

# OPUS 2

INTERNATIONAL

London Bridge Inquests

Day 28

June 18, 2019

Opus 2 International - Official Court Reporters

Phone: 0203 008 6619

Email: [transcripts@opus2.com](mailto:transcripts@opus2.com)

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Tuesday, 18 June 2019  
 2 (10.06 am)  
 3 THE CHIEF CORONER: Good morning, Mr Hough.  
 4 MR HOUGH: Good morning, sir. The first witness today is  
 5 Deputy Assistant Commissioner Lucy D'Orsi.  
 6 DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER LUCY D'ORSI (sworn)  
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: Good morning. Please do make yourself  
 8 comfortable. If you wish to take a seat, that's fine.  
 9 Can I first of all apologise that we didn't get round to  
 10 your evidence yesterday. Things just took slightly  
 11 longer than we thought, so my apologies for any  
 12 inconvenience.  
 13 A. Thank you.  
 14 Questions by MR HOUGH QC  
 15 MR HOUGH: Would you please give your name and rank for the  
 16 court?  
 17 A. I'm Lucy D'Orsi, I'm a deputy assistant commissioner.  
 18 Q. You understand I'm asking you questions first on behalf  
 19 of the Coroner and then you will receive questions from  
 20 other lawyers.  
 21 Is your role as deputy assistant commissioner within  
 22 specialist operations for the Metropolitan Police  
 23 Service?  
 24 A. Yes, I am a deputy assistant commissioner within  
 25 specialist operations and I have responsibility for

1

1 Royalty and Specialist Protection, Parliamentary and  
 2 Diplomatic Protection, protective security operations  
 3 and also for London City Airport and Heathrow Airport.  
 4 I also am part of counter terrorism policing where  
 5 I have national responsibility as the senior national  
 6 coordinator for protective security. That is a national  
 7 role and I have two strands underneath that, which is  
 8 Protect and Prepare, which are two aspects of the  
 9 government's CONTEST strategy.  
 10 Q. We'll look at a number of aspects of that shortly, but  
 11 you've told us that you had both a London and national  
 12 role in terms of protective security. You understand  
 13 you will be giving evidence on the topic of protective  
 14 security from the perspective of both the Metropolitan  
 15 Police Service and counter terrorist police in general?  
 16 A. Yes, I understand that.  
 17 Q. You also appreciate that you are the first of a number  
 18 of witnesses giving evidence on this broad topic, which  
 19 will include consideration of barriers on roadways and  
 20 bridges, but also other forms of protective security,  
 21 including procedures and people?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. So that's the nature of your evidence over the next day  
 24 or so.  
 25 A. Yes, sir. Before I start my evidence, on behalf of the

2

1 Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service and  
 2 counter terrorism policing and all of my colleagues,  
 3 I would like to offer my sincere and heartfelt  
 4 condolences to the families and friends of those who  
 5 were murdered in the attacks and those who were injured.  
 6 Q. Thank you very much. I'm sure that will be appreciated.  
 7 In terms of your own career, did you join the  
 8 Metropolitan Police Service in 1992?  
 9 A. Yes, I did.  
 10 Q. Have you held a number of frontline roles as you rose  
 11 through the ranks?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Have you been a public order commander since 2006?  
 14 A. Yes, I have.  
 15 Q. And have you held command of a number of high profile  
 16 events, such as the Chinese state visit and visits by  
 17 President Trump?  
 18 A. Yes, I have, as well as a number of ceremonial roles and  
 19 I was also the gold commander for five years for New  
 20 Year's Eve celebrations in London.  
 21 Q. The relevance of those, and the reason I ask, is that  
 22 you have a good understanding of large events as well as  
 23 business-as-usual procedures?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. May I ask you about the threat context as it stood in

3

1 2017, and for this purpose may we look at a diagram  
 2 attached to your witness statement, {WS5032/32}. Can we  
 3 see here a diagram that's been prepared identifying  
 4 attacks and disrupted plots in the course of 2017?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct. The terrorist attacks in London  
 6 and Manchester in 2017, and in fact, all of the  
 7 terrorist attacks, marked a watershed moment for UK  
 8 society and also, really, the emergency and intelligence  
 9 services. They were for me, and I would say my  
 10 colleagues, we would say they were unprecedented in  
 11 terms of pace, diversity of methodologies, the targets  
 12 of the attacks and the origin of the threat.  
 13 You will see from the diagram that is on the screen,  
 14 the lighter colour, the pink colour, reflects actual  
 15 attacks, but those in blue mark the 13 disrupted attack  
 16 plots in the UK between 22 March and 28 November. You  
 17 will see that five of those disruptions occurred prior  
 18 to the attack on London Bridge and Borough Market, and  
 19 18 of those 13 disrupted plots were in London over the  
 20 course of 2017.  
 21 Q. I think eight of the disrupted plots.  
 22 A. Eight of the disrupted plots. And you will see between  
 23 Manchester and London Bridge, which is a short time  
 24 frame, as we know, there were in fact two disrupted  
 25 plots during that period.

4

1 Q. But can we see also, as soon as the diagram comes back,  
2 that varying methods appear in the different disrupted  
3 plots, including bladed weapons, firearms and IEDs?  
4 A. That's correct.  
5 Q. And, of course, of the attacks which took place, four  
6 were in London in addition to the one in Manchester?  
7 A. That's correct.  
8 Q. Looking at page 2 of your witness statement,  
9 paragraph 6, more broadly over the period from early  
10 2017, what was the profile of leads and arrests for  
11 terrorist police?  
12 A. Again, it really was unprecedented: the number of  
13 intelligence leads jointly managed by MI5 and counter  
14 terrorism policing more than doubled in this period and  
15 the number of arrests rose by 17%.  
16 I think what's also of note is also the UK threat  
17 level was increased to critical on two occasions and  
18 resulted in the deployment of military personnel into  
19 the public domain so was the threat to the UK.  
20 Also during this period of time I think it is worth  
21 just reflecting on the other things that were taking  
22 place, specifically in London which were placing  
23 a demand on policing, so we had a general election  
24 during this period, we had a number of ceremonial  
25 events, which is the usual, sort of, the Queen's

5

1 birthday parade, but also you will recall we also  
2 100 years of the RAF which was again a huge event with a  
3 global audience, and also we had the tragedy of Grenfell  
4 Tower.  
5 Q. So a period first of all with diffuse threats of varying  
6 types and increasing in scale?  
7 A. Yes, and I have in my statement at paragraph 7 reflected  
8 a statement that the head of MI5, Andrew Parker, made  
9 which I feel really summarised the position  
10 in October 2017, and he publicly stated:  
11 "Today there is more terrorist activity coming at us  
12 more quickly and it can be harder to detect. It is  
13 multi-dimensional, evolving rapidly and operating at  
14 a scale and pace we have not seen before."  
15 Q. And is it important when we look at the actions being  
16 taken and the documents to consider that as counter  
17 terrorist police, you are trying to deal with this wide  
18 diversity of threats both for the ordinary life of the  
19 nation and for special events?  
20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
21 Q. We can take the diagram off screen. May I now ask you  
22 a little bit about the structure of counter terrorist  
23 policing, which you deal with from page 2 onwards in  
24 your statement.  
25 First of all, we'll hear over the coming days about

6

1 the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. Can you  
2 tell us what that body does and where it sits in the  
3 structure?  
4 A. So the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism sits  
5 within the Home Office and it is the lead government  
6 body for developing, coordinating and implementing the  
7 UK's counter terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST.  
8 I suppose I would describe OSCT as the policy partner  
9 for counter terrorism policing and all police services  
10 that deliver counter terrorism activity.  
11 Q. Now, the strategy, as you have told us, is called  
12 CONTEST, and you've referred to the pillars of CONTEST,  
13 which are, I think, four in number?  
14 A. That's correct.  
15 Q. We can put on screen {WS5032/3}, which is part of your  
16 witness statement, if we can maximise paragraph 11, do  
17 you identify here the four pillars of the CONTEST  
18 strategy?  
19 A. Yes, that's correct. So my evidence refers to CONTEST  
20 2011, which was relevant at the time of the attacks, and  
21 there are four pillars defined, as you have said, in  
22 terms of Protect, Prepare, Prevent and Pursue. So if  
23 I could focus on Protect and Prepare.  
24 Protect is to strengthen our protection against  
25 a terrorist attack, and prepare is to mitigate the

7

1 impact of a terrorist attack.  
2 Q. We can take that off screen now.  
3 You've referred to your role in the national counter  
4 terrorist policing network. Looking at that very  
5 broadly, how does that operate? What are the national  
6 arrangements for counter terrorist policing?  
7 A. So the counter terrorism policing network, which we call  
8 counter terrorism policing, is the national  
9 collaboration of police forces in the United Kingdom  
10 working to prevent, deter and investigate terrorism.  
11 The network is governed by the National Police  
12 Collaboration Agreement relating to counter terrorist  
13 activities and this is made under section 22(a) of the  
14 Police Act 1996. The collaboration agreement is a very  
15 comprehensive and complex agreement, however, I feel  
16 that there are two general principles.  
17 Individual chief constables remain accountable to  
18 their governing bodies, which are the police and crime  
19 commissioners, and individual chief constables remain  
20 responsible for taking immediate and long-term threats  
21 from terrorism and allied matters, so they are  
22 responsible for tackling those at a local level.  
23 Q. Is the -- I'm sorry ...  
24 A. I was just going to say, the way that we have  
25 accountability around this is that the CT Policing

8

1 Network is accountable to government and also the  
 2 National Police Chiefs' Counter Terrorism Coordination  
 3 Committee, which is chaired by Assistant  
 4 Commissioner Neil Basu who is the head of counter  
 5 terrorism policing.  
 6 And I think in relation to how I have described that  
 7 local accountability, for the purpose of the attacks,  
 8 for Borough Market that would be the Commissioner of the  
 9 Metropolitan Police and for London Bridge that would  
 10 have been and is the Commissioner of the City of London  
 11 Police.  
 12 Q. We've heard about where the border between the two  
 13 places lies.  
 14 Is the UK divided into a total of 11 regions within  
 15 the CT Policing Network?  
 16 A. Yes, it is.  
 17 Q. Is one of those regions the London area?  
 18 A. Yes, one of the regions is called the London Region and  
 19 that consists of the Metropolitan Police Service and the  
 20 City of London Police. We also have practical  
 21 collaboration with the Ministry of Defence Police and  
 22 British Transport Police.  
 23 Q. You referred to yourself at the start as a senior  
 24 national coordinator. What is that role within the  
 25 national network?

