe so, sir, yes.
 9 Q. So after you received Mr Woolford's matrix, but before,
 10 I think, you responded to that?
 11 A. Yes, I think so.
 12 Q. Was that second Cerastes interim report a substantial
 13 document, I think 67 pages long?
 14 A. I believe -- I don't know how long, but it was
 15 a significant document, yes.
 16 Q. Did you read that report in the following days?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Did you meet the authors on 2 May 2017?
 19 A. I believe so, yes.
 20 Q. And if we can put on screen {WS5014/27}, please. Did
 21 you send an email on 3 May to colleagues to say that you
 22 had read the latest report from Cerastes, that you would
 23 be producing a summary --
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. -- and did you add that it would be of great assistance

169

1 with reference to the venue threat and risk matrix?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Was that a reference to the document Mr Woolford had
 4 sent you?
 5 A. I believe so, yes. I don't know how... I'm not too sure
 6 in terms of what the venue threat and risk matrix is
 7 talking about. I don't know if that's the one that went
 8 back to Mr Woolford because I don't know if Mr Timmins,
 9 Mr Service and Sergeant Haddon would have been aware of
 10 that, so I'm not too sure what risk matrix that refers
 11 to.
 12 Q. Ms Barton helpfully points out that you might be helped
 13 by the title of the email that it suggests that it's the
 14 City of London Corporation?
 15 A. Apologies then, yes, apologies.
 16 Q. So when you said it would be of assistance with the
 17 matrix, that was Mr Woolford's matrix?
 18 A. Yes, yes.
 19 Q. Then if we can go to {WS504/28}, did you immediately
 20 afterwards send a second email listing the sites that
 21 were covered?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And did you add that London Bridge was your biggest
 24 concern regarding a low sophistication attack?
 25 A. Yes.

170

1 Q. Why did you add that when writing the email to those
 2 addressees?
 3 A. Clearly by that time my concern in terms of going around
 4 the City and looking at it with the hostile mindset, my
 5 Servator training, my experience as a CTSA in terms of
 6 protective security measures, I felt that that was my
 7 biggest concern, in terms of a low sophisticated attack.
 8 Obviously there are multiple different attack
 9 options but in terms of low sophisticated attack, using
 10 a vehicle, I was indicating that London Bridge was my
 11 biggest concern.
 12 Q. Can we now look at the abbreviated form of the report
 13 which has been prepared for these Inquests, {WS5015/15},
 14 please. This is the document, an abbreviated form of
 15 the document which you had read through by 3 May, and if
 16 we go to page 16 {WS5015/16}, we can see just below the
 17 middle of the page that, among other points, the
 18 Cerastes team recommended two options for disrupting
 19 vehicle ramming attacks, one being Project Servator
 20 deployments and the other being the placement of vehicle
 21 mitigation measures along both sides of London Bridge?
 22 A. Yes. Now, Cerastes are a very professional company and
 23 I absolutely value their work. However, they're not
 24 CTSA's and they wouldn't understand -- they would
 25 understand, but they wouldn't know the details around

171

1 hostile vehicle mitigation and the national levels of
 2 requirements required -- the requirements for placing of
 3 hostile vehicle mitigation, rated hostile vehicle
 4 mitigation in terms of the limitations, gaps, et cetera,
 5 et cetera. Obviously it talks about individual smaller
 6 structures placed at regular intervals along the
 7 pavement. There are, there is a framework around the
 8 national PAS68, 69, the national standards which
 9 restrict how and where they're placed.
 10 Q. So the Cerastes team may not have known the technical
 11 standards --
 12 A. No.
 13 Q. -- which may have made certain forms of barriers
 14 unadvisable?
 15 A. Absolutely, yes.
 16 Q. And then page 17 {WS5015/17}, we've seen this a number
 17 of times already, so I'll deal with it briefly, they set
 18 out the vulnerabilities of London Bridge, similar to
 19 those you had identified yourself, and then identified
 20 the methods that might be used to carry out
 21 a vehicle-as-weapon attack first of all northbound and
 22 then over the page, southbound.
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. When you met the authors of this report on 2 May, can
 25 you recall having any discussion about them about

172

1 London Bridge and these parts of the report?
 2 A. No, this is obviously one site of many that they had
 3 carried out in the two reports, the two interim reports,
 4 this is the second interim report, and it would have
 5 been a general conversation. I doubt we would have gone
 6 into any focus in terms of the various sites.
 7 The sites, they gave attack methodologies to all the
 8 sites that I suggested and recommended that they went
 9 to. Some came back with the fact that: actually, yes,
 10 we could conduct an attack here but it's not
 11 an attractive site in terms of how to attack, but we
 12 wouldn't have gone into great detail, I'm sure. I can't
 13 be 100%, but I'm quite sure we didn't go into great
 14 detail in terms of all the sites, they would have just
 15 given me the reports.
 16 The main thing for me or for them, and why they were
 17 doing the report, was about our tactics. They didn't
 18 maybe know the reasons why they were sent to certain
 19 areas, that was -- I kept that to myself, they didn't
 20 need to know, they just needed to know what locations
 21 I wanted them to task to and then come back with any
 22 attack methodologies that they felt were reasonable.
 23 Q. Did you have any discussion specifically about hostile
 24 vehicle mitigation, whether in the context of
 25 London Bridge or anywhere else?

173

1 A. I don't believe so, no.
 2 Q. When you read this report and saw that these experienced
 3 people who hadn't been told why they had been tasked to
 4 London Bridge had nevertheless identified the same
 5 vulnerabilities that you had, did you feel it justified
 6 your previous concerns about London Bridge?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. How urgent or important did you regard the vulnerability
 9 to be after you had seen their comments?
 10 A. The vulnerability to London Bridge was there, but being
 11 a CTSA for a number of years, and understanding -- to
 12 have some understanding of the national protocol, I knew
 13 that there wouldn't be, unfortunately, a quick fix in
 14 terms of hostile vehicle mitigation.
 15 The National Barrier Asset, my understanding of the
 16 National Barrier Asset at the time, and it still is the
 17 same, is that it was only deployed, and as a CTSA I only
 18 knew the National Barrier Asset being deployed at events
 19 or where there is specific intelligence and actually
 20 I don't know of any occasion, it may well happen outside
 21 the City but I don't know of any occasion where we
 22 deployed the National Barrier Asset purely on
 23 intelligence; we only deployed it where we had major
 24 events.
 25 Equally, I also understand the time limitations in

174

1 terms of installing hostile vehicle mitigation. It's
 2 not something that can be just put in in terms of
 3 a permanent solution: there are, obviously,
 4 an engineer's got to look at it, you've got to look at
 5 the depth of the pavement, are there fibre optic cables
 6 that run shallow which restrict what assets we can put
 7 in there, a procurement process, I know these things can
 8 take years, so I was under no impression or no illusion
 9 that hostile vehicle mitigation was going to be on the
 10 bridge immediately because of my concerns.
 11 Q. May we go to page 21, please {WS5014/21}. On 8 May 2017
 12 did you respond to Mr Woolford about the risk matrix?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Did you indicate that you had added some premises and
 15 made some changes to columns and scoring?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Did you also say that:
 18 "London Bridge should be considered the most
 19 vulnerable [of the sites] to low sophisticated attacks
 20 using a vehicle."
 21 A. I did. So I highlighted the fact that my concerns in
 22 terms of London Bridge to a low sophisticated attack
 23 using a vehicle. The matrix I was aware obviously
 24 London Bridge, which I added to the matrix, came in at
 25 number six.

175

1 Q. Yes, we can see your revised matrix on {WS5014/23}.
 2 A. Without disclosing the sites that sit above it, in my
 3 opinion, my professional opinion, Richard Woolford
 4 had -- I didn't envy his task at that time, he had
 5 a huge amount of work to do in terms of going into the
 6 Corporation of London to looking at these sites and get
 7 them up to speed in terms of CTSA surveys that had been
 8 done previously, and with the amount of work and
 9 development in such a short space of time, I'd never
 10 seen that before in terms of -- from the City of London
 11 Corporation.
 12 Richard -- Mr Woolford, certainly there was a sea
 13 change in activity in terms of protective security at
 14 the City of London Corporation when he joined them and
 15 significant changes of which I was involved in terms of
 16 training staff, security staff from various sites, as
 17 well as other pieces of work, including hostile vehicle
 18 mitigation surveys. There was a lot of work there to do
 19 and London Bridge was obviously just one of the sites
 20 within that.
 21 Q. Did you expect anything to happen concerning
 22 London Bridge because of this email, the point you made
 23 about its vulnerability, and your inclusion of
 24 London Bridge in the list of places?
 25 A. I expected that -- I wanted to put it on his agenda and

176

1 to make sure he understood my concerns around it, again,
 2 knowing and understanding that there was no fast-time
 3 tactical option available to him or my management in
 4 terms of fast-time solution in terms of hostile vehicle
 5 mitigation.
 6 Q. We can take that document off the screen.
 7 On 11 May 2017, we've heard that there was
 8 a Security Group meeting. Did you attend that meeting?
 9 A. Sorry, if the minutes can be displayed.
 10 Q. Just a second, {WS5015/26}, I'm told. It's just being
 11 found. (Pause).
 12 {WS5015/23}, please. We can see you are listed as
 13 one of the attendees?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. {WS5015/24}, it's recorded that:
 16 "A diverse range of Friendly Hostiles will continue
 17 to be used to test our tactics and PC Hone will provide
 18 a shortened version of his report to highlight points
 19 and recommendations."
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Did you therefore mention at that meeting that you had
 22 received the Cerastes report and produced a shortened
 23 version of it?
 24 A. I did. On getting the Cerastes reports back, both
 25 interim 1 and interim 2, I wasn't tasked to create

177

1 a small document or a précis of the documents, but
 2 I felt it was in my interest and the organisation's
 3 interest to do so because a weighty document, I think
 4 you mentioned 60 or 70-odd pages, I felt that with the
 5 time constraints of senior management that it was
 6 unlikely that they would have the time to read the whole
 7 document page by page, and so I felt a necessity to weed
 8 out the most relevant points in my opinion but also to
 9 reference the document, so if they wanted any further
 10 information about certain points, they had access to the
 11 whole document because it was important that they had
 12 sight of it, if need be.
 13 Q. Was there any other discussion of that report at that
 14 meeting on 11 May, and what the report might lead to?
 15 A. I can't remember, sir.
 16 Q. Then could we have {WS5014/29}. On 16 May, did you
 17 email a summary of the report, the one you had
 18 undertaken to produce to your line manager,
 19 Superintendent Isaac?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. What was the purpose of sending it to her?
 22 A. Again, one of my emails is to make sure that it wasn't
 23 rambling, there was no spelling and grammatical
 24 mistakes, which I know there is a spelling mistake which
 25 I can't help but see every time I look at the document,

178

1 but it was for that, to make sure it looked okay and she
 2 was happy with it, but also, most importantly, because
 3 the recommendations I made in this report are
 4 cross-cutting throughout the City of London Police.
 5 They weren't just recommendations in terms of training,
 6 but I was recommending changes to how the structure of
 7 the organisation and the structure to multiple different
 8 units in the City of London Police and for a police
 9 constable to be doing that, I thought it was a bold
 10 step. I work -- you know, I'm a police officer who
 11 worked in a very structured organisation, I was given --
 12 empowered to do this, but I just wanted to make sure
 13 that I wasn't stepping on any toes or boundaries that
 14 would be upsetting any senior management.
 15 And as of today -- like today, back then I had
 16 complete faith in Helen Isaac to be an accurate
 17 appraisal and to tell me if I would be seen as stepping
 18 over the line.
 19 Q. Because of those concerns that you wanted approval from
 20 a senior officer before you made these significant
 21 recommendations to others, were you expecting her to
 22 approve it before you sent it on to others?
 23 A. Yes, I was going to make sure she was happy with it
 24 before sending it on because, as I say, I didn't want to
 25 go upsetting a commander who may have had or any senior

179

1 officer who may have had other plans in terms of
 2 structure of the organisation or where they wanted to
 3 take the organisation to in terms of countering
 4 terrorism.
 5 THE CHIEF CORONER: So in terms of Mr Hough's question about
 6 approving it, you meant approving the style, because you
 7 said you were conscious -- not stepping over the line --
 8 A. Absolutely.
 9 THE CHIEF CORONER: -- not stepping on people's toes, so it
 10 was that sort of approval rather than an approval "This
 11 is what we've got to do"?
 12 A. Absolutely, yes, it was more about making sure that it
 13 was appropriate for someone of my rank to be giving that
 14 type of advice to Security Group. I must say at this
 15 point that I've never been told by any senior management
 16 that I've overstepped the line or that I've -- you know,
 17 I should be quiet because I'm a junior ranking officer,
 18 far from it. As you can see in my emails, I'm quite
 19 frank and open and so I feel empowered to be able to do
 20 that within the City of London Police.
 21 MR HOUGH: You didn't mark your email as high importance?
 22 A. No.
 23 Q. You didn't say in the text of it "I need you to approve
 24 this before I send it on to others"?
 25 A. No.

180

1 Q. At that stage, did you intend for it to be seen by the
2 members of the Security Group at the meeting which was
3 scheduled for 25 May, some nine days later?
4 A. It would have been at the first Security Group that
5 I would have received it back and if I had to make
6 changes, I would make changes. If that was before
7 25 May, then it would have gone into that meeting, if
8 not, it would have been the subsequent meeting.
9 Q. Did you speak to Superintendent Isaac about this email
10 around the time you sent it or, indeed, at any time
11 before 3 June?
12 A. I can't remember if I spoke to -- I don't know --
13 I can't remember if I spoke to her on the phone or
14 anything about this -- about that email.
15 Q. Looking at the period between when you received the
16 Cerastes report on 27 April and when you produced this
17 summary and provided it on 16 May, have you checked your
18 diary for what you were doing over that period of time?
19 A. Yes, I've checked my diary.
20 Q. And by reference to paragraph 26 of your witness
21 statement, is it fair to say that in short, that was
22 a very busy period for you with only a limited number of
23 spare working days?
24 A. Absolutely. I had -- at the time, as well, there were
25 other projects that I was involved in in terms of, you

181

1 know, I don't know exactly what I was doing but I would
2 have been involved heavily in terms of Project Servator
3 not just in the City of London Police, but other forces
4 and as well as having two -- being tasked by
5 Superintendent Helen Isaac and the Security Group so
6 I had quite a lot of work on then, yes.
7 Q. Were you running a course over that period for which
8 you --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- had to do quite bit of work as well?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Then {WS5014/31}, please. In your summary which you
13 sent to Superintendent Isaac, you noted in your key
14 findings in short that Servator deployments can be very
15 effective but that there had been limitation in the
16 number of encounters between the Cerastes operatives and
17 Servator-deployed police?
18 A. Yes, this basically comes down to the recommendations
19 I made after the first Cerastes report. At that stage
20 we didn't have the volume of trained staff and,
21 therefore, some of our CT deployments were, in my
22 opinion, not up to scratch in terms of Project Servator
23 level CT deployments, and that's why I made that
24 comment.
25 Q. Well, we don't need to go into the detail, but is it

182

1 right to say that you made various recommendations about
2 Servator deployments in this summary?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And then {WS5015/33}, please, you gave a highlighted
5 concern about London Bridge, and you identified the
6 various features of the bridge that made it
7 an attractive or vulnerable target which you have
8 referred to before and which we have gone through with
9 other witnesses?
10 A. Yes, so this -- after the Cerastes report and that
11 confirmation to my concerns, I would have looked into it
12 more in terms of with the hostile mindset and in terms
13 of online reconnaissance, as you can see there from the
14 source of my first point, to take -- carrying out
15 physical reconnaissance myself. That's what I found and
16 my belief and how I felt about that site.
17 Q. Now, the recommendation you gave was installing hostile
18 vehicle mitigation in the form of permanent structures
19 complying with specific standards?
20 A. Yes. As I said, by nature I am impatient, but I was
21 completely of the opinion and aware that even with this
22 report and the Cerastes report, that the National
23 Barrier Asset wouldn't be used in terms of fast-time and
24 knowing that was the only fast-time solution it ruled
25 that out and that this would be a long-term project.

183

1 Q. Now, you recommended the hostile vehicle mitigation
2 option rather than the Servator option out of those two
3 options presented by Cerastes for dealing with the
4 particular threat on London Bridge; is that right?
5 A. So as CT tactical coordinator, I think at that time --
6 I may be wrong, but at that time I think there were more
7 CT Servator-style deployments going on London Bridge
8 than any other place in the City. As I say,
9 I recommended those -- the deployments to Security Group
10 and the Security Group would either say: yes, we agree,
11 or we've got concerns around other sites, or we've got
12 an event on that I may have missed. It happened very,
13 very rarely, but the -- in terms of resourcing,
14 I believe with the resources we had, we did as much as
15 we could in terms of the deployments on London Bridge
16 without neglecting our other sites, and I think after
17 the terrible Manchester attack, nationally the focus was
18 very much on events and we concentrated on our events
19 but we didn't take our eye off the ball in terms of our
20 other locations which I recommended and I certainly
21 wasn't pushed into looking at just events.
22 London Bridge stayed on it.
23 Q. With Servator giving you two options, one relating to
24 further police deployments, one relating to physical
25 protection in the form of barriers, you were

184

1 recommending very clearly here barriers, weren't you?
 2 A. Barriers don't form part of Project Servator. That's
 3 not a Servator tactic.
 4 Q. I appreciate that. I'm sorry to cut across, but the
 5 Cerastes report which we saw --
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. -- gave those two options that we looked at for
 8 addressing their concerns about London Bridge?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. You regarded hostile vehicle mitigation in the form that
 11 you've set out here as the right way to go.
 12 A. As well as the CT deployments. That was always -- that
 13 was a given that our CT deployments would have focused
 14 heavily on London Bridge and that this was absolutely
 15 a -- hostile vehicle mitigation should be considered as
 16 well.
 17 Q. Did you ever make a recommendation of hostile vehicle
 18 mitigation measures of this kind at London Bridge before
 19 you supplied this summary?
 20 A. I don't believe so, no.
 21 Q. We can take that document down now.
 22 Did you provide the entire Cerastes report to anyone
 23 after receiving it?
 24 A. Yes, I took copies to the Security Group meeting with me
 25 for anyone's -- to anyone within there, in the Security

185

1 Group, to take. I can't -- I don't know or can't recall
 2 who took a copy. I remember there would be copies --
 3 I put copies within Special Branch as well, but in terms
 4 of individual officers or personnel taking a copy,
 5 I know they would -- they did because I was left with
 6 few copies but I can't recall who took a copy.
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think we saw from that one page you
 8 were suggesting that even if people didn't read the
 9 whole report they might want to read page 10, which
 10 I think you say refers to some positive points as well
 11 as the issues that you've highlighted?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 MR HOUGH: So it's likely that a number of people saw it
 14 following that meeting of 11 May?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Did you also provide a copy to Mr Woolford?
 17 A. As I say, I can't remember who I gave a physical copy
 18 to. I didn't keep -- unfortunately I didn't keep
 19 a record of who and times and when were given a copy to,
 20 I was given copies of that report and handed it out to
 21 those appropriate.
 22 What I didn't do, I didn't hand it out to anyone who
 23 had been tested, ie any uniformed policing officers
 24 because it was on a need-to-know basis, the reports had
 25 vulnerabilities in of various sites and because of that

186

1 it was on a need-to-know basis.
 2 Q. Mr Woolford, based on his statement, will say that he
 3 met you and received this report between 8 and
 4 11 May 2017; do you recall that meeting with him?
 5 A. I recall that meeting, but, as I say, I can't remember
 6 if I actually physically gave a copy there if -- but
 7 I don't disagree with him. If he had a copy and that's
 8 when he had it, I would say that's an accurate --
 9 Q. Did you discuss London Bridge with him at that meeting?
 10 A. I can't remember if -- what the discussions were.
 11 I'm sure we may have done along with the matrix and
 12 other bits and pieces around his work. I remember --
 13 I do remember talking around training of personnel which
 14 we carried out.
 15 Q. Did you go on paternity leave on 19 May 2017?
 16 A. I did.
 17 Q. Had you received a response from Superintendent Isaac to
 18 your email of 16 May before then?
 19 A. No.
 20 Q. Did you chase?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. Why not?
 23 A. At that stage I didn't see it as urgent in terms of it
 24 would make any difference. I was quite confident that
 25 the CT taskings had been changed in terms of previously

187

1 that they were going to be Servator in style and that
 2 that was the way things were going. So the fast-time
 3 solutions that I'd spoken about were being engaged.
 4 The slower time, ie the training of more officers in
 5 terms of Servator, was being progressed and that was how
 6 it was left.
 7 Q. How long were you going to be away on paternity leave
 8 for?
 9 A. I think I ended up away for about three weeks.
 10 Q. And did you expect that the summary that you produced,
 11 plus your recommendations, would be circulated to
 12 anybody while you were away?
 13 A. I can't recall what I was thinking at the time in terms
 14 of that report. It was, you know, a piece of -- I had
 15 a large workload and that was just one report that I'd
 16 sent to Superintendent Isaac for checking and reviewing
 17 before I would have sent it on to Security Group, so
 18 I can't -- I can't recall.
 19 Q. Did you expect her to send it on to anyone?
 20 A. I would have imagined she would have sent it back to me
 21 to then forward on, but because I was on paternity
 22 leave, I don't know.
 23 Q. If she had sent it back to you approving it, would you
 24 have sent it on to others during your paternity leave?
 25 A. I -- I didn't turn my computer on. I was on paternity

188

1 leave. I had a very difficult first child and I had
 2 very, very little sleep at that stage and so I wouldn't
 3 have touched my laptop in any other circumstances. In
 4 fact, I was told: right, you go and concentrate on your
 5 family. So I wouldn't have been checking my emails in
 6 normal circumstance.

7 Q. That's well understood. Was there any arrangement in
 8 place for somebody else to be checking your emails and
 9 covering your work during your paternity leave?

10 A. The business as usual in terms of CT tasking is
 11 obviously SRC meet fortnightly and then the Security
 12 Group meet in the afternoon the same day and that's when
 13 the CT taskings are discussed, the previous fortnight's
 14 and the subsequent fortnight. So being off for,
 15 potentially I knew it would be longer than two weeks,
 16 I sent an email, I believe, to a couple of colleagues
 17 briefing them up verbally and then letting management
 18 know that, you know, it was in safe hands, they
 19 understood what was needed, they were Servator trained
 20 officers and that there would be no gap or vulnerability
 21 in terms of CT taskings.

22 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think you've described it as the sort
 23 of business as usual part of the job?

24 A. Absolutely.

25 MR HOUGH: If Superintendent Isaac had sent an email back to

189

1 you while you were away saying "I approve this report",
 2 would any of your colleagues have picked that up and
 3 then sent it on to anyone else?

4 A. No, at the time the colleagues that I used in terms of
 5 for the CT taskings, they were, as I say, Servator
 6 trained officers and subject to basically the testing of
 7 Cerastes.

8 Also, they -- I -- because of the information
 9 contained in the report and certainly the changes that
 10 I was recommending to the structure of the organisation
 11 and other bold statements, I didn't feel it was
 12 necessary that they should see it, first off.

13 Q. We now look at another email you sent, {WS5014/34}.
 14 This was after you had started on paternity leave but
 15 the time immediately after the Manchester attack when
 16 the threat level had been raised to critical; do you
 17 remember that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You sent an email to Superintendent Isaac in which you
 20 highly recommended that serious consideration was taken
 21 to carry out the suggestions from -- your suggestions
 22 from the friendly hostile report?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Does that suggest that you were giving strong
 25 recommendation to consideration of those as a matter of

190

1 urgency?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Did you therefore expect, having sent that email, that
 4 your suggestions would be considered while you were
 5 away?

6 A. The considerations, absolutely, but again, I would
 7 exclude from that the last page in terms of hostile
 8 vehicle mitigation, unfortunately, because, as I said
 9 before, I know now, as I did then, that there was no
 10 fast-time solution open to Security Group in terms of
 11 putting hostile vehicle mitigation on that bridge
 12 fast-time, and that's still the case today, if there was
 13 another location it would still be the same.

14 Q. Let's set aside implementation for a moment. Did you
 15 expect, having sent this email, on top of the other one,
 16 that your recommendation would at least be seen and
 17 considered by the Security Group in your absence?

18 A. Yes, obviously by putting "serious consideration is
 19 taken to carry out my suggestions from the friendly
 20 hostile report", the page before obviously had a list of
 21 recommendations that I made which were with regards to
 22 the deployments themselves and the training of
 23 individuals including senior officers.

24 Q. Certainly, but if your serious recommendation about
 25 hostile vehicle mitigation had gone to the Security

191

1 Group in your absence, as you expected, then it would
 2 have been for them to consider what response to give to
 3 that; correct?

4 A. It absolutely would have been their decision, what they
 5 did with it, yes.

6 Q. Now, if you had considered that installation of barriers
 7 on London Bridge was an important or urgent need, was
 8 there any way for you to report that as a point of
 9 concern other than by the various emails you sent?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Is that something you could have pursued through NaCTSO?

12 A. I would have loved -- I would love to be able to say
 13 there was, you know -- I would love to have been -- for
 14 there to have been a route then and now for a fast-time
 15 solution in terms of my fears and concerns around that
 16 bridge, or any other locations where we could have
 17 a fast-time solution to putting in hostile vehicle
 18 mitigation but I know, as of then and as it is now, in
 19 terms of business as usual away from events or where
 20 direct intelligence is there to suggest there's going to
 21 be an attack, there isn't that option.

22 Q. Final general point. You had identified London Bridge
 23 as a vulnerable location from early 2017 or, indeed,
 24 beforehand?

25 A. Yes.

192

1 Q. You had identified it both because of its physical
2 characteristics and because of your understanding of the
3 wider threat picture?
4 A. What gave me the understanding, what gave me the
5 ability, I believe, to be -- have a better understanding
6 of threat, was through my work as a CTSA in terms of
7 protective security, but added to that was the work
8 around Project Servator, in particular, the hostile
9 mindset, and going forward I think it's really important
10 that Project Servator is taken seriously, a product
11 called Scan, See, Check and Notify, which is basically
12 the civilianisation of Project Servator, and most
13 importantly, the hostile mindset for anyone involved in
14 protective security advice, whether that be CTSA's,
15 SECCOs or security coordinators or anyone else, that
16 they have that awareness, because I believe that that
17 work was cutting edge at the time, and still is, and
18 we're still developing it, and that it gives us, the UK,
19 UK plc, a far, far better way of dealing, hopefully,
20 with the threat from terrorism. We're never going to be
21 100 per cent, but I truly believe that those three
22 things will make a significant difference,
23 an enhancement in terms of protective security to the
24 UK.
25 Q. Thank you for those reflections, but can I just have

193

1 your response to this: you had identified London Bridge
2 from well before the Westminster attack --
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. -- as being a vulnerable location, both through your
5 knowledge of the hostile mindset and from its physical
6 characteristics?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. You then had the Westminster Bridge attack involving the
9 use of a vehicle-as-weapon on a comparable bridge in the
10 capital?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can you understand why it's a concern of the families
13 that somebody with your views about London Bridge
14 didn't -- wasn't able to communicate those in such a way
15 as to lead to swift physical protective security?
16 A. Absolutely. I mean, I give my sincere condolences to
17 the families of those involved, and also the victims and
18 the survivors. I wish I could have had a way and still
19 have a way of making that point or the ability to put
20 hostile vehicle mitigation down fast-time, but it didn't
21 exist then and it doesn't exist now in terms of because
22 of my thoughts and my expertise, that would not have met
23 that threshold. As I said, the National Barrier Asset
24 was, in my knowledge, only deployed for events and
25 a permanent solution in terms of hostile vehicle

194

1 mitigation takes a hell of a long time to install
2 because of all of things that local authorities have to,
3 or private corporations have to go through to get it in
4 place, and there's no fast-time solution.
5 I don't know what else to say. It's a very
6 uncomfortable position to be in where you are seeing
7 threat, and there's no fast-time tactical option to deal
8 with it.
9 Maybe if the attack happened not at that time but
10 further in the future that we would have had enough time
11 in terms of the organisations involved to put hostile
12 vehicle mitigation on that bridge, and if not, it would
13 be a different story. If we were here in five years'
14 time and an attack had taken place a number of years
15 after that report and nothing had been done, I would be
16 sitting up here saying, you know, it's outrageous that
17 it wasn't installed or the recommendations weren't
18 installed, but in terms of the time that we had between
19 my reports and what I believed to be the case to the
20 attack, it didn't lend itself to us having enough time
21 to put anything in, and I wish we could have -- you
22 know, I could have done more, I could have -- but I know
23 in my heart of hearts that there is no fast-time
24 tactical option.
25 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Those are all my questions.

195

1 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Patterson, can I, before you start,
2 I'm just going to interrupt you very rudely. We haven't
3 taken a break because I need to finish today at 4.30, so
4 that's why we haven't. My apologies that we haven't
5 done so, and please don't feel you've got to finish just
6 because I can't be here.
7 MR PATTERSON: Yes. I'll try to finish by 4.30, I may not,
8 but I'll certainly try.
9 Questions by MR PATTERSON QC
10 MR PATTERSON: Officer, on more than one occasion, you made
11 the point that your analysis involved not just focusing
12 on intelligence --
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. -- but also on two things in particular that we see
15 emerging again and again in your emails and in your oral
16 evidence today: methodology?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. What have we seen terrorists do in other attacks?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Masood on Westminster Bridge?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Nice, Berlin, elsewhere in the world; yes?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And, secondly, propaganda: what is Dabiq and Inspire
25 magazine encouraging would-be terrorists to do?

196

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Use vehicles like mowing machines and that kind of
 3 material; is that right?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And I made a note that at one stage you said that there
 6 were two things in particular that helped you, and that
 7 was the propaganda and the methodology --
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. -- when analysing what you have described as focusing on
 10 the mindset, the hostile mindset of these terrorists; is
 11 that right?
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. Added to all of your training, and you told us of the
 14 many years of training and courses on HVM issues and all
 15 the rest of it?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. In one of the emails we saw you talking about -- my
 18 words, not yours, we can go there if necessary, but
 19 officers on patrol, they may actually not deter
 20 a terrorist, they may, in certain circumstances,
 21 depending on how they're conducting themselves --
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. -- they may attract terrorists and turn themselves into
 24 a target?
 25 A. Potentially, yes.

197

1 Q. That was a concern of yours?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. You spoke about the crowded places list, and I don't
 4 want to get into that, other than this: you said that we
 5 know there is this Home Office list, we've been told
 6 that neither Westminster Bridge nor London Bridge, even
 7 after Westminster, London Bridge wasn't on the list at
 8 all --
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. -- at any tier, and I made a note that at one stage you
 11 said that the CTSA, so the experts like you, wouldn't be
 12 applying their mind to London Bridge because it wasn't
 13 on the crowded places list.
 14 A. It didn't -- as I put in my statement, it didn't work as
 15 a PSIA site, which is the crowded places workstream from
 16 NaCTSO, it doesn't work because it's not as simple as
 17 crowds in locations.
 18 Q. So we know, now we've discovered that.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Although you, commendably, if I may say so, did identify
 21 its vulnerabilities, but others wouldn't be applying
 22 their mind to it, you told us, because it wasn't on that
 23 list?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. You spoke about your concerns as to the bridge in many

198

1 emails and we looked at those, and obviously after
 2 Masood's attack on Westminster Bridge that will have fed
 3 into your concerns?
 4 A. It would have fed into my concerns, yes.
 5 Q. You were speaking about the deployments that were going
 6 on of officers on foot, and you spoke about how, again,
 7 an interesting phrase you used, there was intelligent
 8 deployment, the deployment was intelligent rather than
 9 being intelligence-led?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And were you making the point that people shouldn't be
 12 just focusing on where you have intel you action it, but
 13 also, use your brains, think intelligently as to how you
 14 deploy people having regard to methodology and
 15 propaganda and hostile mindsets?
 16 A. I don't think it's as simple as just use your brains.
 17 Q. I'm oversimplifying it.
 18 A. I know in Lord Harris' report he says not just
 19 over-reliance on intelligence, absolutely, I agree, but
 20 what else -- you know, what else was there for anyone to
 21 look at. Yes, I grip that in terms of propaganda and
 22 other attack methodologies from across the globe because
 23 of that -- that is what the hostile may be doing, yes.
 24 Q. And those are the two most important features that fed
 25 into your work, you told us?

199

1 A. Along with the intelligence, those three things are
 2 equally as important to one another to come out with
 3 a best guess, as I said in one email with regards to the
 4 five top locations, is this is to the best of my
 5 ability, it's not 100%, but this is, I believe, the most
 6 intelligent way of deploying assets.
 7 Q. {WS5014/17}, please. The day after Westminster you
 8 spoke about this particular email in which, as we saw,
 9 London Bridge got mentioned about two-thirds of the way
 10 down --
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. -- about being the most vulnerable location for
 13 marauding vehicle attack along with, and then another
 14 place, which has been redacted.
 15 So you weren't just focusing on what the methodology
 16 of yesterday had told you from Masood's attack on the
 17 attack at the Palace of Westminster; you were, quite
 18 properly, I suggest, focusing on what the methodology
 19 tells us about an attack from a marauding vehicle in the
 20 context of London Bridge?
 21 A. And another location, yes.
 22 Q. So you didn't dismiss what happened on the pavement as
 23 though it was somehow not something that might feed into
 24 the mindset of other would-be terrorists, did you?
 25 A. Sorry, could you repeat the question, sorry?

200

1 Q. You didn't dismiss what happened on the pavement to all
 2 of those victims at Westminster Bridge --
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. -- as though it was not going to possibly feed into the
 5 mindset of other copycat attackers?
 6 A. To some extent, however, I will say that in terms of
 7 copycat I think we need to get away from the bridges.
 8 It wasn't just: okay, it's a copycat because it is
 9 a bridge --
 10 Q. Yes.
 11 A. -- as I said before, London Bridge was an attractive
 12 target because of multiple factors. One additional
 13 factor to any hostile would be the lack of escape routes
 14 that maybe a streetscape would give you.
 15 Q. Yes. And absence of street furniture allowed Masood to
 16 do what he did, no escape route allowed Masood to do
 17 what he did and, likewise, those two significant
 18 features were preying on your mind in relation to
 19 London Bridge.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. If we go, please, to page 14 of this section, on
 22 24 March you emailed a number of colleagues and again
 23 you mentioned London Bridge in the context of the top
 24 five list of places --
 25 A. Yes.