9

1 A. So the CT Policing Network is functionally coordinated  
 2 by two senior national coordinators, and we are both  
 3 Metropolitan Police Service deputy assistant  
 4 commissioners, and we are co-located at the counter  
 5 terrorism policing headquarters. We each have  
 6 responsibility for two of the pillars of CONTEST, so as  
 7 I've said earlier, I have responsibility for Protect and  
 8 Prepare.  
 9 Reporting to me is the counter terrorism policing  
 10 national coordinator for Protect and Prepare, who is a  
 11 chief superintendent, and I've tried to illustrate the  
 12 sort of structure at appendix 2 of my statement.  
 13 Q. Yes, if we bring that on screen, {WS5032/33}, please.  
 14 So in the chain directly beneath Mr Basu can we see you  
 15 as the lead for Protect and Prepare, with a national  
 16 coordinator for those pillars under you?  
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 18 Q. As regards Protect and Prepare, what are the services  
 19 provided by the network nationally to the various  
 20 regions?  
 21 A. So in addition to myself, you'll see from the diagram  
 22 that there is a chief constable lead for Protect and  
 23 Prepare, so that is a thematic lead who has oversight of  
 24 the Protect and Prepare across the UK. It does vary  
 25 significantly across the UK, but in principle, each

10

1 region has a Protect and Prepare lead.  
 2 In London the Protect lead is the operational  
 3 command unit commander for counter terrorism protective  
 4 security operations and that is a chief superintendent  
 5 and the Prepare lead in London actually is a commander  
 6 for the public order branch.  
 7 In respect of Protect and Prepare, much of the  
 8 provision of services from the Counter Terrorism  
 9 Policing Network is done through specialist advice on  
 10 protective security tactics and measures.  
 11 What I would say, however, is the adoption of this  
 12 advice is entirely discretionary for each police service  
 13 and/or the private or public sector body to whom we've  
 14 given that advice to.  
 15 Q. Yes, you explained earlier the degree of autonomy of  
 16 local forces with their local leads within the network.  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Can we move onto governance of the Protect and Prepare  
 19 pillars of the strategy. Does the national coordinator  
 20 for Protect and Prepare, we saw on that chart, oversee  
 21 the delivery of the work on a day-to-day basis?  
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 23 Q. Every two weeks is there a meeting of a group called the  
 24 Security Review Committee, normally involving you, to  
 25 monitor the work and set the direction of travel?

11

1 A. Yes, there is.  
 2 Q. Does that body include a range of people including you  
 3 and the national coordinator, MI5, representatives of  
 4 other police forces and so on?  
 5 A. Yes, it does. So there's a blend of people that are at  
 6 that meeting. So the regional leads for Protect and  
 7 Prepare from across the country have a presence at that  
 8 meeting. Also we're joined by other bodies, such as the  
 9 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, which is JTAC, MI5.  
 10 We're also joined by some of our key partners in  
 11 delivering protective security in London which is the  
 12 ambulance and fire service, British Transport Police,  
 13 and also our other partners such as the Ministry of  
 14 Defence and also the UK military are present at that  
 15 meeting.  
 16 In addition, obviously we have SO15, which is the  
 17 Pursue arm of the counter terrorism approach in London.  
 18 Q. Those meetings, can I understand, include discussion of  
 19 highly security-sensitive subject matter?  
 20 A. Yes, so the meetings are held at a secret level but we  
 21 do have minutes that are a redacted version, official  
 22 sensitive, and the meeting very much starts by  
 23 considering, having an input from JTAC and MI5 around  
 24 the current threat assessment and some of the risks that  
 25 we are seeing followed by an intelligence overview

12

1 around the threat picture so that we can understand any  
2 decisions that we need to make in relation to protective  
3 security.

4 Q. Now, are there particular types of guidance or output  
5 that can come from those meetings?

6 A. Yes, there are. So they usually result in one of three  
7 types of messages. So one is an advisory group message,  
8 and this is the provision of a service-wide update, and  
9 this usually suggests action to the forces or briefings  
10 at an individual police service level. That's usually  
11 considered to be the strongest level of recommendation  
12 from that meeting.

13 The second one is a network message, and this is the  
14 provision of a network-wide message usually only to  
15 Protect and Prepare leads, whereas the first one would  
16 go to chief constables and the senior teams, and this is  
17 commonly a simple update on matters.

18 Then the third one is taskings which occasionally  
19 regions are asked and tasked to check their own  
20 protective security or preparedness stance and report  
21 these back to the group. The Protect and Prepare leads  
22 then engage with their individual police services in  
23 overseeing the implementation of the tasking or, indeed,  
24 rejection if they don't feel it's appropriate within  
25 their region.

13

1 Q. Now, we'll hear from Deputy Chief Constable Gyford later  
2 about advisory messages that were issued in the  
3 aftermath of the Westminster attack recommending that  
4 forces consider increased counter terrorist deployment.  
5 I think you are aware of those because you were  
6 instrumental in issuing them?

7 A. Yes, that's correct. Can I say, though, that the  
8 messaging and taskings from that meeting, just to  
9 emphasise the point that they are advisory for the  
10 police forces.

11 Q. Yes. But as you've said, the advisory group messaging  
12 is the strongest recommendation that you commission?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. Immediately following that meeting, is there a further  
15 body called the London Security Review?

16 A. Yes, there is.

17 Q. Does that focus specifically on matters relevant to the  
18 Metropolitan Police Service and its security  
19 arrangements?

20 A. Yes, it does.

21 Q. Can I move on now to the concepts of threat and risk and  
22 their effect on decision-making. You've already  
23 mentioned the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, JTAC, and  
24 we've heard about the national terrorist threat level  
25 which it sets.

14

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Can you tell us just briefly about the levels of threat  
3 which can be set by JTAC?

4 A. Yes, so these are highlighted in paragraph 26. So there  
5 are five threat levels: low is an attack is unlikely;  
6 moderate, an attack is possible but not likely;  
7 substantial, an attack is a strong possibility; severe,  
8 which is where the UK is today, is an attack is highly  
9 likely, and; critical, which during 2017 we went to  
10 twice, is an attack is expected imminently.

11 Q. In simple terms, what is the purpose of having the  
12 national threat level? What does it do to inform  
13 a variety of public bodies and cause them to take preset  
14 arrangements?

15 A. So I suppose I would divide it into a number of  
16 sections. I think firstly it's publicised so that the  
17 public are fully aware of what the threat level is to  
18 the UK, and then from a public body perspective, and  
19 certainly from my perspective for policing, and in my  
20 role as the senior national coordinator, it enables us  
21 to think about the protective security stance that we  
22 need to take across the UK to try and create a hostile  
23 environment for terrorists to operate in.

24 Q. As well as the national threat level, are individual  
25 threat levels also set for sectors, that's to say

15

1 geographical regions, and sections of the community?

2 A. Yes, there are, but I'm not able to disclose the details  
3 of these for national security reasons.

4 Q. No. But do they assist those engaging with those  
5 regions and sections of the community in prioritising  
6 protective security measures?

7 A. Yes, they do, and also I think it's worth mentioning  
8 that, you know, for big events there is also a threat  
9 assessment that's conducted for big events which, again,  
10 helps people like myself, the gold commander, think  
11 about the type of security that we want at those events  
12 and the resources that we'd like to deploy.

13 Q. What is the current national threat level?

14 A. It is severe: an attack is highly likely.

15 Q. Highly likely somewhere in the UK?

16 A. Yes, and of course what it does not provide is any  
17 indication of where or when an attack will take place.

18 Q. Was that the level at the time of the London Bridge  
19 attack?

20 A. Yes, that's correct. And what I would say is that the  
21 threat levels do not give an indicator of risk.

22 Q. We'll come onto the concept of risk in a moment.  
23 You've told us that the threat level had been at  
24 critical for a number of days after the Manchester  
25 attack?

16

1 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 2 Q. Now, you've already mentioned the distinction between  
 3 threat and risk. What are the key components of the  
 4 concept of threat when JTAC sets the threat level?  
 5 A. So, I mean it is a really complex area, this, so I've  
 6 tried to think about how I could sort of summarise this  
 7 in a more simplistic way. For me, threat is very much  
 8 around capability and intent, and you will see that  
 9 reflected in numerous documents, and risk is very much  
 10 around vulnerability and consequence.  
 11 Q. Yes.  
 12 A. So to summarise that, really, to assess threat we need  
 13 intelligence because that helps us to assess the threat,  
 14 it helps us to understand the capability of individuals  
 15 and their intent. To assess risk, all we need is  
 16 information, and for me they are the two distinct  
 17 differences.  
 18 So in terms of risk, if you consider that a premises  
 19 might be at risk from taking the absolute extreme,  
 20 a nuclear bomb, you know what measures you need to put  
 21 in place. But in terms of threat, we look at the  
 22 capability and intent, and actually really the  
 23 capability to do that is very low. So, therefore, that  
 24 helps us with our prioritisation process of protective  
 25 security.

17

1 Q. So using a much simpler example of a pavement and  
 2 barriers. Intent and capability might be how many  
 3 terrorists it is thought might have an interest in  
 4 attacking, either generally or in a particular area,  
 5 whereas vulnerability -- or risk is about the  
 6 vulnerability and weakness of the particular area?  
 7 A. That's correct.  
 8 Q. You have told us that the relevant CONTEST strategy in  
 9 force in 2017 was published in 2011. At that time we've  
 10 heard that the main terrorist threats were from Al-Qaeda  
 11 and Northern Irish republican terrorists; is that right?  
 12 A. Yes, that's correct, and at the time of the 2011  
 13 strategy being published we must remember that the  
 14 Islamic caliphate hadn't been declared and Daesh, also  
 15 referred to as the Islamic State, had not evolved at the  
 16 time of the publication of that document.  
 17 Q. So the declaration of the caliphate and the call for  
 18 attacks on the West came later and that, as we've heard,  
 19 encouraged attacks including lone actor and low  
 20 sophistication attacks?  
 21 A. Yes, so the subsequent declaration of the caliphate in  
 22 2014 led to a significant change in intent from those  
 23 driven by Al-Qaeda, and it led to the concept which was  
 24 reiterated in al-Adnani's speech in 2014 that anybody  
 25 could be a terrorist, anything could be used as a weapon

18

1 and anybody could be a target, and that represented  
 2 a significant change.  
 3 Q. Was the CONTEST strategy over the years subject to  
 4 annual reviews?  
 5 A. Yes, it was.  
 6 Q. By 2015, did the review recognise IS or Daesh as the  
 7 principal terrorist threat to the UK?  
 8 A. Yes, it did.  
 9 Q. By 2017 did the review recognise that the UK faced  
 10 a complex threat picture with a substantial range of  
 11 individuals and organisations intent on terrorism?  
 12 A. Yes, it did, and also a more expansive list of  
 13 capabilities.  
 14 Q. Turning now to the question of legislation. Is it fair  
 15 to say that there's little legislation which is specific  
 16 to the work you do within the Protect and Prepare  
 17 strands rather than general but touching upon them?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. We know that there are duties of public authorities  
 20 under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human  
 21 Rights given effect by the Human Rights Act to take  
 22 steps to protect life. Is it also right that there is  
 23 a duty on various public authorities to take measures to  
 24 reduce crime and disorder, including terrorism, under  
 25 the Crime and Disorder Act section 17?

19

1 A. That's correct.  
 2 Q. A duty on local authorities and emergency services to  
 3 assess, plan and advise in relation to emergencies,  
 4 including terrorism, under the Civil Contingencies Act?  
 5 A. That's correct.  
 6 Q. In addition to those duties, is there a power to  
 7 restrict and re-direct traffic using anti-terrorism  
 8 traffic regulation orders under the Road Traffic  
 9 Regulation Act as amended?  
 10 A. That's correct.  
 11 Q. Is it right to say that other legislative duties may  
 12 also affect precautions against terrorism, such as fire  
 13 safety regulation, building regulation and licensing  
 14 regulation?  
 15 A. It is, but they're not specific to it, but you could use  
 16 that legislation to assist, depending on the  
 17 circumstances.  
 18 Q. Now, since the Westminster Bridge attack inquest last  
 19 year, is it right that the Home Office has commissioned  
 20 a review of legislation and whether other legislation is  
 21 needed?  
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 23 Q. One specific point, please: many of the locations where  
 24 terrorists might perpetrate attacks are in private hands  
 25 or in private management. Do private bodies, to your

20

1 knowledge, have a general legislative duty, even  
 2 a qualified one, to take precautions against terrorism?  
 3 A. So my understanding is, no. I think there is  
 4 a legislative gap, and there is an absence of  
 5 legislation and regulations that puts a requirement on  
 6 bodies to consider how they can mitigate the threat of  
 7 terrorism and how they could put protective security in  
 8 place. It is entirely discretionary.  
 9 Q. You say that there is a gap in that regard. From your  
 10 perspective as a very senior police officer responsible  
 11 for Protect and Prepare, would such a legislative duty  
 12 be valuable to the police and to other security agencies  
 13 in encouraging businesses, owners of premises, to work  
 14 with you and take appropriate precautions?  
 15 A. So for me it is a matter for government to consider the  
 16 sort of landscape of legislation, but I do think it  
 17 would be helpful if there was legislation that did  
 18 require people to consider protective security across  
 19 the landscape, so whether that be in planning, building  
 20 new properties, and also I think that's applicable to  
 21 the public and to the private sector.  
 22 The Health and Safety Act, you know, is very clear  
 23 about the responsibilities of people at work. There is  
 24 an absence of legislation that is as clear around  
 25 protective security.

21

1 Q. To take an example for pavements, there is a duty to  
 2 maintain the pavement so that people don't trip on it,  
 3 but not a duty to protect the pavement, or to take  
 4 reasonable steps to protect the pavement against  
 5 terrorist attack?  
 6 A. That's my understanding. And I suppose to take that  
 7 example, you know, a queue of people outside  
 8 a particular venue, there is no requirement to consider  
 9 protective security of those people in that queue.  
 10 Q. Thank you.  
 11 Can I move on, now, to the National Security  
 12 Partnership. You've described the way that work under  
 13 the Protect and Prepare strands and the CONTEST strategy  
 14 is developed nationally but delivered locally. Does  
 15 that in practice mean that advice is given through  
 16 a national network to local bodies?  
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 18 Q. Looking at the different bodies, you've described the  
 19 OSCT as the policy partner; does that body set the  
 20 policy and priorities on behalf of government?  
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 22 Q. You have told us about the role of JTAC in setting  
 23 threat levels which guides the work of the police and  
 24 others. Can you tell us about the role of a body called  
 25 the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure?

22

1 A. Yes, so this is described in a little bit more detail in  
 2 Sarah Nacey's statement, but it is the government  
 3 authority for protective security advice in the UK  
 4 around national infrastructure, and I would describe it  
 5 that as a body it sets the technical standards for  
 6 protective security equipment. So it ensures that if  
 7 people are choosing to purchase protective security  
 8 equipment, in effect, they're buying something with the  
 9 confidence that it's been tested and it does what it  
 10 says.  
 11 These standards provide a measure against users of  
 12 the equipment can assess the level of protection that  
 13 a piece of equipment might deliver, and we use those  
 14 standards when we deliver our own advice.  
 15 Q. Then, of course, you have MI5, which provides  
 16 intelligence both at an operational level and at  
 17 a higher level relevant to police operations?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. So do all those bodies, OSCT, JTAC, CPNI and MI5, help  
 20 you in prioritising your work and resources?  
 21 A. That's correct.  
 22 Q. Can I next ask you about the National Counter Terrorism  
 23 Security Office; what is that?  
 24 A. So this is part of counter terrorism policing and it  
 25 reports to my national coordinator for Protect and

23

1 Prepare. So elements of this unit are embedded and work  
 2 in collaboration with CPNI in the development of  
 3 protective security advice, and it is the police's  
 4 public-facing body which is responsible for taking the  
 5 amalgamated knowledge from the above organisation and  
 6 turning that in effect into operational guidance.  
 7 NaCTSO also oversees the accreditation and tasking  
 8 of the counter terrorism security advisors and there is  
 9 a network of those individuals across the UK. They are  
 10 a group of about 200 individuals and they are  
 11 responsible for delivering advice to both the public and  
 12 private sectors. These are a combination of police  
 13 officers and police staff and they are accredited and  
 14 licensed to a national standard to undertake  
 15 professional practice.  
 16 It is a two-year course and they have a City &  
 17 Guilds qualification at the end of it, so they are our  
 18 highest qualified counter terrorism security advisors in  
 19 the country.  
 20 Q. So a local force area may have its own counter terrorism  
 21 security advisor, we'll hear about some of them over the  
 22 course of this week, and they're accredited and trained  
 23 to a national standard to give advice locally?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. Are they also supported locally by officers called

24

1 counter terrorist focused desk officers ?  
 2 A. That's only in London, but yes.  
 3 Q. In London is there such an officer , or at least one such  
 4 officers , in each borough assisting the CTSA by  
 5 coordinating security and preparedness?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 Q. Is it right that they are not as highly trained as CTSAs  
 8 but assist in giving security advice?  
 9 A. That's my understanding.  
 10 Q. Can I now move on to crowded places and the Crowded  
 11 Places Model. We'll hear over the days that come about  
 12 crowded places. How were crowded places defined in the  
 13 2011 CONTEST strategy?  
 14 A. So crowded places, they are not defined by statute , but  
 15 in the CONTEST strategy of 2011 they were described as  
 16 being crowded places including shopping centres, sports  
 17 stadia, bars, pubs and clubs, which are easily  
 18 accessible to the public and attractive to terrorists .  
 19 Q. Has a further working definition been in use since 2014?  
 20 A. Yes, so a working definition in use since 2014 is  
 21 a crowded place is a location or environment to which  
 22 members of the public have access that may be considered  
 23 more at risk from a terrorist attack by virtue of its  
 24 crowd density or the nature of the site .  
 25 Q. So those are very broad definitions which could

25

1 encompass a great many places?  
 2 A. They could, but actually when we apply the matrix,  
 3 actually that does reduce the number of places that meet  
 4 the matrix that is applied under the Crowded Places  
 5 Model.  
 6 Q. We'll come to the model now.  
 7 Was a programme developed to protect crowded places  
 8 from 2008?  
 9 A. Yes, that's correct. The government, through OSCT,  
 10 developed a policy response that became known as the  
 11 Crowded Places Model, and the programme to protect  
 12 crowded places was developed in 2008 following a report  
 13 by Lord West to review the security of public spaces  
 14 after vehicle-borne explosive devices were used in 2007  
 15 in London. You will remember that that was the Tiger  
 16 Tiger nightclub, and also followed by Glasgow airport.  
 17 And its primary aim was that it focused on free  
 18 advice delivered by CTSAs and this became one part of  
 19 the delivery of the Crowded Places Model.  
 20 The other element was free-to-access advice through  
 21 such mediums as government websites. Lord West's  
 22 review -- report recommended a standard approach to  
 23 assessing the vulnerability of crowded places across the  
 24 UK using a risk assessment matrix, and I would say  
 25 a limiting feature of that model was that its main focus

26

1 was on risk, not threat, the significance of which I've  
 2 spoken about previously.  
 3 Q. Can we look at the policy document that was produced  
 4 after Lord West's review, {DC8293/1}, please. Was this  
 5 document of March 2010, Working Together to Protect  
 6 Crowded Places, a document that flowed from the review?  
 7 A. Yes, it did.  
 8 Q. We can look at page 29, please {DC8293/29}, we can see  
 9 at annex A of that document, the Home Office and NaCTSO  
 10 produced a risk assessment matrix for crowded places?  
 11 A. That's correct.  
 12 Q. If we look at the left -hand column under the heading  
 13 "The stages of risk assessment process", do we see that  
 14 that process would begin by CTSAs, these local advisors,  
 15 drawing up a list of crowded places which may be at  
 16 a relatively high risk of terrorist attack based on  
 17 their local knowledge?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. Then we see in the right -hand column the risk assessment  
 20 process is explained as filtering the places based on  
 21 attractiveness to terrorists , vulnerability assessment  
 22 for the locations , risk assessment of the site , bringing  
 23 together the previous assessments, and a grouping of  
 24 risk assessments of the various sites in each local  
 25 authority area?