201

1 Q. -- at the bottom of the page. {WS5014/14}. Again we
 2 see in the middle of the page how you are focusing not
 3 just on current intelligence but on propaganda and on
 4 attack methodologies?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And applying your mind, entirely appropriately, I would
 7 suggest, to all the relevant factors as to risks?
 8 A. I believe to the best of my ability that this was the
 9 best way to do that --
 10 Q. Yes.
 11 A. -- as I say, in conjunction with my training as a CTSA
 12 and, as I say, very importantly in terms of the
 13 awareness and training around Project Servator, SCaN and
 14 the hostile mindset awareness.
 15 Q. And you are bringing your concerns about
 16 London Bridge -- I appreciate other areas but we don't
 17 know what they are and we are not concerned directly
 18 with them --
 19 A. No.
 20 Q. -- but London Bridge, you're bringing your concerns to
 21 whom? Who -- what roles were held by these recipients
 22 who we can see listed at the top of the page?
 23 A. So, Superintendent Duffy, William Duffy, he was
 24 basically silver -- I believe he was silver commander,
 25 may have been gold, I can't be 100%, but basically in

202

1 essence I was giving him tactical advice. The reference
 2 to my email where I talk about being frustrated around
 3 the actual how we work, within a very quick time,
 4 Superintendent Duffy had changed what they were doing
 5 into what I recommended, which was
 6 Project Servator-style deployment, so that's
 7 Superintendent Duffy.
 8 Q. So he had a role in protective security or counter
 9 terrorism?
 10 A. No, he's uniformed policing because obviously he was the
 11 uniformed policing superintendent and he was put in
 12 control of the uniformed assets post-Westminster for the
 13 City of London.
 14 Q. So he is a senior officer within the force?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Haddon, Rinn, Dyson?
 17 A. Mark Haddon is the sergeant, the CTSA sergeant. Jo Rinn
 18 is the runner for Mr Duffy, and Trevor Dyson worked
 19 within CT, worked within counter terrorism.
 20 Q. So counter terrorism, CTSA, and a senior officer,
 21 a superintendent?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. All being notified of these concerns?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And at {WS5014/15}, please, you say towards the end of

203

1 this email that you have CCed Mark Haddon. He is the
 2 CTSA supervisor so he was somebody that you would work
 3 with, was he?
 4 A. I hadn't worked with him. I had left the department
 5 some time before he became the CTSA supervisor.
 6 Q. And what did you mean when you wrote "I'm pleased to say
 7 Mark concurs with the list above."
 8 You had chatted with him, had you, or messaged him?
 9 A. Yes, I would have spoken to him, and the reason is he is
 10 the CTSA supervisor. By me saying about the -- given
 11 the five sites, I felt that I was cutting across, or
 12 I was cutting across the CTSA department's work and so
 13 I wanted, out of courtesy, to make sure he concurred
 14 with the sites that I was recommending, which he did.
 15 Q. So another figure, senior to you, involved in, as we can
 16 see, NaCTSO issues and protective security issues?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Page 27, {WS5014/27}, on 3 May, as I understand,
 19 although the subject heading refers to a Corporation
 20 matter, as I understand your evidence, this is
 21 a reference to the Cerastes report when you speak about
 22 the "Latest 'Friendly Hostile Report'" is that correct,
 23 that had been given to you "last Friday", which would
 24 have been at the end of April, which is, we understand,
 25 when you received their input?

204

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. When you say "I have a copy for SB" at the end of that
 3 paragraph --
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. -- can you help us: is that one of your colleagues,
 6 or ...?
 7 A. No, that's Special Branch, so it's a department.
 8 Q. Within the force, within the City?
 9 A. Within the force, yes.
 10 Q. So you told us that you gave a copy of this Cerastes
 11 report to Mr Woolford, or it was pointed out to you he
 12 says he received it and you don't disagree with that?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. You said that you left copies of the report for others
 15 at the meeting on 11 May?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. You say that copies were taken, so were they taken by
 18 members of the SG meeting, the Security Group meeting?
 19 A. Not bundles of, there may have been one or two copies
 20 taken at Security Group, but it wasn't shared outside of
 21 that unless they were key and pertinent people to that
 22 report, because of the sensitive nature of the
 23 information within that report and also that we were
 24 testing and testing our personnel, in effect.
 25 Q. So the report that contained all these filings that

205

1 we've been focusing on, and you've been taken through
 2 them again today, they went to the Security Group, they
 3 went to Special Branch, and they went to the Corporation
 4 who had their own responsibility for the bridge?
 5 A. Yes, I don't know whether Mr Woolford was with the City
 6 of London Police then or attached to the Corporation of
 7 London.
 8 Q. We've heard that he was seconded to them from
 9 mid-February --
 10 A. Okay.
 11 Q. -- so quite some few months earlier.
 12 And the reason that you passed it to all of these
 13 people is, perhaps, obvious, but spell it out, please:
 14 why did you pass it to these people and make copies
 15 available?
 16 A. Because the reports were -- we'd paid for the reports.
 17 Q. Yes.
 18 A. The City of London Police had paid for the reports
 19 because, you know, we're a progressive force, as
 20 I'm sure you know.
 21 Q. Yes.
 22 A. We've had, you know, this was part of progression in
 23 terms of countering terrorism, they were important
 24 reports. I am a realist, I understand that these are
 25 large documents, as we've heard, and I felt the

206

1 requirement to do a summary document.
 2 Q. But certainly the actual reports themselves, you
 3 provided them in the way you've described?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. In one of the emails you spoke about London Bridge being
 6 your biggest concern?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Is that because of the no escape factor and the no
 9 street furniture, those features?
 10 A. It would have been with regards to everything that
 11 I listed in my four-page summary.
 12 Q. And when you met with Mr Woolford, you would have
 13 discussed, no doubt, with him the fact, as you gave him
 14 the report, that there was this information that had
 15 come in from this professional group, Cerastes, you
 16 would have told him who they were, for example?
 17 A. If he had a copy he would have -- I would have given him
 18 a précis of who they were, yes.
 19 Q. Your line manager, Superintendent Isaac --
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. -- you sent her that email on 16 May. She had
 22 previously been notified, you told us, about the interim
 23 report number 1?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. This was you bringing to her attention, another

207

1 superintendent, interim report number 2?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. That was on Tuesday, 16 May, and you had paternity leave
 4 that began, you told us, on 19 May?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And you had, if I may say so, quite properly been told
 7 you were on paternity leave and your responsibilities
 8 must cease and you must focus on your family at that
 9 stage; is that correct?
 10 A. I was, yes.
 11 THE CHIEF CORONER: I had the date down as 24 May.
 12 MR PATTERSON: Well, I think in the witness's statement he
 13 gives the date --
 14 THE CHIEF CORONER: We know there's an email that is sent on
 15 24 May.
 16 A. I would have started paternity leave on the 19th -- and
 17 then I did have my laptop at home but I didn't look at
 18 my laptop until, obviously, the Manchester attack.
 19 MR PATTERSON: Paragraph 27, officer, you say:
 20 "I commenced my paternity leave on 19 May."
 21 A. Yes, Friday 19 May.
 22 Q. And then on 24 May, as his Lordship has rightly reminded
 23 you, there was the email, if we could just look at that,
 24 please, at page 34 of this section. {WS5014/34}, so
 25 this is just after Manchester, which was on the 22nd,

208

1 two days after Manchester; yes?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Capital letters :
 4 "... HIGHLY RECOMMEND that serious consideration is
 5 taken to carry out my suggestions from the friendly
 6 hostile report."
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. That was the key message of this email that you were
 9 sending even though you were on paternity leave?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. You must have felt real concern about this issue,
 12 particularly after Manchester, to go to the trouble to
 13 send this email; is that right?
 14 A. I'm absolutely passionate about what I do and because of
 15 that, every day I do my job I do it to the best of my
 16 ability, and even if I was on leave and with little --
 17 very little sleep at that point, I felt it pertinent and
 18 I felt that I should help in any way I can. I felt very
 19 frustrated that I wasn't actually helping my force in
 20 terms of I was stuck at home and not actually at work.
 21 Q. Yes, I'm sure we all understand the emotions, perhaps,
 22 that must have been going through your mind with your
 23 responsibilities .
 24 So you had been repeatedly, in different ways,
 25 flagging up your concerns about London Bridge, you have

209

1 now reminded your superintendent about your short
 2 summary of the report, even though you had distributed
 3 the report itself ?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. There wasn't much more, really, that you could be
 6 expected to do, I would suggest; would you agree?
 7 A. I would like to think that I -- and I do believe I did
 8 the best to my ability .
 9 Q. Yes. And so as Mr Hough indicated, the report posed two
 10 potential solutions to the problem, and in your memo or
 11 note to your superintendent, you focused on barriers in
 12 addition to Operation Servator deployments?
 13 A. Project Servator deployments, yes.
 14 Q. So HVM, and realistically, I would suggest, that to
 15 address this really acute problem, barriers were the
 16 only realistic solution that could address it; would you
 17 agree?
 18 A. I think it would have been a very different story if --
 19 and I must say now, Project Servator isn't a CT tactic
 20 that we would use for a live CT operation.
 21 Q. Quite.
 22 A. But maybe it would have been very different if they had
 23 actually come across a Project Servator deployment, an
 24 enhanced one with firearms in or around the location and
 25 the attack may or would have been very, very different

210

1 in hindsight. Now --
 2 Q. Although of course you can't have them on every street
 3 24/7 within the jurisdiction of the City of London?
 4 A. No. Likewise you can't have hostile vehicle mitigation
 5 on every street .
 6 Q. But forgive me, I mean, the officers on foot --
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. -- you can't have them covering everywhere all of the
 9 time.
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. It was for that reason that you had recommended to your
 12 superintendent in that short summary document,
 13 essentially consideration being given to barriers?
 14 A. Hostile vehicle mitigation, yes, not barriers .
 15 Q. Well, of whatever sort.
 16 A. I think it's a really important point: it's not
 17 barriers, it's hostile vehicle mitigation. If I was
 18 recommending barriers, ie railings or anything, I simply
 19 wouldn't recommend that.
 20 Q. You were asked by Mr Hough as to how long you
 21 anticipated it would take to address this and you made
 22 the point about timing, but of course we know that when
 23 it was addressed after the 3 June attack, barriers were
 24 installed within something like six days?
 25 A. Yes.

211

1 Q. And so the ultimate decision as to how to address the
 2 problems that you had flagged up, that was a decision
 3 that, in your absence, you assumed would be made by
 4 senior management, by the Security Group or by the
 5 commander with responsibility?
 6 A. Sorry, I didn't quite get that, sorry?
 7 Q. Well, you had posed -- you had identified the risk?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. You had drawn it to the attention of Cerastes, they had
 10 added to your concerns with their observations?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. You had passed this to the group --
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. -- and to Special Branch --
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. -- and to the Corporation. You knew that decisions
 17 would have to be made that included issues such as
 18 resources and all manner of factors that perhaps were --
 19 I don't mean this disrespectfully, but to be made at
 20 a more senior level to you?
 21 A. Yes, obviously I recommend, and everything I recommended
 22 in terms of protective security, in terms of the actual
 23 deployments, were taken on board, and there was
 24 a significant increase in the CT deployments to
 25 London Bridge as recommended by myself.

212

1 Q. Well, you said "by nature I am impatient". You wanted
 2 and expected it to be dealt with swiftly, no doubt?
 3 A. I am impatient, but I am a realist as well and, as
 4 I know today as I know then, hostile vehicle mitigation,
 5 fast-time, there was no tactical option at that stage
 6 for that to happen. Absolutely I would have -- my
 7 recommendation, if there was a way to have done it
 8 fast-time, I would have pursued it and I would have been
 9 banging on the door and banging the drum about that.
 10 Q. Obviously ultimately the decision that will have to be
 11 considered is were reasonable steps taken to protect
 12 life where the risk had been flagged up, and you did
 13 everything you could to flag up the risk?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 MR PATTERSON: Thank you very much, sergeant, I have no more
 16 questions.
 17 A. Thank you.

Questions by MR WHITE

18 MR WHITE: Sergeant Hone, I ask questions on behalf of the
 19 parents and partner of Xavier Thomas. I don't have very
 20 much for you, I'm sure you and the Coroner and everyone
 21 else will be glad to know, but just a couple of points
 22 if I can, please. Can I pick up first of all on your
 23 immediate reaction to the Westminster Bridge attack?
 24 A. Yes.

213

1 Q. We've seen the emails, we've seen your statement, so
 2 I won't take you to them for time purposes, unless we
 3 need to, but it's fair to say, isn't it, that the nature
 4 of that attack and the fact that it came across a bridge
 5 was something that brought into your mind concerns you
 6 already had in relation to London Bridge?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And if you are making a correct analysis or a proper
 9 analysis of what happened in the Westminster attack, it
 10 would be wrong, wouldn't it, to ignore the fact that
 11 that attack started and came across a bridge?
 12 A. A bridge, yes. But in reference, as I've said before,
 13 in reference to London Bridge, if you took the -- all of
 14 the things I've highlighted as what I believe and put it
 15 anywhere else, not on a bridge, there was only one added
 16 bonus for the hostiles which was the lack of escape
 17 route.
 18 I don't -- I still don't believe it was targeted
 19 because it was a bridge.
 20 Q. It's not an attack on the bridge for the sake of saying
 21 "We attacked a bridge".
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. It's an attack on a bridge because of the tactical
 24 benefits to the hostile mind that bridges tend to offer;
 25 that's right, isn't it?

214

1 A. Some bridges.
 2 Q. Including London Bridge?
 3 A. Including London Bridge.
 4 Q. And Westminster Bridge?
 5 A. And Westminster Bridge.
 6 Q. Because, for example, if we take an analysis of what
 7 happened at Westminster, it has been suggested, for
 8 example, that Westminster Bridge was just a road that
 9 led to Parliament, but from the hostile mindset, that's
 10 not right, is it?
 11 A. The hostile mindset, sir, it's not a simple thing and
 12 it's very detailed and I don't want to go into the
 13 detail and I don't want to go into the actual course
 14 that we deliver and how we develop and how we've
 15 developed that knowledge around the hostile mindset.
 16 Q. Forgive me for cutting across you, for time purposes,
 17 can I put it to you like this --
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. -- if you come through Parliament Square on a marauding
 20 vehicle attack there is a huge space for people to
 21 disperse into, isn't there?
 22 A. In terms of Parliament Square?
 23 Q. Yes, just for example.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. For the sake of argument.

215

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. There are things people can hide behind, aren't there,
 3 statues, for example?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Street furniture?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. The same is not true for Westminster Bridge, is it?
 8 A. Of London Bridge?
 9 Q. No, no, of Westminster Bridge. We're talking about the
 10 analysis of what happened in Westminster, for the sake
 11 of argument for the moment?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. So if one takes the analysis from the hostile mindset,
 14 tactically, if I'm a terrorist and I want to attack
 15 Parliament, the best way, from the terrorist's point of
 16 view, is to come across the bridge on a marauding
 17 vehicle attack, isn't it?
 18 A. It depends what that --
 19 THE CHIEF CORONER: It might be a slightly dangerous line of
 20 questioning, this, because there are all manner of ways
 21 in which those who are suitably minded could attack
 22 Parliament. I'm not entirely sure, I mean I get --
 23 we've had quite a lot of questions about the lack of
 24 street furniture, the fact that there were no escape
 25 routes. I think we've covered that area quite

216

1 substantially, so I'm slightly conscious that actually
2 you're potentially entering into an area which is way
3 outside the scope of this, and looking at all sorts of
4 potential attacks on Parliament which invite speculation
5 and I don't want us to go down that route.

6 As I say, I've got your point, or I've got the point
7 in relation to the lack of street furniture, the lack of
8 escape routes.

9 MR WHITE: I don't intend to press that any further. It's
10 just this point, really: it is that to make a proper
11 analysis, and I'll put it in the broadest terms I can
12 without wishing to tread on anything that is outwith
13 scope, to make a proper analysis of that attack you had
14 to consider, didn't you, not just the fact that it was
15 an attack on Parliament, but how the attack began and
16 where it came from?

17 A. There are -- doing a vehicle attack isn't as simple as
18 it first appears. There is multiple factors that
19 I don't want to go into, considerations that the hostile
20 has to take. If I go into them it obviously could give
21 vulnerability --

22 THE CHIEF CORONER: Well, we're not going to go into them.

23 MR WHITE: Of course, but it's for that reason, isn't it,
24 that you don't just say: well, they came up the road, it
25 could have been any road?

217

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Moving on, we've seen your frustrations expressed in
3 respect of the application of some of the tactics that
4 obviously you've been involved personally in developing?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And we heard, for example, about your experience seeing
7 some officers outside Liverpool Street station?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Is it fair to say that there were occasions, more than
10 one occasion, where you had frustrations with whether or
11 not those tactics were being properly employed
12 throughout the force?

13 A. As I say, I am very impatient and my colleagues will say
14 that's very true of me.

15 I've been working on Servator since 2011 in
16 development of it, and I expected it to be perfect from
17 day one. Clearly it's not. We had to train up a number
18 of people. There are gaps in terms of where the
19 training were, we really concentrated and focused the
20 training on police constables and sergeants and some
21 inspectors and not enough strategic officers. That was
22 adapted or that was one of my recommendations and
23 obviously that is now in place and there is
24 business-as-usual work in terms of keeping the awareness
25 up as people get promoted.

218

1 Q. Can we just look quickly, please, at {WS5014/17}. This
2 is the email we've already seen and we've already picked
3 up on that part at the top and just look at the top,
4 particularly, the top half, please. We have already
5 looked at that part at the top where you mentioned this
6 point:

7 "I find it incredibly frustrating that yet again ..."

8 You say, so it's not the first time, is it, that
9 this problem has arisen?

10 A. I can't recall when it would have been -- or when it
11 would have happened before, but clearly, looking back,
12 probably not a terrorist attack, but maybe another
13 incident, maybe another event or a protest where they've
14 gone to that, and again, that was just down to lack of,
15 or the staff in the management, ie the gold, silver and
16 bronze commanders, may not have the awareness around
17 Project Servator.

18 Q. That's one thing I just want to pick up on. I think we
19 haven't picked up on this yet, it is the next paragraph,
20 you say this:

21 "We have tactical advisors for public order who are
22 taken seriously and are listened to ..."

23 Now, for context, is it right from that that we take
24 it that there is a sort of comparable role to the one
25 you have or had for public order tactics?

219

1 A. So there are tactical advisors for public order --

2 Q. Would that be a police constable as well, for example?

3 A. Potentially a police constable, yes, so maybe a
4 sergeant, it could be any rank, but yeah, potentially
5 a police constable, TAC ads or tactical advisors, yes.

6 Q. And your frustration here is that those people, perhaps
7 it's because it's been embedded for longer or perhaps
8 it's because public order is the sort of day-to-day work
9 of the police and has been since Peelian times, as we
10 heard earlier, but for whatever reason you seem to be
11 frustrated that your role is not being given the same
12 status in the organisation or recognised in the same
13 way; is that right?

14 A. It was a very new role and to expand on your point,
15 I think it's a good point for me and something that
16 I feel is very important is the -- you can see how hard
17 it is and how difficult it is to get new, emerging
18 cutting-edge tactics within a police force. I've heard
19 about -- it's been brought up about merging police
20 forces, the City of London Police being merged because
21 operationally it would run better. For me, the fact is
22 it is not by chance that some of the most progressive
23 protective security and counter terrorism tactics in the
24 UK now have come out of the City of London. ANPR and
25 Ring of Steel in the early 90s, Project Griffin which

220

1 was groundbreaking in its time in terms of protective
 2 security, engaging with the business community and wider
 3 community, Project Servator and now SCaN, See, Check and
 4 Notify, and the reason is is because of the point you
 5 bring up is because it's very difficult or it can be
 6 difficult to get the volume of people trained quickly to
 7 make changes, significant tactical changes and what
 8 we've done in the City is throughout the years is we've
 9 made tactical changes, significant, groundbreaking
 10 cultural changes and developments within policing,
 11 especially around countering terrorism, and if that
 12 merger happened, in my professional opinion, we wouldn't
 13 be damaging just London, we would be damaging UK plc in
 14 terms of progression in terms of countering terrorism
 15 and protective security.
 16 Q. You will be glad to know I don't need to ask you about
 17 merging the City of London and the
 18 Metropolitan Police --
 19 A. But it is relevant to your point because you've
 20 highlighted the fact that yes, it is difficult, but we
 21 have done it.
 22 Q. But what I want to pick up from this is something you
 23 say further on in this paragraph that relates to another
 24 issue: you at the time sat under the direct line
 25 management of Superintendent Isaac --

221

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. -- correct?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Now that was a legacy issue, wasn't it, it was just
 5 because a role had been lost in that department and it
 6 was created -- your role was created, and so almost for
 7 political reasons or because no one thought to do
 8 anything better you sat there under her, didn't you?
 9 A. The reason why I sat under Superintendent Isaac was
 10 because she was as passionate about Project Servator as
 11 I was, and so she saw how important it was that
 12 Project Servator and all the research around it
 13 including the hostile mindset was expedited and the
 14 importance of it, and so she gave up a role within her
 15 directorate for me to fulfil.
 16 Q. But the role doesn't sit there anymore, does it?
 17 A. Sorry?
 18 Q. The role doesn't sit there anymore?
 19 A. No, because it worked -- I was basically dual-hatting
 20 and now the role has gone back into crime because
 21 obviously it's a proven concept, it works, and, you
 22 know, so it fits in better within the crime directorate.
 23 Q. So just in the final part of that second paragraph, what
 24 you say is:
 25 "With counter terrorism tactics, we now have the

222

1 ability to offer the same service ..."
 2 Presumably to public order?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. "... both Matt Timms and I could be tactical advisors to
 5 Gold and/or Silver ..."
 6 And those are command positions --
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. -- correct --
 9 A. Correct.
 10 Q. -- within the police force? So I think what you are
 11 suggesting there, correct me if I'm wrong, is that it
 12 would have been better, or there would have at least
 13 been advantages to your role being fed directly into
 14 gold and silver command; is that fair?
 15 A. Absolutely, and due to this email, going in at 08.59,
 16 right at the start of the day, what Superintendent Helen
 17 Isaac made sure is that I was in effect the TAC ad to
 18 Superintendent Duffy and all of the deployments were
 19 changed and it was on my recommendation where all our
 20 uniformed assets were and in essence, I was the true
 21 tactical commander for countering terrorism to
 22 Superintendent Duffy who was either the silver or gold
 23 at the time. I believe silver.
 24 Q. But finally on that, it didn't change the fundamental
 25 management structure, so you were still reporting into

223

1 Superintendent Isaac and we see, for example, that the
 2 Cerastes summary of recommendations that you do goes to
 3 her inbox?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And the reason you tell us you do that is not because
 6 you want her advice; she's not a counter terrorism
 7 expert?
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. It's because you want, I'm going to call it political
 10 clearance, effectively, because you, as you say
 11 "I'm a police constable, she's a superintendent", you
 12 want to make sure you're not crossing the line; correct?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. So you wouldn't have had that problem if it was going
 15 straight into the inbox of a gold commander, would you?
 16 A. I may not have done that to a gold commander directly,
 17 it's because of the -- (overspeaking) --
 18 Q. If you had been working directly for the gold commander
 19 you would, wouldn't you?
 20 A. It depends on the relationship I had with that gold
 21 commander: if it was someone anonymous to me, no,
 22 I wouldn't have done it.
 23 Q. But if you had been working directly for them you would
 24 have had a relationship?
 25 A. If I worked directly for them, yes, but with this type

224

1 of thing, the gold and -- the silver commanders, if it's
2 a prolonged operation, will change, and so it might be
3 someone who is familiar to me and it may be someone who
4 is not that familiar to me. And, again, that's another
5 benefit of the City of London Police: is I had that
6 relationship with most of the superintendents, including
7 Superintendent Bill Duffy, who joined ten weeks before
8 me in the year 2000.

9 Q. Just finally, Sergeant Hone, we've heard about the
10 national decision-making processes and the crowded
11 places analysis, which I think we've heard plenty about.
12 We've heard plenty about the issues with those things
13 and we've heard about what you have called the hostile
14 mindset approach.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Which, as I understand it, is essentially you saying "If
17 I were a terrorist what would I do?" I appreciate
18 that's a very simplistic way of looking at it, but that
19 allows you to identify, as has been identified by
20 Mr Patterson, for example, London Bridge as a target
21 where the national criteria wouldn't allow for that?

22 A. Alongside the framework -- alongside the framework that
23 I created, yes.

24 Q. Yes. But it means, doesn't it, that in terms of
25 national categorisation, London Bridge is always lower

225

1 down the priority order than it might otherwise be
2 because it's tier 3 at most, isn't it?

3 A. It's not -- it's -- at current -- at the current time,
4 if you look at it pure, this is exactly what we are
5 doing, with a focus on tier 1, tier 2, tier 3. As
6 I said, it didn't feature on the PSIA, the Home Office
7 protective security, because it couldn't: it didn't lend
8 itself as a location because it didn't have anyone to
9 work with. It didn't have security team, it didn't have
10 security manager. But it doesn't mean the City of
11 London Police, it came down the profile. Because I was
12 giving (inaudible) tactical advice it was very much
13 a significant site that we put a lot of resource within.

14 Q. I absolutely appreciate that from your point of view,
15 and obviously we've heard about the good work that you
16 did on that front, but from a national point of view, if
17 you were feeding things back up the chain, if you like,
18 in terms of recommendations that you wanted to make for
19 particular sites, it must be right, mustn't it, that if
20 something had been on the national criteria in tier 1 or
21 tier 2, then those recommendations would probably have
22 been looked upon more favourably or acted upon more
23 quickly?

24 A. Having a look at what I now know to be the
25 categorisation of the tier 1 and tier 2 site, which

226

1 I didn't know how they created tier 1 -- and the crowded
2 places definition was known to me, but the tiered sites
3 definitions, I would say that it can be -- it could be
4 progressed, and hopefully the things that I have worked
5 on, maybe it would give a wider or a potentially better
6 understanding to the locations that we work on. Or the
7 CTSA, my CTSA colleagues work on.

8 MR WHITE: Thank you very much.

9 Questions by MS BALLARD

10 MS BALLARD: Sorry, sir, I won't be long.

11 I ask questions on behalf of the Corporation of
12 London. You do recall the meeting with Mr Woolford
13 shortly after you sent the email to him on 8 May in
14 which you include the revised matrix; is that right?

15 A. I remember meeting Mr Woolford, yes.

16 Q. And I think you've said earlier you recall discussing
17 training issues?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is that issues around the guarding aspect that you were
20 working on quite closely with Mr Woolford at the time?

21 A. As a -- absolutely. As I said, the changes that were
22 made when Mr Woolford went into the Corporation were
23 significant and rapid.

24 Q. And might it have been in that context that you provided
25 a copy of the interim 2 Cerastes report as it touched

227

1 upon some of those aspects?

2 A. Potentially. Without compromising anything, the reports
3 may have contained more than one site in terms of
4 belonging to the City of London Corporation.

5 Q. And although you do not recall now, you think it's
6 likely and you would accept that you might have had
7 a brief conversation about the revised matrix and the
8 inclusion of London Bridge; is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. But in earlier answers you stated that your expectation
11 in terms of raising London Bridge with Mr Woolford was
12 that it was going to be put on, in your words, "on his
13 agenda"; is that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And is it fair to say that that would be in terms of
16 a long-term permanent solution?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did you understand that thereafter that was going to be
19 taken back into the Corporation in order to be raised at
20 their security board -- distinct from the Security
21 Group -- in June; is that right?

22 A. I wouldn't have gone into that detail. I understand
23 that Mr Woolford -- and I had complete trust in
24 Mr Woolford -- would have brought it into the City of
25 London Corporation and would have taken it on board and

228

1 progressed it .
 2 Q. Irrespective of whether you knew that or not, that sort
 3 of action was in line with your expectation; is that
 4 right?
 5 A. The expectations would have been that Mr Woolford would
 6 have, and I'm sure he did, bring it to the attention of
 7 the City of London Corporation, along with the rest of
 8 the risk matrix.
 9 MS BALLARD: Thank you.
 10 Questions by MS BARTON QC
 11 MS BARTON: I've only got a couple of issues I need to deal
 12 with.
 13 Could I have up on screen, please {WS5014/17}. This
 14 is the email that you've been taken to that refers to
 15 TAC advisors for public order, the email of 23 March.
 16 A. Yes ma'am.
 17 Q. Can I just deal with this: this email doesn't deal with
 18 hostile vehicle mitigation at all, does it?
 19 A. No.
 20 Q. What we're talking about in this email is the tactics
 21 that are being used to patrol locations?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And the purpose of this email is to flag up effectively
 24 the difference between a normal patrol and
 25 Project Servator?

229

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And the suggestion that you were making on 23 March was
 3 that you and your colleague could act as TAC advisors in
 4 the immediate aftermath of a critical incident?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And in fact in the immediate aftermath of this critical
 7 incident, that invitation was in fact taken up?
 8 A. Immediately, yes.
 9 Q. And you did act as a TAC advisor?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Yes, and that was a very novel and innovative solution?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Can I just deal with this, please: that in respect of
 14 the two potential solutions or recommendations that were
 15 made in the Cerastes report, one of them was the need
 16 for Project Servator deployments?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Now in respect of London Bridge, the tasking already
 19 provided for Servator deployments?
 20 A. A significant amount of Servator deployments, yes.
 21 Q. And had done since January 2016?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And in fact we see in a bar chart, which we saw earlier
 24 today, that there had been a 35% uplift in the Servator
 25 deployments on London Bridge in the period from the

230

1 early part of the year, March, to June 3?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And that accords, does it, with your recollection of the
 4 efforts that were being put in?
 5 A. Yes, and my recommendations in terms of the changing
 6 threat and the increase into certain locations, yes.
 7 Q. So, far from doing nothing in relation to Cerastes, one,
 8 you were already ahead of the curve because it was
 9 already a location being policed by Servator
 10 in January 2016?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. There had been an uplift?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And so you were delivering one of the two
 15 recommendations and working on it already?
 16 A. Yes, and, as already mentioned, if it wasn't for that,
 17 it wouldn't have featured on any national criteria in
 18 terms of a site -- a vulnerable site .
 19 Q. And the reason that you were doing that was, at least in
 20 part, because the other recommendation of hostile
 21 vehicle mitigation was one which, even at that time in
 22 your view, was a slow-time rather than a fast-time
 23 solution?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. So was the provision of the Project Servator deployments

231

1 the measure that was put in place to ensure that you
 2 were doing as much as you could at that time?
 3 A. To the best of our ability and the resources we had.
 4 MS BARTON: Thank you.
 5 MR HOUGH: Thank you, officer, those are all the questions
 6 we have for you, and thank you very much for your
 7 evidence and all your efforts .
 8 A. Thank you, sir .
 9 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you very much indeed. It's always
 10 good to see someone who's got a passion for what they
 11 do, and that's fairly clear to me not only from what
 12 you've said but the text of your emails, and thank you
 13 very much indeed for doing what you did.
 14 A. Thank you, sir .
 15 MR ADAMSON: I just want to add to that, I know that the
 16 family of Xavier Thomas endorse everything that you have
 17 just said, sir .
 18 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 19 MR ADAMSON: About Sergeant Hone's enthusiasm for this
 20 expertise .
 21 THE CHIEF CORONER: A little bit later than we thought, but
 22 it's more important that we didn't keep -- please don't
 23 feel you've got to stay there -- but that we didn't keep
 24 the officer waiting overnight to finish his evidence.
 25 We'll sit in the morning, Mr Hough, at 10 o'clock.

232

1 Can I just mention, there will be some other people
 2 in the courtroom tomorrow morning first thing. They've
 3 promised me they will be away from the courtroom by
 4 9.40, so I just thought I would just mention that if you
 5 see some stray bodies walking around the courtroom where
 6 you're not expecting them, that they are here with my
 7 permission.

8 (4.51 pm)
 9 (The court adjourned until 10.00 am on
 10 Thursday, 20 June 2019)

233

	INDEX	PAGE
	DEPUTY CHIEF CONSTABLE JANE GYFORD	1
	(continued)	
	Questions by MR HOUGH QC (continued)	1
	Questions by MR PATTERSON QC	45
	Questions by MR ADAMSON	119
	Questions by MS BARTON QC	131
	PS MATTHEW HONE (sworn)	139
	Questions by MR HOUGH QC	139
	Questions by MR PATTERSON QC	196
	Questions by MR WHITE	213
	Questions by MS BALLARD	227
	Questions by MS BARTON QC	229