27

1 A. That's correct.  
 2 Q. Would assessments then be brought together to produce  
 3 a rating on a risk severity scale?  
 4 A. So if I could probably just clarify a point here. So  
 5 this became known as the vulnerability model, and the  
 6 overall ambition was to reduce vulnerability , and it  
 7 then came up with a group of places which was known as  
 8 the crowded places baseline. There was no  
 9 differentiation between those sites on the original  
 10 model: it was entirely -- all of them were, in effect ,  
 11 to receive the same level of advice, which then changed  
 12 as we moved to the model in 2014, which was the tiering  
 13 process.  
 14 Q. If we can look at page 22 of that document {DC8293/22}.  
 15 Now, you have told us that all places meeting a certain  
 16 threshold of risk went on that crowded places baseline.  
 17 Is it right that there weren't any priority gradings as  
 18 between them?  
 19 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 20 Q. And can we see in the working together document  
 21 paragraph 3.05, the authors recommended the CTSAs focus  
 22 their action on those crowded places they consider to be  
 23 at highest risk, taking account of the information  
 24 available to them?  
 25 A. That's correct.

28

1 Q. Both generic information and specific threat information  
2 about precise locations?  
3 A. That's correct.  
4 Q. And then at 3.06, advice that:  
5 "CTSAs [should take] account of local authority  
6 views on the crowded places business sectors that  
7 feature most prominently in their local area and ...  
8 specific crowded places that ought to be included in the  
9 [risk] assessment."  
10 A. That's correct, and obviously if we look at the threat  
11 picture at the time, that was very much in relation to  
12 Al-Qaeda and for Northern Ireland-related terrorism.  
13 Q. So at that stage, CTSAs were being asked to carry out  
14 this risk assessment process with those principles in  
15 mind in order to identify a baseline list of crowded  
16 places in their local area?  
17 A. That's correct.  
18 Q. As we'll hear, Borough Market was placed on that  
19 baseline list within London?  
20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
21 Q. In 2012 -- we can take that document off screen -- was  
22 a body called the Crowded Places Working Group  
23 established with government and policing representatives  
24 chaired by the OSCT?  
25 A. Yes, it was.

29

1 Q. In simple terms, what was its role?  
2 A. So that was to bring practitioners together to discuss  
3 the model, the effectiveness of the model and to be  
4 really a constant review. Obviously at my level I would  
5 never have been somebody that would have attended that  
6 meeting, it was more at a sort of practitioner level and  
7 chaired by OSCT.  
8 Q. Did that body carry out a review of the effectiveness of  
9 the model, which you have described as the vulnerability  
10 model? I'm looking at paragraph 56 of your statement.  
11 A. Yes, so it conducted a review of the vulnerability model  
12 and then made some recommendations for improvement on  
13 that model, and then subsequent to that we saw a change,  
14 move towards the development of an attractiveness model  
15 and that was really because of the change that we were  
16 seeing in attack methodology and some of the learning  
17 from the previous model.  
18 Q. So looking at the learning from the previous model, did  
19 the review find that there were a significant number of  
20 sites on the baseline list, but only a fifth or so had  
21 had reduced vulnerability since the model had been  
22 introduced?  
23 A. Yes, it did, so after -- following the 2012 Olympics,  
24 the review highlighted that only 20% of sites had  
25 reduced vulnerability. As I've said earlier, you know,

30

1 giving the advice is one thing, people doing something  
2 with the advice is entirely discretionary. So we saw  
3 that only 20% of the sites have reduced vulnerability,  
4 and also a follow-up report dated June 2013 identified  
5 that 45% of the sites on the baseline had no improvement  
6 plan in place.  
7 Q. In view of that learning and the changing threat picture  
8 which you have already described, what change was made  
9 to the model?  
10 A. So I think one of the things that the review said, which  
11 if I could read out, which I think is really important,  
12 is that:  
13 "There are and always will be many more crowded  
14 places than we can protect or we would want to protect  
15 even if we could, given the need for our response to  
16 remain proportionate."  
17 The report identified some options for change which  
18 were carried through to a third report that defined  
19 a new operating model for crowded places, and what that  
20 required was a stock-take of the crowded places  
21 locations and created a new baseline, and the new model  
22 was essentially predicated on a site's attractiveness,  
23 based on a number of factors. So some of the old  
24 model's criteria was used but, again, we brought in --  
25 collectively we brought in some new criteria, and that

31

1 led, as I've said, to the development of what we call  
2 the attractiveness model, and that was launched in 2014  
3 and remains in use today.  
4 Q. So to simplify grossly, were you moving from a model  
5 that focused upon the weakness or vulnerability of  
6 locations to one focused upon their attractiveness to  
7 terrorists, taking into account broader concepts of  
8 threat?  
9 A. That's correct.  
10 Q. May we have on screen, please, {WS5032/14}, this is the  
11 relevant part of your statement, and can we focus on  
12 paragraph 60. Did this new model, as well as moving  
13 from the concept of vulnerability to attractiveness,  
14 also introduce tiers, or priority gradings of crowded  
15 places?  
16 A. That's correct, and my understanding is that the  
17 baseline that I talked about previously didn't change.  
18 What happened was they were in effect put through the  
19 new matrix and placed in a tiering, and you will see  
20 here from the screen that there were three tiers:  
21 "Tier 1: sites that are nationally or  
22 internationally recognisable as symbolic of the UK and  
23 its way of life or have a widely known, frequent and  
24 predictable attendance by notable users.  
25 "Tier 2: sites ... whilst not of national or

32

1 international prominence, nevertheless have a profile  
2 above local or have a significant attendance by notable  
3 users."

4 Then there were two sub tiers to that:

5 "Tier 2(a) are [the] sites that have a less  
6 developed current security stance.

7 "... 2(b) are sites that have a more developed  
8 current security stance."

9 That then left tier 3, and these were sites that:

10 "... whilst having sufficient footfall and crowd  
11 density to merit being classed as crowded places have  
12 only local recognition and do not have a widely known,  
13 frequent or predictable attendance by notable users."

14 You will see from paragraph 61, to become a site  
15 within the Crowded Places Model at any tier, the site  
16 needed to be specifically and geographically defined,  
17 and it must have sufficient crowd density that if it was  
18 attacked by any of the methodologies described in the  
19 national risk assessment, it could suffer harm to life,  
20 commensurate with the loss of life as specified in the  
21 NRA. If it didn't meet the specific threshold in  
22 respect of crowd density, it would not progress further  
23 to the assessment process. These sites, however, could  
24 be retained on a local basis as a tier 3 site.

25 Q. Now, if we can look at some of the guidance and

33

1 assistance provided to sites at different tiers, may we  
2 bring up {WS5032/34}. Now, just to introduce this  
3 document we're looking at, is it right to say that one  
4 of the functions of prioritising sites was to give  
5 higher levels of assistance and advice to those at the  
6 highest tiers?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And can you see here that you have identified in this  
9 appendix to your witness statement the levels of  
10 assistance provided in practical terms at each of the  
11 different tiers?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. So the tier 1 sites, the nationally significant sites,  
14 your table refers to a proactive and bespoke engagement  
15 for all sites and possible further forms of engagement  
16 for specific sites. Are you able to say, in short, what  
17 that means in practice? What form the proactive and  
18 bespoke engagement and potential further engagement  
19 might take?

20 A. So this, in the Metropolitan Police area, for tier 1 and  
21 tier 2 sites, counter terrorism security advisors  
22 offered protective security advice and guidance. A tool  
23 was used called the Protective Security Improvement  
24 Activity, because this was all looking at how we could  
25 improve protective security, and they would put in place

34

1 an action plan for delivery, but depending on the  
2 premises, obviously, you know, that's discretionary as  
3 to what is or is not taken up.

4 If in relation to a tier 2(b) site they did not  
5 elect to take up the offer of protective security advice  
6 and guidance they were not pursued further, given their  
7 well-developed security stance, that would have been the  
8 end of the process because we are identifying under 2(b)  
9 that actually they've got a relatively good security  
10 stance.

11 If a tier 2(a) site did not initially engage,  
12 further approaches were considered, but I am advised  
13 that over time the distinction between 2(a) and 2(b) in  
14 the Metropolitan Police became a bit blurred and  
15 a consistent approach was applied across all tier 2  
16 sites, which was, indeed, reflective of the 2(b)  
17 approach, which was around the counter terrorism and  
18 security advisors.

19 Q. So tier 1 and tier 2 sites would receive support from  
20 CTSAs, given protective security advice; would there be  
21 more and more regular such advice for tier 1 sites?

22 A. Not specifically, I mean, obviously tier 1 are the ones  
23 we are most concerned about because of the rating of the  
24 matrix and the tiering process, so they would  
25 automatically always get preferential treatment from the

35

1 CTSAs because they are a tier 1, which makes absolute  
2 sense.

3 But tier 2, you know, these are regionally  
4 significant sites within the UK, so they would get  
5 a priority. That will vary across the UK in terms of  
6 how quickly that can be done. I mean, the Metropolitan  
7 Police Service does have a number of CTSAs so is able to  
8 cope with the capacity -- has the capacity to deal with  
9 both.

10 Q. You indicated that tier 2 was originally separated into  
11 (a) and (b), depending on the level of profile of the  
12 site, but that distinction gradually broke down over  
13 time?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Tier 3 sites, the local sites which didn't qualify for  
16 the higher tiering, what assistance and advice did they  
17 receive?

18 A. So the aim of a tier 3 site is to signpost people to  
19 access generic material that's available on web sites  
20 and, in effect, that's the approach for tier 3, to route  
21 them in that direction and signpost them to readily  
22 accessible security advice that's been compiled by  
23 highly qualified people.

24 The tier 3 sites were sub divided into 3(a) and 3(b)  
25 nationally over time. Tier 3(a) sites did actually --

36

1 they were offered CTSA support if they required it and  
2 resources allowed, so that was definitely qualified in  
3 terms of our capacity to deal with that, and the 3(b)  
4 sites, which was the bulk of the sites within tier 3,  
5 they were given a contact officer from the counter  
6 terrorism focus desk, of which there was one on every  
7 borough.

8 I mean, just to give you an idea of scale, in the  
9 MPS, Metropolitan Police area for tier 3 crowded places,  
10 there were 463 of them on the list, and only 15 were  
11 considered to be 3(a), which received a CTSA.