234

235

<p>A</p> <p>abbreviated (2) 171:12,14</p> <p>ability (11) 44:15 162:23 163:2 193:5 194:19 200:5 202:8 209:16 210:8 223:1 232:3</p> <p>able (15) 24:9 25:19 31:18 35:22 49:13,15 61:19 63:14 67:7 111:8 134:21 151:13 180:19 192:12 194:14</p> <p>above (6) 2:17 84:20 132:21 159:2 176:2 204:7</p> <p>absence (17) 36:17 39:2 47:9 52:2,4 54:15,18 55:5 61:21 72:7,17 107:20 109:11 191:17 192:1 201:15 212:3</p> <p>absent (3) 75:4 104:1,13</p> <p>absolutely (40) 5:25 12:2 49:5 51:17 54:13 56:3 59:2 85:10 86:7 130:22 131:25 136:24 138:23 140:5 142:3 143:18 144:1 146:3 153:20 159:6,10,19 166:24 168:8 171:23 172:15 180:8,12 181:24 185:14 189:24 191:6 192:4 194:16 199:19 209:14 213:6 223:15 226:14 227:21</p> <p>academics (1) 145:20</p> <p>accept (3) 56:14 74:13 228:6</p> <p>access (7) 52:15,22 53:3 85:19 152:2 162:8 178:10</p> <p>accompanied (1) 166:17</p> <p>accomplices (1) 56:11</p> <p>according (4) 1:25 22:25 28:20 31:9</p> <p>accordingly (2) 20:2 87:24</p> <p>accords (1) 231:3</p> <p>account (7) 10:17 20:7 101:8 102:2,5 148:24 149:7</p> <p>accreditation (2) 141:7 142:12</p> <p>accredited (2) 60:13 141:3</p> <p>accurate (3) 131:22 179:16 187:8</p> <p>achievable (1) 5:21</p> <p>achieve (1) 145:22</p> <p>achieved (2) 17:2 46:23</p> <p>achieving (1) 144:11</p> <p>acronym (1) 88:14</p> <p>acronyms (1) 48:24</p> <p>across (21) 53:9 62:12 76:10 87:14 89:10 123:12 133:5,7 143:4 145:5 148:17 164:7 185:4 199:22 204:11,12 210:23 214:4,11 215:16 216:16</p>	<p>acted (1) 226:22</p> <p>acting (4) 22:11 72:12 91:20 161:9</p> <p>action (14) 2:21 5:2 10:10 29:12 72:9 108:19,24 120:13 123:14 124:2 128:7 155:11 199:12 229:3</p> <p>actioned (2) 100:6 113:1</p> <p>actioning (1) 114:5</p> <p>actions (11) 13:23 47:14 56:5 99:3,5,10 59:13 82:8 102:16 117:17 126:9,17 127:6 148:16</p> <p>active (2) 120:17 126:1</p> <p>activities (1) 108:13</p> <p>activity (11) 27:2 32:1 59:13 82:8 102:16 127:5 142:24 144:19 161:21 167:13 176:13</p> <p>actual (9) 93:13 97:13 113:11 149:16 168:3 203:3 207:2 212:22 215:13</p> <p>actually (35) 2:10 9:21 10:23 13:10 21:24 26:4,25 42:6 64:11 76:5 77:4,24 88:7 91:2 92:4 93:7 110:2 113:17 118:9,12,15,19 161:18 162:9,10 163:7 164:12 173:9 174:19 187:6 197:19 209:19,20 210:23 217:1</p> <p>acute (1) 210:15</p> <p>ad (2) 32:12 223:17</p> <p>adamson (12) 62:20 119:23,24,25,25 122:9,15,22 130:25 232:15,19 234:6</p> <p>adapted (1) 218:22</p> <p>add (6) 11:17 158:23 169:25 170:23 171:1 232:15</p> <p>added (13) 11:20 40:14 59:24 152:8 158:22 168:21,24 175:14,24 193:7 197:13 212:10 214:15</p> <p>addition (4) 30:11 84:20 132:20 210:12</p> <p>additional (8) 90:25 91:21 118:6 126:3 151:6 160:23 166:10 201:12</p> <p>address (9) 31:7 69:18 87:16 92:4 142:5 210:15,16 211:21 212:1</p> <p>addressed (4) 45:14 69:11 103:17 211:23</p> <p>addressees (2) 153:18 171:2</p> <p>addresses (1) 114:16</p> <p>addressing (2) 103:15 185:8</p> <p>adjourned (1) 233:9</p> <p>adjournment (1) 112:18</p> <p>ads (1) 220:5</p> <p>advance (5) 21:10 59:23 127:16 147:8,20</p>	<p>advanced (4) 2:13 78:4,6 106:21</p> <p>advantages (2) 99:20 223:13</p> <p>advice (14) 14:5 16:10 41:19 51:12 72:6 78:17 117:18 155:24 157:1 180:14 193:14 203:1 224:6 226:12</p> <p>advise (6) 50:24 72:1 81:15 89:8 111:6 142:4</p> <p>advised (2) 1:25 95:24</p> <p>advising (5) 20:25 75:18 96:13 108:12 161:23</p> <p>advisor (8) 3:15 40:18 41:19 60:3 140:21 141:1 155:22 230:9</p> <p>advisors (10) 52:15 82:14,15 146:15 219:21 220:1,5 223:4 229:15 230:3</p> <p>advisory (18) 7:14 8:1 9:5 13:7 15:22 18:22 20:25 24:11 38:13 52:12 78:20 79:2,9 80:20 81:20 82:4 88:24 155:21</p> <p>aegis (1) 118:3</p> <p>after (51) 2:6 3:12,13 4:24 10:1 13:13 19:15 22:25 27:20 28:2 31:23 34:24 42:10,17 43:2 49:8,22 53:14 58:25 59:5 60:24 64:12,21 67:17 80:19 81:20 85:5 87:20 92:12 120:12 134:12 135:1 160:10 166:8 169:9 174:9 182:19 183:10 184:16 185:23 190:14,15 195:15 198:7 199:1 200:7 208:25 209:1,12 211:23 227:13</p> <p>aftermath (4) 84:20 90:1 230:4,6</p> <p>afternoon (4) 119:25 139:14,15 189:12</p> <p>afterwards (5) 74:3,4 84:22 97:1 170:20</p> <p>again (34) 9:19 12:13 16:7,20 17:9 23:4 51:1 62:17 68:19 71:12 75:4,8 76:24 83:15 111:22 115:24 135:21,25 138:10 150:10 151:8 165:25 177:1 178:22 191:6 196:15,15 199:6 201:22 202:1 206:2 219:7,14 225:4</p> <p>against (12) 5:22 9:20 10:21 25:7 26:11 34:9 43:17 55:11 57:19 81:6 161:1,23</p> <p>agencies (1) 117:3</p> <p>agency (2) 50:17 52:10</p> <p>agenda (5) 115:13,16,23 176:25 228:13</p> <p>agility (1) 78:8</p> <p>ago (2) 151:16 159:18</p>	<p>agree (27) 12:8 48:1,3,5,11,13 49:10 53:14 54:1 73:1 74:25 75:1 84:6 86:23 91:17,18 100:10 102:20 105:24 114:14 121:5,17 122:25 184:10 199:19 210:6,17</p> <p>agreed (2) 85:13 109:22</p> <p>agreement (1) 33:20</p> <p>ah (1) 90:14</p> <p>ahead (5) 43:18,25 123:2 159:14 231:8</p> <p>aims (1) 26:24</p> <p>airport (1) 3:17</p> <p>alarm (1) 94:12</p> <p>albeit (2) 12:12 72:2</p> <p>aldworth (5) 116:4,5,12 117:7 119:9</p> <p>alive (2) 74:21 77:15</p> <p>allimportant (1) 55:9</p> <p>allow (3) 12:14,18 225:21</p> <p>allowed (2) 201:15,16</p> <p>allowing (2) 26:24 30:22</p> <p>allows (1) 225:19</p> <p>almost (1) 222:6</p> <p>alone (1) 90:20</p> <p>along (16) 6:21 20:6 36:19 70:8 99:24 107:22 138:13 160:17 163:21 164:16 171:21 172:6 187:11 200:1,13 229:7</p> <p>alongside (2) 225:22,22</p> <p>already (25) 6:3 23:19 27:2 30:7 49:20 69:11 117:10 124:4,20 127:7 128:16,17 133:25 138:6,9 172:17 214:6 219:2,2,4 230:18 231:8,9,15,16</p> <p>also (56) 2:14 4:16 5:2 6:18 7:13 8:20 14:11 17:12 21:17 24:19,20 30:14 31:13,25 42:23 44:7 46:10,12,18 50:17 54:8 70:13 77:3 89:4 92:7,13 93:24 98:22 100:4 108:18 113:12 118:18,23,24 120:5 121:20 125:18 135:9 141:21 142:8,15 150:12 153:21 154:13 156:4 164:9 174:25 175:17 178:8 179:2 186:16 190:8 194:17 196:14 199:13 205:23 44:14 74:10 75:5 97:15 137:25 153:2 198:20 204:19 211:2 228:5</p> <p>always (15) 4:19 5:17 13:3 58:24,25 86:13,19 102:8 114:6 117:12 122:3 139:9 185:12 225:25 232:9</p> <p>amber (1) 30:4</p> <p>among (1) 171:17</p> <p>amongst (2) 17:10 83:22</p>	<p>amount (10) 5:20 45:20 118:21 119:3 144:8 163:4 164:6 176:5,8 230:20</p> <p>amplified (1) 145:8</p> <p>analyse (1) 114:2</p> <p>analysing (2) 96:22 197:9</p> <p>analysis (11) 126:2 131:19 196:11 214:8,9 215:6 216:10,13 217:11,13 225:11</p> <p>andor (1) 223:5</p> <p>annotations (1) 11:18</p> <p>annual (3) 160:14 162:8,9</p> <p>anonymous (1) 224:21</p> <p>another (21) 6:22 22:17 47:2 75:3 112:8 113:21 126:9 141:16 153:5 163:22 190:13 191:13 200:2,13,21 204:15 207:25 219:12,13 221:23 225:4</p> <p>anpr (1) 220:24</p> <p>answer (12) 12:1 13:6 18:5 48:9 57:10 61:19 68:8 86:6 117:5 129:18 157:3,3</p> <p>answered (1) 93:22</p> <p>answers (2) 51:25 228:10</p> <p>anticipated (1) 211:21</p> <p>antisurveillance (1) 55:19</p> <p>antiterrorism (1) 88:16</p> <p>antivehicle (1) 69:12</p> <p>anxieties (1) 145:7</p> <p>anxiety (1) 144:24</p> <p>anybody (4) 6:16 25:25 165:13 188:12</p> <p>anymore (3) 89:17 222:16,18</p> <p>anyone (10) 99:16 185:22,25 186:22 188:19 190:3 193:13,15 199:20 226:8</p> <p>anyones (2) 108:25 185:25</p> <p>anything (14) 37:12 45:21 99:24 102:5 119:15 155:11 158:21 176:21 181:14 195:21 211:18 217:12 222:8 228:2</p> <p>anywhere (6) 35:1 66:15 87:23 109:19 173:25 214:15</p> <p>apologies (7) 73:24 75:7 104:15,17 170:15,15 196:4</p> <p>apparent (1) 162:17</p> <p>apparently (1) 163:18</p> <p>appears (4) 11:17 110:24 143:19 217:18</p> <p>application (1) 218:3</p> <p>applied (3) 62:17 67:25 167:3</p> <p>apply (8) 4:20 12:16 26:25 72:6 80:3 119:7 124:21 128:12</p>	<p>applying (4) 5:13 198:12,21 202:6</p> <p>appraisal (1) 179:17</p> <p>appreciate (11) 40:4 47:7 51:15 80:23 81:13 99:18 112:4 185:4 202:16 225:17 226:14</p> <p>approach (14) 11:1 17:10 18:18 55:15 72:23 86:20 87:12 106:23 108:6 129:4,6 145:20 149:13 225:14</p> <p>approached (1) 81:12</p> <p>approaching (1) 119:18</p> <p>appropriate (5) 16:11 18:12 82:13 180:13 186:21</p> <p>appropriately (1) 202:6</p> <p>approval (4) 158:11 179:19 180:10,10</p> <p>approve (3) 179:22 180:23 190:1</p> <p>approving (3) 180:6,6 188:23</p> <p>april (21) 15:18 27:11 40:10,19 41:4,10 105:18,18 113:1,5 114:23 116:18 125:2,2 133:16 156:14 167:21 169:4,7 181:16 204:24</p> <p>archibald (3) 46:3 47:7 50:19</p> <p>architects (1) 111:6</p> <p>area (37) 7:1 8:3 10:8,22 19:10,16 21:8 34:19 35:1,18,24 39:23 43:16 54:21,25 55:22 57:23 59:6,9 60:6 61:18 70:17 81:9 88:18 103:14 118:2,4,25 119:16 124:13 148:12 152:13 155:20 161:18 164:7 216:25 217:2</p> <p>areas (30) 12:20 26:9 37:20 44:11 47:16 48:20 51:20 52:6 63:6 68:2 69:21,23 70:23 72:5 94:8 107:11 111:2 118:14 123:18 150:16,17 151:10,18,20 152:19 164:16 165:21 167:3 173:19 202:16</p> <p>arena (1) 29:6</p> <p>arent (3) 49:1,4 216:2</p> <p>argue (1) 95:3</p> <p>arguing (2) 101:18,20</p> <p>argument (7) 121:6,9 122:6 123:1 124:15 215:25 216:11</p> <p>arisen (1) 219:9</p> <p>arises (1) 112:24</p> <p>arising (1) 36:9</p> <p>armed (19) 4:16 5:1 6:4 8:21 17:11 44:7,20 47:3 67:1 92:7,8,11,21 93:24 94:3,8,21 118:16 143:10</p> <p>armoury (1) 5:24</p> <p>around (101) 2:7 4:13 7:5 9:23 10:25 12:20</p>	<p>13:8 14:17 16:19 19:14,17 22:1 23:22 25:10 26:5,6 30:2,3 35:13 37:18 39:17 41:13,14 42:19 43:25,25 44:18 49:23 50:16 54:7 55:14 61:16 64:25 65:17 66:6,19,23 67:13 69:21 70:24 71:24 72:21 75:9 85:9 86:1 89:5 92:16,20,21 93:17,24 98:12,21,22 101:22,22 102:9 103:8,12,23 106:7 107:8 109:6,17,19,24 110:17 111:4 113:7,12 116:9 117:6 118:17,17 124:21 126:5 128:18 141:3 149:16 150:16 151:17 155:1 171:3,25 172:7 177:1 181:10 184:11 187:12,13 192:15 193:8 202:13 203:2 210:24 215:15 219:16 221:11 222:12 227:19 233:5</p> <p>arranged (1) 131:17</p> <p>arrangement (1) 189:7</p> <p>arrangements (2) 57:16 105:13</p> <p>arterial (1) 167:11</p> <p>article (2) 96:24 97:12</p> <p>articles (1) 97:4</p> <p>articulated (1) 77:13</p> <p>arv (3) 44:19 94:24 103:16</p> <p>arvafof (1) 22:13</p> <p>arvs (2) 46:25 94:6</p> <p>aside (1) 191:14</p> <p>asides (1) 41:14</p> <p>ask (18) 33:10 34:17 45:25 50:15,19,20,21 59:25 78:9 108:9 120:23 121:5 130:7 138:17 140:2 213:19 221:16 227:11</p> <p>asked (24) 1:19,23 9:12,18 19:18,22 23:6 24:2 37:15 40:11 49:16 85:3 92:23 100:14 129:15 130:7 132:12 133:19 158:11 166:12,13 167:25 168:5 211:20</p> <p>asking (13) 9:16 10:2,5 19:1 30:2 45:5 53:22,23 74:11 82:4 84:24 97:25 105:21</p> <p>aspect (6) 43:1,3 44:2 123:8,9 227:19</p> <p>aspects (5) 56:21 57:8 105:1 153:3 228:1</p> <p>assess (2) 87:24 118:1</p> <p>assessment (7) 2:9,12 5:13,22 9:21 55:12 141:21</p> <p>asset (32) 4:16 5:1 6:4 33:22 34:3,5,10,13,18 35:1 36:1 37:1 42:25 66:13 75:10,19,21 96:17 98:22 108:9 111:3,5,11 124:17,23</p>
---	--	--	---	--	--	--

138:14	200:13,16,17,19 202:4	164:18 188:7,9,12	basic (1) 153:23	194:4 199:9 200:12	body (3) 2:23 159:3	130:1,4,10
174:15,16,18,22	208:18 210:25 211:23	190:1 191:5 192:19	basically (16) 88:17	203:2,23 207:5 211:13	167:2	131:10,17,20,24
183:23 194:23	213:24	201:7 233:3	146:18 154:3 155:15	218:11 220:11,20	bogged (1) 60:16	132:5,14 133:9 134:7
assets (13) 72:20 74:15	214:4,9,11,20,23		158:17,20 159:20	223:13 229:21 231:4,9	bold (2) 179:9 190:11	137:7 138:22
76:8 146:20,21 154:6	215:20 216:14,17,21	B	160:18 164:3 168:5	belief (1) 183:16	bollard (1) 152:22	150:23,25
161:6 163:1 164:12	217:13,15,15,17		182:18 190:6 193:11	believe (40) 22:16 27:22	bollards (8) 45:1	151:11,14,19,23
175:6 200:6 203:12	219:12	back (41) 4:22 14:7	202:24,25 222:19	28:14,17 32:3 33:21	69:12,21,22 70:4,8	152:7,7,8,12,24
223:20	attacked (4) 35:24	21:22 23:7 27:1 38:10	basis (6) 22:18 38:17	41:4 44:7 62:25 69:13	98:17 165:14	153:3,12 156:7,13,20
assigned (1) 140:11	54:25 164:10 214:21	51:12 52:8 58:22	53:8 118:14 186:24	75:15 78:5 103:9	bonus (1) 214:16	157:2 163:17,18
assist (4) 63:11	attacker (1) 161:9	59:21 62:17 84:17	187:1	104:23 130:24 145:8	borough (1) 156:5	164:14,17,18
129:23,24 146:4	attackers (6) 65:12	87:19 104:10 106:9,20	bastille (1) 69:4	153:14 154:25 163:20	both (15) 5:1 33:20	165:1,6,15,23
assistance (3) 100:24	90:24 91:3 163:11,12	109:22 116:14 117:22	bbc (1) 96:21	165:24 166:1 168:3	43:21 46:11 52:11	166:3,22,25 167:15
169:25 170:16	201:5	118:5 129:19,22 139:8	bear (2) 125:13 151:6	169:8,14,19 170:5	58:2 137:2 138:8	170:23 171:10,21
assistant (6) 7:13	attacking (1) 84:2	151:16 158:12	bearing (8) 4:18 6:1	174:1 184:14 185:20	155:10 165:18 171:21	172:18 173:1,25
16:2,7 17:17 22:10	attacks (32) 18:14	173:9,21 177:24	37:19 41:6 51:8 93:16	189:16 193:5,16,21	177:24 193:1 194:4	174:4,6,10
42:13	25:7,22 26:14,14	179:15 181:5	103:5 113:20	200:5 202:8,24 210:7	223:4	175:10,18,22,24
assisted (2) 119:8	28:13 39:23 43:17,19	188:20,23 189:25	became (3) 62:25	214:14,18 223:23	bottom (8) 10:15 16:13	176:19,22,24 183:5,6
142:24	54:7 65:4 69:17 73:6	219:11 222:20 226:17	146:16 204:5	believed (2) 149:5	75:24 87:4,9 147:25	184:4,7,15,22
assists (1) 4:3	77:9,19 80:3 81:25	228:19	become (3) 28:23	195:19	157:15 202:1	185:8,14,18 187:9
assume (2) 124:9	86:10,11 89:6 91:13	balances (2) 107:5	151:19 161:22	bells (1) 94:12	boundaries (1) 179:13	191:11 192:7,16,22
125:22	108:1 109:9 113:16	114:12	beef (1) 103:16	belonging (1) 228:4	bounds (1) 27:3	194:1,8,9,13 195:12
assumed (1) 212:3	137:15 145:5 148:16	ball (1) 184:19	before (54) 9:7 13:11	below (2) 159:5 171:16	boxes (4) 152:21,22,23	196:20
assurance (1) 113:12	159:20 171:19 175:19	ballard (4) 227:9,10	19:13 32:14 34:1 35:4	benefit (3) 132:6	156:25	198:6,6,7,12,25 199:2
assure (1) 108:21	196:18 217:4	229:9 234:12	37:12 38:23 39:15	155:19 225:5	brains (2) 199:13,16	200:9,20
assured (1) 114:9	attend (6) 4:12 28:18	banging (2) 213:9,9	40:19 43:8 45:11 46:4	benefits (2) 144:10	branch (8) 17:8 57:13	201:2,9,11,19,23
attach (1) 72:7	74:11 116:7 147:15	bank (1) 148:22	50:5,6 73:20 76:13	214:24	143:11 154:1 186:3	202:16,20 206:4 207:5
attached (5) 56:12	177:8	bar (2) 32:21 230:23	87:18 94:12 100:15	berlin (4) 71:12 77:15	205:7 206:3 212:14	209:25 212:25 213:24
107:16 128:22 136:17	attended (4) 31:4 60:5	barnard (5) 13:24 14:9	108:22 111:19 112:22	83:16 196:22	breach (1) 168:15	214:4,6,11,12,13,15,19,20,21,2
206:6	129:20 162:13	23:12 107:6 133:25	121:2 124:24 132:6	berlinstyle (1) 98:18	bread (1) 106:14	215:2,3,4,5,8
attaching (1) 153:16	attendees (3) 73:23	barrier (31) 33:22	146:8 147:4 154:19	bespoke (1) 2:10	break (3) 68:14,21	216:7,8,9,16
attack (194) 1:11,22 2:2	104:14 177:13	34:3,5,10,13,18 35:1	155:15 156:13 164:13	best (20) 18:6 43:16	196:3	225:20,25 228:8,11
3:5,7,9,11,12,13,17,18,21	attending (1) 116:21	36:1 37:1 42:25 74:15	166:5 169:9 176:10	48:7,21 68:10 78:8	bridge (302) 4:20	230:18,25
4:24 5:7 6:21 7:1,7,16	attention (9) 55:18	75:10,19 76:10 90:7	179:20,22,24 180:24	145:25 148:4,4,5	6:18,24 8:3,7,8 11:6	bridges (36) 5:6 8:3
10:20 11:3 12:6,23,24	65:25 82:21 104:6	96:16 98:14,22 108:9	181:6,11 183:8 185:18	161:22 163:2 200:3,4	12:5,25	18:13 19:10,15
13:8,10,11 14:6	126:1 163:6 207:25	111:3,11 124:17,22	187:18 188:17	202:8,9 209:15 210:8	13:2,5,5,8,11,13,16,18	20:10,18,19 26:3,5
19:2,15 21:2 26:11,13	212:9 229:6	138:11,14	191:9,20 194:2 196:1	216:15 232:3	15:6 17:3 18:5 19:22	39:3 42:25 43:5 47:18
28:7,11 29:6,19	attract (1) 197:23	174:15,16,18,22	201:11 204:5 214:12	better (14) 24:7 61:19	21:15 22:22 23:20	50:3,7,14,15,16 51:19
30:8,12 31:23	attractive (19) 15:13	183:23 194:23	219:11 225:7	104:10 118:2 133:23	25:22 27:7 28:5,7 30:8	52:8 53:16,19 54:3,7
32:15,18 34:1,24	43:6 44:25 71:2 73:1	barriers (109) 1:24 5:16	beforehand (1) 192:24	159:8 164:11 193:5,19	31:14 32:22	84:25 85:17,20
35:5,9 36:7 37:12,24	83:20 107:25 148:11	8:7 18:11 24:13	began (3) 84:2 208:4	220:21 222:8,22	33:7,14,16,20,24	87:7,21 89:1 115:4
38:9 39:4,11,15 40:22	149:22,23 151:9,19,23	25:6,20 26:3,7	217:15	223:12 227:5	34:1,13,23 35:4,5	116:25 201:7 214:24
42:10,21 43:3,8,21	152:25,25 153:4	33:18,23 34:4,25	begin (3) 1:12 62:21	being (27) 14:12	36:5,15 37:4,22	215:1
44:25 46:1	173:11 183:7 201:11	35:4,13 37:9,25	67:15	15:9 21:18 25:17,21	38:3,5,8,10,10,21	brief (2) 105:4 228:7
47:10,13,23 49:8,17	attractiveness (1) 36:21	38:17,21,22	begins (1) 92:12	32:17 36:4 45:17	39:7,14 40:14,19	briefing (1) 189:17
50:4,5,6 51:10 52:3	attro (4) 77:4,6,6 88:15	39:7,14,16,25 40:1,4	behalf (6) 45:25 120:1	48:16 51:11 53:4	41:14,16,22,23	briefly (2) 15:20 172:17
53:11,20,21,22,23	authorised (4) 8:23	42:10 45:1,14	129:20 140:2 213:19	66:15 86:24 91:5	42:7,11,17,18,20	bring (10) 27:1 58:21
56:8 57:19 60:25	44:18 46:6,19	47:8,10,12,15,18	227:11	113:1 114:22 115:7	47:3,9,11,11 46:3,4	97:16 111:21 148:23
63:21 64:2,13 65:1	authorities (5) 38:15	49:8,17,19,21 50:3,7	behind (8) 18:9 21:21	117:2,3 122:10 124:25	47:6,8,10,13,16,22	151:6 167:20 168:9
67:18 69:4,6	51:22 69:20 98:19	51:6 52:2,4 53:16	68:9 83:14 99:25	138:11 181:15 182:16	49:9,18,19,21,22 50:8	221:5 229:6
71:3,5,5,7,8,12,24	195:2	54:4,15,19 69:8,18	120:22 144:2 216:2	187:3 195:18 229:24	51:7,10,10 52:4	bring (4) 17:10
74:18 76:14 78:11	authority (2) 33:12	70:6 72:20 73:19	being (102) 2:23,25	beyond (2) 23:18 32:5	53:12,23 54:12,16,23	202:15,20 207:25
79:16 80:12 81:21,21	111:7	74:17 75:11 77:19	4:18 7:6 8:4 11:19	big (2) 57:21,25	60:18,25 61:13,20	british (3) 21:19 22:4
82:1,5 83:11,23	authors (2) 169:18	79:21,24 80:5,6,19,23	12:5,22,22 13:10,14	biggest (7) 28:6,10	62:1,9,12 63:6,16 65:5	159:25
84:3,21 85:5,9 90:16	172:24	81:15 89:3,8,9,23,24	17:14 19:14 20:11	111:17 170:23	66:10,20	broad (3) 30:16 33:15
91:10,17 92:12	availability (1) 75:14	93:21 95:21 96:7,22	22:17 23:9,12,21 24:3	171:7,11 207:6	67:5,12,14,22	73:11
95:2,10,15 98:18	available (7) 17:4 46:20	97:3,7	25:13 37:20 38:6,12	bill (1) 225:7	68:5,7,11,25 70:2,5	broadest (1) 217:11
105:16 106:7 107:25	75:11 94:2 124:18	98:1,8,10,19,20,23	41:23 42:19 43:25	bit (5) 15:10 114:10	71:1,16 72:4 76:13	bronze (1) 219:16
110:3 111:18,19	177:3 206:15	99:1 100:12 102:25	47:13 52:9,10,12	155:9 182:10 232:21	78:12 81:8,16	brought (4) 104:6 214:5
112:4,23 113:2,22	avoiding (1) 55:19	103:13,19 107:3	55:20 56:15 62:16	bits (2) 167:10 187:12	82:11,18,20,22	220:19 228:24
114:23 115:21 120:12	aware (32) 5:20,23 6:24	108:7,17 109:19,21	64:1,19 65:3	bladed (1) 43:20	83:3,4,17,20 84:21	btp (2) 118:20 119:2
123:23 124:5,7,10	7:2 12:22 28:7,23 29:3	110:5,10 115:24 120:8	66:1,16,17 67:18,19	blacked (1) 6:22	85:5 88:4,7	build (2) 43:13 44:1
128:22 130:16 139:5	32:15 39:18,21 42:15	122:14 127:24 128:8	71:21 75:10,13,25	block (1) 48:5	89:10,13,23 90:6	building (4) 41:5 98:14
142:25 143:13	55:3 69:1 74:14 75:9	165:14 172:13 184:25	76:5 77:4 78:3 79:23	blocking (1) 1:23	91:16,19,24 92:1,4	168:23,24
145:10,14 148:20	86:4,5 96:23 97:10,13	185:1,2 192:6	82:9,20 83:18,20	bluntly (1) 48:5	93:18,19,23	buildings (1) 152:16
152:10 153:4	99:16 103:11 105:2	210:11,15	89:20 90:12 92:16	board (18)	94:14,16,20 95:5,17	built (2) 49:22 84:24
160:6,11,16 162:21	116:17 117:15 120:3	211:13,14,17,18,23	95:1,4,8 102:9 108:11	14:3,11,13,14,19	96:7,22 97:3,24	bullet (2) 9:7 137:12
163:21 164:9 166:9	164:4 167:21 170:9	barton (10) 91:4	111:17 114:8 122:12	15:5,10,14 24:19	98:2,15 101:10 104:9	bundles (1) 205:19
167:8 170:24	175:23 183:21	131:2,3 138:24 170:12	123:1,2,2,6,11 125:24	45:17,18,19 100:5	105:16,25	bursting (1) 65:15
171:7,8,9 172:21	awareness (8) 142:9	229:10,11 232:4	130:17 133:2,20	113:25 115:14 212:23	107:10,19,24 108:3	buses (1) 1:24
173:7,10,11,22 175:22	154:8 155:12 193:16	234:7,13	134:8,25 138:9 159:24	228:20,25	111:15 112:8,23	business (8) 16:22 53:8
184:17 190:15 192:21	202:13,14 218:24	based (6) 5:5 28:17	164:2 166:3 171:19,20	boards (2) 24:20 102:8	113:16 120:4,8,14	57:25 60:17 189:10,23
194:2,8 195:9,14,20	219:16	40:16 117:18 121:22	174:10,18 177:10	bodies (5) 33:20 48:14	123:18,23 124:7,25	192:19 221:2
199:2,22	away (11) 145:10,11	187:2	182:4 188:3,5 189:14	52:7,11 233:5	127:18 128:17 129:4,5	businessasusual (3)

99:9 160:3 218:24
businesses (3) 16:17
 142:9 144:13
busy (3) 46:19 98:17
 181:22
butt (2) 47:11 56:11
butter (1) 106:15
button (1) 111:8

C

cables (1) 175:5
calendars (1) 29:13
call (6) 14:19,24 85:14
 99:7 166:17 224:9
called (8) 24:24 30:4
 34:3 56:4 61:4 115:13
 193:11 225:13
calling (1) 98:19
callout (1) 16:23
came (14) 43:2 110:15
 113:5 149:1 152:11
 154:21 155:16 173:9
 175:24 214:4,11
 217:16,24 226:11
cameras (1) 44:5
cannot (1) 128:7
cant (45) 5:18 19:20
 25:23 26:4 31:19
 45:3,21 51:18 54:5
 55:7 62:25 65:13 68:8
 69:13 73:9 74:8,13
 83:14 95:6 145:10
 157:3 165:9
 166:6,12,17 173:12
 178:15,25 181:12,13
 186:1,1,6,17 187:5,10
 188:13,18,18 196:6
 202:25 211:2,4,8
 219:10
capabilities (4) 94:23
 116:10 117:11 118:10
capability (1) 94:3
capable (1) 76:9
capacity (4) 24:12
 30:21 57:3 130:23
capital (2) 194:10 209:3
capturing (1) 88:10
car (4) 83:25 84:1 95:6
 160:17
careful (1) 97:17
carefully (1) 99:23
carnival (1) 75:25
carolyn (2) 84:24,25
carried (4) 79:6 90:19
 173:3 187:14
carrier (1) 92:17
carry (9) 3:19 56:8
 92:25 145:4 146:18
 172:20 190:21 191:19
 209:5
carrying (2) 32:7 183:14
cars (1) 92:15
carved (1) 118:2
cases (1) 99:8
casualties (1) 65:22
catch (1) 168:18
categorisation (2)
 225:25 226:25
category (1) 12:18
caused (1) 158:2
causes (2) 36:14 144:24
cced (1) 204:1
cctv (2) 44:5 141:20

cease (1) 208:8
cent (3) 165:9 166:18
 193:21
centered (1) 44:4
central (2) 53:16 122:25
centre (3) 70:9 75:16
 145:18
century (1) 48:19
cerastes (75) 13:20
 27:20 28:2,4,14,21,23
 29:1 36:8 41:7,10
 93:17 100:14,14,18,19
 102:12 103:4,11,17,25
 104:4,22 106:8
 110:9,14 112:20 113:8
 116:17,23 117:1,15
 119:6,14 131:19
 134:25 136:17
 137:3,11,12 138:2,10
 149:25 150:2,13,18
 151:1,22 153:10
 157:12 169:5,12,22
 171:18,22 172:10
 177:22,24 181:16
 182:16,19 183:10,22
 184:3 185:5,22 190:7
 204:21 205:10 207:15
 212:9 224:2 227:25
 230:15 231:7
certain (19) 43:9 69:23
 70:23 78:10 111:1
 134:19 143:9 149:21
 150:13,16 151:18
 163:4 165:8 172:13
 173:18 178:10 197:20
 231:6
cetera (2) 172:4,5
chain (1) 226:17
chair (6) 10:12 14:25
 25:24 76:17,18 96:4
chaired (7) 1:14 4:11
 8:10 17:17 21:25 25:1
 118:19
challenged (1) 129:8
chamberlain (1) 134:3
chance (2) 28:2 220:22
change (4) 166:21
 176:13 223:24 225:2
changed (9) 8:16 34:7
 110:12,13 135:15
 166:19 187:25 203:4
 223:19
changes (13) 32:16
 115:20 175:15 176:15
 179:6 181:6,6 190:9
 221:7,7,9,10 227:21
changing (3) 14:6 71:9
 231:5
channels (2) 25:16,18
characteristics (4)
 152:16 153:7 193:2
 194:6
chart (2) 32:21 230:23
chase (1) 187:20
chatted (1) 204:8
check (7) 59:21 60:1
 108:19 158:14,21
 193:11 221:3
checked (3) 11:12
 181:17,19
checking (4) 108:10
 188:16 189:5,8
checks (2) 107:4 114:12

chicanes (1) 1:21
chief (57) 1:3,5,6
 11:14,22 12:3 13:24
 14:9 19:3 23:11 34:17
 61:6 64:17
 68:13,16,19 75:20,24
 76:3 78:22,25 86:6
 87:18 88:14,21 107:6
 112:11,16 119:23
 122:9,16 131:1 133:25
 138:25
 139:7,14,16,19,22
 143:14 146:1 150:1
 159:2,7 180:5,9 186:7
 189:22 196:1
 208:11,14 216:19
 217:22 232:9,18,21
 234:3
chiefs (1) 26:21
child (1) 189:1
choose (1) 150:14
choosing (2) 151:7
 167:3
chose (3) 100:21 150:15
 151:8
chosen (3) 83:10,11
 161:3
christine (4) 46:3 47:7
 120:2,5
christmas (3) 54:8,10
 71:7
chronology (2) 27:9
 157:4
circulated (1) 188:11
circumstance (1) 189:6
circumstances (7) 5:11
 13:6,12 34:2 84:6
 189:3 197:20
city (161) 1:23 2:10 3:8
 7:1 8:20 9:3 10:1,21
 14:1 15:14 16:21
 17:14,24 19:8,16
 20:20 21:8,18 24:7,21
 25:2,5,11,13,17,18,21
 26:2,10 33:14 35:1,13
 36:1 37:19 38:16,18
 39:5,24 40:12
 43:15,24 44:23
 45:8,10,16 46:12
 47:4,16 50:9,16,21,23
 51:21 52:25 54:22
 56:18,23,25
 57:2,17,22 58:19,24
 59:6 62:4 63:8
 67:11,16,21
 70:3,9,19,22,25
 72:22,22 77:6 78:2,7
 81:9 82:25 84:23
 85:1,4,7
 86:12,16,18,22,24
 87:9 88:11,19
 89:11,17 94:6 100:20
 101:1,4 106:17
 107:11,25 109:19
 110:17 116:7,14,20
 117:4,17,23 118:6,23
 119:7 131:9,23
 133:5,7,23 134:11,19
 140:1,9,15,17 145:22
 146:4 147:6 148:18
 153:8,25 156:12,25
 164:21 165:18
 167:10,21,22 170:14

171:4 174:21
 176:10,14 179:4,8
 180:20 182:3 184:8
 203:13 205:8 206:5,18
 211:3 220:20,24
 221:8,17 225:5 226:10
 228:4,24 229:7
cities (1) 19:10
civilianisation (1)
 193:12
clamour (1) 97:6
clarification (2) 9:12,16
clarify (2) 154:16
 165:17
clarity (6) 10:7,11 30:2
 48:1 129:15,17
clear (4) 12:3 136:8
 160:25 232:11
clearance (1) 224:10
clearly (8) 38:2 55:3
 100:9 139:20 171:3
 185:1 218:17 219:11
clerk (2) 14:25 134:3
clients (2) 121:14 128:3
clockwork (1) 161:18
close (5) 13:14 56:1,5
 131:7,9
closed (1) 131:23
closeknitted (1) 53:5
closely (1) 227:20
cm (1) 65:14
cognisant (2) 2:16
 25:14
collaborate (1) 44:8
collaboration (2) 118:8
 119:4
collaborative (1) 21:23
collaboratively (1)
 118:17
colleague (1) 230:3
colleagues (16) 28:3
 111:16 153:17 156:11
 157:7 160:20,21
 162:20 169:21 189:16
 190:2,4 201:22 205:5
 218:13 227:7
column (1) 168:21
columns (4)
 168:12,17,19 175:15
come (28) 12:4 15:17
 34:11 47:24 49:24
 61:10 87:19 91:7
 104:21 105:2,8,10,22
 113:23 116:17 139:8
 148:21 151:21 156:14
 166:13 167:4 173:21
 200:2 207:15 210:23
 215:19 216:16 220:24
comes (8) 5:21 15:18
 24:12 55:19 123:15
 130:1 164:3 182:18
comfortable (1) 139:16
coming (10) 62:1 65:12
 66:3 79:9 96:3 107:13
 113:1,17 114:15,23
command (8) 57:4 85:6
 96:5 154:5,22 164:4
 223:6,14
commander (24) 9:11
 11:24 13:25 14:10,16
 54:14 63:8 76:18 85:6
 106:16 109:3 133:19
 134:1,2 160:10 168:1

179:25 202:24 212:5
 223:21
 224:15,16,18,21
commanders (2) 219:16
 225:1
commanding (1) 5:9
commenced (1) 208:20
commencement (1)
 68:24
commendably (1)
 198:20
comment (7) 24:10
 25:3 45:4 53:17 73:9
 161:10 182:24
comments (3) 4:7 59:25
 174:9
commissioned (3)
 114:16 150:1,8
commissioner (5) 7:14
 17:18 42:13 85:1,3
commissioners (2)
 16:3,8
committed (1) 130:16
committee (16) 15:21
 17:17 19:9 51:12
 58:4,5 59:1,2,15,25
 84:22 102:9 104:7
 112:25 115:3 166:8
communicate (2)
 147:19 194:14
communicating (1)
 118:13
communication (3)
 25:16 157:8,15
communications (4) 2:3
 53:4 156:13 160:20
communities (2) 57:23
 58:1
community (7) 16:22
 44:15 154:6,17,19
 221:2,3
commuter (1) 11:8
commuters (1) 62:11
commuting (2) 19:22
 51:20
company (3) 72:1 103:6
 171:22
comparable (2) 194:9
 219:24
compare (1) 136:13
compelled (1) 128:6
compiled (1) 138:19
complement (2) 46:22
 94:22
complete (6) 99:7 127:4
 141:10 142:15 179:16
 228:23
completed (2) 127:7
 168:3
completely (2) 84:4
 183:21
completing (1) 167:22
complex (3) 55:22
 83:13 103:12
complying (1) 183:19
compromising (1) 228:2
computer (1) 188:25
conceivable (1) 38:22
concentrate (2) 44:11
 189:4
concentrated (3) 61:24
 184:18 218:19
concept (2) 10:7 222:21

concern (33) 9:23,25
 10:7 19:24 23:15,21
 25:4 28:6,8,10,12
 36:12,14 37:23 38:4
 43:1,4 52:9 53:18 57:4
 107:18 111:17 121:11
 170:24 171:3,7,11
 183:5 192:9 194:12
 198:1 207:6 209:11
concerned (6) 22:14
 120:19 121:21 140:13
 141:4 202:17
concerning (3) 17:3
 33:19 176:21
concerns (31) 20:2
 25:19 41:14 42:4 43:7
 53:20 103:18 107:1
 111:15 115:4 130:21
 150:16 165:5 174:6
 175:10,21 177:1
 179:19 183:11 184:11
 185:8 192:15 198:25
 199:3,4 202:15,20
 203:23 209:25 212:10
 214:5
conclusion (2) 98:25
 108:6
conclusions (3)
 157:8,11 158:4
concurred (1) 204:13
concur (1) 204:7
condolences (2) 139:6
 194:16
conduct (3) 131:19
 141:24 173:10
conducted (1) 159:24
conducting (1) 197:21
confidence (3) 4:17
 46:13 134:17
confident (2) 102:18
 187:24
configuration (2) 44:7
 61:16
configured (2) 61:20
 82:16
confirm (3) 80:10 82:13
 108:16
confirmation (4) 16:8
 89:1 150:10 183:11
confirms (1) 16:14
confusing (1) 15:10
congestion (1) 165:7
conjunction (1) 202:11
connection (1) 23:5
conscious (4) 112:13
 126:14 180:7 217:1
consent (1) 122:18
consider (18) 13:4 32:6
 38:20 39:24 40:21,24
 47:15 55:14 70:4
 72:16 80:2,18 81:6
 121:5 126:18 129:12
 192:2 217:14
considerable (2) 5:20
 60:6
consideration (30)
 5:6,17 7:22,22 8:1
 10:10 17:20 18:2
 34:24 35:3 37:3
 69:5,19 70:18,20
 71:1,14 75:9 78:14
 108:2 112:3 120:17
 122:8 138:3 152:11

190:20,25 191:18
 209:4 211:13
considerations (7)
 10:17 151:6 159:17
 167:3 168:12 191:6
 217:19
considered (24) 13:3
 35:8,20 37:20 39:22
 42:1 70:15 71:21
 79:23 80:10,14 81:5
 82:20 99:23 100:3
 109:8 122:4 163:15
 175:18 185:15
 191:4,17 192:6 213:11
considering (19) 41:21
 43:10 45:1 53:15
 70:21 72:15 79:18,24
 80:5,21 81:14
 89:3,7,9,22 97:2 98:7
 109:22 116:13
consist (1) 138:12
consistently (1) 30:24
constantly (15) 1:5,6
 27:19 91:9 94:5
 102:11 138:25 140:14
 150:1 179:9 220:2,3,5
 224:11 234:3
constables (1) 218:20
constraints (1) 178:5
consultant (2) 168:4,11
consulted (2) 19:12
 85:12
contact (3) 16:9 98:11
 102:12
contacted (1) 84:23
contained (3) 190:9
 205:25 228:3
contains (1) 62:4
contemporaneous (2)
 133:1 134:13
content (1) 137:2
contents (6) 102:23
 105:23 112:22 113:11
 119:5,19
contest (1) 115:13
context (21) 1:20 43:12
 55:7 58:13 67:24
 69:14 75:20 77:2
 87:22 117:6,23
 122:2,3,3 129:8
 133:12 173:24 200:20
 201:23 219:23 227:24
continue (8) 29:22,24
 45:22 68:6 89:15
 103:7 123:14 177:16
continued (10) 1:6,7
 37:15,18 45:19 90:4
 98:23 145:24 234:3,4
continuing (1) 27:6
contrary (1) 162:1
contrast (1) 136:13
control (3) 44:4 152:23
 203:12
convenient (1) 112:10
conversation (14) 8:6
 14:17 19:20 26:4 40:6
 41:3 50:18 84:12,13
 127:11 128:18 133:24
 173:5 228:7
conversations (20) 7:4
 14:8 15:4 24:14,20
 25:4,25 26:5,6,9,19
 37:16 45:17,19 52:10

63:1,3 89:5 98:21 108:11 cooperation (1) 115:8 coordinator (3) 51:5 146:24 184:5 coordinators (1) 193:15 copied (11) 6:9 20:13 85:24 115:5 135:3,6,9 153:21,22 158:8,24 copies (9) 185:24 186:2,3,6,20 205:14,17,19 206:14 copy (14) 64:5 105:21 186:2,4,6,16,17,19 187:6,7 205:2,10 207:17 227:25 copycat (6) 42:23 43:1 49:23 201:5,7,8 copying (3) 155:5,5,7 core (1) 141:13 coroner (49) 1:3 11:14,22 12:3 61:6 64:17 66:18 68:13,16,19 75:20,24 76:3 78:22,25 86:6 87:18 88:14,21 112:11,16 119:23 122:9,16,23 131:1 139:7,14,16,19,22 140:3 143:14 146:1 159:2,7 180:5,9 186:7 189:22 196:1 208:11,14 213:21 216:19 217:22 232:9,18,21 corporation (71) 1:20 14:1,8,11,13,18 15:3,15 19:9 20:1,21 24:5,5,25 25:5,8,11,18 26:2 33:14 37:16 38:16,18 39:6 40:12 41:2,12 45:18 50:11,12,13,20 52:9 53:7 62:22 63:2 84:23 85:7 86:13 87:10,15,15 88:9 96:11 98:12 107:7 108:22 114:1 115:3 132:24 133:3,21 156:12,19 157:1 167:22 168:2 170:14 176:6,11,14 204:19 206:3,6 212:16 227:11,22 228:4,19,25 229:7 corporations (2) 52:14 195:3 correct (69) 3:10,22 5:4 6:5 8:12,25 10:23 11:5 15:25 16:19 17:7 20:20 21:3,16 28:19 29:15 36:24 46:21 47:5 56:10,19,22,23 57:18 59:7,14 63:10 73:25 75:12,23 76:7 79:22,25 80:17 82:12 85:8,22 90:4 100:16 101:2,3 109:5,10 112:7 114:25 122:24 131:16,21 132:15,16,19 133:4 135:5,10,16 136:1 137:21,22 138:5 192:3	197:12 204:22 208:9 214:8 222:2 223:8,9,11 224:12 correctly (2) 144:23 162:3 costly (1) 137:25 couldnt (7) 4:12 32:11 38:25 96:1 130:4 147:19 226:7 counter (53) 3:15 5:1 7:8 15:23 20:17 21:6 27:17 30:17 31:11 32:16,22 33:4,5 40:18 41:18 55:16 56:21,25 57:4,11,13 58:9,13 59:8,12,22 60:2 71:9 75:16 140:20,22,25 141:1,22 142:10,15 146:15,21,23 147:2,5 154:1,23 155:1,22 159:13 160:23 203:8,19,20 220:23 222:25 224:6 countering (6) 3:21 180:3 206:23 221:11,14 223:21 country (8) 46:16 50:24 57:24 58:20 103:14 123:5 124:22 129:12 couple (6) 58:25 129:8 152:5 189:16 213:22 229:11 course (30) 23:19 27:24 46:24 48:10,22 64:15 68:2 69:3 70:6 78:16 84:7 91:8 96:25 97:10,15,19 102:4 112:1,24 120:9 122:15,24 130:17,21 160:5 182:7 211:2,22 215:13 217:23 courses (3) 60:13 141:7 197:14 courtesy (1) 204:13 courtroom (3) 233:2,3,5 cover (2) 68:17 141:18 coverage (1) 72:16 covered (5) 28:5 54:22 124:4 170:21 216:25 covering (4) 118:6 119:6 189:9 211:8 covert (1) 146:21 covertly (1) 91:21 cpni (6) 74:14 100:15,17 145:18,20 148:8 cpnis (1) 98:22 create (3) 1:24 163:10 177:25 created (11) 16:21 107:24 144:2 146:16 148:3 155:15,18 222:6,6 225:23 227:1 creating (1) 3:4 credible (1) 59:23 crime (3) 153:25 222:20,22 criteria (23) 34:7,14 35:17 36:3 96:2 124:20 125:3,12 148:7,7,24 149:5 151:19 156:8,21,23 164:19,25 165:2,19	225:21 226:20 231:17 critical (12) 30:15 99:6 118:25 131:19 149:3 154:7 156:22 168:22,23 190:16 230:4,6 critically (1) 154:2 crosscheck (1) 168:5 crosscutting (1) 179:4 crosses (1) 168:20 crossing (1) 224:12 crosspollinate (1) 14:15 crossreferenced (1) 10:20 crossreferencing (1) 167:9 crowd (3) 36:17 42:22 107:19 crowded (65) 7:20 9:10,17,21,23,24 10:6,8,9 11:7 12:11,13 14:2 16:4 23:5,9,10,16,22,22 24:4 41:16,17 42:2,5 60:10,17,18,20 61:3,8,17,22 85:19 125:3,9,16 126:15 127:20 128:24 129:7,9,13,15,21 131:14 132:9,13,15 133:21 148:25 149:2 156:2,5,8,21 163:16 167:10,15 168:14 198:3,13,15 225:10 227:1 crowds (4) 11:8 12:9 167:17 198:17 crucial (1) 93:2 crying (2) 72:24 73:2 ct (50) 2:7 4:18 5:15 7:3 10:18 29:22 41:22 66:11,12,14,19,23 67:1,4 68:11,24 80:1,11,25 81:2,11 82:14 100:1 109:24,24 131:17 135:25 136:3,5 146:18 148:1 156:10,16 163:24 167:4 182:21,23 184:5,7 185:12,13 187:25 189:10,13,21 190:5 203:19 210:19,20 212:24 ctsa (42) 4:12 16:3,14 17:8,24 37:21 60:2 61:18 66:17 81:2 103:6 105:5,8 106:9 111:25 123:17 126:17 141:3 142:19,20 146:16 153:19 155:1 156:10,16,18 165:25 171:5 174:11,17 176:7 193:6 198:11 202:11 203:17,20 204:2,5,10,12 227:7,7 ctsas (11) 10:24 16:9 22:17 41:1 42:7 154:24 157:2 165:13,17 171:24 193:14 culminate (1) 127:23 cultural (1) 221:10 culture (2) 87:14 134:21	curious (2) 105:12,14 current (15) 10:19 20:3 29:23 55:11 82:2,17 85:17 115:16 123:24 140:9,14 167:7 202:3 226:3,3 currently (2) 132:23 140:11 curve (1) 231:8 cut (2) 123:12 185:4 cutting (4) 193:17 204:11,12 215:16 cuttingedge (1) 220:18 cyber (1) 43:25 <hr/> D <hr/> dabiq (2) 73:14 196:24 dac (2) 141:8 156:1 dacso (13) 42:24 49:21 51:3 59:3 78:17 79:10 82:7 88:24 103:11 111:4 116:8 117:18 125:6 dacosos (2) 58:21 126:5 daily (2) 45:20 118:14 damaging (2) 221:13,13 dangerous (1) 216:19 date (8) 41:7 64:24 104:11 112:22 113:2 169:6 208:11,13 day (35) 6:6 8:17 10:14 18:23 21:11 29:8 53:13 64:12 67:17 69:4 74:12 78:18,18,19,24,25 79:2 86:5 90:16 91:8 143:22 145:4,6 152:4 162:5,10,21 163:8 165:8 166:7 189:12 200:7 209:15 218:17 223:16 days (13) 7:21 31:2 42:10 53:14 84:22 95:22 97:1 104:3 169:16 181:3,23 209:1 211:24 daytoday (2) 157:1 220:8 dc78491 (1) 115:11 dc83331 (1) 96:21 dc83332 (1) 97:22 deal (13) 3:9 4:3 8:13 57:16 59:5 78:20 131:4 172:17 195:7 229:11,17,17 230:13 dealing (9) 13:12 23:17 51:18 59:8 60:10 88:8 115:14 184:3 193:19 deals (4) 104:9 105:24 106:3,5 dealt (4) 42:7 104:25 153:11 213:2 debate (1) 78:9 debated (2) 17:15 70:15 debates (1) 89:15 december (3) 71:7,11 79:20 decide (1) 34:12 decided (3) 1:20 93:11 122:12 deciding (3) 50:2 147:2 149:12	decision (35) 4:13,20,23 6:3 22:14,17 32:3 42:14,15,25 48:10 49:7,21,23 51:6 63:15 89:12,14,23 93:14 95:19,20 99:8,12 100:9,11 110:4 122:13,22 127:1 138:22 192:4 212:1,2 213:10 decisionmakers (1) 48:4 decisionmaking (10) 5:10 26:23 35:21 48:8 49:24 81:10 97:15,17 110:1 225:10 decisions (16) 18:19 22:9 99:3,5,10,13,17 102:10,19 130:8,11,12,12,15,23 212:16 dedicated (1) 125:21 deep (1) 154:25 define (2) 24:4 133:20 defined (2) 9:11 127:20 defining (1) 136:7 definitely (1) 12:11 definition (18) 9:12,17,22,25 10:6,9 12:13 23:4,8,16 42:2,5 61:6,22 62:16 129:22 143:6 227:2 definitions (1) 227:3 delay (1) 110:25 delcros (3) 120:2,5 130:7 deliver (3) 149:18 154:15 215:14 delivering (2) 140:12 231:14 demand (1) 2:14 demeanour (2) 161:21 163:10 demonstrate (1) 117:1 densely (2) 25:12 62:4 density (8) 36:17 42:22 61:4,16,20 107:20 125:7,14 department (4) 156:16 204:4 205:7 222:5 departments (1) 204:12 depend (1) 31:20 dependencies (1) 111:1 depending (6) 3:1 66:16 103:23 111:5 127:5 197:21 depends (4) 50:7 125:24 216:18 224:20 deploy (6) 66:22 68:6 118:17 160:3 161:12 199:14 deployed (14) 66:10 67:5,20 91:16,19 93:23 136:3 150:15 164:2 174:17,18,22,23 194:24 deploying (6) 30:23 91:23 164:12,23,24 200:6 deployment (17) 30:16 31:14,17,21 68:24 70:1 90:6 92:3 103:7 143:3 144:12 146:18 166:10 199:8,8 203:6 210:23 deployments (70) 3:19 6:13 7:15 9:9 17:6 18:7 21:7,18 22:1,12,15 27:14 32:17,22 33:4 59:19,20 79:13 91:5 93:1,3,5,6,20 116:24 135:25 137:18 142:24 147:2,5,17,22 149:1,16 150:12 157:20 158:6 159:23 160:23 161:3,20 163:3,16 164:22 166:18,22,24 171:20 182:14,21,23 183:2 184:7,9,15,24 185:12,13 191:22 199:5 210:12,13 212:23,24 223:18 230:16,19,20,25 231:25 depth (1) 175:5 deputy (10) 1:5,6 7:13 16:2,7 17:17 42:13 138:25 149:25 234:3 describe (2) 131:22 167:15 described (11) 16:25 25:16 28:5 64:19 66:14 81:17 126:5 141:7 189:22 197:9 207:3 describes (4) 6:18 10:15 11:7 37:5 design (1) 108:17 designated (3) 125:9 126:20 163:16 desire (1) 49:3 desks (1) 51:21 despite (2) 42:4 92:1 detail (10) 55:18 68:9 126:15 144:3 165:12 173:12,14 182:25 215:13 228:22 detailed (1) 215:12 details (4) 84:8 101:6 156:4 171:25 detect (2) 95:7 145:13 detection (3) 55:19 56:9 141:19 detective (10) 1:17,19 2:8 3:6 9:13 13:24 14:9 23:11 77:2 133:25 deter (5) 91:16 95:3,7,9 197:19 determinative (1) 55:6 determine (2) 37:17 44:24 deterrent (3) 44:21 46:10 90:24 develop (3) 71:24 145:24 215:14 developed (5) 142:22 145:19,24 160:2 215:15 developing (5) 146:5,10 156:17 193:18 218:4 development (7) 142:13 145:16 150:4,11 154:3 176:9 218:16 developments (2) 32:16	221:10 devising (1) 55:12 diagram (1) 116:9 dialogue (3) 50:25 134:5,8 diary (2) 181:18,19 didnt (89) 7:6 9:22,24 10:8 12:14 15:1 24:15 25:23 28:17 36:7 47:22 51:5,9 58:12 61:3 69:12 72:8 80:18 81:13 90:11 91:15 102:14 103:2 105:3,22 112:24 113:3 114:22 125:13 127:19 128:20 129:24 131:14 132:17 150:14,24,25,25 152:24 153:2,11 155:11,15 156:7,15,20,24 157:1 164:1,25 165:1 168:18 173:13,17,19 176:4 179:24 180:21,23 182:20 184:19 186:8,18,18,22,22 187:23 188:25 190:11 194:14,20 195:20 198:14,14 200:22 201:1 208:17 212:6 217:14 222:8 223:24 226:6,7,8,9,9 227:1 232:22,23 died (1) 46:1 difference (6) 122:10 127:19 129:2 187:24 193:22 229:24 different (37) 8:17 13:20 30:21 47:3,4 48:22 52:6,7 63:5 65:1 66:12 74:10 90:14 92:6 95:13 96:18 104:25 111:10 117:3 118:3,14 124:12 126:9 143:11 156:2 158:19,20 162:24 168:17,19 171:8 179:7 195:13 209:24 210:18,22,25 differently (1) 42:1 difficult (9) 11:4 53:17 73:2 127:4 189:1 220:17 221:5,6,20 difficulties (1) 92:3 direct (9) 36:19 107:22 137:13 152:2 153:23 154:22 157:19 192:20 221:24 direction (4) 26:17 27:4 71:9 94:18 directions (1) 59:12 directly (7) 105:4 202:17 223:13 224:16,18,23,25 director (1) 84:24 directorate (4) 153:25 155:17 222:15,22 disadvantages (1) 99:21 disagree (3) 100:13 187:7 205:12 disappointment (1) 163:4 disclosed (1) 83:14 disclosing (2) 127:3
--	---	--	---	--	---

176:2
discover (1) 120:16
discovered (1) 198:18
discuss (4) 24:6 32:8
 133:22 187:9
discussed (7) 35:16
 101:15,17,24 134:9
 189:13 207:13
discussing (4) 77:1 98:6
 134:12 227:16
discussion (12) 2:4,6
 8:2 9:8 27:16,23 31:11
 77:24 147:12 172:25
 173:23 178:13
discussions (4) 22:9
 117:11 119:13 187:10
dismiss (2) 200:22
 201:1
disperse (1) 215:21
displayed (1) 177:9
disrespectfully (1)
 212:19
disrupt (7) 95:3,7
 137:15 142:25 143:12
 144:21 145:12
disrupting (1) 171:18
disruption (1) 158:2
disruptive (1) 157:22
distinct (1) 228:20
distinction (4) 91:5
 122:13,19,24
distributed (1) 210:2
diverse (1) 177:16
document (42) 8:15
 36:7 39:12 61:9 64:11
 67:17 75:20 82:3
 87:19 98:24 99:19
 100:3 107:16 119:20
 120:20 121:12 126:5,7
 132:3,8 133:14 135:21
 136:15 157:6 160:8
 162:4 166:14
 169:13,15 170:3
 171:14,15 177:6
 178:1,3,7,9,11,25
 185:21 207:1 211:12
documentation (1)
 134:13
documents (10) 63:23
 67:22 99:11,25 115:13
 120:17 132:2 151:21
 178:1 206:25
does (19) 22:21 36:25
 40:4 74:14 87:7,21
 88:25 90:22,23 92:18
 122:1 123:20 124:11
 141:18 143:2 190:24
 222:16 229:18 231:3
doesn't (26) 26:7 29:20
 48:2,9 55:4 70:6 74:24
 95:11 106:4 116:20,21
 118:3 122:1,8 124:9
 136:5 143:22,25
 161:25 194:21 198:16
 222:16,18 225:24
 226:10 229:17
dogs (1) 143:11
doing (26) 20:17
 29:21,21 38:1,24
 87:16 88:9 111:25
 123:19 127:9,16
 144:16 149:19 156:16
 173:17 179:9 181:18

182:1 199:23 203:4
 217:17 226:5 231:7,19
 232:2,13
dominic (1) 119:25
done (42) 1:21 20:11
 24:3 37:13 45:12
 70:23 86:3 90:3 92:1,4
 93:7,9,21 94:13
 95:16,25 103:19 107:2
 112:6,21 113:8 118:9
 120:18 128:4,14,16
 133:2,20 144:22 162:2
 164:16 176:8 187:11
 195:15,22 196:5 213:7
 221:8,21 224:16,22
 230:21
dont (75) 8:6 20:13,18
 44:15 47:12 49:18
 50:3 51:16,22
 52:14,19 54:18 57:2
 60:16 67:6,8,15 74:4
 81:15 84:4 89:16
 96:24 100:10 101:20
 103:20 104:13 106:12
 117:1 119:11,17 121:4
 124:3 143:23 144:3,8
 146:9 154:25 156:18
 157:3 165:24,25
 169:14 170:5,7,8
 174:1,20,21 181:12
 182:1,25 185:2,20
 186:1 187:7 188:22
 195:5 196:5 198:3
 199:16 202:16 205:12
 206:5 212:19 213:20
 214:18,18 215:12,13
 217:5,9,19,24 221:16
 232:22
door (1) 213:9
dorsi (6) 7:14 9:1 16:25
 125:6 141:8 156:1
doubt (17) 40:6
 46:17,24 53:18,19
 54:1 74:2 75:9 77:15
 78:14 100:23 102:5
 104:18 150:4 173:5
 207:13 213:2
down (25) 1:18 60:16
 77:18 79:11,17 87:2
 99:12 135:1 137:13
 148:21,23 151:16
 160:17 164:3 167:20
 169:3 182:18 185:21
 194:20 200:10 208:11
 217:5 219:14 226:1,11
drafted (1) 168:6
draw (2) 26:16 102:9
drawing (5) 65:25 97:18
 103:4 122:13 158:4
drawn (1) 212:9
drive (1) 65:21
driven (2) 12:24 108:6
driving (2) 87:11 160:17
drove (1) 54:11
drum (1) 213:9
dualhatting (1) 222:19
due (3) 36:16 48:10
 223:15
duffy (9) 22:11
 202:23,23 203:4,7,18
 223:18,22 225:7
duggan (1) 94:5
during (10) 8:1 12:12

27:23 143:22 145:10
 162:21 163:17,19
 188:24 189:9
duty (5) 31:14,17 94:6
 162:21 163:8
dwyer (3) 84:24 88:25
 115:2
dynamic (7) 13:5
 17:9,12 49:12 72:9
 96:15 128:19
dynamically (4) 71:21
 72:13 101:21 108:8
dyson (4) 9:13 129:21
 203:16,18

E

earlier (23) 3:17 4:7
 38:11 63:23 66:6
 67:18 81:19 83:19
 88:21 97:25 109:6
 112:6,20 115:1 117:21
 132:4 136:23 157:13
 206:11 220:10 227:16
 228:10 230:23
early (16) 39:19
 40:10,20 41:3
 63:16,25 71:25 73:4
 113:2 146:13 150:6
 153:11 157:5 192:23
 220:25 231:1
ears (1) 144:18
easily (1) 86:5
eastern (2) 11:8 167:16
easy (1) 65:15
economic (1) 58:2
economy (1) 85:20
edge (2) 70:8 193:17
effect (13) 30:15 35:22
 42:6 78:8 89:14 90:11
 109:16 122:11 123:20
 157:18,22 205:24
 223:17
effected (2) 38:6,25
effective (7) 6:14 106:3
 118:15 150:12
 161:14,15 182:15
effectively (4) 138:6
 147:4 224:10 229:23
effects (1) 110:4
efficacy (1) 46:18
efforts (4) 61:24 149:9
 231:4 232:7
egress (1) 85:19
either (15) 12:14 18:9
 34:8 35:3 43:20 48:8
 73:11 78:22 90:20
 109:17 138:10 150:16
 152:17 184:10 223:22
else (15) 2:17 25:9
 29:21 66:3 109:19
 165:13 173:25 189:8
 190:3 193:15 195:5
 199:20,20 213:22
 214:15
elsewhere (1) 196:22
email (82) 3:13 4:7,8,9
 6:7,8,15,18 9:15 19:13
 20:8,13 21:5 28:10
 74:11 85:23,24 86:3,9
 90:12,14,16 108:14,18
 111:16 113:15 115:1,9
 135:2,11,17,20,22
 136:16 147:9 153:16

157:7 158:8,12,24
 160:9,18,22 161:1
 162:15 164:13
 166:15,16 167:1
 169:21 170:13,20
 171:1 176:22 178:17
 180:21 181:9,14
 187:18 189:16,25
 190:13,19 191:3,15
 200:3,8 203:2 204:1
 207:21 208:14,23
 209:8,13 219:2 223:15
 227:13
 229:14,15,17,20,23
emailed (4) 21:6 28:3
 29:1 201:22
emailing (1) 163:24
emails (23) 74:12 86:5
 113:17 114:3,5,6
 134:23 136:13,23,25
 138:19 159:13 178:22
 180:18 189:5,8 192:9
 196:15 197:17 199:1
 207:5 214:1 232:12
embedded (2) 93:13
 220:7
emergency (1) 118:22
emerging (3) 2:7
 196:15 220:17
emotions (1) 209:21
emphasis (1) 58:18
emphasising (1) 55:24
employed (1) 218:11
empowered (2) 179:12
 180:19
empowerment (1)
 134:20
emulate (1) 73:16
enables (1) 122:6
enact (1) 88:20
encountered (1) 157:21
encounters (1) 182:16
encourage (2) 73:15
 95:9
encouragement (1)
 70:3
encouraging (1) 196:25
end (12) 13:23 14:7
 41:10 65:7 72:19
 125:14 145:4,6 168:21
 203:25 204:24 205:2
ended (2) 120:4 188:9
endorse (1) 232:16
energy (1) 107:24
engage (3) 82:9 130:5
 156:11
engaged (2) 78:3 188:3
engagement (15)
 16:10,14,17 25:17
 41:18 46:14 62:21
 126:6 127:8,10,13
 154:20 156:1,4,18
engaging (7) 6:12 24:17
 63:4 143:8 144:13
 161:6 221:2
engineering (1) 33:19
engineers (1) 175:4
english (1) 159:8
enhance (1) 164:21
enhanced (5) 30:18
 44:10 92:7 93:24
 210:24
enhancement (1)

193:23
enhancing (1) 94:8
enough (6) 25:6 62:14
 99:15 195:10,20
 218:21
ensure (9) 14:1 22:12
 56:5 57:22 82:15
 127:11 128:4,7 232:1
entering (1) 217:2
enterprises (1) 144:13
enthusiasm (1) 232:19
entire (1) 185:22
entirely (2) 202:6
 216:22
entry (2) 1:21 57:17
environment (4) 84:24
 125:24 130:20 167:9
envy (1) 176:4
equally (7) 25:8 48:13
 53:20 119:7 152:20
 174:25 200:2
equipped (1) 145:2
errors (1) 158:17
escape (11) 107:23
 152:9,17,19 165:7
 201:13,16 207:8
 214:16 216:24 217:8
especially (5) 7:6 32:7
 78:6 164:6 221:11
essence (3) 145:21
 203:1 223:20
essential (1) 114:2
essentially (3) 110:12
 211:13 225:16
established (1) 160:19
estate (5) 17:14 43:23
 89:11 107:11 167:23
et (2) 172:4,5
europe (1) 39:23
even (15) 41:16 51:4
 73:20 78:12 90:23
 95:19 131:13 163:18
 183:21 186:8 198:6
 209:9,16 210:2 231:21
evening (5) 3:12 4:1
 31:21 160:10 162:12
event (15) 2:20 30:5
 34:8 35:17 76:6 91:25
 120:11 124:24
 127:21,24 128:7
 134:12 135:1 184:12
 219:13
eventing (1) 36:2
events (24) 7:19
 29:13,18,25
 30:1,2,3,11 31:3 36:1
 46:4,12 75:22 128:4
 132:6 141:4 157:4
 174:18,24
 184:18,18,21 192:19
 194:24
ever (2) 156:11 185:17
every (13) 2:11 11:13
 15:7 35:8 62:10
 80:14,25 99:9 147:1
 178:25 209:15 211:2,5
everyone (3) 74:20 91:8
 213:21
everything (1) 86:4
everything (11) 2:17
 29:21 55:9 78:5 94:11
 111:1 122:2 207:10
 212:21 213:13 232:16

everywhere (1) 211:8
evidence (18) 1:4 19:12
 20:9 22:21 40:16
 81:13 89:2 90:3 97:14
 120:3 121:22 127:18
 138:18 139:2 196:16
 204:20 232:7,24
exactly (14) 5:15 38:5
 44:5 46:22 51:13
 65:10 74:13 106:14
 111:19 118:4 166:19
 168:22 182:1 226:4
example (20) 6:15
 41:20 57:15 58:8
 59:18 62:3 86:25
 107:12 115:15 159:12
 166:5 207:16
 215:6,8,23 216:3
 218:6 220:2 224:1
 225:20
examples (2) 117:1
 131:12
exceptionally (1) 58:18
exchange (1) 40:19
exclude (1) 191:7
executed (1) 56:9
exercise (6) 2:22 3:8
 77:20,23,25 127:14
exercising (3) 2:20
 86:16 119:1
exist (4) 154:4 155:15
 194:21,21
existing (1) 75:11
expand (1) 220:14
expanded (1) 63:13
expect (6) 155:11
 176:21 188:10,19
 191:3,15
expectation (2) 228:10
 229:3
expectations (1) 229:5
expected (8) 136:21
 156:2 166:20 176:25
 192:1 210:6 213:2
 218:16
expecting (3) 158:20
 179:21 233:6
expedited (1) 222:13
experience (8) 46:9,10
 55:17 60:6 78:7 96:12
 171:5 216:6
experienced (4)
 142:19,20 158:1 174:2
expert (7) 4:12 14:5
 27:1 101:16 105:9
 129:10 224:7
expertise (5) 52:15
 96:12 136:9 194:22
 232:20
experts (1) 198:11
explain (5) 2:4 24:9
 32:2 148:2 159:16
explained (8) 9:14
 24:14 40:22 80:22
 86:12 120:21 124:21
 128:16
explains (1) 15:9
explanation (1) 16:19
explore (1) 69:22
explored (1) 120:20
exploring (1) 101:22
exposure (1) 157:19
express (3) 134:17,21

162:16
expressed (3) 101:25
 163:4 218:2
expresses (1) 6:10
expressing (2) 107:1
 111:16
expressions (1) 107:13
extended (2) 32:9 151:4
extending (1) 32:1
extent (1) 201:6
extra (1) 98:6
extract (1) 1:16
extraordinarily (1)
 88:18
extraordinary (6) 4:1
 8:10 29:7 64:19 78:23
 162:11
extremis (5) 13:5 14:24
 72:13 111:23 128:20
eye (1) 184:19
eyes (1) 144:18

F

face (1) 121:6
faced (1) 124:24
facetoface (1) 102:12
facilitate (1) 63:11
factor (8) 91:3
 152:8,8,9,11 161:9
 201:13 207:8
factors (7) 67:13 99:22
 125:12 201:12 202:7
 212:18 217:18
failure (2) 145:9,11
fair (14) 18:18 20:16
 26:16 97:16 125:25
 131:22 134:16
 142:18,25 181:21
 214:3 218:9 223:14
 228:15
fairly (3) 74:25 134:18
 232:11
fairness (2) 73:21 75:4
faith (1) 179:16
fall (2) 48:16 131:14
falling (2) 117:2,14
familiar (4) 143:16
 150:5 225:3,4
families (8) 46:1 47:17
 50:10 62:2 99:18
 139:4 194:12,17
family (5) 46:2 47:6
 189:5 208:8 232:16
far (11) 2:17 32:15
 42:14 45:10 148:21
 161:14,15 180:18
 193:19,19 231:7
fashioned (1) 2:22
fast (1) 166:16
fasttime (18) 138:21
 166:21 177:2,4
 183:23,24 188:2
 191:10,12 192:14,17
 194:20 195:4,7,23
 213:5,8 231:22
fatigue (1) 32:7
fault (1) 89:21
favour (2) 121:6,9
favourably (1) 226:22
fear (4) 54:7 144:24
 145:9,11
fears (3) 118:4 145:7
 192:15

feasibility (1) 34:11
 feature (2) 150:25
 226:6
 featured (2) 83:5
 231:17
 features (6) 103:13
 158:6 183:6 199:24
 201:18 207:9
 february (7) 32:23
 71:14 75:2 140:6
 153:13,15 157:6
 fed (5) 110:16
 199:2,4,24 223:13
 feed (7) 15:7 53:10
 58:21 77:24 116:14
 200:23 201:4
 feeding (2) 23:6 226:17
 feeds (1) 17:23
 feel (10) 64:7 78:7 97:6
 129:17 174:5 180:19
 190:11 196:5 220:16
 232:23
 fell (2) 3:11 61:21
 felt (16) 10:11 148:4,11
 151:8 171:6 173:22
 178:2,4,7 183:16
 204:11 206:25
 209:11,17,18,18
 few (7) 68:16,18 155:21
 157:13 159:18 186:6
 206:11
 fibre (1) 175:5
 field (3) 27:1 105:9
 155:2
 figure (1) 204:15
 figures (1) 33:3
 filings (1) 205:25
 filled (1) 17:7
 filtering (1) 148:17
 final (5) 9:7 43:14
 102:10 192:22 222:23
 finally (6) 27:5
 111:12,12 115:1
 223:24 225:9
 find (2) 48:19 219:7
 findings (2) 157:16
 182:14
 finish (5) 52:23
 196:3,5,7 232:24
 finished (1) 1:12
 finite (1) 164:5
 fire (1) 50:10
 firearms (10) 8:23 19:3
 22:1 44:18 46:6,19
 77:9 82:1 118:18
 210:24
 first (25) 64:8 71:4
 83:18 84:8 137:18
 140:13 143:6 149:23
 150:24 153:10,16
 158:4 160:16 162:16
 168:22 172:21 181:4
 182:19 183:14 189:1
 190:12 213:23 217:18
 219:8 233:2
 firstly (2) 103:6 117:5
 fit (9) 10:8 19:6 61:3
 156:7,20,20,24 164:25
 165:2
 fits (2) 9:10 222:22
 five (30) 11:2,4 12:6
 15:12 16:4,15
 17:19,25 21:14 22:21

24:22 27:7 41:24
 50:16 79:10 82:9
 101:11 112:15
 132:8,12,21 143:7
 166:10,13 167:4,17
 195:13 200:4 201:24
 204:11
 fix (1) 174:13
 fixture (2) 36:25 138:16
 fixtures (2) 103:10
 123:18
 flag (7) 2:1,5,19 77:21
 127:14 213:13 229:23
 flagged (2) 212:2
 213:12
 flagging (2) 112:5
 209:25
 flags (1) 127:12
 flash (4) 143:15,16,19
 144:6
 flexible (1) 69:17
 floor (1) 102:9
 focus (14) 5:7 18:13
 22:21 27:6 29:17 59:3
 82:21 88:25 137:20
 156:10 173:6 184:17
 208:8 226:5
 focused (5) 22:1 66:13
 185:13 210:11 218:19
 focuses (1) 48:4
 focusing (12) 59:15
 67:22 68:4 73:6 88:11
 196:11 197:9 199:12
 200:15,18 202:2 206:1
 follow (4) 9:14 82:4
 93:13 112:14
 followed (5) 18:18 89:3
 104:3 127:1 146:2
 following (22) 3:24 4:13
 6:6 10:14 15:20 16:16
 18:23 21:11 29:8,18
 30:8 52:2 78:18 80:11
 94:11 95:25 105:15
 115:20 159:22 166:7
 169:16 186:14
 follows (4) 81:9 84:19
 134:1 137:24
 followup (1) 71:18
 foot (7) 8:23 67:2 92:4
 94:13 103:15 199:6
 211:6
 footage (2) 53:11,25
 football (1) 152:4
 footprint (7) 9:4 37:19
 44:3 70:22 103:23
 107:11 133:5
 footway (1) 13:16
 footways (2) 13:17
 70:13
 force (33) 2:11,13 8:3
 23:16 26:1 29:20
 30:20 34:17 36:18,22
 41:22 44:3 57:24 68:6
 69:1 70:17 78:3 83:19
 96:4 105:2 116:18
 118:3,25 140:14 166:9
 203:14 205:8,9 206:19
 209:19 218:12 220:18
 223:10
 forces (17) 7:18 20:25
 21:24 29:12 51:13
 58:22 78:7 79:12
 81:25 85:18 117:4