12 Q. And to understand how CTSA's work, when they provide  
13 direct advice to the owner of a local site, whether it's  
14 a public or private owner, might that involve them going  
15 around the site and using their skills to identify  
16 vulnerabilities, risk mitigation measures and advise the  
17 owner?

18 A. That's right. I mean, the purpose is to use the  
19 protective security improvement sort of action tool, so  
20 this is looking at activity that will improve the  
21 protective security.

22 Now, you know, you can go from Rolls Royce to, you  
23 know, a much lower scale of that depending on  
24 an individual's ability to be able to finance that, have  
25 the resources to do it, there's a lot of factors that

37

1 they will take into consideration, and the counter  
2 terrorism security advisors would be able to signpost  
3 them as to what could improve protective security at  
4 that location.

5 It's not just physical security, it's about training  
6 of staff and making sure that they understand some of  
7 the procedures and policies that are in place at the  
8 venue where they work.

9 Q. Borough Market, you've confirmed that under the  
10 vulnerability model, before 2014, it was on the baseline  
11 list. After the attractiveness model came in, where was  
12 that area placed?

13 A. In tier 3.

14 Q. 3(a) or 3(b)?

15 A. So it was in 3(b).

16 Q. Did it, however, receive visits from the local CTSA and  
17 reasonably regular direct engagement from local CT  
18 officers, as we'll hear?

19 A. Yes, so appendix 4 of my statement shows the activity  
20 that took place over a number of years at  
21 Borough Market. It did continue to receive regular  
22 engagement from the counter terrorism security advisor  
23 and one of the reasons for this is that actually they  
24 were very forward-reaching as an area in terms of  
25 wanting to engage with us and, obviously, fortunately we

38

1 had the capacity to be able to provide them with the  
2 support of a counter terrorism security advisor.

3 Q. Was London Bridge a crowded place at all?

4 A. I can't comment on that. It wasn't within -- it's not  
5 within the Metropolitan Police area so I wouldn't know.

6 Q. We will hear that it was addressed locally by the City  
7 of London Police, I think you were aware of that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Moving to protective security after the Westminster  
10 attack on 21 March 2017. Immediately before that attack  
11 what was the national threat level?

12 A. That was at severe.

13 Q. However, before the attack was there any information, so  
14 far as you can reveal, that an attack would take place  
15 at any particular location?

16 A. No, there wasn't.

17 Q. There was evidence in the Westminster Bridge Inquests  
18 that Westminster Bridge was not a crowded place; are you  
19 aware of that evidence?

20 A. Yes, I am. I'm aware of the evidence given by Chief  
21 Superintendent Nick Aldworth during the Westminster  
22 terrorist attack and I would agree with his evidence.

23 Q. After that attack had taken place, what action was taken  
24 in broad terms to ensure vulnerable locations had  
25 effective security?

39

1 A. So there was a number of actions that were taken. The  
2 first was to look at all of our currently identified  
3 vulnerable locations in London, to review their cover  
4 for protective security, and on 22 March that meant  
5 starting the review of a number of sites, which are  
6 shown in my statement at paragraph 70.

7 So that was 50 tier 1 sites, 43 tier 2(a) and 2(b)  
8 sites, 15 tier 3(a) sites and 440 3(b) sites. There  
9 were also sites around hazardous sites and substance  
10 storage locations and also sites of critical national  
11 infrastructure.

12 There were two security review meetings post  
13 Westminster, which we call a SRC(e), which is  
14 an emergency SRC, and there were nine actions generated  
15 from that meeting. The MPS focused on optimising the  
16 effectiveness of existing security operations and  
17 supporting consequence management and investigative  
18 operations.

19 One of the actions that we put in place within the  
20 Metropolitan Police Service was that a large number of  
21 police support units were deployed to support the  
22 protective security plan, and at peak times there were  
23 an additional 250 officers deployed on security patrols.  
24 These officers were deployed to locations that we  
25 believed were most at risk in the MPS, as defined by the

40

1 Crowded Places Model.  
 2 One of the other things that the Metropolitan Police  
 3 protective security operations unit did was replicating  
 4 methodology that we believed terrorists were using to  
 5 identify potential targets. We created a top ten list  
 6 of locations that would be focused on in terms of  
 7 installation of infrastructure and police patrols.  
 8 Q. Was that in the London area?  
 9 A. That was in the London area. 34 unique locations of  
 10 interest were identified through methodology, and 10  
 11 were prioritised. Obviously I can't name those for  
 12 security reasons, but what I can confirm is that  
 13 Borough Market and London Bridge did not feature, save  
 14 for London Bridge being mentioned once, but this was  
 15 plainly a reference to Tower Bridge.  
 16 Q. Just breaking that down, after the Westminster attack  
 17 you had first of all the review of both crowded places  
 18 in all tiers, hazardous sites, and critical national  
 19 infrastructure sites?  
 20 A. That's correct.  
 21 Q. Each of those having its own category?  
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 23 Q. We also had a large number of additional police, 250,  
 24 deployed to particular locations at greatest risk?  
 25 A. That's correct.

41

1 Q. And we had an identification of a top ten list of  
 2 attractive attack targets?  
 3 A. That's correct.  
 4 Q. In addition, I think we'll hear that messages were sent  
 5 from the Security Review Committee to the City of London  
 6 Police, amongst others, about identifying sites locally  
 7 and considering increasing deployment of officers there?  
 8 A. That's correct, and the City of London Police are  
 9 present at the Security Review Committee, which includes  
 10 an emergency one.  
 11 Q. Was the focus of your efforts on iconic locations?  
 12 A. So that was a part of it. So iconic locations were  
 13 certainly a consideration amongst some other areas.  
 14 Q. Looking at bridges specifically, did you have any  
 15 specific intelligence indicating that there was or  
 16 remained a threat to London's bridges?  
 17 A. No, I did not.  
 18 Q. Was the Westminster attack seen as being an attack on  
 19 a bridge?  
 20 A. No.  
 21 Q. Is it fair to say that at the time it was seen by the  
 22 authorities as an attack on Parliament preceded by  
 23 a murderous attack on a roadway approaching Parliament?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. Was any consideration given in those meetings that

42

1 followed the attack and the weeks that followed to the  
 2 idea that bridges across the Thames can themselves be  
 3 iconic and that some of them had relatively unprotected  
 4 broad pavements, so vulnerable to vehicle-as-weapon  
 5 attacks?  
 6 A. No, not specifically for bridges. After the attack we  
 7 considered the locations that we -- considering the  
 8 threat assessment and the intelligence picture and  
 9 focused our activity in those areas.  
 10 Q. The suggestion may be made that the attack on  
 11 London Bridge, as well as being on a roadway directly  
 12 approaching the Palace, was on a bridge which features  
 13 in many depictions of the city, and so that, like other  
 14 bridges, might be an iconic location?  
 15 THE CHIEF CORONER: You said London Bridge in that --  
 16 MR HOUGH: I'm sorry, Westminster Bridge.  
 17 THE CHIEF CORONER: Westminster Bridge, yes.  
 18 A. I can understand how people may think that, but there  
 19 are numerous iconic locations where the same criteria  
 20 could be applied across London. Also, the road network  
 21 across London around those iconic locations is  
 22 extensive. I mean, there's over 205 miles of roadway  
 23 across London. We need to focus our protective security  
 24 based on the threat assessment and the intelligence that  
 25 we've got, and there are other locations based on the

43

1 threat assessment intelligence at that time which needed  
 2 our focus.  
 3 MR HOUGH: Now, as we'll hear later this week, separately  
 4 some studies were carried out by a company called  
 5 Cerastes in relation to the City of London area,  
 6 directed and commissioned by the City of London Police.  
 7 I think you are aware of those now?  
 8 A. In preparation for the Inquest I became aware of it,  
 9 yes, but I wasn't aware of it at the time.  
 10 Q. Are you aware now that those were studies, some before  
 11 and some after the Westminster attack, primarily  
 12 concerned with tactics for disrupting hostile  
 13 reconnaissance?  
 14 A. Yes, I am.  
 15 Q. Now, we shall hear that one of the Cerastes reports  
 16 produced after the Westminster attack, but before the  
 17 London Bridge attack, identified London Bridge as  
 18 a viable and attractive target for a vehicle-as-weapon  
 19 attack; is that something you're now aware of?  
 20 A. I am now aware of, yes.  
 21 Q. You've made clear that you didn't become aware of the  
 22 Cerastes studies before the attack, presumably you  
 23 weren't aware of the report or its content before the  
 24 attack?  
 25 A. That's correct.

44

1 Q. May I nevertheless ask you about one part of the report,  
2 and if we can bring up on screen {WS5015/17}, please.  
3 This is a summary of the report produced to remove  
4 irrelevant and security sensitive material, and under  
5 the heading "Attack Planning", the authors of the report  
6 say that they had conducted or replicated hostile  
7 reconnaissance activities on sites, one of which was  
8 London Bridge, and they write as follows:

9 "London Bridge -- located immediately south of  
10 Monument, London Bridge is used by vehicles and  
11 pedestrians entering or exiting the City of London.  
12 Hostile team observations indicated that at certain  
13 times of day there was particular congestion. The  
14 location and layout of the bridge lends itself to  
15 a ramming attack, with no physical barriers in place to  
16 prevent a vehicle from mounting the pavement in either  
17 direction."

18 Then there's a description particularly of  
19 a northbound vehicle ramming attack, and then over the  
20 page, please {WS5015/18}, as regards a southbound  
21 ramming attack, the authors write:

22 "... if travelling southbound ... hostile vehicle  
23 would need to wait until it has the bus stop and subway  
24 entrance outside Pret A Manger, before then mounting the  
25 pavement. A large bus stop and several confectionery

45

1 stands located at the southern end just prior to the  
2 junction with Duke Street Hill represent an attractive  
3 location at which to crash the vehicle and then start  
4 attacking bystanders with a bladed weapon."

5 So the report, which we know was issued to the CTSA,  
6 PC Hone, for the City of London Police on 27 April 2017,  
7 identified the particular risk of a vehicle-as-weapon  
8 attack on London Bridge and its vulnerability to such  
9 an attack; would you agree?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, we'll hear that Mr Hone, the CTSA, emailed his  
12 manager, Superintendent Isaac, on 16 May with a summary  
13 of that report and a recommendation for considering  
14 hostile vehicle mitigation on London Bridge. Were you  
15 aware of any such recommendation before the attack?