118:6 119:16 146:1,4
 182:3 220:20
 foreign (1) 148:20
 forgive (9) 14:14 41:7
 43:25 52:18 77:6
 89:19 129:10 211:6
 215:16
 form (12) 16:9 17:7
 37:5 74:22 105:3
 138:11 171:12,14
 183:18 184:25
 185:2,10
 formal (1) 114:13
 formally (2) 32:4 114:7
 forms (4) 16:16 26:10
 43:16 172:13
 formulate (1) 159:4
 forth (4) 51:22 53:2
 69:2 79:7
 forthcoming (1) 41:15
 forthright (1) 134:18
 fortnight (1) 189:14
 fortnightly (1) 189:11
 fortnights (1) 189:13
 forward (20) 17:13 22:4
 55:14 59:24 78:9 80:8
 84:1 86:15,19
 107:9,17 109:25 113:7
 118:19,20,23 119:13
 138:9 188:21 193:9
 forwarded (1) 6:16
 forwardthinking (2)
 106:23 164:20
 found (2) 177:11 183:15
 four (5) 53:24 78:14
 143:7 150:18 160:1
 fourpage (1) 207:11
 frames (1) 81:1
 framework (4) 144:1
 172:7 225:22,22
 frank (1) 180:19
 free (1) 64:7
 freedom (1) 164:21
 frequently (1) 136:24
 friday (3) 84:21 204:23
 208:21
 friendly (6) 157:8
 177:16 190:22 191:19
 204:22 209:5
 friends (1) 139:4
 front (1) 226:16
 frustrated (5) 90:12
 163:12 203:2 209:19
 220:11
 frustrating (1) 219:7
 frustration (4) 6:10
 162:17 163:7 220:6
 frustrations (2)
 218:2,10
 fulfil (1) 222:15
 full (3) 9:14 28:14 99:15
 fully (2) 99:10 100:6
 function (3) 57:2 58:19
 154:20
 functions (1) 30:22
 fundamental (1) 223:24
 funding (5) 69:18 76:5
 99:21 101:1 115:25
 201:15 207:9 216:5,24
 217:7
 further (23) 8:17,23
 18:22 20:24 22:21

31:3 45:11 77:18
 79:6,17 81:25 87:2
 126:2 138:25 145:24
 151:4,7 160:2 178:9
 184:24 195:10 217:9
 221:23
 future (4) 2:14 72:12
 88:11 195:10

G

game (1) 43:25
 gap (3) 56:3,6 189:20
 gaps (4) 2:15 117:14
 172:4 218:18
 gave (18) 12:1 78:14
 106:8 129:21 131:21
 148:10 155:17 173:7
 183:4,17 185:7 186:17
 187:6 193:4,4 205:10
 207:13 222:14
 geared (1) 21:14
 general (11) 26:9 27:16
 32:25 39:13,18 44:24
 47:25 55:22 76:24
 173:5 192:22
 generally (5) 20:12
 25:20 33:11 79:21
 142:10
 generated (1) 27:3
 get (32) 9:7 20:1,9 41:7
 47:3 60:16 62:12
 65:15 73:20 78:11
 92:11,15 94:1 104:11
 105:18 112:25 114:9
 122:20 125:13
 147:18,19 157:1 164:7
 176:6 195:3 198:4
 201:7 212:6 216:22
 218:25 220:17 221:6
 gets (1) 110:16
 getting (8) 2:6 51:21
 76:10 104:24 113:18
 117:19 122:17 177:24
 gig (2) 57:21,25
 give (26) 19:12,20
 31:19 41:1 58:18
 61:19 63:14 67:9,24
 70:20 92:18 106:7
 112:12 115:12 127:4
 139:24 142:8 143:24
 147:16 155:23 160:22
 192:2 194:16 201:14
 217:20 227:5
 given (39) 16:10 18:2
 34:24 35:3 37:3 39:2
 56:15 69:5,19
 71:1,1,14 75:10 91:25
 92:2 108:2 111:15
 114:25 115:12 121:9
 122:8 129:17 138:3
 150:4 155:14 164:21
 166:11 168:17,19
 173:15 179:11 185:13
 186:19,20 204:10,23
 207:17 211:13 220:11
 gives (4) 97:12 138:17
 193:18 208:13
 giving (13) 11:4 17:18
 20:7 51:11 80:24
 139:2 145:11 164:17
 180:13 184:23 190:24
 203:1 226:12
 gla (1) 69:19

glad (2) 213:22 221:16
 globally (3) 148:17
 159:21 164:11
 globe (1) 199:22
 goes (5) 10:24 48:10
 85:2 90:25 224:2
 going (56) 19:23 21:20
 35:24 38:9 41:1,1 49:9
 51:9 54:25 55:13 56:7
 62:17 68:13 72:1,9
 87:19 89:19 97:9
 105:2,3,9,11,22
 108:20 111:21 122:14
 123:3,23 124:6,10
 128:22 132:5 144:3
 159:17 162:22 171:3
 175:9 176:5 179:23
 184:7 188:1,2,7
 192:20 193:9,20 196:2
 199:5 201:4 209:22
 217:22 223:15
 224:9,14 228:12,18
 gold (11) 14:24 202:25
 219:15 223:5,14,22
 224:15,16,18,20 225:1
 gone (12) 38:18 94:11
 109:3 114:13 173:5,12
 181:7 183:8 191:25
 219:14 222:20 228:22
 good (21) 1:3,4,8,9
 4:15,25 12:20 16:14
 43:5 44:20 46:8,9
 68:15 88:6 119:25
 139:14 148:10 162:2
 220:15 226:15 232:10
 governance (3) 111:23
 114:7,13
 governed (1) 34:6
 governing (1) 148:24
 government (5) 13:10
 23:6 25:10 38:12
 83:12
 grade (1) 134:21
 graduateship (1) 142:15
 grammatical (2) 158:17
 178:23
 grateful (1) 115:19
 great (5) 77:11 144:24
 169:25 173:12,13
 greater (1) 125:23
 green (1) 30:4
 griffin (3) 16:19,25
 220:25
 grip (1) 199:21
 grossly (1) 17:16
 ground (3) 83:18 121:4
 151:17
 groundbreaking (2)
 221:1,9
 group (96) 1:11 4:2,10
 8:11 11:11 14:12,24
 15:7,11 18:22 21:6,10
 22:6,24 27:10 28:16
 29:7 31:3 32:4,14 35:9
 37:17 36:13
 58:4,16,16,17,23,24
 64:20 66:1 75:4
 78:23,24 80:14,25
 93:12 96:4 99:2 100:4
 101:17 102:7 104:7,8
 105:5,10 106:20,24
 109:25 111:22,23
 112:25 113:4,24

114:1,21,22 125:2
 133:15 135:7
 146:19,20 147:1,10,16
 153:18,24 155:3
 156:10 159:14 162:12
 163:19,25 164:15
 165:4 166:4 177:8
 180:14 181:2,4 182:5
 184:9,10 185:24 186:1
 188:17 189:12
 191:10,17 192:1
 205:18,20 206:2
 207:15 212:4,12
 228:21
 groups (1) 165:3
 groupsecurity (2) 24:19
 45:17
 guard (2) 36:18,22
 guarding (1) 227:19
 guards (2) 16:20,22
 guess (1) 200:3
 guidance (1) 85:2
 guises (1) 82:8
 gyford (9) 1:5,6 9:11
 11:24 85:6 133:19
 150:1 160:10 234:3

H

haddon (9) 53:1,6
 101:25,25 114:11
 170:9 203:16,17 204:1
 haddons (1) 101:11
 hadnt (12) 13:11 40:17
 43:8 60:14 83:8
 103:2,3 113:15 162:12
 168:6 174:3 204:4
 half (6) 120:11 140:13
 148:1 152:2,3 219:4
 halfway (2) 1:18 137:12
 hand (1) 186:22
 handed (1) 186:20
 handinhand (2) 20:21
 86:14
 hands (2) 104:24
 189:18
 happen (8) 34:15 48:18
 80:3 111:8 159:21
 174:20 176:21 213:6
 happened (16) 34:22
 39:18 83:24,25 96:7
 110:2 113:20 184:12
 195:9 200:22 201:1
 214:9 215:7 216:10
 219:11 221:12
 happening (4) 39:23
 41:2 51:1 71:23
 happens (3) 46:20
 128:5 143:17
 happy (6) 74:13 92:24
 106:12 158:15
 179:2,23
 hard (2) 138:11 220:16
 hardened (1) 87:12
 hardening (4) 24:8,12
 133:24 134:8
 harris (13) 21:22,25
 55:2,24 69:10 70:2
 72:6 77:16 98:16,19
 117:22 131:4 199:18
 hasnt (1) 89:14
 havent (5) 137:2
 196:2,4,4 219:19
 having (21) 8:21 12:23
 26:18 28:14 40:3

44:20 46:18 47:18
 61:10 63:17 68:9
 98:12 99:20 139:8
 172:25 182:4 191:3,15
 195:20 199:14 226:24
 head (3) 48:5 106:15
 116:1
 heading (3) 148:1 158:8
 204:19
 health (1) 30:22
 hear (7) 19:11 33:11
 40:10,13 106:19
 107:15 111:22
 heard (30) 2:17 33:22
 34:7 42:13 59:2
 67:10,13 73:3 116:8
 117:18 125:6,18
 142:21 143:14 147:1
 149:25 160:16 165:21
 166:8 177:7 206:8,25
 218:6 220:10,18
 225:9,11,12,13 226:15
 heart (1) 195:23
 hearts (1) 195:23
 heavily (3) 21:14 182:2
 185:14
 height (1) 65:14
 heightened (2) 30:7
 145:12
 heightening (1) 103:22
 held (5) 4:2 27:11 78:23
 154:1 202:21
 helen (11) 107:16
 135:9,23 136:14
 146:17 155:16,16
 166:18 179:16 182:5
 223:16
 helicopter (1) 143:10
 hell (1) 195:1
 help (14) 53:8 65:8
 66:18 67:7 74:14
 115:11 119:13,21
 132:2 147:22,23
 178:25 205:5 209:18
 helped (4) 120:21
 148:14 170:12 197:6
 helpful (1) 126:6
 helpfully (1) 170:12
 helping (1) 209:19
 helps (3) 48:1 75:18
 127:17
 here (23) 9:18 14:9
 22:5,7 23:1,15 24:17
 28:9 32:20 67:23
 93:19 111:25 133:18
 157:6 160:9 173:10
 185:1,11 195:13,16
 196:6 220:6 233:6
 hes (8) 87:15 108:21
 109:13,14,17 136:6,6
 203:10
 hgvs (1) 77:13
 hide (1) 216:2
 high (19) 8:18 17:3
 26:17 36:17 40:15
 51:19 65:13 135:12,23
 136:19,20,21,25
 152:4,16 161:4,11
 165:7 180:21
 higher (4) 28:13 30:6
 32:10 67:2
 highest (2) 28:8 37:22
 highlevel (1) 126:13

<p>highlight (4) 92:18 104:20 118:4 177:18</p> <p>highlighted (11) 17:8 36:12 38:4 43:4 79:19 121:11 175:21 183:4 186:11 214:14 221:20</p> <p>highlighting (3) 38:2 42:8 123:16</p> <p>highlights (1) 36:16</p> <p>highly (7) 17:5 73:1 142:19,23 161:5 190:20 209:4</p> <p>highrisk (2) 40:13,15</p> <p>highvis (1) 18:9</p> <p>highway (2) 33:12 50:17</p> <p>highways (1) 52:10</p> <p>himself (2) 111:16 168:7</p> <p>hindsight (4) 40:1 56:14 132:7 211:1</p> <p>hit (4) 11:3 12:6,23 53:19</p> <p>hold (1) 102:8</p> <p>holiday (2) 3:16 160:13</p> <p>holistic (3) 86:20,23 115:8</p> <p>home (12) 9:11 23:8 60:21 61:6 118:1 162:8 163:17 164:8 198:5 208:17 209:20 226:6</p> <p>homegrown (1) 73:15</p> <p>hone (64) 3:13,15 4:7,11 6:6,10,24 10:13 11:16 12:20 17:25 21:5 22:9 24:4 27:19 28:3,20 36:13 39:4 40:11,14,23 43:8 52:16 53:1,6 60:5,5 66:3,6 90:10,16 93:15,16 101:16,18 102:11 104:16,19 105:4,11,17 106:9 107:5,12 108:21 111:13,21 113:5 114:10 133:20 134:16,24 135:2 138:17 139:12,13,14 140:1,2 177:17 213:19 225:9 234:8</p> <p>hones (12) 11:1 14:5 15:17 36:8 41:6 71:23 75:5 106:19 110:15 120:24 137:3 232:19</p> <p>hope (1) 15:9</p> <p>hopefully (6) 120:21 144:17 145:13 155:19 193:19 227:4</p> <p>hoping (1) 159:8</p> <p>horrendous (1) 130:16</p> <p>horrific (3) 53:25 91:12 110:3</p> <p>host (3) 52:1 105:25 106:5</p> <p>hostile (90) 5:23 7:23 8:4 13:1 33:10 36:23 37:3 40:3 70:10 79:17,18 81:3 89:4 93:8,9 102:15 103:8 108:2,15 109:18 115:14,17 121:7,10 123:15 128:18 132:24 135:17 138:15 141:13</p>	<p>143:13 144:20 148:13 149:18,21 151:9,17 157:9,19 158:1 167:14 171:4 172:1,3,3 173:23 174:14 175:1,9 176:17 177:4 183:12,17 184:1 185:10,15,17 190:22 191:7,11,20,25 192:17 193:8,13 194:5,20,25 195:11 197:10 199:15,23 201:13 202:14 204:22 209:6 211:4,14,17 213:4 214:24 215:9,11,15 216:13 217:19 222:13 225:13 229:18 231:20</p> <p>hostiles (5) 144:23 151:9 152:9 177:16 214:16</p> <p>hough (30) 1:3,4,7,8 11:19,24 12:4 45:23 57:7 76:21 97:25 104:12 138:25 139:12,23,24 143:15,24 146:7 159:11 180:21 186:13 189:25 195:25 210:9 211:20 232:5,25 234:4,9</p> <p>houghs (1) 180:5</p> <p>hours (3) 12:12 58:25 163:18</p> <p>houses (2) 13:14,15</p> <p>however (9) 7:2 87:23 89:12 156:10 161:12 164:19 165:22 171:23 201:6</p> <p>hub (1) 57:6</p> <p>hubs (3) 85:19 148:9 167:11</p> <p>huge (6) 45:20 118:21 119:3 166:20 176:5 215:20</p> <p>human (3) 130:17,18 145:6</p> <p>hurt (1) 130:17</p> <p>hvm (11) 79:20 80:10 101:18 111:10 115:17 133:3,12 136:2 138:22 197:14 210:14</p>	<p>157:16 158:5 166:9 198:20 225:19</p> <p>identifying (3) 16:4 66:5 142:2</p> <p>ie (11) 124:13 144:12 148:19 154:17 164:9 167:9,11 186:23 188:4 211:18 219:15</p> <p>ignore (2) 97:8 214:10</p> <p>ignored (1) 102:1</p> <p>ill (8) 91:7 154:16 156:14,20 172:17 196:7,8 217:11</p> <p>illusion (1) 175:8</p> <p>im (85) 2:19 3:3 20:1,7 45:5,7 47:19,20 49:11 50:14 53:22,22 54:5 61:17,22 62:16,18 72:9 73:11,13 74:13 76:17 77:5 86:4,5 89:17 91:23 92:24 97:4,11 99:15 103:11 106:12,13 110:13,13,23 111:20 112:13 115:19 119:12 122:13,14,19 123:13 126:12,13,14 128:10 129:10 130:18,21 138:17 139:7 140:24,24 143:4 162:7,9,19 166:6 170:5,10 173:12,13 177:10 179:10 180:17,18 185:4 187:11 196:2 199:17 204:6 206:20 209:14,21 213:21 216:14,22 217:1 223:11 224:9,11 229:6</p> <p>imagine (1) 154:18</p> <p>imagined (1) 188:20</p> <p>immediate (4) 84:20 213:24 230:4,6</p> <p>immediately (9) 35:22 54:2 64:21 85:5 135:15 170:19 175:10 190:15 230:8</p> <p>imminent (1) 81:25</p> <p>impact (4) 53:25 61:14 126:24 144:23</p> <p>impatient (6) 162:19,19 183:20 213:1,3 218:13</p> <p>implementation (10) 121:21 122:10,12,16,23 126:25 127:1,23 145:16 191:14</p> <p>importance (8) 134:24 135:11,23 136:19,20,21 180:21 222:14</p> <p>important (35) 44:6,14 47:2 58:17,18 75:3 77:4 79:14 90:21 104:25 113:3 114:15 116:23 120:8 122:3,18 139:19 143:18 149:15,24 152:6 154:2,17 165:17 174:8 178:11 192:7 193:9 199:24 200:2 206:23 211:16 220:16 222:11 232:22</p>	<p>importantly (5) 90:23 144:20 179:2 193:13 202:12</p> <p>impression (2) 143:24 175:8</p> <p>improve (3) 49:3 94:23 129:9</p> <p>improving (2) 22:19 29:18</p> <p>inaudible (1) 226:12</p> <p>inbox (2) 224:3,15</p> <p>incident (5) 99:6,7 219:13 230:4,7</p> <p>include (13) 7:22 11:25 24:13 54:7,8 87:7,21 88:25 141:21 150:23 153:11 166:22 227:14</p> <p>included (19) 12:14 22:9,22 23:19 54:22 57:11 62:19 66:19 81:22 82:21 115:16 129:5 141:12 151:11,14 166:24 168:12,23 212:17</p> <p>includes (2) 81:1 86:15</p> <p>including (22) 10:18 23:9 24:7 27:7 37:11 46:2 63:6 67:4 85:20 130:2 131:20 132:23 133:23 164:25 167:17 168:13 176:17 191:23 215:2,3 222:13 225:6</p> <p>inclusion (2) 176:23 228:8</p> <p>inconvenienced (1) 139:8</p> <p>incorporate (1) 2:2</p> <p>increase (5) 4:17 22:19 33:6 212:24 231:6</p> <p>increased (5) 4:16 5:1 6:4 18:8 103:15</p> <p>increases (1) 33:3</p> <p>increasing (1) 43:13</p> <p>incredible (1) 46:13</p> <p>incredibly (1) 219:7</p> <p>independent (2) 55:5 90:19</p> <p>index (1) 234:1</p> <p>indicate (2) 120:13 175:14</p> <p>indicated (3) 125:2 126:14 210:9</p> <p>indicating (2) 137:20 171:10</p> <p>indication (1) 21:23</p> <p>individual (4) 133:6 138:12 172:5 186:4</p> <p>individuals (4) 48:15 66:7 158:25 191:23</p> <p>inevitably (1) 111:14</p> <p>infinitum (1) 32:12</p> <p>inform (1) 144:16</p> <p>information (14) 5:12 9:19 53:9 55:11 67:6 97:10 107:9 116:23,25 149:8 178:10 190:8 205:23 207:14</p> <p>informed (1) 63:15</p> <p>infrastructure (8) 24:24 26:6 44:2 89:6,10 145:19 149:3 156:22</p> <p>initially (1) 150:18</p> <p>injects (2) 2:23,25</p>	<p>injured (3) 53:25 71:13 95:2</p> <p>injuries (1) 120:6</p> <p>innovative (1) 230:11</p> <p>input (2) 81:2 204:25</p> <p>inquest (1) 99:11</p> <p>inquests (3) 23:20 43:22 171:13</p> <p>inquiry (1) 19:9</p> <p>inspectors (1) 218:21</p> <p>inspire (2) 73:14 196:24</p> <p>install (13) 34:3 42:14,16 89:12,24 95:21 98:6,9 100:11 108:7 110:4 111:3 195:1</p> <p>installation (10) 33:18 37:25 43:5 69:20 70:19 74:24 81:15 121:7,10 192:6</p> <p>installations (2) 93:10,11</p> <p>installed (15) 33:24 38:23 40:2 42:11 89:8 98:8 99:1 101:19 103:1 107:3 110:10 128:8 195:17,18 211:24</p> <p>installing (8) 34:25 35:12 37:3 38:17,20 108:2 175:1 183:17</p> <p>instance (5) 70:14 72:21 100:4 111:6 127:11</p> <p>instructor (1) 19:3</p> <p>instrumental (1) 87:11</p> <p>integrated (1) 141:16</p> <p>intel (3) 72:7,8 199:12</p> <p>intelligence (77) 2:14,15 5:12,21 6:2 9:19 10:19 13:7 14:22 18:6 20:3 24:15 29:23 30:3 34:9,20 35:10,18,23 38:8 39:2,10 44:1 47:22 49:20,23,25 51:9 54:24 55:6,9,10,15,25 56:3,4,6,7,13,15 57:1 71:20 72:15,17 73:10 80:4 81:7,24 83:13 95:20 97:9,14 99:21 108:25 123:22 124:6,7,8,11,23 128:15,20,21 131:6 148:9,10,12 149:7 159:19 167:7 174:19,23 192:20 196:12 199:19 200:1 202:3</p> <p>intelligenced (2) 164:23 199:9</p> <p>intelligent (5) 164:23,24 199:7,8 200:6</p> <p>intelligently (1) 199:13</p> <p>intend (2) 181:1 217:9</p> <p>intended (1) 76:9</p> <p>intention (2) 15:12 55:13</p> <p>intentioned (1) 48:25</p> <p>intentions (1) 26:24</p> <p>interest (3) 165:22 178:2,3</p> <p>interested (3) 99:19</p>	<p>104:24 150:13</p> <p>interesting (4) 106:14 136:3 138:9 199:7</p> <p>interim (20) 27:20 28:3,21,23 29:2 36:8 104:8 124:15 153:10,17 157:12 169:4,12 173:3,4 177:25,25 207:22 208:1 227:25</p> <p>internal (1) 157:7</p> <p>internationally (2) 58:2 146:5</p> <p>internet (1) 73:16</p> <p>interoperability (1) 117:22</p> <p>interpretation (1) 37:10</p> <p>interpreted (2) 38:13 105:7</p> <p>interrupt (2) 89:19 196:2</p> <p>interrupting (1) 122:19</p> <p>intervals (2) 138:13 172:6</p> <p>into (81) 10:8 11:20 13:15 14:2,7 20:13 25:1 27:9 34:10 40:23 45:3 48:23 58:21,22 61:23 79:9 85:7,24 93:13 94:3 97:16 101:8 102:2,5 103:6 105:2,4,5,10,11,19 106:20 109:19 110:16 112:3 113:23,25 114:7,13 116:17 134:22 139:20 144:3 152:11,19 159:8,17 165:12 173:6,12,13 176:5 181:7 182:25 183:11 184:21 197:23 198:4 199:3,4,25 200:23 201:4 203:5 214:5 215:12,13,21 217:2,19,20,22 222:20 223:13,25 224:15 227:22 228:19,22,24 231:6</p> <p>introduce (1) 84:18</p> <p>introduced (2) 48:23 90:8</p> <p>intrusion (1) 141:19</p> <p>invested (1) 101:3</p> <p>investigative (1) 57:3</p> <p>invitation (1) 230:7</p> <p>invite (1) 217:4</p> <p>invited (1) 131:19</p> <p>inviting (1) 138:21</p> <p>involve (2) 33:19,20 involved (26) 15:1 16:3 42:18 56:17 57:14 58:9 69:6 79:21 108:20 115:25 119:3 139:5 142:23 145:15 154:7,9 155:9 176:15 181:25 182:2 193:13 194:17 195:11 196:11 204:15 218:4</p> <p>involvement (1) 15:17</p> <p>involves (1) 55:18</p> <p>involving (3) 13:11 110:21 194:8</p> <p>irrespective (1) 229:2</p> <p>isaac (32) 6:7 29:3 41:9</p>	<p>107:16 108:18 113:14,15 135:9,23 136:14 146:17 153:21,23 155:17 158:9,14 162:15 166:18 178:19 179:16 181:9 182:5,13 187:17 188:16 189:25 190:19 207:19 221:25 222:9 223:17 224:1</p> <p>isaacs (1) 154:10</p> <p>isis (2) 73:17 148:15</p> <p>islamistbased (1) 55:17</p> <p>isnt (20) 49:9 55:6 72:14 84:3 89:7 106:24 109:1,15 124:7 135:15 139:9 192:21 210:19 214:3,25 215:21 216:17 217:17,23 226:2</p> <p>issued (1) 7:14</p> <p>issues (28) 56:18 59:15 60:10 63:12 68:3 69:1 77:16 87:16 97:19 99:21 106:1,5,17,22 107:21 114:16 115:16 119:7 131:3 186:11 197:14 204:16,16 212:17 225:12 227:17,19 229:11</p> <p>item (5) 23:3 27:5 34:20 115:23,23</p> <p>its (159) 2:11,16,20,21 5:17 11:15 12:11 13:3,18 14:14 17:18 18:9 24:18 26:21 28:10 29:24 35:20 40:1 42:21,22,22 44:14 46:10,14,17,18,21 48:4 50:9 53:17 55:9,22 57:23 58:1 61:8,20 62:2,16 64:8,24 67:9 69:1 72:14 75:20 77:23,23 78:1,22 81:5 84:4,5 89:7,15 90:16 95:6 97:15,16 99:2,4,8 100:6 101:3 104:9,18 105:19 106:14 108:4 111:7 112:7,22 114:10,12 119:3,16 120:20 121:6 123:8,16 127:4,9 128:19 130:19 133:7 134:11,16,20,24 136:3,10,10,11,24 137:12 138:1,15 143:2,6,18,24,25 144:11,20,22 145:7,25 151:25 152:6 158:16 162:2 163:10 165:17 170:13 173:10 175:1 176:23 177:10,15 186:13 193:1,9 194:5,12 195:5,16 198:16,21 199:16 200:5 201:8 205:7 211:16,16,17 214:3,20,23 215:11,12 217:9,23 218:17 219:8 220:7,7,8,15,19 221:1,5 222:21 224:9,17 225:1</p>
---	--	---	--	---	--	--

226:2,3,3 228:5
232:9,22
itself (4) 36:24 195:20
210:3 226:8
ive (30) 23:19 24:14
32:6 42:17 46:11
72:20 74:4 78:6 80:22
81:17 86:12 92:23
93:22 99:17 114:25
124:20 128:15 129:7
131:3 180:15,16,16
181:19 214:12,14
217:6,6 218:15 220:18
229:11

J

jane (3) 1:6 85:6 234:3
january (15) 66:9,19
67:5 68:5,23 71:14
73:19,21 74:7,16 88:5
109:22 151:2 230:21
231:10
jo (1) 203:17
job (3) 166:11 189:23
209:15
joined (4) 115:7 140:17
176:14 225:7
joint (4) 21:17 22:14
86:15 115:7
jointly (2) 44:4 159:24
jostling (1) 62:11
jtac (1) 23:7
judgment (2) 6:1 12:20
july (1) 69:4
jump (1) 95:6
junction (1) 148:22
june (18) 1:1 15:5
31:15 32:23 38:23
54:16 94:9 95:21
113:2,25 114:24 130:9
132:6 181:11 211:23
228:21 231:1 233:10
junior (1) 180:17
jurisdiction (1) 211:3
justified (1) 174:5

K

keen (4) 106:13,19
162:20 164:7
keep (7) 126:13 144:7,9
186:18,18 232:22,23
keeping (1) 218:24
keith (1) 91:9
kept (1) 173:19
kerb (7) 65:6,8,9,13,16
72:21 107:21
kerbs (2) 70:14 103:22
key (12) 17:4 28:9
133:2 143:5,5,12
148:13 154:20 157:16
182:13 205:21 209:8
khumam (1) 47:11
killed (5) 46:3 53:24
71:13 78:15 95:1
killing (1) 43:6
kilometre (2) 152:2,3
kind (9) 6:13 19:24 65:9
71:5 89:12 90:6 105:7
185:18 197:2
knew (11) 47:21 55:17
74:16 101:10 155:6,12

174:12,18 189:15
212:16 229:2
knife (2) 84:1,2
knives (1) 84:8
know (98) 27:19 30:15
38:15 39:1,13 40:2
42:10 45:10 48:21
62:3,10 63:16 65:12
68:2,3 86:3,17 87:18
89:16 92:14 95:19
99:17 100:2
102:11,14,14 105:3,22
106:12 111:4 112:11
113:24 116:15
119:11,17 128:3
129:10 130:18 143:17
144:12,21 145:1,10
150:8 155:15 156:18
157:3 160:5 162:11
169:14 170:5,7,8
171:25 173:18,20,20
174:20,21 175:7
178:24 179:10 180:16
181:12 182:1,1
186:1,5 188:14,22
189:18,18 191:9
192:13,18
195:5,16,22,22
198:5,18 199:18,20
202:17 206:5,19,20,22
208:14 211:22
213:4,4,22 221:16
222:22 226:24 227:1
232:15
knowing (4) 38:15
151:17 177:2 183:24
knowledge (16) 27:1,25
40:7,8,20,21 43:15
44:23 45:10,15 58:20
68:10 71:4 194:5,24
215:15
known (4) 73:14 112:22
172:10 227:2

L

lack (10) 55:25 131:6
157:25 165:7 201:13
214:16 216:23 217:7,7
219:14
landscape (2) 115:17,20
language (1) 14:14
laptop (4) 162:8 189:3
208:17,18
laptops (1) 73:16
large (8) 43:6 62:10
70:6 71:12,12 145:2
188:15 206:25
larger (1) 65:22
last (4) 32:14 163:19
191:7 204:23
late (8) 31:20 40:10,19
41:4 105:18 150:8
156:14 167:21
later (11) 3:11 4:1
19:11 31:2 33:11
49:24 62:20 114:24
151:21 181:3 232:21
latest (2) 169:22 204:22
launch (1) 146:11
launched (2) 95:15
146:8
lawyers (2) 69:16 140:4

lead (6) 56:20 57:8
85:14 86:18 178:14
194:15
leaders (1) 134:22
leadership (2) 85:4 96:3
leading (1) 113:10
learn (2) 78:9 86:14
learned (3) 107:18
111:14 122:23
learning (9) 86:10,11,19
88:10 101:4 116:17
146:9 149:17,24
least (6) 37:23 106:24
108:4 191:16 223:12
231:19
leave (17) 123:3 160:14
162:8,9 187:15
188:7,22,24 189:1,9
190:14 208:3,7,16,20
209:9,16
led (9) 15:22 24:25 43:4
58:4 63:25 70:1 79:5
88:3 215:9
left (7) 23:21 45:11
146:15 186:5 188:6
204:4 205:14
legacy (1) 222:4
lend (3) 149:22 195:20
226:7
lends (1) 36:24
length (1) 107:23
less (4) 90:23 126:1,2
149:23
lessons (1) 69:17
lets (4) 3:3 37:2 136:13
191:14
letters (1) 209:3
letting (1) 189:17
level (16) 9:2 15:21
26:17 30:14 32:10,21
40:15 44:19 67:2 86:3
125:7 156:4 158:2
182:23 190:16 212:20
levels (4) 162:25
168:17,19 172:1
liaising (1) 98:9
liaison (1) 61:11
licensed (2) 140:20,25
life (3) 48:2,18 213:12
lift (2) 137:13,13
light (8) 30:12 39:22
43:2 69:25,25 70:2
110:2 152:21
lighting (2) 141:20
152:23
lightning (2) 167:12,12
lights (1) 152:21
lightweight (1) 74:15
like (51) 10:23 19:22
23:24 31:20 41:13
45:14 52:16,25
53:1,1,13 54:8 55:20
58:23 60:11 62:3
66:14 67:11 74:7
77:15 88:20 92:14
95:22 99:14 105:18
107:6 108:16
114:10,16 115:11
116:24 119:8,17 122:6
129:13,25 131:3 132:2
143:3,19 144:6,25
148:25 161:18 179:15
197:2 198:11 210:7

211:24 215:17 226:17
likelihood (1) 48:16
likely (9) 11:2 12:6
39:11 49:7 125:22
126:1,24 186:13 228:6
likewise (3) 56:11
201:17 211:4
limitation (1) 182:15
limitations (2) 172:4
174:25
limited (5) 39:24 73:7
90:10 157:20 181:22
line (27) 6:7 29:2 60:14
75:24 82:2 87:6 93:15
112:1 135:9,22 136:16
153:23 154:9,11 155:6
162:15 166:19 168:22
178:18 179:18
180:7,16 207:19
216:19 221:24 224:12
229:3
lines (4) 20:6 79:10,10
99:24
linked (1) 14:2
linking (2) 22:10,13
links (2) 117:10 133:24
list (25) 11:2 17:19,25
40:14 60:20,21,23
61:2,15 73:22 93:3
101:11 104:13 151:11
166:10 167:18 176:24
191:20
198:3,5,7,13,23
201:24 204:7
207:11
listed (6) 12:22 57:11
99:20 177:12 202:22
207:11
listened (1) 219:22
listing (2) 40:13 170:20
little (7) 1:18 90:22
95:9 189:2 209:16,17
232:21
live (4) 99:6 130:20
145:23 210:20
liveplay (1) 2:21
liverpool (2) 163:9
218:7
lives (1) 47:19
local (14) 9:4 16:17
17:23,24 23:24 29:20
38:13,15 51:13 58:22
69:20 148:12 167:9
195:2
locally (3) 117:16,20
149:8
location (25) 6:20,22
7:3 36:14,16 37:22
72:24 83:21 106:6,7
111:5 126:24 143:20
144:8 163:20 165:1
166:4 191:13 192:23
194:4 200:12,21
210:24 226:8 231:9
locations (39) 6:25
57:17 67:21,24 73:7
82:15,25 93:5 105:25
109:19 110:17
131:20,21 132:21
143:9 147:16,22
148:11 149:12,22
150:13,14,19,21 151:8
163:15 164:1,3,10,18
167:5 173:20 184:20

192:16 198:17 200:4
227:6 229:21 231:6
log (1) 99:8
logistics (2) 38:17,24
london (354) 2:10 4:20
6:18,24 8:3,7,21 9:3
10:1,22 11:6 12:5
14:1,8,11 15:3,6,14
16:21 17:3,14,24 18:5
19:8,16 20:20,21
21:15,18 22:22 23:20
24:5,25
25:5,8,11,12,13,17,18,22
26:2 27:7 28:5,7 31:14
32:22
33:7,12,14,14,24
34:1,23 35:4,5 36:5,15
37:4,17,19,22
38:3,5,8,16,18,21
39:6,7,14 40:12,14,19
41:2,13,14,16,22,23
42:7,11 43:3,9,11
44:9,23 45:8,11 46:12
47:22 49:22
50:3,9,20,22,23
51:7,10,11 52:9,25
53:16 54:16,22,23
56:18,23,25 57:2,22
58:19,24 59:6 60:18
61:20 62:4 63:3,6,9,16
66:20
67:5,11,12,14,16,22
68:5,7,11 69:22
70:3,5,19,22 71:1,16
72:4,22 77:7 78:2,8
81:8,9,16
82:11,18,20,22
83:1,3,4,7,20 84:23
85:1,4,7,18
86:12,13,18,24
87:2,10 88:4,7,19
89:10,11,13,17,23
91:24 93:18,19 94:6
96:7,10 97:24 98:2,17
100:20 101:1,5,10
105:16,25 106:17
107:7,10,11,19 108:22
110:17 112:8,23
113:16 115:3,13
116:7,10,11,13,14,20
117:4,9,17,24
118:2,10,23 119:8
123:18,23 124:25
127:18 128:17 129:5
130:1,4
131:9,10,17,20,23,24
132:5,14,24
133:3,5,7,9,22
134:7,11,19 137:7
140:1,9,15,17 145:22
146:4 148:19
150:23,25
151:11,14,19,23
152:24 153:6,8,12,25
156:7,11,12,20,25
163:17,18
164:14,17,18
165:1,6,15,23
166:3,22,25
167:15,22,23
170:14,23 171:10,21
172:18 173:1,25
174:4,6,10

175:18,22,24
176:6,10,14,19,22,24
179:4,8 180:20 182:3
183:5 184:4,7,15,22
185:8,14,18 187:9
192:7,22 194:1,13
198:6,7,12 200:9,20
201:11,19,23
202:16,20 203:13
206:6,7,18 207:5
209:25 211:3 212:25
214:6,13 215:2,3
216:8 220:20,24
221:13,17 225:5,20,25
226:11 227:12
228:4,8,11,25 229:7
230:18,25
londoners (2) 53:14,15
londons (4) 14:18 45:19
114:1 116:2
long (13) 30:23 36:18
46:14 110:25 141:10
143:20 152:3
169:13,14 188:7 195:1
211:20 227:10
longer (6) 45:8 110:16
112:13 149:19 189:15
220:7
longest (1) 107:21
longterm (2) 183:25
228:16
look (64) 1:15 3:9 8:9
16:13 20:9 21:23 22:5
23:18 27:9 28:2,9
29:10 30:3,22 31:6
32:20 34:13 36:6 37:2
38:19 40:25 41:11
46:21 55:7 59:21,24
73:22 74:12 78:9
79:10 87:3 97:9 99:16
106:6 113:6 114:11
119:17 126:10 129:12
132:4,20 133:16
134:23 135:1,20 143:3
147:25 149:19,21
153:15 162:4 168:22
171:12 175:4,4 178:25
190:13 199:21
208:17,23 219:1,3
226:4,24
looked (22) 9:4 15:19
30:1 63:23 69:15
76:21 99:15 112:20
113:23 114:19 115:1
124:1 125:24 129:13
137:2 165:11 179:1
183:11 185:7 199:1
219:5 226:22
looking (32) 2:13 10:1
18:21 20:24 30:11
33:2 43:18,21,23
44:2,3 58:6 68:23 72:3
82:3 94:9 108:17
111:2 118:24 119:12
123:24,25 137:11
159:20 167:1 171:4
176:6 181:15 184:21
217:3 219:11 225:18
looks (2) 73:23 141:19
lordship (1) 208:22
lorries (1) 77:13
lorry (2) 69:7 78:13
lose (1) 44:15

lost (1) 222:5
lot (13) 20:10,17 37:24
102:11 103:12 106:10
115:6,6 144:4 176:18
182:6 216:23 226:13
lots (1) 83:13
loud (1) 139:20
love (2) 192:12,13
loved (1) 192:12
low (15) 28:6,10 37:23
43:17,19 65:4 108:1
109:8 111:18 112:4
170:24 171:7,9
175:19,22
lower (4) 44:19
65:10,16 225:25
luncheon (1) 112:18

M

m25 (2) 160:17,18
maan (2) 153:23
229:16
machines (1) 197:2
magazine (1) 196:25
main (4) 54:9 159:19
167:11 173:16
mainly (1) 38:3
maintain (1) 127:8
maintenance (1) 33:13
major (7) 25:6 29:18
30:11 99:6 147:3
148:8 174:23
makes (5) 3:18 12:13
74:20 90:25 106:14
making (13) 76:4
108:12 124:15 126:25
151:23 154:8 155:13
158:16 180:12 194:19
199:11 214:8 230:2
management (12)
102:19 142:16 164:7
177:3 178:5 179:14
180:15 189:17 212:4
219:15 221:25 223:25
manager (13) 6:7 29:2
135:9,22 136:16
153:24 154:9,11 155:6
162:16 178:18 207:19
226:10
managers (3) 112:1
149:20,21
managing (1) 59:11
manchester (8) 29:6
30:12 184:17 190:15
208:18,25 209:1,12
manner (2) 212:18
216:20
many (26) 13:19 26:21
53:14,15,24 54:2
60:14 67:11,21 70:9
72:18 73:7 83:22
86:6,7 104:25
110:21,21 122:17
123:5 147:18 152:20
160:19 173:2 197:14
198:25
marauding (12) 6:20
7:1 19:1 77:9 82:1
83:23 152:10 163:21
200:13,19 215:19
216:16
march (31) 1:13 3:12
7:13 8:11 14:9 15:22

18:23 19:8 20:25
 21:4,5 22:7 54:11
 64:12,24 76:12 78:11
 83:7 90:17 94:10 97:1
 135:3 159:11,25 160:6
 162:5 167:1 201:22
 229:15 230:2 231:1
margins (1) 15:8
mark (5) 136:25 180:21
 203:17 204:1,7
marked (4) 108:14
 113:18 135:11,23
marker (2) 63:18,18
market (3) 54:10 71:7
 156:5
markets (1) 54:8
masood (9) 56:7
 83:10,11,25 112:6
 144:25 196:20
 201:15,16
masoods (4) 49:8 53:11
 199:2 200:16
material (5) 100:15
 110:9,14 151:14 197:3
matrix (26) 14:18
 15:16,17 40:13 72:5
 88:7 134:6 167:6,25
 168:3,10 169:2,9
 170:1,6,10,17,17
 175:12,23,24 176:1
 187:11 227:14 228:7
 229:8
mat (5) 53:6 93:3
 111:25 114:9 223:4
matter (12) 4:12 46:17
 67:23 105:10,16
 113:18,21 121:15,23
 122:7 190:25 204:20
matters (2) 59:9 103:12
matthew (5) 53:1
 139:12,13 140:1 234:8
matts (1) 112:5
maturing (1) 70:24
maximise (1) 147:25
maybe (10) 152:22
 166:17 173:18 195:9
 201:14 210:22
 219:12,13 220:3 227:5
mayor (1) 116:2
mayors (5) 75:25
 98:7,9,11 116:4
mean (23) 9:22 24:16
 26:7 29:20 50:11
 66:11 73:13 82:23
 95:14 110:15 124:9
 136:6 143:22,25
 144:17 161:10,25
 194:16 204:6 211:6
 212:19 216:22 226:10
meaning (2) 72:3 94:1
means (6) 33:23 43:10
 65:20 74:18 147:20
 225:24
meant (7) 30:5 40:23
 61:21 108:10 128:22
 156:25 180:6
measure (3) 18:12
 127:2 232:1
measures (27) 8:5 14:21
 33:11 36:4 50:25
 55:20 58:9,13 89:4
 96:19 98:6 101:18,23
 111:6 119:15 123:11

124:15 126:3 133:3
 137:6 138:4 142:10
 156:12 165:15
 171:6,21 185:18
mechanism (4) 15:2
 34:15 90:7 113:9
mechanisms (2) 69:12
 115:17
medium (1) 144:13
meet (5) 59:5 62:15
 169:18 189:11,12
meeting (76) 1:12,14
 2:9 4:1 5:5,19 8:11
 10:12,13 11:11,12,15
 13:23 15:21,22 21:11
 22:6,24 25:1
 27:6,10,15,17,21,24
 28:16,21 29:7 31:4,10
 32:14,18 37:14 63:2
 64:19,20 75:3 80:15
 93:14 98:13 99:2,9
 100:1 103:25
 104:3,4,5,12
 105:15,20 117:7
 118:19 125:1 134:1
 147:1,9 159:14 162:12
 166:8 177:8,8,21
 178:14 181:2,7,8
 185:24 186:14
 187:4,5,9
 205:15,18,18
 227:12,15
meetings (1) 1:11
 25:24,24 58:5 60:5
 73:21 100:5,5
 102:6,7,8,13 116:7,21
 127:8,10 147:4,15
 166:4
member (7) 19:9,24,25
 84:23 115:3 155:3
 156:15
members (17) 21:6
 25:1 53:19,24 54:5
 62:11 78:14 90:22
 142:9 143:8 144:14,14
 147:10 153:18 161:6
 181:2 205:18
memo (1) 210:10
memory (8) 19:5,7 61:9
 64:7 65:9 98:12,13
 118:7
mention (6) 151:25
 163:22 166:15 177:21
 233:1,4
mentioned (24) 10:25
 14:4 24:21 32:6 40:9
 55:2 61:17 69:13
 73:19 75:25 89:4
 103:25 105:20
 163:19,24 164:14
 165:4,10 166:3 178:4
 200:9 201:23 219:5
 231:16
mentioning (1) 165:14
menu (10) 5:15 7:23
 35:7 79:20 80:1,11,25
 81:11 100:1 109:24
merged (1) 220:20
merger (1) 221:12
merging (2) 220:19
 221:17
message (19) 7:14 8:1
 9:5 13:7 15:22 18:22

20:16,25 78:20
 79:2,9,12 80:20 81:20
 82:4 88:24,25 90:15
 209:8
messaged (1) 204:8
messages (1) 17:18
messaging (4) 18:9
 38:13 93:2 157:17
met (12) 34:14
 35:17,19 96:2 117:4
 118:19 119:7,10
 172:24 187:3 194:22
 207:12
method (6) 7:16 79:15
 81:21 82:5 92:7
 159:17
methodologies (8)
 10:20 14:6 164:10
 167:8 173:7,22 199:22
 202:4
methodology (16)
 40:22 42:24 65:1 69:6
 71:6,8,25 84:4 93:9
 112:7 164:9 196:16
 197:7 199:14
 200:15,18
methods (2) 161:9
 172:20
metropolitan (14)
 21:19 22:3 46:11 57:5
 86:25 116:5,15,16,22
 117:14,23 119:2
 159:24 221:18
microphone (1) 139:20
mid (1) 41:4
middle (4) 69:3 90:18
 171:17 202:2
midfebruary (1) 206:9
might (28) 4:18 12:23
 13:1 26:10 33:19 43:5
 115:24 120:18 121:22
 124:14 126:6 152:17
 156:24 161:18 170:12
 172:20 178:14 186:9
 200:23 216:19 225:2
 226:1 227:24 228:6
mile (2) 25:15 133:8
militarystyle (1) 2:22
mind (23) 6:1 10:24
 24:9 28:12 37:19 41:6
 42:20 48:4 51:8 93:16
 103:5 108:25 113:20
 125:13 138:18 149:13
 198:12,22 201:18
 202:6 209:22 214:5,24
mindful (1) 17:13
minds (7) 54:6 56:2
 131:7,10,11,13,23
mindset (20) 149:18
 151:9,17,18 171:4
 183:12 193:9,13 194:5
 197:10,10 200:24
 201:5 202:14
 215:9,11,15 216:13
 222:13 225:14
mindsets (1) 199:15
minimise (1) 110:4
ministry (1) 160:1
minute (3) 8:10,15 99:4
minuted (3) 99:2,10
 100:6

minutes (38)
 1:13,16,19,25 4:2,5,6
 5:5 8:14
 11:11,12,15,20,21,25
 22:7 23:1,11 24:1
 27:5,15 29:10,16,17
 31:6,25 58:5 63:2 66:2
 68:19 74:2 93:12
 99:25 104:2 112:15
 133:15 138:7 177:9
misleading (1) 84:5
missed (2) 118:5 184:12
missile (2) 148:20,22
mistake (1) 178:24
mistakes (1) 178:24
misunderstood (1)
 89:20
mitigate (9) 1:22
 4:14,23 16:11 18:2,6
 81:6 82:16 103:19
mitigated (1) 77:18
mitigating (4) 3:7 17:20
 29:14 82:21
mitigation (59) 5:24
 7:23 8:5 13:1 18:12
 23:17 33:10 36:18,24
 37:4 40:3 70:11
 79:18,19 81:3 103:8
 107:20 108:3,10,15
 109:18 115:14,19
 121:7,10 123:15
 128:19 132:25 135:18
 138:4 141:14 171:21
 172:1,3,4 173:24
 174:14 175:1,9 176:18
 177:5 183:18 184:1
 185:10,15,18
 191:8,11,25 192:18
 194:20 195:1,12
 211:4,14,17 213:4
 229:18 231:21
mitigations (1) 138:15
mob (2) 143:16,19
mobile (1) 116:24
mode (1) 7:7
model (12) 5:10 26:23
 35:21 61:4 81:10,10
 110:1 129:9 131:14
 132:18 147:23 148:2
modelled (1) 2:21
moment (8) 47:24
 61:10 62:1 91:7
 112:10 149:11 191:14
 216:11
moments (1) 159:18
money (1) 106:10
monitoring (1) 148:16
month (2) 3:11 111:19
monthly (1) 118:14
months (12) 39:1
 74:24,24 109:14
 110:21 112:6 120:12
 121:23 122:17 127:15
 165:5 206:11
mopac (1) 116:1
more (64) 3:19 6:13
 11:2 12:6 13:8,18
 18:16,17 26:3,10
 29:24 36:24 41:18,19
 45:7 48:13,14,15
 49:6,7 60:8 63:14
 65:20,22 77:23 90:23
 92:25 93:23

94:1,2,13,20
 98:8,10,16,20 103:9
 126:15 137:25 149:22
 151:19 152:8,25
 161:14,15
 164:11,22,22,24
 168:25 180:12 183:12
 184:6 188:4 195:22
 196:10 210:5 212:20
 213:15 218:9
 226:22,22 228:3
 232:22
morning (11) 1:3,4,8,9
 6:6 54:10 62:10 76:21
 162:5 232:25 233:2
most (24) 6:20,25,25
 15:12 25:12 36:14
 44:25 62:4 107:25
 109:8 144:20 148:14
 152:20 163:20 175:18
 178:8 179:2 193:12
 199:24 200:5,12
 220:22 225:6 226:2
motivate (1) 163:11
motivating (2) 91:3
 161:9
mount (1) 65:11
mounted (1) 143:11
movable (4)
 74:15,20,22 76:8
move (16) 2:1 3:3 4:5
 8:14 15:19 21:4 22:8
 27:9 28:1 31:8 70:15
 86:14 148:12 157:4
 159:11 160:8
movement (1) 88:17
moving (5) 17:13 86:19
 146:13 166:7 218:2
mowing (1) 197:2
mps (1) 22:13
ms (21) 7:14 9:1 16:25
 88:25 91:4 115:2
 125:6 130:7 131:2,3
 138:24 170:12
 227:9,10 229:9,10,11
 232:4 234:7,12,13
mtfa (1) 77:8
much (34) 19:21 20:6
 32:13 45:23 56:12,14
 72:7,16 73:9 80:9
 70:25 71:15 72:15
 130:25 138:24
 139:2,10 145:11 163:6
 165:12 166:19 168:20
 184:14,18 195:25
 210:5 213:15,21
 226:12 227:8
 232:2,6,9,13
multiple (7) 85:18
 106:8 143:21 171:8
 179:7 201:12 217:18
multisite (1) 2:2
mumbai (2) 84:6,7
mumbaistyle (1) 83:23
murder (1) 130:16
murdered (1) 91:10
must (10) 96:23 122:3
 158:16 180:14 208:8,8
 209:11,22 210:19
 226:19
mustnt (1) 226:19
myriad (2) 141:20
 143:11

myself (6) 10:11 14:25
 84:13 173:19 183:15
 212:25

N

nactso (6) 81:18 132:3
 142:16 192:11 198:16
 204:16
name (4) 75:5 104:13
 119:25 139:24
narrative (1) 67:25
national (62) 5:10 15:23
 23:25 26:23 30:14
 33:22 34:2,5,18,25
 35:21 36:1,25 51:4
 59:3 75:10,16,19
 81:10 96:16 98:22
 108:9 110:1 111:10
 117:19 124:17,22
 138:14 140:12
 145:18,25 146:3
 148:6,7,24 149:3,4
 151:18 156:21,22,23
 164:19,25 165:2,19
 167:10 172:1,8,8
 174:12,15,16,18,22
 183:22 194:23
 225:10,21,25
 226:16,20 231:17
nationality (6) 118:24
 140:12 146:5 149:8
 165:18 184:17
nature (12) 7:16 10:2
 69:1 73:10 79:15
 81:21 82:5 162:19
 183:20 205:22 213:1
 214:3
nearly (1) 152:3
necessarily (5) 26:7
 41:21 58:23 66:11
 127:3
necessary (3) 105:23
 190:12 197:18
necessity (1) 178:7
need (49) 2:1,16 8:4
 13:18 25:9,20 26:2,10
 49:8
 50:10,18,19,20,21
 51:15 54:4 69:18
 70:25 71:15 72:15
 74:24 77:12 80:24
 81:14,20 96:6,22 97:7
 107:8 110:19 115:24
 126:2 128:14 133:20
 144:3 148:11 155:18
 165:14 173:20 178:12
 180:23 182:25 192:7
 196:3 201:7 214:3
 221:16 229:11 230:15
needed (29) 10:11
 13:1,4 14:21 23:18
 24:4,16 25:4,14 32:9
 35:15 39:24 41:11
 57:22 59:23,24 66:22
 69:8 70:23 80:6 97:3
 101:22 114:14,17
 124:1 129:11,12
 173:20 189:19
needing (1) 21:23
needs (4) 113:7 122:8
 127:7 144:8
needtoknow (2) 186:24
 187:1

negative (1) 158:5
neglecting (1) 184:16
neither (2) 96:10 198:6
network (1) 71:10
never (4) 34:22 176:9
 180:15 193:20
nevertheless (3) 10:9
 131:15 174:4
news (2) 96:24 97:11
next (30) 4:5 10:16,18
 15:5 16:1 21:7
 27:10,13 28:1 29:11
 31:8 53:13 73:23
 76:20 79:2 85:11
 87:6,22 91:4 92:23
 97:22 104:17 113:13
 115:23 132:13 139:12
 142:21 159:11 162:5
 219:19
nice (9) 69:4,17,25 71:4
 77:15 83:16 98:18
 139:20 196:22
nick (2) 116:12 117:7
night (8) 31:14,17,20
 47:10,13 94:6
 95:14,17
nights (1) 163:19
nighttime (1) 85:20
nine (2) 141:3 181:3
nobody (1) 35:14
none (3) 78:10 95:1
 118:11
nonpolice (2) 84:22
 115:2
nor (2) 96:11 198:6
normal (2) 189:6 229:24
normally (1) 153:5
north (1) 65:12
northbound (1) 172:21
notable (2) 157:21,25
note (6) 24:1 101:13
 157:16 197:5 198:10
 210:11
noted (3) 27:6 104:17
 182:13
notes (2) 98:24 147:8
nothing (8) 73:5 91:25
 93:9 95:15 120:18
 136:2 195:15 231:7
notified (2) 203:23
 207:22
notify (2) 193:11 221:4
notwithstanding (1)
 132:17
novel (1) 230:11
november (1) 150:21
novice (1) 157:21
nowhere (1) 107:22
number (22) 11:7 8:21
 16:16 88:7 119:6
 122:11 131:5 135:3,6
 145:2 146:1 172:16
 174:11 175:25 181:22
 182:16 186:13 195:14
 181:22 207:23 208:1
 218:17
numbers (10) 22:19
 30:19 43:7 61:13,13
 62:10,15 65:22 71:13
 94:3

O

objective (1) 144:11

<p>observation (2) 4:11 23:23</p> <p>observations (1) 212:10</p> <p>observe (1) 71:11</p> <p>obvious (6) 39:9 55:3 68:4 71:18 72:14 206:13</p> <p>obviously (38) 29:4 34:13 43:23 71:2 73:10 74:4 75:21 81:22 83:14 89:16 99:3 101:6,7 103:3 113:6 146:8 161:23 164:18 168:4 171:8 172:5 173:2 175:3,23 176:19 189:11 191:18,20 199:1 203:10 208:18 212:21 213:10 217:20 218:4,23 222:21 226:15</p> <p>occasion (8) 6:1 42:18 76:14 100:20 174:20,21 196:10 218:10</p> <p>occasions (2) 83:24 218:9</p> <p>occur (2) 12:25 87:23</p> <p>occurred (4) 34:23 39:5 43:10 105:16</p> <p>oclock (1) 232:25</p> <p>october (1) 69:10</p> <p>odd (1) 152:22</p> <p>offer (2) 214:24 223:1</p> <p>office (19) 4:10 9:11 15:24 23:8 60:21 61:6 98:7,9,11 116:3,4,11 117:12 118:1 156:18 163:17 164:8 198:5 226:6</p> <p>officer (31) 10:4 34:16,17 44:18 45:25 48:8 60:6 68:23 72:15 75:17 79:1 88:3,23 91:8 93:7 102:20 110:3 112:20 140:23,25 158:23 179:10,20 180:1,17 196:10 203:14,20 208:19 232:5,24</p> <p>officers (68) 6:11 8:23 13:9 26:18 30:16,20,23 32:6 33:4,5 44:19 46:7,19 47:3 53:21 59:19 66:10 67:4,20 68:7,25 70:2 88:4 90:20 91:2,12,15,19 92:3,8,20 93:23 94:2,13,20 95:12 97:20 103:15 134:18 136:8 138:21 143:8,10 144:8 145:3 147:5 149:20 154:14 155:8 161:17,21,25 162:25 163:5,10 164:2,3 186:4,23 188:4 189:20 190:6 191:23 197:19 199:6 211:6 218:7,21</p> <p>often (7) 19:25 44:13 55:20 62:11 88:18 91:13 110:21</p> <p>oh (1) 168:25</p>	<p>okay (3) 179:1 201:8 206:10</p> <p>old (1) 121:4</p> <p>oldstyle (3) 3:20 6:11</p> <p>obvious (6) 162:17</p> <p>once (4) 60:8 126:20 143:22 160:18</p> <p>ones (2) 130:24 148:18</p> <p>ongoing (6) 7:5 20:22 45:3 89:15 134:4 138:7</p> <p>online (3) 148:15 157:17 183:13</p> <p>onto (6) 12:24 65:21 68:7 93:23 97:22 104:17</p> <p>onward (1) 147:10</p> <p>onwards (2) 144:22 146:11</p> <p>open (8) 71:2 148:4,15 159:20 160:19 165:6 180:19 191:10</p> <p>opened (6) 2:6 92:16 113:15 131:11,12 137:1</p> <p>operate (1) 164:20</p> <p>operated (1) 166:21</p> <p>operation (5) 58:8 167:12 210:12,20 225:2</p> <p>operational (3) 57:9 79:13 116:1</p> <p>operationalise (1) 51:13</p> <p>operationalised (1) 145:21</p> <p>operationalising (2) 117:16,20</p> <p>operationally (1) 220:21</p> <p>operations (3) 5:10 54:14 76:18</p> <p>operatives (1) 182:16</p> <p>operator (1) 50:7</p> <p>opinion (18) 23:13,14 38:24 44:13,14 67:9 102:1,1 110:12,13 134:17 164:22 176:3,3 178:8 182:22 183:21 221:12</p> <p>opinions (1) 134:22</p> <p>opportunities (2) 21:24 44:1</p> <p>opposed (3) 10:1 72:12 126:4</p> <p>opposite (2) 92:19 131:11</p> <p>optic (1) 175:5</p> <p>option (14) 5:23 35:23 103:20 137:25 138:1,2 161:12 177:3 184:2,2 192:21 195:7,24 213:5</p> <p>options (22) 2:8 5:16 7:24 35:7 55:14 70:15 79:20 80:1,2,11,25 81:3,5,11 100:2 103:21 109:25 171:9,18 184:3,23 185:7</p> <p>optionsmeasures (1) 132:25</p> <p>oral (1) 196:15</p> <p>order (12) 3:9 74:25 88:16 125:9 219:21,25 220:1,8 223:2 226:1</p>	<p>228:19 229:15</p> <p>ordinary (1) 152:13</p> <p>organisation (13) 26:20 50:21 101:4 116:2 128:5 130:13 163:1 179:7,11 180:2,3 190:10 220:12</p> <p>organisations (8) 48:22 52:18 53:4,9 115:8 126:22 178:2 195:11</p> <p>organisers (1) 76:6</p> <p>originally (1) 140:17</p> <p>osct (4) 12:15 60:23 62:17 148:8</p> <p>others (19) 44:9 53:24 76:19 78:15 98:5 102:6,24 112:14 118:25 119:9 126:15 135:4 165:4 179:21,22 180:24 188:24 198:21 205:14</p> <p>otherwise (2) 81:4 226:1</p> <p>ought (1) 121:14</p> <p>outrageous (1) 195:16</p> <p>outside (10) 24:20 151:18 153:24,24 164:18 165:21 174:20 205:20 217:3 218:7</p> <p>outstanding (3) 86:22,23 115:8</p> <p>outwith (1) 217:12</p> <p>over (34) 1:18 2:17 4:22 10:16 16:15 22:8 27:13 30:25 62:9 64:15 67:18 75:2 76:12,20 82:7 83:19 85:11 88:8 95:16 97:22 104:17 107:23 121:4 125:13 132:13 150:1 157:24 165:4 168:9 172:22 179:18 180:7 181:18 182:7</p> <p>overall (2) 33:3 36:21</p> <p>overarching (1) 106:16</p> <p>overcome (1) 115:24</p> <p>overlapping (5) 48:14,14,25 49:6,11</p> <p>overload (1) 88:14</p> <p>overnight (1) 232:24</p> <p>overreliance (1) 199:19</p> <p>oversight (1) 116:1</p> <p>oversimplifying (1) 199:17</p> <p>overspeaking (1) 224:17</p> <p>overstepped (1) 180:16</p> <p>own (10) 9:4 41:13 43:24,24 44:13,13 55:12 147:23 161:1 206:4</p> <p>owners (1) 142:4</p>	<p>pairs (7) 46:7 90:20 91:24 94:16 95:12 136:9 161:25</p> <p>palace (2) 3:18 200:17</p> <p>palmer (1) 91:9</p> <p>panacea (1) 124:8</p> <p>panlondon (3) 8:22 9:2 15:21</p> <p>paper (1) 77:24</p> <p>paragraph (32) 4:4 7:12 18:21 20:24 31:7 33:2 55:8 64:9,17,18,22 69:16 79:1 80:8,9 84:19 85:12 87:3 90:18 91:4 92:23 93:13 133:16 159:16 162:16 163:13 181:20 205:3 208:19 219:19 221:23 222:23</p> <p>paragraphs (2) 131:5 159:22</p> <p>parents (2) 120:1 213:20</p> <p>paris (1) 3:17</p> <p>parliament (13) 13:14,15 53:21,23 83:12 145:1 215:9,19,22 216:15,22 217:4,15</p> <p>part (51) 7:4,23 8:22 9:1 15:16 16:23 17:3 21:21 26:22 36:2 39:15 42:20 44:15 48:18 52:13 63:1,3 65:9 68:11 72:5 80:11 81:5 85:4 92:13,15 93:16 97:14 103:14 118:20 119:1 127:13 130:12,18 134:7,8 135:6 141:24 147:3 149:15 154:17 155:23 158:5 167:25 185:2 189:23 206:22 219:3,5 222:23 231:1,20</p> <p>particular (39) 3:4 5:6 7:18 9:3 12:12 18:13 20:18 23:20 25:3,14,19 30:3,25 34:19,20 37:6 46:2 55:8 57:16 64:18 72:24 97:12 108:13 117:3,17 119:16 125:7 126:23 128:10 136:9 137:5 144:10 165:5 184:4 193:8 196:14 197:6 200:8 226:19</p> <p>particularly (15) 22:1 24:10 25:1 43:2 44:9 46:7,9 48:20 52:2 53:7 55:17 65:13 101:10 209:12 219:4</p> <p>parties (3) 108:12,20,23</p> <p>partly (1) 10:6</p> <p>partner (4) 120:2,5 133:2 213:20</p> <p>partners (1) 107:8</p> <p>partnership (6) 46:24 50:18 52:13 53:5 86:20 145:17</p> <p>parts (4) 43:21 98:17 143:5 173:1</p> <p>party (2) 73:11 108:13</p> <p>pas68 (1) 172:8</p>	<p>pass (1) 206:14</p> <p>passed (2) 206:12 212:12</p> <p>passion (1) 232:10</p> <p>passionate (2) 209:14 222:10</p> <p>past (1) 83:24</p> <p>paternity (12) 187:15 188:7,21,24,25 189:9 190:14 208:3,7,16,20 209:9</p> <p>pathogens (1) 149:4</p> <p>patrol (6) 8:23 161:17 162:17 197:19</p> <p>patroling (11) 6:11,12 90:20 92:20 94:15 95:12 136:9 161:8,11 162:1 163:5</p> <p>patrols (19) 3:20 4:16,25 8:18 18:8 44:17,18,20 67:3 90:4,11 91:6 92:22 93:1 94:19 106:3 161:4,4,11</p> <p>patterson (33) 45:24,25 61:10 64:22 68:12,13,15,18,23 76:8 79:1 86:8 87:18,25 88:23 91:7 112:8,10,12,15,20 119:19 124:3 196:1,7,9,10 208:12,19 213:15 225:20 234:5,10</p> <p>pause (1) 177:11</p> <p>pausing (1) 122:9</p> <p>pavement (22) 11:8 12:25 36:19 53:12,24 54:12 65:6,11,18 70:8 78:12,15 81:23 98:1 107:22,23 138:13 167:16 172:7 175:5 200:22 201:1</p> <p>pavements (4) 12:11 69:7 98:15 165:7</p> <p>paying (2) 106:10 163:6</p> <p>pc (45) 3:13,15 4:7,11 6:6,24 10:13 11:1,16 12:20 14:5 22:9 28:3,20 36:8,13 39:4 40:14,23 41:6 43:8 52:16 53:6 60:5 71:23 93:15,16 104:19 105:4,11 106:9,19 107:5 108:21 110:15 111:21 113:5 114:10 133:20 134:16,24 135:2 137:3 138:17 177:17</p> <p>peculiarly (1) 166:3</p> <p>pedestrian (2) 39:16 143:4</p> <p>pedestrians (6) 43:7 98:15,17 107:22 120:14 138:11</p> <p>peelian (4) 44:16,21 46:15 220:9</p> <p>penetration (5) 40:25 71:22 86:17 93:17 105:6</p> <p>people (44) 2:23 16:17 25:5 26:1</p>	<p>52:1,7,11,15,25,25 53:1 54:1,2 61:13 62:14 65:20 71:13 77:24 84:2 86:8 91:24 113:3 114:19 119:8 123:4 130:17 145:4 152:10 159:8 174:3 186:8,13 199:11,14 205:21 206:13,14 215:20 216:2 218:18,25 220:6 221:6 233:1</p> <p>peoples (1) 180:9</p> <p>per (4) 44:16 165:9 166:18 193:21</p> <p>perceive (1) 20:18</p> <p>perceived (1) 4:24</p> <p>perception (3) 120:15 121:16,18</p> <p>perceptions (1) 130:22</p> <p>perfect (1) 218:16</p> <p>perhaps (10) 44:11 53:13 68:4 71:18 124:11 206:13 209:21 212:18 220:6,7</p> <p>perimeter (1) 141:19</p> <p>period (17) 30:25 32:1,17,23 41:17 85:9 89:2 96:1 113:1 114:22 123:3 165:16 181:15,18,22 182:7 230:25</p> <p>periods (2) 30:24 122:23</p> <p>permanent (18) 33:18 35:4 36:25 37:8 38:17,20 70:10 77:7 88:19 103:10,13 108:17 123:17 138:16 175:3 183:18 194:25 228:16</p> <p>permission (1) 233:7</p> <p>person (9) 19:21 49:19 61:11,12 116:16 117:8 125:1 137:1 162:19</p> <p>personal (2) 130:15 139:5</p> <p>personally (3) 9:23 54:16 218:4</p> <p>personnel (6) 36:22 127:10 130:5 186:4 187:13 205:24</p> <p>persons (1) 16:5</p> <p>perspective (3) 120:7,10 128:3</p> <p>pertinent (2) 205:21 209:17</p> <p>phase (4) 128:20 145:14 146:7,8</p> <p>phone (3) 85:14 166:17 181:13</p> <p>phrase (1) 199:7</p> <p>phrased (1) 115:9</p> <p>phrases (1) 143:14</p> <p>physical (29) 1:24 5:16 24:13,24 26:6,10 41:20 44:2 45:1 47:15 71:15 77:19 79:21 89:5,9,13 90:7,7 109:18 111:2 119:14 141:25 165:15 183:15 184:24 186:17 193:1 194:5,15</p>	<p>physically (3) 92:1 154:15 187:6</p> <p>pick (3) 213:23 219:18 221:22</p> <p>picked (4) 154:21 190:2 219:2,19</p> <p>picking (3) 46:5 111:24 136:4</p> <p>picture (21) 5:12,22 20:3 23:21 24:15 29:23 35:18 43:13 44:2 47:21,22 48:23 51:9 80:4 81:7 108:25 123:6 224 127:4 128:15 193:3</p> <p>pictures (1) 83:13</p> <p>piece (12) 21:25 23:22 35:9 47:14 55:15 110:16 118:8 133:6 138:7 149:24 159:4 188:14</p> <p>pieces (3) 167:11 176:17 187:12</p> <p>place (47) 11:7 12:13,23 16:4 19:6 22:6,25 29:6,8 30:8,9 31:17 36:18 41:16,17 42:2,5 49:3 60:18 64:20 77:4 92:21 114:4,4 118:21 125:3,9,10,16 127:20 128:7,25 129:15 156:5,8 160:6,11 163:22 167:16 168:14 184:8 189:8 195:4,14 200:14 218:23 232:1</p> <p>placed (3) 138:12 172:6,9</p> <p>placement (2) 138:3 171:20</p> <p>places (56) 7:20 9:10,17,21,24 10:6,9,21 11:2 12:6 14:2 15:13 23:5,9,10,16,22 24:5,7 25:13 28:4 35:13 47:4 60:10,17,20 61:3,8,17,22 62:5 70:9 85:19 126:16 129:7,9,21 131:14 132:9,13,15 133:21,23 148:25 149:2 156:2,21 163:16 168:13 176:24 198:3,13,15 201:24 225:11 227:2</p> <p>placing (1) 172:2</p> <p>plain (5) 51:4 68:1 74:20 89:7 110:10</p> <p>plan (5) 32:17 55:13 92:14,21 107:9</p> <p>plane (1) 148:23</p> <p>planet (2) 25:13 62:7</p> <p>planned (7) 22:6 56:8 113:24 123:2,6 127:15,17</p> <p>planning (7) 106:7 119:1 122:17 142:25 143:13 145:10,14</p> <p>plans (6) 4:14 19:2,2,5 82:2 180:1</p> <p>plato (2) 19:2 82:2</p> <p>played (1) 134:25</p> <p>playing (1) 77:25</p>
--	--	--	---	---	--	--