16 A. No.

17 Q. At any time before the London Bridge attack, to your  
18 knowledge, was there any assessment of London Bridge as  
19 being particularly vulnerable to attack using a vehicle  
20 as a weapon?

21 A. I mean, I can't comment on what City of London Police  
22 may know, I think that's for a later witness, but  
23 I'm not aware of anything in the Metropolitan Police  
24 that we were aware of in relation to any reports.

25 Q. If a colleague of yours had raised this aspect of the

46

1 Cerastes report with you in a meeting in, say, mid-May  
2 2017, are you able to say what your reaction would have  
3 been, what comments or advice you might have given?

4 A. I mean, that's a really difficult question and very sort  
5 of hypothetical. I mean, I think generally for me the  
6 report, that could be written for a number of locations  
7 across London, certainly that I'm aware of. The report  
8 has the absence of knowledge which policing has in  
9 relation to understanding the threat and the  
10 intelligence picture, and I think one of the challenges  
11 for all sort of managers and those involved in  
12 protective security is that we do have to prioritise  
13 where our effort is placed in order to put in place  
14 additional protective security measures.

15 So I don't think the report itself would cause me to  
16 suddenly start putting protective security measures in  
17 because it could be written for a multitude of locations  
18 around London, which is why we need to ground ourselves  
19 in the threat assessment and the intelligence so we can  
20 have a prioritisation.

21 So I think it's difficult to answer your question  
22 without considering the broader context of other  
23 locations which do cause me a concern, or have caused me  
24 a concern in the Metropolitan Police area.

25 Q. If one added to the report the comment of an experienced

47

1 CTSA that hostile vehicle mitigation should be seriously  
2 considered for London Bridge, and for example, a further  
3 comment that that CTSA was very concerned about  
4 London Bridge being vulnerable, would that cause you to  
5 start regarding it as more of a clear and identified  
6 priority?

7 A. So I always give great consideration to what the CTSA's  
8 raise. I think they are a fantastic group of people  
9 across the country who do a really challenging role,  
10 which is often a role of negotiation in relation to  
11 protective security, and they are hugely qualified, so  
12 for me it is always important to absolutely listen to  
13 what they're saying but it does need to be considered  
14 within the wider issue of the threat assessment and the  
15 intelligence picture, which may be something that they  
16 have not got full sight of and they certainly wouldn't  
17 necessarily have full sight of all of the sites across  
18 London and that's the role of bringing that together and  
19 prioritising.

20 Q. They might be anxious about one site in their local area  
21 but not have the broader picture and the understanding  
22 that resources have to be prioritised?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. We can take that off the screen now.

25 Can we move on to marauding terrorist attacks which

48

1 you addressed from page 18 of your report. We know that  
2 there were terrible attacks in Paris involving marauding  
3 terrorists. What was the responses in London to those  
4 attacks?

5 A. I know that a previous witness, Ross McKibbin, covered  
6 this in some of his evidence, but actually post-Paris,  
7 the then commissioner, Lord Hogan-Howe, announced  
8 in January 2017 that an additional 600 armed officers  
9 would be employed to protect London. So that was in  
10 effect almost doubling the number of armed officers from  
11 armed response vehicles that were present in London, and  
12 the work that was undertaken was to consider the  
13 methodology of the Paris attacks and think about what  
14 that would mean in London and to reflect and consider  
15 what would our capability be to neutralise that threat  
16 if it was posed in London.

17 So the initial action was through negotiation with  
18 government, receiving additional funding to have  
19 a substantial uplift in armed capability and that was  
20 replicated across parts of the UK.

21 Q. Was there also a substantial increase specifically in  
22 the number of armed response vehicles on patrol between  
23 the time of the Paris attack and the time of the  
24 London Bridge attack?

25 A. Yes, obviously so to deliver the increase in armed

49

1 officers is an enormous training challenge for UK  
2 policing and that was recognised in London. So to  
3 bridge the gap between the current number of armed  
4 officers and our future requirement in terms of  
5 an increased capacity of armed officers,  
6 the commissioner determined that there would be  
7 a greater visible armed policing stance across London  
8 and Operation Hercules commenced on 20 August 2016, and  
9 it was expected to finish in March 2017, although it  
10 continued -- because of events it continued  
11 until August 2017.

12 Primarily these were officers, additional firearms  
13 officers who were brought on in addition to their normal  
14 duties to provide that armed policing presence across  
15 the capital.

16 Probably if it helps I can say that there were two  
17 clear tactics: an increase in the number of visible  
18 mobile armed officers in either ARVs or people carriers,  
19 and a second one was armed officers being moved between  
20 areas and undertaking some very short foot patrols.

21 Q. How many areas, not specifically, but in terms of broad  
22 scale, were there where officers could patrol on foot?  
23 Are we talking very many or relatively few?

24 A. Very, very few. The whole sort of principle of UK  
25 policing is that we police by consent and we are largely

50

1 an unarmed organisation, so it is a very sensitive  
2 subject with the communities of London particularly, and  
3 across the country, around the presence of armed  
4 officers on the streets.

5 Now, some of the locations that we were also  
6 patrolling, because of where they fell within the  
7 crowded places tiering processes, are private premises,  
8 so, again, seeking permission of people to put officers  
9 at those locations had to be negotiated.

10 So what I would say, there were very, very small  
11 amount of areas where we had negotiated the presence of  
12 armed foot patrols in those locations.

13 Q. So far as you can say, what sort of factors determined  
14 the areas where officers could patrol armed on foot?

15 A. So where they could patrol armed on foot was very much  
16 around considering the sort of community impact  
17 assessment, considering the value of that tactic at that  
18 particular location, is that the right tactic to use.  
19 Foot patrols, obviously it's not as easy to move people  
20 between locations, so we had to consider that, and also  
21 we had to negotiate with the people who potentially  
22 owned the land, the property or the area where we were  
23 intending to place those officers.

24 Q. Now, as a very experienced commander are you able to say  
25 what are the practical difficulties of placing small

51

1 foot patrols of armed officers in an area like the  
2 Borough Market and Borough area on a Saturday night?

3 A. So I did read Ross McKibbin's transcript and I think he  
4 covered that very well and I would agree with the  
5 observations he made. Placing people on foot in  
6 a particular location, whether it be armed or unarmed,  
7 to move them at speed to other locations where they're  
8 required, we would reduce the agility of that particular  
9 type of officer once they're on foot. So, you know,  
10 I think certainly for me the ARVs are the preferred  
11 choice for armed deployments across London. We're able  
12 to move them around very quickly and they are very  
13 highly trained, trained to a higher level than the armed  
14 officers who were on Operation Hercules.

15 Q. As part of the uplift produced by Operation Hercules,  
16 was there a substantial increase in the level of ARV  
17 activity in the Borough Market area?

18 A. So I've tried to highlight in my statement the sort of  
19 activity around Borough Market. Borough Market fell  
20 within protective security patrol 4, which was a very  
21 large geographical area, so it did benefit from having  
22 armed officers either travelling through or in that area  
23 at times.

24 Having said that, the sort of threat assessment and  
25 intelligence, and when considered against the crowded

52

1 places list of locations, it was a benefactor in a way  
 2 of being within protective security patrol 4, so  
 3 therefore, because that had a higher number of tier 1  
 4 and tier 2 locations in it, the officers would have been  
 5 in and around the vicinity of Borough Market to get to  
 6 other locations.

7 Q. To give us an impression, may we have on screen  
 8 {WS5032/19} and can we maximise the plan at the top of  
 9 the page. This is, I think, a plan you have produced to  
 10 show ARV activity in the Borough Market area on 3 June  
 11 between particular times of day?

12 A. Yes, so that's 3 June between 15.40 hours and  
 13 18.22 hours, which just shows you the presence of ARV  
 14 officers in that location.

15 Q. First of all, why were those times chosen for the  
 16 snapshot?

17 A. I mean, they were just taken for an illustrative  
 18 purpose, there was no specific reasoning, and, in fact,  
 19 if you look at appendix 7, there are other maps that  
 20 just pick other times.

21 Q. Yes, we'll have a look at some of them later. But what  
 22 do the points and arrows indicate?

23 A. So the points -- well, the dots represent a particular  
 24 vehicle and its movement through the area. So each one  
 25 of the colours, and you can see that they've not

53

1 necessarily taken all of the colours, they've just taken  
 2 specific vehicles, just for illustrative purposes, so  
 3 there there are five vehicles on the left-hand side that  
 4 are highlighted and then you can see their movement  
 5 through that particular area.

6 Q. We can take that off the screen now.  
 7 Between 20 August 2016 and 21 March 2017, I think  
 8 you have recorded that that area received 306 taskings  
 9 from mobile armed patrols?

10 A. Yes, I was advised of that by our protective security  
 11 department who have looked through the number of  
 12 taskings that were given.

13 Q. What is a tasking for this purpose?

14 A. So a tasking is to have a presence in a particular area,  
 15 and obviously, again, that was in relation to protective  
 16 security patrol 4, which is quite a large geographical  
 17 area, of which Borough Market was within it, and part of  
 18 the tasking for that armed response -- armed response  
 19 vehicles would be to have a presence in that area as  
 20 part of the counter terrorism plan for protective  
 21 security.

22 Q. So quite a lot of standard ARV patrolling going on in  
 23 that area as a result of, particularly, Operation  
 24 Hercules?

25 A. Yes, that's correct, across the whole of PSP4. To have

54

1 a visible presence of armed policing in that area.

2 Q. We have heard that the speed with which armed officers  
 3 reached the scene in this attack, the first ARV arriving  
 4 at the scene at 22.11, about 4 minutes after the attack  
 5 began, and the ARVs arriving where the attackers were  
 6 within 9 or 10 minutes, stopping the attack within 10  
 7 minutes.

8 From your understanding, with your role in CT  
 9 policing and policing generally, what would you say to  
 10 those response times as illustrating the speed with  
 11 which armed police can get to an attack?