P

<p>plc (2) 193:19 221:13 please (72) 1:15 4:5,22 22:24 23:3 29:11,25 31:8 32:2,20 36:6 39:13 43:14 47:6 64:4,10 73:20 75:2,7 76:12,20 79:5 80:8 81:18 82:7 84:17 85:11,23 91:4 96:21 97:22 107:14,17 114:12 115:11,12 120:23 132:7,11,13 133:14 135:1,21 137:9 139:16,24 140:7 142:21 155:21 157:5,24 158:14 160:9 167:20 169:20 171:14 175:11 177:12 182:12 183:4 196:5 200:7 201:21 203:25 206:13 208:24 213:23 219:1,4 229:13 230:13 232:22 pleased (1) 204:6 plenty (2) 225:11,12 plus (3) 18:8 61:20 188:11 pm (5) 8:11 68:22 112:17,19 233:8 pointed (1) 205:11 pointing (1) 65:10 points (16) 1:18 46:5 104:20 108:1 137:12 152:5 158:18 168:24,25 170:12 171:17 177:18 178:8,10 186:10 213:22 police (147) 2:10,24 5:3 7:1,9 8:21 9:3 10:1 13:9 14:12,15 15:2 16:21 17:6,14,24 20:1,20 21:7,18,19,19 22:3,4 24:11 25:17 27:19 32:10 33:4,5 34:6 45:11 46:11 50:22,23,23 52:12,19,25 53:21,22 54:22 55:15 56:1,18,23 57:1,2,5,22 58:19 63:9 66:13 67:16 70:4,19,22 78:3 81:6 85:1,13 86:12,24,25 87:2 89:17 91:9,12 94:5,7 96:4 97:9,16 98:5 100:20 101:1,5,11 106:18 110:20 116:5,7,14,15,16,20,22 117:4,14,17,23,24 118:16 119:2,8,15 131:7,9 134:11,19 139:12 140:1,10,14,15,17 142:23 143:8 145:3,23 146:1,4 148:19 149:19 154:1,6 156:4 157:25 159:13,24,25 160:1 162:25 163:10 179:4,8,8,10 180:20 182:3,17 184:24 206:6,18 218:20 220:2,3,5,9,18,19,20 221:18 223:10 224:11</p>	<p>225:5 226:11 policed (1) 231:9 policing (25) 30:25 32:4 38:14 43:15 48:20 55:10 57:9 67:1 81:9 86:18 92:22 115:7 130:19 146:17,22 154:5,6,13,16,17,18 186:23 203:10,11 221:10 policy (1) 26:17 political (2) 222:7 224:9 poor (1) 162:1 populated (2) 25:13 62:5 posed (3) 129:11 210:9 212:7 position (16) 14:20 23:24,25 24:4 26:19 58:2,21 60:24 92:7 93:24 117:19 133:21 154:10 155:16,17 195:6 positions (1) 223:6 positive (3) 134:20 158:5 186:10 positively (3) 91:20 95:9 149:12 possibilities (2) 56:2 131:8 possibility (1) 42:19 possible (7) 34:12,16 47:20 48:7 106:24 108:4 126:14 possibly (4) 121:23 122:7 148:18 201:4 post (6) 10:13 11:14 15:6 67:8 146:16 155:18 postmeeting (1) 9:6 posture (8) 22:13 29:22 30:6,7 79:13 91:1 92:13 161:16 postwestminster (1) 203:12 potent (4) 121:6,9 122:6 123:1 potential (11) 5:1 35:12 65:22 74:17 76:1 77:12 149:14 161:8 210:10 217:4 230:14 potentially (10) 1:23 13:9,20 189:15 197:25 217:2 220:3,4 227:5 228:2 practical (3) 33:23 42:6 46:18 practice (2) 45:20 145:25 practices (1) 44:9 practitioner (2) 61:18 126:12 practitioners (1) 26:25 prcis (2) 178:1 207:18 preceded (1) 1:11 preceding (1) 165:5 precisely (1) 144:5 precluded (1) 9:22 predictable (6) 11:8 12:9 36:17 152:4 161:20 167:16 preexisting (1) 69:25 preferred (1) 2:7</p>	<p>premises (2) 155:24 175:14 prepare (7) 9:13 10:2 56:20 59:12 147:3,8,23 prepared (2) 137:10 171:13 presence (6) 17:4 40:4 88:4 91:1 158:1 161:16 present (6) 73:22 76:14,19 95:4 98:13 104:16 presented (2) 4:19 184:3 presently (1) 109:15 press (4) 96:21 97:4 111:8 217:9 presumably (8) 63:4,11 65:23 74:7 101:16,24 104:2 223:2 pretty (4) 19:21 20:6 78:3,5 prevent (1) 95:1 preventing (1) 76:9 previous (11) 8:16 11:16 27:15 104:10 158:12 162:12 166:14,15 168:15 174:6 189:13 previously (5) 4:19 5:8 176:8 187:25 207:22 preying (1) 201:18 primary (1) 146:19 principle (1) 47:25 principles (3) 44:16,22 46:15 prior (6) 21:1 36:7 59:21 85:12 127:24 130:9 priorities (1) 26:17 prioritisation (1) 88:6 prioritise (1) 87:24 prioritising (1) 168:13 priority (5) 7:8,20 40:15 121:15 226:1 private (4) 2:24 71:25 103:6 195:3 proactive (2) 106:23 108:5 probable (1) 108:5 probably (19) 25:12 28:5 30:6 31:19 40:9 41:5 63:14 64:18 86:18 94:4 111:17 144:3 165:10,10,11,17 166:16 219:12 226:21 problem (12) 92:5 103:16,17,19 114:2,6 124:13 139:11 210:10,15 219:9 224:14 problems (1) 212:2 procedures (2) 114:4,18 proceedings (1) 137:11 process (6) 9:18 10:24 81:17 141:7 147:23 175:7 processes (3) 98:25 114:20 225:10 procurement (1) 175:7 produce (1) 178:18 produced (8) 11:20</p>	<p>32:21 153:12 168:1,10 177:22 181:16 188:10 producing (3) 28:22,24 169:23 product (1) 193:10 products (1) 167:10 professional (11) 41:13 44:13 61:11,21 130:14,23 142:13 171:22 176:3 207:15 221:12 professionals (1) 2:24 profile (3) 63:13 91:1 226:11 programme (10) 24:21,23 39:15,18,21,25 40:8 43:24 45:16 86:16 progress (2) 101:21 155:13 progressed (3) 188:5 227:4 229:1 progressing (1) 128:18 progression (2) 206:22 221:14 progressive (2) 206:19 220:22 project (52) 3:20 16:25 24:23 66:23 88:2 92:6 93:1,20 95:4,11 103:7 113:11 137:18 140:11 142:21,22 143:3 145:23 148:5 149:15 154:15,19 156:17,17 157:17,20 159:23 161:2,13 163:3 164:5 171:19 182:2,22 183:25 185:2 193:8,10,12 202:13 203:6 210:13,19,23 219:17 220:25 221:3 222:10,12 229:25 230:16 231:25 projects (1) 181:25 prolonged (2) 123:3 225:2 promised (1) 233:3 promoted (1) 218:25 propaganda (12) 10:20 73:5,13 148:14 159:20 164:9 167:8 196:24 197:7 199:15,21 202:3 proper (3) 214:8 217:10,13 properly (5) 23:17 49:9 200:18 208:6 218:11 proportionate (4) 44:21 46:15 72:23 87:12 proposals (1) 27:2 proposed (1) 21:6 proposition (1) 122:25 prospect (2) 3:8 121:21 protect (11) 9:13 10:2 25:6 49:4 56:20 59:12 98:6,15,17 120:14 213:11 protected (2) 51:15 69:8 protecting (7) 24:6 37:18 70:13 74:18 88:11 110:17 133:22 protection (10) 26:10 43:17 45:2 71:15</p>	<p>72:25 74:22 89:13 95:16 145:18 184:25 protective (53) 5:9 7:19 10:5 36:3 41:20 50:24 51:5 53:7 56:17,21 57:15 58:13 59:9,16 62:22 69:21 70:16 72:20 75:3 78:4 82:16 88:9 93:8 96:6,19 101:22 102:6 105:1,13 106:15,22 116:10 117:9,11 118:4 119:10 127:10 155:24 157:2 165:15 171:6 176:13 193:7,14,23 194:15 203:8 204:16 212:22 220:23 221:1,15 226:7 protest (1) 219:13 protocol (1) 174:12 proved (1) 83:7 proven (2) 144:10 222:21 provide (9) 13:25 32:10 93:3 100:24 142:8 150:21 177:17 185:22 186:16 provided (9) 76:5 95:16 153:12 157:13 169:2 181:17 207:3 227:24 230:19 providing (3) 59:11 104:19 153:17 provision (1) 231:25 prudent (2) 94:4 151:10 ps (2) 139:13 234:8 psia (5) 149:2 156:22 164:8 198:15 226:6 public (53) 4:17 5:2 6:12 7:19 8:24 14:19 19:25 24:6 40:5 45:18 46:13,14,20 47:15 48:2 49:4,11,15 53:17,19,24 54:6 62:11 69:7 72:4,12 74:18 78:15 83:16 90:23 92:18 95:1,16 96:21 97:6,11 98:7 100:2 110:19 123:6 133:23 142:9,24 143:8 144:14,15 161:6 163:6 219:21,25 220:1,8 223:2 229:15 publications (1) 148:15 pulse (1) 44:17 pure (2) 146:8 226:4 purely (2) 156:16 174:22 purpose (6) 19:6 137:10 141:6 150:9 178:21 229:23 purposes (5) 30:17 33:5 147:6 214:2 215:16 pursued (2) 192:11 213:8 pushed (1) 184:21 puts (3) 48:8 88:7 91:5 putting (8) 49:17 50:6 72:19 103:13 149:13 191:11,18 192:17</p>	<p>7:6,11,18,22 8:1,9,13,20 9:1,6 10:4,13 11:2,6,10 12:8,22 13:23 15:12,17 16:1,7,13,25 17:16,23 18:2,5,11,16,18,21,25 19:4,8,18 20:8,14,16,24 21:4,10,13,17 22:5,17,21,24 23:3,15 24:1 25:3,16,25 26:9,13,16 27:5,9,13,19,23 28:1,12,15,20 29:1,6,10,16 30:7,11,14 31:2,6,13,17,23,25 32:13,20,25 33:2,7,9,18,22 34:1,16,24 35:3,7,12 36:6,12,21 37:2,11,21 38:15 39:2,9,12,21 40:10 41:16,23 42:4,10,13 43:1,14,20 44:23 45:5,9 46:17,24 47:2,6,24 48:4,7,13,22 49:3,6,13,15,24 50:5,9,12,19 51:3,15,18,25 52:5,14,18,21,23,25 53:11,22 54:10,14,18,21 55:2,16,24 56:7,11,17,20 57:7,14,19,21 58:4,8,12,16 59:2,5,8,11,15,18 60:2,5,8,10,13,16,20,24 61:2 62:1,7,9,14,20,24 63:4,8,11,16,20,23 64:5,7,11,15 65:2,5,8,12,17,22,25 66:3,5,9,18,22,25 67:4,7,15 68:1 69:10,15,25 70:6,12,18 71:1,11,18 72:6,14,24 73:5,13,19 74:2,6,9,16,20,24 75:2,7,13,17 76:12,16,18,24 77:5,8,11,15,18,22 78:2,11,17,20 79:4,9,23 80:5,8,18,23 81:13,18 82:3,7,11,13 83:2,4,7,10,15,19,23 84:7,11,15,17 85:11,16,23 86:1,20,22 87:2,6,9 88:2,8 89:12,19 90:1,3,6,10,13,15 91:12,15,19,25 92:9,11,23 93:21,23 94:1,5,11,17,20,23 95:1,8,14,19,24 96:3,10,21 97:1,6,19 98:5,14,24 99:11,18 100:8,11,14,18,20,23 101:1,6,10,13,15,18,24 102:5,11,15,18,23 103:15,25 104:5,9,16,24 105:12,17,23</p>	<p>106:3,10,13,21 107:12 109:2,6,11,21 110:2,7,9,19,24 111:12 112:6 114:2,14,22 115:1,11,19,23 116:4,7,15,20 117:21 118:1 119:5 120:10,16,23 121:2,4,9,14,17,20 122:1,3,6 123:7,10,12,21 124:3,13,19 125:1,6,9,12,18,20,25 126:7,11,13,19,22 127:18,23 128:1,3,24 129:2,4,15,17,23 130:7,12 131:12,17,19,22 132:1,11,17,20 133:1,5,9,12,14,18 134:8,11,16,23 135:6,9,11,14,17,20,25 136:2,8,11,13,19,21 137:2,5,9,18,20,23 138:2,6,17 140:2,6,9,13,17,20,24 141:3,6,10,12,16,18,21,24 142:2,4,8,12,15,18,21 143:2 144:3,10,25 145:15 146:11,13,23 147:1,8,12,15,19,22,25 148:24 149:7,11,25 150:4,8,18,21,23 151:1,4,6,11,13,21 152:13,16 153:2,10,15,21 154:10,13,23 155:3,5,21 156:1,4,7,10,24 157:4,11,15,24 158:4,8,11,24 159:16,22 160:5,8,13,22,25 161:8,17 162:4,11,15 163:4,13,24 164:13 165:4,13 166:3,7,22 167:1,15,20,25 168:6,9,17,19,22 169:2,7,9,12,16,18,20,25 170:3,12,16,19,23 171:1,12 172:10,13,16,24 173:23 174:2,8 175:11,14,17 176:1,21 177:6,10,15,21 178:13,16,21 179:19 180:23 181:1,9,15,20 182:7,10,12,25 183:4,17 184:1,23 185:4,7,10,17,21 186:16 187:2,9,15,17,20,22 188:7,10,19,23 189:7 190:13,19,24 191:3,14,24 192:6,11,22 193:1,25 194:4,8,12 196:14,18,20,22,24 197:2,5,9,13,17,23 198:1,3,10,18,20,25 199:5,11,17,24 200:7,12,22</p>
---	---	--	--	---	--	---

Q

q (817) 1:10 3:6,11,23
 4:1,22 5:5,23 6:1,6,18

roadway (6) 33:13 34:4,19 152:14 153:3,5	109:6,14,17 110:13,13,23 111:18 121:24 134:12 136:6 138:2 190:1 195:16 204:10 214:20 225:16	101:17,23 102:6,7 104:7,8 105:1,5,10,13 106:15,20,22 109:25 111:22,23 112:25 113:24,25 114:1,21 115:4 116:11 117:9,12 118:4 119:10 125:2 126:3 127:1,10 129:4 130:5,10 133:15 135:7 140:21 141:1,16 142:16 146:15,19,20 147:1 149:20,20 153:18,24 155:3,22,24 156:12 157:2 159:14 162:11 163:19,25 164:15 165:3,4,15 166:4,8 168:15 171:6 176:13,16 177:8 180:14 181:2,4 182:5 184:9,10 185:24,25 188:17 189:11 191:10,17,25 193:7,14,15,23 194:15 203:8 204:16 205:18,20 206:2 212:4,22 220:23 221:2,15 226:7,9,10 228:20,20	152:13 158:6 172:16 174:9 176:10 179:17 181:1 191:16 196:18 214:1,1 218:2 219:2 selection (2) 11:4 159:17 send (9) 86:9 113:9,12 159:7 169:21 170:20 180:24 188:19 209:13 sending (4) 19:13 178:21 179:24 209:9 sends (1) 17:18 senior (18) 10:4 34:16 134:18,22 138:21 158:22 164:6 178:5 179:14,20,25 180:15 191:23 203:14,20 204:15 212:4,20 sense (3) 126:22,24 138:20 sensitive (5) 37:5 73:10 144:4 151:13 205:22 sensitivity (1) 20:5 sent (39) 3:13 4:9 6:6,9 103:3 104:15 108:18 115:2 134:24 135:2 136:14,16 138:18 144:5 153:16 157:7 162:15 164:13 170:4 173:18 179:22 181:10 182:13 188:16,17,20,23,24 189:16,25 190:3,13,19 191:3,15 192:9 207:21 208:14 227:13 sentence (2) 87:20,22 sentiment (1) 97:11 separate (2) 112:23 118:2 sequence (2) 1:10 31:2 sergeant (17) 53:1,6 101:11,25,25 102:11 114:10 139:12 140:1 170:9 203:17,17 213:15,19 220:4 225:9 232:19 sergeants (1) 218:20 series (3) 127:8,9 168:12 serious (6) 110:19 120:6 190:20 191:18,24 209:4 seriously (3) 38:20 193:10 219:22 servator (100) 3:20 4:15,25 6:4 17:4,9 18:7,8 21:17 22:12 27:14 58:8 59:19 66:9,12,23 67:3,4 68:7,8,25 77:11 88:2 90:4 92:6 93:1,20,23 94:18,20 95:4,11 103:7 106:3 113:11 136:4,6,6,8 137:18 140:11 142:21,22 143:3,5 145:16,23 148:5 149:15 150:5 154:2,3,3,7,15,19,20 156:17,17 157:17,20 158:6 159:23 161:13 162:23 163:3 171:5,19 182:2,14,22 183:2 184:2,23 185:2,3	188:1,5 189:19 190:5 193:8,10,12 202:13 210:12,13,19,23 218:15 219:17 221:3 222:10,12 229:25 230:16,19,20,24 231:9,25 servatordeployed (1) 182:17 servatorstyle (5) 8:17 161:2,15 184:7 203:6 servatortrained (1) 164:5 served (1) 9:12 service (4) 50:23 130:19 170:9 223:1 services (1) 160:2 serving (1) 57:23 set (10) 5:11 13:5 57:16 72:1 84:1 98:24 99:12 172:17 185:11 191:14 sets (2) 11:2 26:23 setting (3) 10:18 26:17,22 several (3) 9:18 40:23 83:24 sg (1) 205:18 shall (1) 40:10 shallow (1) 175:6 share (3) 41:1 54:15 107:8 shared (2) 52:1 205:20 sharing (1) 53:9 shaw (6) 1:17,19 2:8 3:6 76:22 77:3 sheet (2) 66:15 81:19 shes (3) 51:4 224:6,11 shift (2) 31:21 143:21 shifts (2) 30:18 31:1 shoes (1) 149:13 short (12) 68:21 74:25 86:6 96:1 117:5 143:20 150:9 176:9 181:21 182:14 210:1 211:12 shortened (3) 104:19 177:18,22 shortly (4) 3:13 19:14 160:10 227:13 should (31) 35:8 37:3 38:1,20 43:18 56:1 69:19 70:17 87:21 97:20 99:1 108:2 109:8 118:1 124:9 131:6 136:4 137:16,20 138:3 142:5 144:5 147:5 161:3,5 166:15 175:18 180:17 185:15 190:12 209:18 shouldertoshoulder (1) 62:12 shouldnt (2) 26:21 199:11 show (3) 64:14 75:25 118:9 showing (3) 32:21 53:25 71:8 shown (4) 37:11 83:15 99:11 161:13 shows (5) 10:23,25 17:12 93:14 164:17 side (5) 53:8 126:10,17 152:17 154:17	sidebyside (1) 160:3 sides (1) 171:21 sight (1) 178:12 sign (2) 59:18 60:1 significant (23) 7:19 10:21 32:16 61:23 72:8 92:10 104:6 119:6 144:23 157:18,25 162:24 169:15 176:15 179:20 193:22 201:17 212:24 221:7,9 226:13 227:23 230:20 signing (1) 32:4 signs (1) 152:22 silver (8) 202:24,24 219:15 223:5,14,22,23 225:1 similar (6) 14:14 84:5,7 128:7 152:16 172:18 similarly (1) 152:17 simple (5) 111:7 198:16 199:16 215:11 217:17 simplify (1) 17:16 simplistic (1) 225:18 since (11) 62:2 66:9 88:5 101:10 118:7,8 142:12 145:15 218:15 220:9 230:21 sincere (1) 194:16 single (2) 38:12 116:15 singularly (1) 86:17 sir (15) 1:4 139:21 141:2 147:18 159:10 163:7 166:6,18 169:8 178:15 215:11 227:10 232:8 14:17 sit (12) 15:5 19:2 58:23 68:19 83:14 99:25 132:17 146:9 176:2 222:16,18 232:25 site (40) 11:7 12:8,11 14:23 34:9 36:23 38:9 39:11 42:21 43:6 47:23 67:10 103:23,24 123:23 126:20 127:5,15,21,22 128:5,6,12,23 129:6 130:2,5 134:7 156:19 165:12 167:16 173:2,11 183:16 198:15 226:13,25 228:3 231:18,18 sites (80) 7:5,8 9:23 10:15,21 13:19,21 14:18,21 16:4,9,15 17:19,21,25 18:3 21:14 22:18,22 23:10,18 27:7 28:12 40:13,15 41:24 45:6 61:24 66:13,15 67:11 72:19 82:9,15 83:22 106:8 119:11,12,17 123:5 124:1 125:22,23,25 127:4,12 131:15 132:23 133:6,9 141:25 142:4 149:3,19 151:4,7,11 152:18 164:8,24 165:22,22 166:10 170:20 173:6,7,8,14 175:19 176:2,6,16,19 184:11,16 186:25	204:11,14 226:19 227:2 sits (2) 57:4 144:1 sitting (2) 110:14 195:16 situation (1) 96:15 six (8) 46:1 79:10 95:22 97:1 114:23 127:15 175:25 211:24 size (2) 144:5,13 sleep (2) 189:2 209:17 slightly (2) 216:19 217:1 slow (1) 110:21 slower (1) 188:4 slowtime (1) 231:22 small (4) 30:20 57:24 144:13 178:1 smaller (2) 138:12 172:5 smallest (1) 57:24 smoke (1) 130:1 soft (1) 146:11 solution (14) 123:1 124:14 175:3 177:4 183:24 191:10 192:15,17 194:25 195:4 210:16 228:16 230:11 231:23 solutions (3) 188:3 210:10 230:14 somebody (6) 55:16 66:3 159:3 189:8 194:13 204:2 somehow (1) 200:23 someone (10) 9:25 86:8 98:12 144:25 148:21 180:13 224:21 225:3,3 232:10 something (50) 2:16 11:10 12:15 13:4 16:20 24:24 30:5 35:15 38:4 40:6,9 43:2 46:20 47:18 48:10 53:13 56:4,13 61:3 63:13 65:14 74:7 81:1 93:4,5,6 95:22 97:24 101:3,13 105:4,18 107:2 108:24 109:21 115:13 129:7,25 130:19 136:25 143:17 158:19 175:2 192:11 200:23 211:24 214:5 220:15 221:22 226:20 somewhere (3) 64:1 66:22 99:19 soon (1) 53:11 sophisticated (11) 28:6,11 102:1 109:9 111:18 118:14 136:10 171:7,9 175:19,22 sophistication (6) 28:13 37:24 43:17,19 65:4 170:24 sort (18) 3:21 37:23 90:7 97:21 136:22 141:18 146:11 148:10 149:17 159:7 161:3 167:6 180:10 189:22 211:15 219:24 220:8 229:2 sorts (8) 26:14,18 63:11 77:16 107:13 116:21	
S							
safe (1) 189:18 safety (7) 19:10,15 30:23 39:16 72:12 84:25 98:1 sake (3) 214:20 215:25 216:10 same (31) 20:2,6 22:2 23:13 26:7 41:12 67:25 78:19,24,25 81:10 84:4 109:2 112:7 118:6 133:14 135:21 136:15 145:7 151:25 153:7 160:8 167:2 174:4,17 189:12 191:13 216:7 220:11,12 223:1 sat (11) 15:7 58:24 99:9 151:18 153:24 154:4 155:20 164:18 221:24 222:8,9 satisfactory (1) 122:1 saturday (2) 95:14,17 saved (1) 47:19 saw (20) 11:16 14:6 49:20 53:11,17 66:22 71:6 82:7 88:21 155:18 156:1,4 174:2 185:5 186:7,13 197:17 200:8 222:11 230:23 saying (29) 3:3 24:1 25:8 37:6,22 50:9 51:14 62:14,16 77:3 97:6 107:1 108:22	168:17,19,20 175:15 scratch (1) 182:22 screen (13) 7:11 28:15 32:13 33:9 39:12 79:5 112:2 120:23 130:1 149:11 169:20 177:6 229:13 sea (1) 176:12 search (2) 140:22,25 seat (5) 13:10 38:11 83:12,12 139:17 seccos (1) 193:15 second (20) 8:14 42:18 78:10 82:23 84:2,9 87:3 103:8 118:10 137:23 139:8 151:1,14 159:16 169:4,12 170:20 173:4 177:10 222:23 seconded (6) 14:16 40:11 63:8 85:7 168:2 206:8 secondly (2) 91:19 196:24 secondment (1) 109:4 secretariat (1) 147:9 section (5) 82:23 109:2 120:24 201:21 208:24 sector (1) 2:24 secure (5) 24:21 25:2 43:24 45:16 86:15 securing (1) 70:24 security (197) 1:10 3:15 4:2,10 5:9 7:19 8:10 10:5 11:11 14:2,11,12,13 15:5,7,10,10,14,21,23 16:20,22 17:16 21:1,6,10 22:6,24 23:6 24:18 25:10 27:10 28:16 29:7,18 30:7 31:3 32:3,14 35:8 36:3,22 37:13 40:18 41:19,20 43:23 45:17 50:24 51:4,5,12 52:15 53:7 54:14,21 56:17,21 57:9,15 58:4,13,16,24,25 59:9,11,16 60:3 61:11,21 62:22 64:20 66:1 70:16 75:3 76:19 78:4,23,24 79:13 80:14,25 82:14,14,16 87:14 88:10 93:8,12 96:4,6,19 99:2 100:4,5	see (108) 1:13,14,15,16 3:14,14 4:2,6,13 6:8,15 8:9,15,20 9:6,8 10:13,18 11:6,18 12:16 13:23 16:1,23 17:2 21:5,13,17 22:5,8 23:1,4 27:5 29:12 31:6,25 32:20,25 34:14 36:7,10 43:1 45:9 59:22 63:1 70:9 75:5,24 76:16,19 77:2,8 81:14 90:16 97:19 98:3 99:23 104:13,16 105:12 107:12 111:12 115:15,21,25 119:19 121:11 123:15 127:6 132:11 133:18 134:13 135:11,20 136:21 148:6 150:11,11 153:5,15,21 157:6 158:13 159:3,22 160:9 167:2,6 168:10 171:16 176:1 177:12 178:25 180:18 183:13 187:23 190:12 193:11 196:14 202:2,22 204:16 220:16 221:3 224:1 230:23 232:10 233:5 seeing (10) 6:10 24:17 74:5,8,14 99:3 163:5,9 195:6 218:6 seeking (3) 110:2,3 113:12 seem (2) 122:1 220:10 seemed (1) 87:21 seems (3) 76:4 108:16 122:18 seen (36) 11:12 12:24 17:11 18:13 37:17,24 40:23 44:17 50:25 74:2,4,6 86:1 91:9 92:19 95:8 101:15 104:2 106:25,25 118:22 138:6 145:25	188:1,5 189:19 190:5 193:8,10,12 202:13 210:12,13,19,23 218:15 219:17 221:3 222:10,12 229:25 230:16,19,20,24 231:9,25 servatordeployed (1) 182:17 servatorstyle (5) 8:17 161:2,15 184:7 203:6 servatortrained (1) 164:5 served (1) 9:12 service (4) 50:23 130:19 170:9 223:1 services (1) 160:2 serving (1) 57:23 set (10) 5:11 13:5 57:16 72:1 84:1 98:24 99:12 172:17 185:11 191:14 sets (2) 11:2 26:23 setting (3) 10:18 26:17,22 several (3) 9:18 40:23 83:24 sg (1) 205:18 shall (1) 40:10 shallow (1) 175:6 share (3) 41:1 54:15 107:8 shared (2) 52:1 205:20 sharing (1) 53:9 shaw (6) 1:17,19 2:8 3:6 76:22 77:3 sheet (2) 66:15 81:19 shes (3) 51:4 224:6,11 shift (2) 31:21 143:21 shifts (2) 30:18 31:1 shoes (1) 149:13 short (12) 68:21 74:25 86:6 96:1 117:5 143:20 150:9 176:9 181:21 182:14 210:1 211:12 shortened (3) 104:19 177:18,22 shortly (4) 3:13 19:14 160:10 227:13 should (31) 35:8 37:3 38:1,20 43:18 56:1 69:19 70:17 87:21 97:20 99:1 108:2 109:8 118:1 124:9 131:6 136:4 137:16,20 138:3 142:5 144:5 147:5 161:3,5 166:15 175:18 180:17 185:15 190:12 209:18 shouldertoshoulder (1) 62:12 shouldnt (2) 26:21 199:11 show (3) 64:14 75:25 118:9 showing (3) 32:21 53:25 71:8 shown (4) 37:11 83:15 99:11 161:13 shows (5) 10:23,25 17:12 93:14 164:17 side (5) 53:8 126:10,17 152:17 154:17	188:1,5 189:19 190:5 193:8,10,12 202:13 210:12,13,19,23 218:15 219:17 221:3 222:10,12 229:25 230:16,19,20,24 231:9,25 servatordeployed (1) 182:17 servatorstyle (5) 8:17 161:2,15 184:7 203:6 servatortrained (1) 164:5 served (1) 9:12 service (4) 50:23 130:19 170:9 223:1 services (1) 160:2 serving (1) 57:23 set (10) 5:11 13:5 57:16 72:1 84:1 98:24 99:12 172:17 185:11 191:14 sets (2) 11:2 26:23 setting (3) 10:18 26:17,22 several (3) 9:18 40:23 83:24 sg (1) 205:18 shall (1) 40:10 shallow (1) 175:6 share (3) 41:1 54:15 107:8 shared (2) 52:1 205:20 sharing (1) 53:9 shaw (6) 1:17,19 2:8 3:6 76:22 77:3 sheet (2) 66:15 81:19 shes (3) 51:4 224:6,11 shift (2) 31:21 143:21 shifts (2) 30:18 31:1 shoes (1) 149:13 short (12) 68:21 74:25 86:6 96:1 117:5 143:20 150:9 176:9 181:21 182:14 210:1 211:12 shortened (3) 104:19 177:18,22 shortly (4) 3:13 19:14 160:10 227:13 should (31) 35:8 37:3 38:1,20 43:18 56:1 69:19 70:17 87:21 97:20 99:1 108:2 109:8 118:1 124:9 131:6 136:4 137:16,20 138:3 142:5 144:5 147:5 161:3,5 166:15 175:18 180:17 185:15 190:12 209:18 shouldertoshoulder (1) 62:12 shouldnt (2) 26:21 199:11 show (3) 64:14 75:25 118:9 showing (3) 32:21 53:25 71:8 shown (4) 37:11 83:15 99:11 161:13 shows (5) 10:23,25 17:12 93:14 164:17 side (5) 53:8 126:10,17 152:17 154:17	204:11,14 226:19 227:2 sits (2) 57:4 144:1 sitting (2) 110:14 195:16 situation (1) 96:15 six (8) 46:1 79:10 95:22 97:1 114:23 127:15 175:25 211:24 size (2) 144:5,13 sleep (2) 189:2 209:17 slightly (2) 216:19 217:1 slow (1) 110:21 slower (1) 188:4 slowtime (1) 231:22 small (4) 30:20 57:24 144:13 178:1 smaller (2) 138:12 172:5 smallest (1) 57:24 smoke (1) 130:1 soft (1) 146:11 solution (14) 123:1 124:14 175:3 177:4 183:24 191:10 192:15,17 194:25 195:4 210:16 228:16 230:11 231:23 solutions (3) 188:3 210:10 230:14 somebody (6) 55:16 66:3 159:3 189:8 194:13 204:2 somehow (1) 200:23 someone (10) 9:25 86:8 98:12 144:25 148:21 180:13 224:21 225:3,3 232:10 something (50) 2:16 11:10 12:15 13:4 16:20 24:24 30:5 35:15 38:4 40:6,9 43:2 46:20 47:18 48:10 53:13 56:4,13 61:3 63:13 65:14 74:7 81:1 93:4,5,6 95:22 97:24 101:3,13 105:4,18 107:2 108:24 109:21 115:13 129:7,25 130:19 136:25 143:17 158:19 175:2 192:11 200:23 211:24 214:5 220:15 221:22 226:20 somewhere (3) 64:1 66:22 99:19 soon (1) 53:11 sophisticated (11) 28:6,11 102:1 109:9 111:18 118:14 136:10 171:7,9 175:19,22 sophistication (6) 28:13 37:24 43:17,19 65:4 170:24 sort (18) 3:21 37:23 90:7 97:21 136:22 141:18 146:11 148:10 149:17 159:7 161:3 167:6 180:10 189:22 211:15 219:24 220:8 229:2 sorts (8) 26:14,18 63:11 77:16 107:13 116:21		

152:23 217:3
sound (1) 158:20
sounds (1) 51:25
source (4) 148:16
 159:20 160:20 183:14
southbound (1) 172:22
space (5) 10:8 26:25
 128:25 176:9 215:20
spaces (4) 9:24 23:23
 46:20 129:13
spare (1) 181:23
speak (7) 14:10 53:6
 63:18 109:12 139:19
 181:9 204:21
speaking (10) 14:16
 20:15 26:1 107:15,17
 108:4,22 109:2 162:20
 199:5
speaks (2) 86:20 88:10
special (8) 10:10 17:8
 57:13 154:1 186:3
 205:7 206:3 212:14
specialist (2) 10:2,5
specialists (3)
 102:15,17,17
specific (25) 14:23
 20:10 24:16 25:23
 27:14 31:13 34:9
 35:3,18,24 36:18 39:2
 55:25 71:20 75:22
 76:6 81:24 82:18,20
 97:23 128:15 141:21
 165:12 174:19 183:19
specifically (16) 8:7
 26:13 33:7 35:15
 37:21 40:18 46:6
 69:11 73:19
 79:9,23,24 80:5
 154:23 166:23 173:23
speculation (1) 217:4
speed (1) 176:7
spell (1) 206:13
spelling (3) 158:17
 178:23,24
spinoff (1) 149:17
spoke (14) 57:21 62:21
 90:17 106:21,22 111:4
 114:10 181:12,13
 198:3,25 199:6 200:8
 207:5
spoken (8) 17:15 19:14
 102:24 107:12 111:13
 154:19 188:3 204:9
sporadic (2) 4:15,25
square (5) 25:15 133:7
 145:1 215:19,22
src (4) 2:7 58:21 129:19
 189:11
staff (7) 4:9 101:16
 162:23 176:16,16
 182:20 219:15
stage (31) 7:2 8:6 12:22
 13:6 18:11 35:8
 63:16,25 64:7 69:5
 70:3 79:24,25 84:2
 102:25 148:19
 151:1,15,22,25 152:13
 165:9,11 181:1 182:19
 187:23 189:2 197:5
 198:10 208:9 213:5
stages (1) 84:8
staggered (1) 70:8
stance (7) 21:1 30:25

70:17 82:16 95:13
 130:14,15
stand (1) 30:21
standard (1) 36:24
standards (5) 37:6,7
 172:8,11 183:19
standing (2) 143:4
 148:22
standpoint (1) 141:22
start (12) 1:10 3:3
 14:17,20 15:3 24:16
 145:17 153:12 158:11
 159:11 196:1 223:16
started (11) 14:8 21:24
 24:19 52:11 64:25
 70:24 71:8 128:17
 190:14 208:16 214:11
stated (2) 156:15
 228:10
statement (29) 4:4 7:12
 8:13 18:21 28:17,20
 31:8,9 33:2 35:21
 40:16 44:17 63:17
 64:3,17,23 79:1,4 80:8
 84:19 89:1 102:18
 140:6 158:22 181:21
 187:2 198:14 208:12
 214:1
statements (1) 190:11
states (1) 102:18
stating (1) 46:6
station (1) 218:7
statues (1) 216:3
status (5) 30:4
 126:3,16,23 220:12
stay (1) 232:23
stayed (1) 184:22
steady (4) 20:22 51:2
 72:2 96:20
steel (3) 57:14 70:25
 220:25
steer (1) 106:7
step (1) 179:10
stepping (4) 179:13,17
 180:7,9
steps (7) 16:11 82:13
 102:25 107:2,4 146:2
 213:11
still (20) 38:7 46:15
 68:16 76:13 103:17
 114:8 146:9,10
 160:14 161:11 162:7
 174:16 191:12,13
 193:17,18 194:18
 214:18 223:25
stoils (1) 48:17
stop (2) 29:21 145:13
story (4) 125:15 149:1
 195:13 210:18
straight (2) 152:2
 224:15
straightaway (1) 122:12
straightforward (1)
 139:10
strands (3) 24:22,22,24
strategic (6) 2:9,12
 26:24 27:3 59:11
 218:21
strategically (2) 116:13
 117:8
strategy (4) 5:14
 26:22,24 55:12
stray (1) 233:5

street (14)
 152:3,21,21,22,23
 163:9 201:15 207:9
 211:2,5 216:5,24
 217:7 218:7
streets (10) 5:3 6:11
 24:7 32:11 51:19
 133:23 152:20,20
 153:1,6
streetscape (2) 152:19
 201:14
strong (2) 118:13
 190:24
struck (2) 120:3,5
structure (12) 33:15,19
 52:9 65:7,8 164:4,8
 179:6,7 180:2 190:10
 223:25
structured (1) 179:11
structures (5) 50:14
 103:10 138:12 172:6
 183:18
stuck (2) 153:8 209:20
studies (2) 150:1,6
study (8) 34:11 45:12
 150:8,9,10 151:1,15
 158:5
stuff (1) 152:23
style (6) 81:9 136:4,6
 144:12 180:6 188:1
subgroup (1) 115:14
subject (5) 4:12 27:15
 76:1 190:6 204:19
subjective (1) 83:9
subjectively (1) 99:14
subjects (4) 78:10
 141:12,13,13
submit (1) 29:25
submitted (2) 19:6
 66:17
subsequent (2) 181:8
 189:14
subsequently (3) 29:4
 128:8,9
substances (1) 149:4
substantial (1) 169:12
substantially (1) 217:1
successfully (1) 56:8
suddenly (1) 145:2
suffered (1) 120:6
suffice (1) 24:18
suggest (27) 14:22
 35:23 37:7 38:8 39:10
 51:9 54:6,24 55:4
 56:11 68:13 73:3
 81:24 94:12 108:5
 110:9 118:12
 123:17,22 124:11
 128:21 190:24 192:20
 200:18 202:7 210:6,14
suggested (9) 13:25
 24:15 57:25 80:18
 134:24 147:17 157:15
 173:8 215:7
suggesting (13) 14:10
 37:25 47:19 73:17
 97:8 109:14 110:11,24
 119:5 124:6 157:7
 186:8 223:11
suggestion (6) 96:10
 98:14 100:8,12 102:23
 230:2
suggestions (5)

190:21,21 191:4,19
 209:5
suggests (3) 29:17
 120:3 170:13
suitably (1) 216:21
summary (33) 6:10
 18:18,25 19:20 20:8
 28:22,24 29:1,16 36:8
 37:11 39:4 55:22
 120:24 134:25 136:17
 137:3,10 142:25
 153:16 155:5 169:23
 178:17 181:17 182:12
 183:2 185:19 188:10
 207:1,11 210:2 211:12
 224:2
summer (1) 71:6
superintendent (59)
 1:17,19 2:8 3:6 6:7
 9:13 13:24 14:9
 22:11,11 23:12 29:2
 41:9 75:15,18 76:4,22
 77:3 107:6,15 108:18
 113:10,14,14 116:5
 119:9 133:25 146:17
 153:21 154:10 155:16
 158:9 162:15 178:19
 181:9 182:5,13 187:17
 188:16 189:25 190:19
 202:23 203:4,7,11,21
 207:19 208:1 210:1,11
 211:12 221:25 222:9
 223:16,18,22 224:1,11
 225:7
superintendents (1)
 225:6
supervisor (6) 16:14,18
 114:11 204:2,5,10
supplied (2) 168:11
 185:19
supplying (1) 159:13
support (2) 102:19
 143:11
supporting (1) 87:11
sure (47) 20:1 48:7
 49:11 50:14 54:5
 61:22 62:18,25 72:10
 86:4 91:23 97:4,12
 103:11 107:4 108:12
 111:20,24 114:18
 119:12 128:10 138:17
 154:8 155:12
 158:15,16 162:7,9
 170:5,10 173:12,13
 177:1 178:22
 179:1,12,23 180:12
 187:11 204:13 206:20
 209:21 213:21 216:22
 223:17 224:12 229:6
surely (1) 109:12
surfacoair (2)
 148:20,22
surge (2) 30:21 46:13
surprise (1) 12:4
surprised (1) 101:13
surveys (3) 141:25
 176:7,18
survivors (1) 194:18
suspect (1) 87:20
suspected (1) 167:14
suspects (1) 55:21
suspicious (2) 144:19
 167:13

sussex (2) 34:6 96:17
swift (1) 194:15
swiftly (1) 213:2
sworn (2) 139:13 234:8
synopsis (1) 17:2
system (2) 122:6 168:20
systems (5) 51:19
 114:3,18,20 141:19

T

tabletop (4) 2:20
 77:20,23,25
tac (5) 220:5 223:17
 229:15 230:3,9
tacit (1) 81:4
tacitly (2) 5:17 35:22
tactic (20) 13:3
 46:8,9,11 93:11 95:7
 136:11 140:12 142:22
 144:10 145:19 146:6
 150:17 151:10 161:3
 162:1,2,22 185:3
 210:19
tactical (27) 5:16 35:7
 79:20 80:1,2,11,25
 81:11 100:2 109:24
 146:23 161:12 177:3
 184:5 195:7,24 203:1
 213:5 214:23 219:21
 220:1,5 221:7,9
 223:4,21 226:12
tactically (1) 216:14
tactics (27) 3:9
 4:15,21,25 5:19,24
 6:4,11 8:16 9:10 31:11
 40:24 79:18 95:5
 119:14 143:12 150:10
 162:18 173:17 177:17
 218:3,11 219:25
 220:18,23 222:25
 229:20
tailend (1) 91:10
taken (40) 4:10 16:11
 31:17 49:21 64:12
 82:14 89:12,14,24
 101:7 102:2,25
 107:2,4 109:25
 118:21,23 121:2
 123:11 130:9 132:4
 138:9 160:11 190:20
 191:19 193:10 195:14
 196:3 205:17,17,20
 206:1 209:5 212:23
 213:11 219:22
 228:19,25 229:14
 230:7
takes (5) 10:17 109:20
 111:3 195:1 216:13
taking (8) 17:10 22:4
 43:12 47:14,20 122:11
 124:2 186:4
talk (5) 15:8 30:19
 77:20 123:8 203:2
talked (4) 12:21 40:7
 67:1 103:21
talking (25) 5:18 19:21
 37:8 38:3 41:12 64:24
 71:10 73:13 75:21
 87:15 93:17 94:10,15
 96:19 107:7 124:16
 135:14,25 159:3 165:2
 170:7 187:13 197:17
 216:9 229:20

talks (5) 87:2,9 88:2
 90:12 172:5
target (12) 24:7,12,16
 83:8 87:12 91:21
 133:24 134:8 183:7
 197:24 201:12 225:20
targeted (3) 91:13
 161:18 214:18
targeting (1) 69:6
targets (1) 107:25
tasers (1) 97:21
task (3) 41:22 173:21
 176:4
tasked (8) 22:17 92:15
 150:13,18 165:18
 174:3 177:25 182:4
tasking (17) 17:7
 66:11,12,14 67:4,22
 68:24 79:7 81:19
 87:24 131:17
 135:14,25 136:4
 151:22 189:10 230:18
taskings (34) 4:18 7:3,9
 10:18 15:23 16:2
 21:13 22:10 27:17
 29:22 31:13 41:25
 59:18,22 66:19,23
 67:1 68:11 81:2
 109:24 136:5 147:3,8
 148:2 155:9 156:16
 159:13 163:25 164:14
 167:4 187:25
 189:13,21 190:5
taught (1) 55:10
tea (1) 90:17
team (14) 34:11 99:11
 106:16,24 107:6
 140:12 146:3,15
 153:19 157:21 158:1
 171:18 172:10 226:9
teams (2) 144:5 157:19
technical (1) 172:10
telephone (4) 84:12,13
 102:12 152:21
television (1) 53:13
telling (5) 13:21 29:24
 85:16 96:13 111:25
tells (2) 84:17 200:19
temporarily (1) 34:4
temporary (27) 9:11
 33:23 34:25 35:3 37:8
 39:6 42:25 74:21
 76:8,18 80:10,23
 88:18 89:3
 98:19,20,23 108:9
 109:21 111:10 124:16
 133:19 134:1,2
 138:14,22 168:1
ten (1) 225:7
tend (1) 214:24
term (5) 20:22 44:16
 70:10 73:2 110:16
terminology (1) 138:10
terms (128) 13:13
 24:11 28:6,10 30:16
 32:5 33:15 36:4 37:23
 39:19 43:9 47:24 50:1
 52:8 55:10,23 57:13
 61:12 62:21 66:13
 67:15 72:22 73:12
 78:4 84:7 86:18 90:22
 93:8,9 96:18 102:8
 103:9 106:21 109:13

111:17 114:8 122:17
 123:6,14 125:15
 126:2,22 127:18
 128:16,24 132:5
 146:21 148:21 152:10
 153:8 154:2,8
 158:18,22 161:13
 164:8 170:6
 171:3,5,7,9 172:4
 173:6,11,14 174:14
 175:1,2,22
 176:5,7,10,13,15
 177:4,4 179:5
 180:1,3,5 181:25
 182:2,22 183:12,12,23
 184:13,15,19 186:3
 187:23,25 188:5,13
 189:10,21 190:4
 191:7,10 192:15,19
 193:6,23 194:21,25
 195:11,18 199:21
 201:6 202:12 206:23
 209:20 212:22,22
 215:22 217:11
 218:18,24 221:1,14,14
 225:24 226:18
 228:3,11,15 231:5,18
terrible (2) 130:20
 184:17
territory (1) 124:3
terror (2) 69:5 84:21
terrorism (49) 3:15 7:8
 15:23 21:7 27:17
 30:17 31:11 32:17,22
 33:4,5 40:18 41:19
 55:16,18 56:21,25
 57:4,12,13 58:14
 59:9,12,22 60:2 71:10
 75:16 87:13 140:22,25
 141:22 142:10
 146:15,21 154:1,23
 155:1 180:4 193:20
 203:9,19,20 206:23
 220:23 221:11,14
 222:25 223:21 224:6
terrorist (38) 5:2 10:19
 19:1 20:11,17 23:17
 55:21 57:19 58:9
 74:18 77:9 82:1
 83:8,11,23 84:3 91:13
 95:5 139:5 140:21
 141:1 142:16 146:23
 147:2,6 148:16
 149:8,14 151:24 153:4
 155:22 159:13 160:23
 161:19 197:20 216:14
 219:12 225:17
terrorists (16) 2:23
 40:25 42:20 54:25
 73:6,15 77:25 95:4,15
 130:16 196:18,25
 197:10,23 200:24
 216:15
test (8) 3:1 9:20 16:23
 78:1 150:17,18 151:10
 177:17
tested (3) 5:22 136:11
 186:23
testing (15) 2:3,19
 40:25 55:11 71:22
 86:16,17 93:17 105:7
 119:1 127:14 153:11
 190:6 205:24,24

text (4) 1:18 167:2 180:23 232:12	theres (31) 22:17 23:8 24:1 31:25 46:12 47:12 73:9 83:13 96:6 97:6,7 98:5,15 103:12 107:21 109:11 112:1 114:6 118:21 122:9,22,22 124:9,20 125:20 127:9 148:7 192:20 195:4,7 208:14	105:23 106:9 114:21 117:7,11,14 129:19 144:12,21 148:5 160:19,20 161:13 162:20 163:9 164:9 171:15 183:8 192:11 193:6 194:4 195:3 206:1 209:22 215:19	timmins (1) 170:8	tread (1) 217:12	understanding (18) 20:3 33:17 34:2,5 44:5 70:16,22 120:21 130:22 155:1 174:11,12,15 177:2 193:2,4,5 227:6	usual (6) 15:2 23:1 31:10 189:10,23 192:19	
tfl (6) 50:17 52:10 62:24,25 156:19,25	theyre (11) 2:25 44:11 49:3 78:5 88:18 92:15 99:15 126:1 171:23 172:9 197:21	throughout (6) 45:3 68:5 118:22 179:4 218:12 221:8	timms (2) 93:3 223:4	treated (2) 127:20,22	understood (5) 7:7 79:21 177:1 189:7,19	utilised (1) 93:4	
thames (1) 120:4	theyve (2) 219:13 233:2	thursday (1) 233:10	titan (1) 70:14	treating (1) 130:3	undertaken (6) 45:16 75:13 82:9 141:6 142:12 178:18	utmost (1) 121:15	
thank (32) 12:3 32:13 45:23 64:22 68:12 80:9 116:4 119:21,22 130:25 138:24 139:2,3,7,10,18,22 140:8 145:15 193:25 195:25 213:15,17 227:8 229:9 232:4,5,6,8,9,12,14	thing (12) 26:8 38:24 103:18 124:12 130:4 139:19 159:7 173:16 215:11 219:18 225:1 233:2	tier (37) 10:15 12:14,15,17,18 41:16 60:22,22 125:20,21,22,22,23,25 126:4,4,4 127:6,21 128:5,6,10,12,12,12 156:5 165:22 198:10 226:2,5,5,5,20,21,25,25 227:1	title (2) 146:23 170:13 today (14) 2:18 19:11 63:23 77:20 92:16 97:25 179:15,15 191:12 196:3,16 206:2 213:4 230:24	trespassing (1) 151:13	undertake (1) 83:11	van (1) 78:13	
thats (152) 3:10,22,23 5:4,14,17 6:5 8:12,19,25 10:23 11:5,19 13:14,17 15:25 16:19 17:5,7,12 19:7 20:20 21:3,16 24:17 25:10 28:19 29:15 30:2 33:17 34:7,22 36:2 37:10 38:12 45:3,18 46:21 47:5 49:22 50:25 55:24 56:4,10,19,23 57:1,3,5,18 59:2,7,14 60:4,22 61:5,6 62:16 63:10 68:5,15 70:10,14,23 75:12,23 76:7 77:21 79:22 80:17 81:11 82:12 83:9 84:3,15 85:22 88:2 89:15 92:10 98:13,21 99:4 100:2,3,12 101:3 103:5 109:3,5,10,15 110:14,23 111:10,18 112:6,7 113:16 114:25 116:3 118:23 119:1 120:20,21 121:17 122:19 124:24 125:12,21 131:16,21 132:16,19 133:4 135:10,16 136:1 137:22 138:5,13 143:16 145:22 146:3 152:10,24 154:7,21 155:19 159:7 161:16 163:12 165:19 170:7 182:23 183:15 185:2 187:7,8 189:7,12 191:12 196:4 197:12 203:6 205:7 214:25 215:9 218:14 219:18 225:4,18 232:11	thinking (21) 5:11,14 9:19 13:17 14:20 21:21 25:12 54:2 64:25 70:24 71:24 72:10,11 78:4,6 81:1 116:12 144:4 151:16 163:14 188:13	tiered (5) 61:24 72:5 126:23 127:12 227:2	tomorrow (4) 19:12 111:9 122:14 233:2	truly (1) 193:21	undertook (1) 7:21	various (22) 9:8 10:14,16,21 25:16 35:13 48:20 112:11 115:7 132:23 144:21 148:7 157:7 161:6 163:24 165:3 173:6 176:16 183:1,6 186:25 192:9	
themselves (10) 51:18 73:16 91:16 109:12 149:22 161:23 191:22 197:21,23 207:2	third (6) 100:20 150:8,9,10 151:1 163:13	tiers (4) 123:25 125:18 126:21 156:2	too (13) 26:21 56:12,14 60:16 72:7,19 86:6,7 145:11 162:7,9 170:5,10	trust (1) 228:23	unfeeling (1) 130:21	vehicle (102) 5:23 6:21 7:1,23 8:4 12:24 13:1 25:7 26:13,14 33:10 36:17,23 37:4 40:3 43:19,20 54:1 63:20 64:2 65:3,11 70:11 71:3,4,12 73:6 76:9 78:12 79:17,19 81:3,22 84:8 89:4 91:17 92:8 93:8,10 95:2 103:8 107:20,24 108:3,9,15 109:9,18 115:14,17 120:3,6 121:7,10 123:15 128:18 132:24 135:17 137:15 138:4,11,15 141:14 152:10 163:21 171:10,19,20	
thereafter (1) 228:18	thomas (3) 120:1 213:20 232:16	time (129) 3:23 5:20 6:15 11:10,13 13:13,18 19:14,17 23:5 26:25 28:9 29:5 30:24 31:1,19,20,21 32:18 34:6 35:4 36:4 41:11,12 42:18 49:16 50:4 64:25 65:17 66:6,16 68:15,19 70:21 71:10,22,23 74:3,5 75:9 80:4 83:18 86:2 89:2,5,22,24 90:17 93:6,12 96:1,15,17,23 97:1 98:23 102:14 105:10 107:6,14 109:6,20 111:3,12,14 113:6,10,16,22 114:7 117:15 120:13 123:3,20 132:5 133:1 134:13,17 135:22 138:20 139:8 140:13 141:4 143:10,20 153:23 160:16 164:4 165:25 166:5,16 171:3 174:16,25 176:4,9 178:5,6,25 181:10,10,18,24 184:5,6 188:4,13 190:4,15 193:17 195:1,9,10,14,18,20 203:3 204:5 211:9 214:2 215:16 219:8 221:1,24 223:23 226:3 227:20 231:21 232:2	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	try (5) 39:6 73:16 106:6 196:7,8	unfortunatly (5) 15:6 105:15 174:13 186:18 191:8	unimpeded (2) 36:19 107:21	vehicleasweapon (4) 18:14 39:22 172:21 194:9
therefore (34) 11:24 12:19 13:12,18 14:15 22:2 23:20 24:13 30:24 32:8 33:18 35:24 43:12 53:5 65:10,21 71:5 72:19 80:2 81:4 86:1 91:25 105:9 116:12 117:9,12 119:17 123:24 124:10 134:20 154:14 177:21 182:21 191:3	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timings (1) 143:19	today (14) 2:18 19:11 63:23 77:20 92:16 97:25 179:15,15 191:12 196:3,16 206:2 213:4 230:24	try (5) 39:6 73:16 106:6 196:7,8	unlikely (2) 148:23 178:6	viewing (1) 100:3	
therein (1) 5:16	thoughts (1) 194:22	timetabling (1) 139:9	tomorrow (4) 19:12 111:9 122:14 233:2	trying (8) 9:20 88:22 92:18 94:23 103:16 126:13 136:5 148:23	unpredictability (2) 143:7,12	views (5) 42:14 111:24 112:1,3 194:13 vis (2) 138:14,14	
	though (11) 51:4,25 73:24 78:13 95:19 97:5 131:13 200:23 201:4 209:9 210:2	timetabling (1) 139:9	too (13) 26:21 56:12,14 60:16 72:7,19 86:6,7 145:11 162:7,9 170:5,10	turn (6) 46:4 105:11 145:3 149:25 188:25 197:23	unprotected (1) 124:14		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	twice (2) 100:15 145:2	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	twos (2) 6:12 163:5	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	twothirds (1) 200:9	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	types (3) 66:12 156:1 162:25	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	typically (3) 55:18 59:5 147:15	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	tyres (1) 65:15	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	uk (11) 58:2 83:18 86:18 145:5 148:17 153:7 193:18,19,24 220:24 221:13	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	ukwide (1) 159:21	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	ultimate (1) 212:1	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	ultimately (3) 70:7 166:11 213:10	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	unadvisable (1) 172:14	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	unarmed (4) 92:20 94:20,21 161:17	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	uncomfortable (1) 195:6	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	underground (1) 51:19 133:19	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	underlines (2) 17:9 134:14	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	undermine (1) 106:6	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	understand (46) 12:18 14:5,19 33:16 38:4 39:17 41:11 44:8 47:8,17 58:1 61:5,7 68:10 90:3 113:11,15,19 118:25 120:7,10,15,16 121:16,20 122:3 128:14 129:11 139:9 140:2 154:10 156:7 163:14 164:2 171:24,25 174:25 194:12 204:18,20,24 206:24 209:21 225:16 228:18,22	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	understand (46) 12:18 14:5,19 33:16 38:4 39:17 41:11 44:8 47:8,17 58:1 61:5,7 68:10 90:3 113:11,15,19 118:25 120:7,10,15,16 121:16,20 122:3 128:14 129:11 139:9 140:2 154:10 156:7 163:14 164:2 171:24,25 174:25 194:12 204:18,20,24 206:24 209:21 225:16 228:18,22	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	understand (46) 12:18 14:5,19 33:16 38:4 39:17 41:11 44:8 47:8,17 58:1 61:5,7 68:10 90:3 113:11,15,19 118:25 120:7,10,15,16 121:16,20 122:3 128:14 129:11 139:9 140:2 154:10 156:7 163:14 164:2 171:24,25 174:25 194:12 204:18,20,24 206:24 209:21 225:16 228:18,22	unreasonably (1) 100:11		
	thought (14) 9:18 10:24 18:12 34:18 35:14 80:24 98:25 125:3 149:23 158:18 179:9 222:7 232:21 233:4	timetabling (1) 139:9	took (14) 22:6,25 29:6 64:20 68:14 93:14 113:6 118:18,20 160:6 185:24 186:2,6 214:13	under			

visibility (5) 8:18 17:4
46:17 161:4,11
visible (6) 17:6 40:4
46:10 92:16 142:23
161:5
visit (1) 22:18
visitor (1) 22:19
vocal (1) 42:8
volume (5) 113:17
114:3 136:25 182:20
221:6
volumes (1) 114:6
vulnerabilities (15)
13:21 45:13 70:1
110:20 114:17 116:24
131:10,13 142:2,6
163:11 172:18 174:5
186:25 198:21
vulnerability (17)
63:18,20 64:8 65:1,2,3
67:17 69:21 93:18
109:13,15 164:14
174:8,10 176:23
189:20 217:21
vulnerable (33) 6:20,25
7:3,7 8:4 12:9 15:12
65:5,19 73:1 83:20
109:8 123:5 124:1
127:22 129:6 130:2
131:15,20 161:22
163:20 165:6 166:4
175:19 183:7 192:23
194:4 200:12 231:18

W

wait (1) 109:14
waiting (2) 105:6
232:24
walking (4) 51:20 95:16
163:9 233:5
wants (2) 108:21 135:14
warning (1) 117:21
wasnt (58) 6:9 10:7
15:1 20:10 23:21 29:4
31:21 34:16 35:17
39:20 54:10 58:17
60:20,22 61:2 65:13
67:8,12 68:8 71:1
76:25 83:10 84:7
101:19 103:16,19
105:2,14 107:10
113:17 114:7
127:16,20 128:19
148:25 152:6 154:4
155:2 156:15 163:18
165:1,25 166:12
177:25 178:22 179:13
184:21 194:14 195:17
198:7,12,22 201:8
205:20 209:19 210:5
222:4 231:16
way (44) 2:13 3:20 5:8
18:6 20:2 30:19 40:5
42:6 47:20 95:6
109:17 110:6 111:15
123:19 131:12,22
134:18 143:16 148:4,6
159:18
164:11,12,20,23,24
166:21 185:11 188:2
192:8 193:19
194:14,18,19 200:6,9

202:9 207:3 209:18
213:7 216:15 217:2
220:13 225:18
ways (5) 17:20 47:3
70:13 209:24 216:20
weapon (2) 65:3 92:17
weaponry (1) 32:7
weapons (2) 43:20
83:15
weather (1) 22:19
wed (1) 206:16
wednesday (1) 1:1
weed (1) 178:7
week (2) 3:17 33:11
weekly (2) 16:23 118:14
weekon (1) 160:3
weekout (1) 160:4
weeks (17) 15:7 21:7
22:25 38:25 59:21,25
99:9 105:16,19
113:21,22 114:23
147:2 157:13 188:9
189:15 225:7
weigh (1) 72:17
weight (6) 56:12,14
72:7,8 111:5 158:23
weighty (1) 178:3
welfare (1) 32:6
wellbeing (1) 58:3
went (14) 30:18 41:8
95:21 145:23 147:18
150:14,15 168:4 170:7
173:8 206:2,3,3
227:22
werent (21) 18:11,13
20:14 26:18 49:13,15
62:14 73:22 101:13
103:15 106:10 109:23
116:20,22 117:15
130:6 162:22 179:5
185:1 195:17 200:15
westminster (62)
3:11,18,24 4:24
13:8,13 19:15 21:2
25:21 30:8 34:24 36:4
38:10 39:3 42:17
43:11 49:9 51:11 52:3
53:12 54:12 60:25
64:13 67:18 73:20
76:13 78:11 80:12,19
83:17,18 84:21 85:5,9
90:1 94:11 95:25
115:20 120:12
124:5,25 128:5 160:5
166:9 194:2,8 196:20
198:6,7 199:2
200:7,17 201:2 213:24
214:9 215:4,5,7,8
216:7,9,10
weve (49) 33:22 34:7
37:24 42:13 51:8 58:5
67:10 90:19 92:19
95:8,21 105:17 115:12
118:22 125:18 138:6
139:7 143:22 145:23
146:3 147:1 149:25
166:7 172:16 177:7
180:11 184:11,11
198:5,18
206:1,8,22,25 214:1,1
215:14 216:23,25
218:2 219:2,2 221:8,8
225:9,11,12,13 226:15

whatever (5) 42:21 78:1
99:22 211:15 220:10
whats (3) 114:14,17
138:9
whenever (1) 110:19
whereas (1) 33:14
white (6) 213:18,19
217:9,23 227:8 234:11
whole (20) 25:15 43:12
52:1 60:16 68:6 70:21
72:4,21 81:8 99:4
105:25 106:5 123:25
133:7 148:25 154:16
168:12 178:6,11 186:9
whom (3) 19:11 107:15
202:21
whos (1) 232:10
wide (2) 71:2 141:12
widen (1) 149:6
wideness (1) 65:6
wider (9) 23:22 47:14
69:20 70:19 77:2
129:8 193:3 221:2
227:5
width (2) 65:18,20
william (1) 202:23
willingness (1) 78:9
wiring (1) 116:9
wish (6) 86:8 128:3
139:17 140:7 194:18
195:21
wishing (1) 217:12
witness (12) 4:4 7:12
8:13 18:21 28:17,20
31:7,9 33:2 139:12
140:6 181:20
witnesses (2) 112:12
183:9
witness (1) 208:12
wondering (1) 106:13
wont (2) 214:2 227:10
woolford (39) 13:25
14:10,16 15:13 19:11
20:8,15 40:11 63:8
84:12,14 87:20 109:3
115:2 134:1,2 156:14
168:1,4,6,11 170:3,8
175:12 176:3,12
186:16 187:2 205:11
206:5 207:12
227:12,15,20,22
228:11,23,24 229:5
woolfordmaam (1)
158:14
woolfords (3) 40:16
169:9 170:17
work (81) 16:21
20:11,21 21:25
24:3,22,23 29:25
37:18 38:5,15
44:4,5,10 45:11,15,20
53:5 60:14 71:24,25
74:17 77:11 79:6
85:20 87:9 89:15
98:22 101:1,21 106:15
110:16 113:7 115:7
116:10 118:9,10,18,21
119:4 133:2,20 138:7
142:13 150:4
154:9,24,24 155:1,21
157:9 162:6,10 165:21
166:1 171:23
176:5,8,17,18 179:10

182:6,10 187:12 189:9
193:6,7,17 198:14,16
199:25 203:3 204:2,12
209:20 218:24 220:8
226:9,15 227:6,7
worked (7) 179:11
203:18,19 204:4
222:19 224:25 227:4
workers (1) 51:21
working (29) 2:5 5:14
22:2 26:22,23 27:3
44:9 55:12 59:23
60:14 72:3 73:4 74:15
75:15 85:8,18
86:13,14,15 132:23
165:20,20,23 181:23
218:15 224:18,23
227:20 231:15
workload (2) 41:11
188:15
works (4) 38:16 44:8
136:10 222:21
workstream (2) 149:2
198:15
world (4) 5:9 52:14
145:5 196:22
worthy (1) 10:10
wouldbe (4) 73:15
163:11 196:25 200:24
wouldnt (44) 12:18
35:19,25 47:20 58:23
66:11 81:7 96:2,8,14
102:1,2 103:2 107:19
108:8 110:11 112:21
119:8,13 153:4 154:4
165:10,11,20,23,24
171:24,25 173:12
174:13 183:23 189:2,5
198:11,21 211:19
214:10 221:12
224:14,19,22 225:21
228:22 231:17
wrestle (1) 48:24
write (1) 78:1
writing (1) 171:1
written (3) 98:24 99:12
158:15
wrong (9) 41:8 48:10
49:25 91:2 100:9
158:18 184:6 214:10
223:11
wrote (3) 160:9,14
204:6
ws01010 (2) 84:11
85:23
ws01011 (1) 88:12
ws01016 (1) 85:11
ws010140 (1) 157:24
ws010141 (1) 159:12
ws010143 (4) 3:14
90:13 135:2 160:8
ws010144 (2) 166:7
202:1
ws010145 (1) 203:25
ws010146 (1) 153:15
ws010147 (5) 6:8 162:4
200:7 219:1 229:13
ws010148 (1) 168:9
ws010149 (1) 168:10
ws0101421 (1) 175:11
ws0101423 (1) 176:1
ws0101427 (2) 169:20
204:18

ws0101428 (2) 28:1
111:13
ws0101429 (3) 107:14
136:15 178:16
ws010143 (1) 147:25
ws0101430 (1) 36:6
ws0101431 (1) 182:12
ws0101433 (3) 36:13
107:17 120:23
ws0101434 (3) 135:21
190:13 208:24
ws010149 (2) 157:5
158:13
ws010152 (1) 80:9
ws0101515 (1) 171:13
ws0101516 (2) 137:9
171:16
ws0101517 (1) 172:16
ws0101523 (1) 177:12
ws0101524 (2) 104:10
177:15
ws0101525 (1) 4:3
ws0101526 (3) 4:6,23
177:10
ws0101527 (1) 4:22
ws0101528 (1) 8:9
ws0101529 (2) 8:15
64:15
ws0101530 (2) 10:17
64:16
ws0101531 (3) 15:19
81:18 132:3
ws0101532 (2) 82:7
132:11
ws0101533 (4) 16:16
82:19 132:14 183:4
ws0101535 (1) 22:5
ws0101536 (1) 22:8
ws0101537 (1) 21:4
ws0101538 (1) 22:24
ws0101539 (2) 23:3
133:15
ws0101541 (1) 32:20
ws0101542 (1) 27:10
ws0101543 (1) 27:13
ws0101544 (1) 29:10
ws0101545 (1) 29:11
ws0101546 (1) 31:6
ws0101547 (1) 31:9
ws010157 (1) 79:5
ws010314 (1) 73:20
ws010316 (1) 75:2
ws010317 (1) 75:7
ws010318 (2) 1:14 76:12
ws010319 (2) 1:16 76:20
ws0103234 (1) 126:8
ws010428 (1) 170:19

X

x (2) 144:8 168:23
xavier (4) 120:1,2
213:20 232:16
xaviers (1) 120:2

Y

yeah (1) 220:4
year (4) 67:18 83:19
225:8 231:1
years (23) 39:1,14
43:18 60:14 73:7
121:23 122:7,11,17
123:2 124:14 130:19

141:4,11 144:21 150:2
151:16 174:11 175:8
195:13,14 197:14
221:8
yesterday (20) 1:12 9:2
10:25 14:4 15:20 17:1
24:21 40:2 51:3 56:24
57:7 59:3 66:18 69:15
103:12 125:6,6 134:3
143:15 200:16
yet (3) 83:15 219:7,19
youd (1) 63:4
youll (105) 24
youre (25) 5:23 24:17
29:21 55:8,13,23
64:9,14 72:9 73:18
74:11 94:15 97:7 99:3
110:11 112:5 119:5
124:16 126:13 158:15
159:3 202:20 217:2
224:12 233:6
youcs (3) 89:21 197:18
198:1
yourself (4) 26:19
139:16 149:13 172:19
youve (38) 2:17 6:3
7:24 17:11 25:16 35:7
43:4 44:17 50:17,25
63:6 69:10 73:3 89:22
97:2 100:4,5,14
109:22 112:13 126:14
149:7 161:20 165:6,21
175:4 185:11 186:11
189:22 196:5 206:1
207:3 218:4 221:19
227:16 229:14
232:12,23

Z

zero (1) 152:3
zone (2) 23:6 25:10

0

0859 (1) 223:15

1

1 (19) 10:15 12:14
60:22 97:20 104:8
125:20,22 126:4 127:6
128:12 157:12 177:25
207:23 226:5,20,25
227:1 234:3,4
10 (3) 65:14 186:9
232:25
100 (8) 62:25 74:11
165:9 166:18 173:13
193:21 200:5 202:25
192:23
1000 (1) 233:9
1002 (1) 1:2
100s (1) 86:4
103 (1) 112:17
11 (10) 28:16 32:23
103:25 104:11 105:20
177:7 178:14 186:14
187:4 205:15
1144 (1) 68:20
119 (1) 234:6
12 (1) 109:14
1204 (1) 68:22
12hour (3) 30:18,21
31:1

13 (1) 133:16
131 (1) 234:7
139 (2) 234:8,9
14 (3) 7:21 69:4 201:21
14day (3) 29:13 32:1,5
15 (1) 68:19
16 (11) 1:13 29:1 41:8
76:12 113:21 171:16
178:16 181:17 187:18
207:21 208:3
17 (2) 7:15 172:16
1743 (1) 135:3
19 (7) 1:1 73:21 168:9
187:15 208:4,20,21
196 (1) 234:10
19th (1) 208:16

2

2 (26) 2:1,5,19 10:15
12:15 27:20 28:3,23
29:2 36:8 60:22 75:2
77:21 94:9 125:20,22
126:4 128:12 169:18
172:24 177:25 208:1
226:5,21,25 227:25
20 (4) 66:15 74:6
143:10 233:10
200 (1) 86:4
2000 (2) 140:18 225:8
2004 (3) 140:20,22,24
2008 (2) 140:22 141:1
2009 (1) 39:17
2010 (1) 61:8
2011 (5) 100:19 144:22
145:17 146:7 218:15
2014 (4) 100:19 145:22
146:7,11
2015 (1) 41:17
2016 (26) 14:7 40:23
41:17,21 66:9,19 67:5
68:5,6,11,23 69:3,10
71:6,7 88:5 117:22
118:5 131:17 146:13
150:8,21 155:14
156:15 230:21 231:10
2017 (49) 1:13 3:12
7:13 8:11 14:7 18:23
19:8 20:25 21:4 27:11
28:1,16 29:1,8 30:14
31:2,15 32:23 38:19
39:19 40:11,20,23
41:3,23 45:3 51:1
71:25 73:4 133:16
140:13 142:16,18,22
151:2 153:13 156:14
157:5,6 159:25
167:1,21 169:4,18
175:11 177:7 187:4,15
192:23
2019 (3) 1:1 140:6
233:10
204 (1) 112:19
206 (1) 66:25
20day (1) 32:1
21 (3) 74:6 109:2
175:11
213 (1) 234:11
21st (1) 48:19
22 (9) 3:12 29:6 74:7
78:11 83:7 84:19
90:17 135:3 160:6
227 (1) 234:12
229 (1) 234:13

22nd (2) 78:22 208:25
 23 (10) 7:13 8:11 15:22
 29:8 30:14 64:12,24
 162:5 229:15 230:2
 23rd (4) 11:15 17:18
 78:22 79:2
 24 (9) 18:23 19:8 85:12
 157:6 167:1 201:22
 208:11,15,22
 247 (2) 30:18 211:3
 24th (2) 11:17 84:21
 25 (4) 19:8 31:2 181:3,7
 26 (2) 4:4 181:20
 27 (16) 7:12 20:25
 27:11 79:1 105:18
 113:1,5 114:23 116:18
 130:19 140:6 169:4,7
 181:16 204:18 208:19
 28 (5) 8:13 64:18,22
 97:1 111:13
 29 (3) 21:4,5 136:15
 2a (1) 125:20
 2b (1) 125:20

7

70odd (1) 178:4

8

8 (4) 109:7 175:11
187:3 227:13

9

9 (1) 1:15
90s (1) 220:25
940 (1) 233:4

3

3 (33) 10:15 12:17,18
 28:1 31:15 38:23
 41:16 54:16 111:19
 114:24 115:23
 125:21,23,25 126:4
 127:21 128:5,6,10,12
 130:9 132:6 156:5
 165:22 168:23 169:21
 171:15 181:11 204:18
 211:23 226:2,5 231:1
 30 (3) 10:19 22:7 66:15
 31 (2) 18:21 81:18
 32 (3) 16:1 20:24
 132:11
 33 (2) 36:12 82:19
 34 (1) 208:24
 35 (2) 33:6 230:24
 36 (1) 33:2
 39 (3) 23:3 118:7
 133:14

4

4 (1) 82:13
 40 (1) 118:8
 400 (1) 8:11
 42 (3) 23:3 25:9 31:7
 43 (1) 133:16
 430 (2) 196:3,7
 45 (1) 234:5
 451 (1) 233:8
 46 (1) 27:5
 48 (2) 80:8,9
 4x4 (1) 78:13

5

5 (2) 82:25 84:18
 51 (1) 9:8
 539 (1) 69:16
 543 (1) 160:10

6

6 (6) 32:23 75:2 88:7
 109:14 132:21 153:15
 60 (1) 178:4
 67 (1) 169:13
 69 (1) 172:8