12 A. So for me I feel it demonstrates a real positive --  
 13 a real positive in terms of our speed of being able to  
 14 go to an area where an attack is taking place and  
 15 neutralise the threat at that location, and I think if  
 16 we reflect back in history, as you've kindly taken me  
 17 through, actually if we look before Paris, I think we  
 18 would have to question whether or not that would have  
 19 been possible, and the actual investment in increasing  
 20 the number of armed response vehicles across London was  
 21 exactly for this purpose: to ensure a very quick, swift  
 22 response by highly trained, capable officers to  
 23 neutralise a threat, and that's what my colleagues did  
 24 on the day.

25 Also, I think it shows the value of the taskings and

55

1 making sure that we are considering that threat  
 2 assessment, considering the intelligence picture, and  
 3 putting mobile armed patrols in the right locations as  
 4 part of the tasking process.

5 Q. As well as the --

6 A. I mean, I think they -- under very difficult  
 7 circumstances and very tragic circumstances, I think  
 8 they did a tremendous job.

9 Q. In addition to the armed patrolling tactics, was  
 10 a further tactic developed using unarmed officers for  
 11 the purposes of deterrence and immediate response to  
 12 an attack?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. What did that involve, in simple terms?

15 A. So these were high visibility uniformed policing  
 16 patrols, consisting of a sergeant and seven constables,  
 17 and the intention of this was to have a visible presence  
 18 to deter terrorists, to create a hostile environment for  
 19 terrorists to operate in, and provide an immediate but  
 20 unarmed response in the event that there was an attack.

21 These were in addition to local and routine  
 22 policing. I think from a counter terrorism perspective  
 23 in London we very much recognise that there is business  
 24 as usual, and we needed to consider investment of money  
 25 and people to step up and have an additional policing

56

1 presence.  
 2 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much.  
 3 Sir, would that be a convenient moment for the  
 4 mid-morning break?  
 5 THE CHIEF CORONER: It will. We will break there, Mr Hough.  
 6 We will sit again in 15 minutes' time.  
 7 (11.33 am)  
 8 (A short break)  
 9 (11.52 am)  
 10 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.  
 11 MR HOUGH: Thank you, sir.  
 12 We had just been discussing tactics in response to  
 13 marauding terrorist attack. May I now ask you about  
 14 vehicle-as-weapon attacks which you address from page 20  
 15 of your statement.  
 16 First of all, were there a significant number of  
 17 vehicle-as-weapon attacks in the period leading up to  
 18 2017?  
 19 A. So JTAC advised us that the use of vehicle as a weapon  
 20 featured in at least ten attacks by Islamist terrorist  
 21 groups across Western Europe since 2012. So for Western  
 22 Europe, 10, but obviously if we look wider than that,  
 23 which I haven't got the information to hand, that  
 24 actually globally there were more in different parts of  
 25 the world.

57

1 Q. Did most of those also, as in the London Bridge case,  
 2 also involve other weaponry or other attack methods?  
 3 A. Yes, so the majority of these attacks included the use  
 4 of additional attack methodology. On two occasions, the  
 5 vehicles contained gas canisters with the intent to  
 6 create an explosive attack, so quite a wide use in terms  
 7 of the attack that they were intending to carry out.  
 8 Q. So when officers in this case expressed concern about  
 9 the vehicle potentially containing fuel canisters or  
 10 something else which could have an explosive effect,  
 11 that was based on practical experience elsewhere?  
 12 A. An awareness of what was happening in the sort of  
 13 Western Europe and potentially globally.  
 14 Q. Before March 2017 had there been any experience,  
 15 nationally or internationally, of bridges being a focus  
 16 for attacks using a vehicle as a weapon?  
 17 A. So I'm absolutely not aware of bridges being a focus for  
 18 terrorist attacks using marauding terrorist attack  
 19 methodology. I think prior to this, what I would say,  
 20 and something that I saw in my career growing up with  
 21 Northern Ireland-related terrorism, is that bridges had  
 22 previously been targeted in order to destroy or damage  
 23 them as essential infrastructure for the UK.  
 24 Q. Also historically, and using Irish republican terrorism  
 25 as an example, did vehicle-based attacks often use

58

1 explosive devices?  
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 3 Q. Is advice given by the Centre for Protection of National  
 4 Infrastructure concerning protection against  
 5 vehicle-as-weapon attacks?  
 6 A. Yes, there is advice from the CPNI.  
 7 Q. May I now ask you about the National Barrier Asset.  
 8 Some years ago did Sussex Police, in collaboration with  
 9 the CPNI, develop something called the National Barrier  
 10 Asset?  
 11 A. Yes, they did. They developed it around about  
 12 2003/2004, and this was during the sort of party  
 13 conferences that were taking place, taking the  
 14 methodology that I've talked about a vehicle being used  
 15 to bring an explosive device to a particular location.  
 16 So it was developed at the time in relation to those  
 17 party conferences and then has gradually expanded over  
 18 the years.  
 19 Q. I think it came under the aegis of counter terrorism  
 20 policing last year; is that right?  
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 22 Q. What is the asset, physically?  
 23 A. So the asset contains various different types of  
 24 barriers, fencing, gates of different specifications and  
 25 materials to meet a range of threat types. It was

59

1 designed and updated by CPNI, who are the engineering  
 2 experts who considered the threat and have developed it  
 3 accordingly.  
 4 It's primarily a mitigation against five different  
 5 types of vehicle-borne improvised explosive device  
 6 methodologies. I can go through them if it's helpful.  
 7 Q. I don't think we need to. It counters a range of  
 8 threats?  
 9 A. It does, yes.  
 10 Q. Is it moved around and installed and stored by a private  
 11 contractor?  
 12 A. It is.  
 13 Q. In summary, can it be used to establish barriers and  
 14 other hostile vehicle mitigation measures in a range of  
 15 environments?  
 16 A. Yes, it can, although it's primarily used around events  
 17 in terms of mitigating the threat of a vehicle being  
 18 driven into a crowded place, which is part of an event.  
 19 Q. Considering vehicle attacks in London more broadly, is  
 20 it right that considerable work has been done in London  
 21 over many years developing hostile vehicle mitigation  
 22 measures against a range of the threats that you have  
 23 described over time?  
 24 A. Yes, that's correct, and there are some temporary  
 25 measures and there are some permanent measures that are

60

1 in place around London.

2 Q. And when you and others speak of hostile vehicle  
3 mitigation, once again, are you referring to things  
4 other than physical barriers? Are you also referring to  
5 systems, processes, the use of people as mitigation?

6 A. Yes, I mean there's a sort of systems approach to  
7 dealing with hostile vehicles, but primarily the sort of  
8 main deterrent is a barrier.

9 Q. Now, we have heard that there was a major attack in Nice  
10 for the Bastille Day celebrations of July 2016 which  
11 used a truck to mow down many people. Following that  
12 attack, was there a meeting involving a range of  
13 participants, including the Metropolitan Police Service,  
14 to look at how to counter that sort of attack?

15 A. Yes, there was. There was a cross-industry meeting that  
16 took place on 22 July 2016, and this was to scope the  
17 risk from the vehicle as a weapon.

18 There were -- a number of our industry partners were  
19 present because, you know, it is a partnership in terms  
20 of dealing with this threat and creating a hostile  
21 environment. The Road Haulage Association were present,  
22 Transport for London, the Confederation of Passenger  
23 Transport, freight transport associations and a number  
24 of other people which also included the UK rental sector  
25 and our own roads and transport policing command.

61

1 Q. Was there a particular focus to the discussions and the  
2 recommendations flowing from that meeting?

3 A. Yes. So the initial meeting was very much a focus with  
4 industry representatives looking at the scale of the  
5 threat from heavy vehicles, and it didn't really  
6 consider smaller vehicles as the focus because obviously  
7 of what we'd seen in Nice.

8 Q. In the course of those meetings was there consideration  
9 given to the use of other vehicles, other forms of  
10 vehicles, to inflict mass casualties other than heavy  
11 goods vehicles?

12 A. No, the meeting primarily focused on the threat from  
13 heavy vehicles.

14 Q. Did that then lead to energy being directed to efforts  
15 preventing terrorists acquiring such vehicles which are  
16 naturally not easily or cheaply acquired?

17 A. It did and it required sort of close work with  
18 government in terms of looking at policies and also with  
19 the rental car industry and other parts of the sort of  
20 road haulage that were available. I suppose the bit for  
21 me was the inescapable conclusion was that heavy  
22 vehicles were freely available and therefore that the  
23 success of an attack by such a vehicle would depend on  
24 the availability of a target and any mitigation around  
25 it.

62

1 So obviously following on from that, that's when  
2 we've seen certainly more in terms of the deployment of  
3 the National Barrier Asset, at a lot of the events that  
4 take place around London that people will be familiar  
5 with, such as London Marathon, certainly I was a gold  
6 commander for New Year's Eve following that and we had  
7 an extensive barrier plan put in place, developed on the  
8 one that was already there and expanded it even further,  
9 and certainly something that we're very guided by are  
10 CTSA's in terms of how to structure that and limit the  
11 opportunity for somebody to carry out such an attack.

12 Q. Now, of course, the Bastille Day attack in Nice was  
13 an attack on an event in which large numbers of people  
14 had gathered, using a very large vehicle to inflict a  
15 large number of casualties on a crowd which had gathered  
16 for a special event. Was that the sort of attack that  
17 was being focused upon preventing at that time?

18 A. Yes, that's correct. I mean, we were very obviously  
19 alive to the fact that 86 people tragically died in  
20 Paris, so how we could reduce the opportunity for  
21 terrorists to conduct a similar attack here in the UK at  
22 similar large-scale high-profile global events.

23 Q. Then in December 2016 there was an attack on a Christmas  
24 market in Berlin using a heavy vehicle. How was that  
25 attack viewed and responded to at the time?

63

1 A. So very similar, you know, again, the Christmas market  
2 is an event, so it continued with our focus on looking  
3 at events. For London, and certainly nationally, there  
4 was a requirement for people to continue to engage with  
5 Christmas markets that were taking place across the UK,  
6 and certainly you will have seen that engagement  
7 activity taking place across London.

8 Many of those are private events and the National  
9 Barrier Asset is available for the private sector to  
10 rent in order to add protective security measures but,  
11 again, there's nothing in legislation that requires them  
12 to do that or consider it, it is something that is  
13 discretionary and it's not mandatory.

14 Q. The Westminster attack then came on 22 March 2017, and  
15 that, we know, involved a significantly smaller vehicle  
16 than an HGV. Did that have any effect on your thinking  
17 and the thinking of your strategic partners about  
18 vehicle-as-weapon attacks?

19 A. I mean, there was no significant difference to our  
20 thinking, you know, we were aware it's a possibility  
21 and, again, working towards the threat assessment and  
22 the intelligence picture to focus our efforts around  
23 protective security. As I've said earlier it was never  
24 seen that the bridge was the target: it was a roadway  
25 that was used to get to a location to create the attack

64

1 that they did.

2 Q. Was a concern raised, was the concern raised, that this

3 might inspire other attacks with smaller vehicles, so

4 less ambitious than an attack using a heavy goods

5 vehicle, but still capable of causing multiple

6 fatalities?

7 A. I mean, there is -- we're always cognisant of the fact

8 of a copycat, but there was nothing -- you know, nothing

9 to that attack that made us raise our concern

10 significantly about a copycat attack. In fact, our

11 focus at that time in terms of the threat assessment and

12 the intelligence picture was around the interest in

13 government locations and sites and also police officers,

14 and you will see from the earlier slide in terms of the

15 disrupted plots actually some of those, that's what the

16 targets -- that's what the target focus was.

17 Q. As we'll see later this week with Mr Hone, some of the

18 points that he made about London Bridge were that

19 a bridge of that kind may be exceptionally busy,

20 particularly at rush hour times, but especially where

21 the bridge is a crossing point from, for example, a busy

22 station into the city area. So, for example,

23 London Bridge or Waterloo Bridge.

24 Was any thought given after the attack on

25 Westminster Bridge that bridges might be exceptionally

65

1 busy at particular times of day with long, broad,

2 relatively unobstructed pavements, and limited escape

3 routes?

4 A. So no more so than at other locations that would fit

5 that definition across London. You know, I could

6 transpose that definition to other locations that

7 I'm aware of, so there is always a consideration.

8 I suppose the difficulty for everybody is there is

9 a need to prioritise where we put our focus in terms of

10 protective security, and I would go back to looking at

11 what the threat assessment is telling us and the

12 intelligence which, again, at that time was around the

13 sort of government focus of terrorists on government and

14 also on police officers.

15 Q. During all those meetings, was anybody saying to you

16 bridges may be particularly attractive or vulnerable or

17 exposed to mass casualties?

18 A. No.

19 Q. As I say, we'll hear that Mr Hone did give some comments

20 within his force, the City of London Police, about

21 London Bridge being heavily congested at rush hour and

22 attractive to terrorists because of its broad pavement

23 and relatively unobstructed access to that pavement.

24 If those sorts of points had been made to you about

25 London Bridge or any other bridge, would they have

66

1 resonated with you at that time before the second bridge

2 attack, the London Bridge attack?

3 A. So I think I touched on this earlier. I mean, it's very

4 difficult because we can't protect everywhere all of the

5 time, and, you know, obviously we very much value the

6 views and opinions of the CTSA's, but we do have to

7 prioritise where our focus is.

8 So I would understand the points that he was making.

9 Whether or not -- it's a very hypothetical question, but

10 whether or not that would lead to the installation of

11 measures, I can't really comment on that because I would

12 consider it against everything else, the threat

13 assessment and the intelligence picture, and if you look

14 at the intensity of the attack planning that was taking

15 place throughout 2017 and where the focus was,

16 I certainly would be drawn to other areas as a priority.

17 Q. We have to consider that broader piece with all the

18 disrupted attack plots you were telling us about

19 earlier?

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. Now, we'll hear that in London there had been for some

22 years before the London Bridge attack a programme of

23 removing barriers from some roadways because they

24 increased risks to pedestrians, so a pedestrian might be

25 more at risk because they might tend to walk out into

67

1 the roadway side rather than on the pavement. We'll

2 hear that that programme had resulted in London Bridge

3 having barriers removed some years before the attack,

4 pedestrian barriers, obviously, rather than barriers

5 against terrorist attacks.

6 Had you been aware before June 2017 of that

7 programme of removing barriers across the capital?

8 A. I wasn't aware of it, no.

9 Q. Had you been aware that there had been a programme of

10 removing barriers for pedestrian safety reasons, and

11 bearing in mind the increased number of

12 vehicle-as-weapon attacks, would you have considered

13 some sort of review to determine whether that pedestrian

14 safety programme left some major roadways relatively

15 unprotected?

16 A. I mean, I've reflected on this quite a lot and, you

17 know, hindsight is a really difficult area to get into.

18 I suppose for me there was clearly a lot of academic

19 research around why they are decluttering the landscape

20 in terms of traffic casualties, collisions, and it's

21 balancing that against another thematic area, which is

22 around counter terrorism, and both -- you know, there's

23 strengths and weaknesses on both sides.

24 So I think probably a learning is to make sure that

25 there is real synergy when we are all discussing

68

1 strategies to make sure they do co-join at some point,  
 2 would be my reflection for the future, but I suspect  
 3 there is a lot of academic research showing the benefit  
 4 of decluttering the sort of streetscape in terms of  
 5 preventing death from road traffic collisions .  
 6 Q. We'll hear later this week that consideration was given  
 7 and the view was taken that lives were saved because of  
 8 the removal of pedestrian barriers .  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Lives being saved from traffic casualties . But would  
 11 you accept this : given that that programme had been in  
 12 place, it would have been a good idea for anyone aware  
 13 of it to consider whether that programme had left  
 14 certain areas more exposed than they should have been  
 15 and, therefore, more vulnerable to vehicle attacks?  
 16 A. I mean, there's -- any decision potentially always has  
 17 a collateral impact somewhere else, and I think it's  
 18 important that we do think through those to see whether  
 19 it is having an impact somewhere else, so yes.  
 20 Q. Since the attack, and obviously to the extent you can  
 21 say, has there been any consideration given to whether  
 22 the removal of barriers in that perfectly understandable  
 23 programme has left some places exposed?  
 24 A. I'm not personally aware of anything, no.  
 25 Q. Do you consider from your perspective, as the lead for

69

1 protective security, that it would be a good idea to  
 2 carry out such a review in the future?  
 3 A. So I think it's important that we look at the threat  
 4 assessment and what the intelligence is telling us and  
 5 consider the protective security based in those areas,  
 6 and if there is a conflict in those areas, then I would  
 7 say yes, we should have a review.  
 8 Q. Can I move on to the --  
 9 A. Could I say one other thing on that as well.  
 10 Q. Yes, of course.  
 11 A. So if you remember earlier, I talked about CPNI setting  
 12 the standards for it, so just because these are barriers  
 13 for delivering safety around road traffic collisions  
 14 doesn't mean to say that they serve the purpose of  
 15 stopping a hostile vehicle. So we have to be cautious  
 16 that we don't just see a barrier and think that that's  
 17 going to stop a vehicle, because sometimes that's not  
 18 the case.  
 19 Q. No. Would you accept this also as a factor in the  
 20 balance: that a barrier which may not be physically  
 21 capable of stopping a vehicle, a heavy vehicle driven at  
 22 full speed, may nevertheless deter an attack taking  
 23 place by somebody driving the vehicle who may not know  
 24 the physical characteristics of the barrier?  
 25 A. I absolutely agree with you on that, and I think we see

70

1 that widely across London.  
 2 Q. May we turn, then, to actions taken since the  
 3 London Bridge attack to counteract vehicle-as-weapon  
 4 attacks .  
 5 On 4 June 2017 did you chair a meeting of the  
 6 Emergency Security Review Committee in order to consider  
 7 the attack and immediate actions?  
 8 A. Yes, I did.  
 9 Q. Did you set two particularly relevant actions in that  
 10 meeting?  
 11 A. I did, yes.  
 12 Q. If we can look at them on screen, {WS5032/22}, the  
 13 bottom of the page, can we see a first action requiring:  
 14 "... regions and P&P leads to review where they  
 15 stand from a protective security standpoint around their  
 16 publicly accessible crowded places (now ten to be  
 17 identified for each region). If there are gaps around  
 18 protective security what are the short term measures  
 19 that can be implemented?"  
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 21 Q. And over the page, please, a second action {WS5032/23}:  
 22 "... regions and [local] leads to identify their  
 23 iconic bridges ... that are, or have the potential to  
 24 be, crowded places and review their current protective  
 25 security measures ..."

71

1 And then identify short, medium and long-term  
 2 actions?  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 4 Q. We can take that off screen.  
 5 Later that day did you make a particular decision in  
 6 relation to London bridges?  
 7 A. Yes, although the decision was relevant to outside of  
 8 London as well where there was one bridge outside of  
 9 London, but I made the decision to install hostile  
 10 vehicle mitigation on eight London bridges.  
 11 Q. At that stage, beyond the attack that happened, was  
 12 there any particular intelligence of further threats to  
 13 bridges?  
 14 A. No.  
 15 Q. It may be obvious but why, in simple terms, did you  
 16 decide to install barriers on those eight London bridges  
 17 and one bridge outside London?  
 18 A. So I made the decision based on the fact that the attack  
 19 methodology that had been used on Westminster Bridge had  
 20 been copied on 3 June on London Bridge. I was  
 21 absolutely not aware of any intelligence or a threat  
 22 assessment that said that bridges were at risk or being  
 23 considered in live operations as attack methodology.  
 24 However, it really was my view that there needed to  
 25 be a deterrent following a second bridge being used in

72

1 a terror attack, and for me, morally, it felt absolutely  
 2 the right thing to do.  
 3 Q. How quickly were those barriers installed?  
 4 A. So the barriers -- the installation of the barriers took  
 5 six days in terms of them being physically in position.  
 6 There was then a couple of weeks of additional activity,  
 7 which was more of a refinement process.  
 8 Q. Where did the barriers come from? Were they part of the  
 9 National Barrier Asset or were they separately procured?  
 10 A. The National Barrier Asset.  
 11 Q. Were there any particular challenges you can tell us  
 12 about with the installation of those barriers on  
 13 London Bridge and other bridges?  
 14 A. So I'm sure everybody can appreciate there are a huge  
 15 amount of engineering challenges in relation to  
 16 installing them on the bridges, which would be  
 17 inappropriate for me to share that, but yes, it was very  
 18 challenging and the work that was undertaken by  
 19 everybody involved in that, the engineers and all of the  
 20 experts, was highly commendable.  
 21 Q. So although it was a swift process, it was not an easy  
 22 one without its technical complexities?  
 23 A. Absolutely not, and it required people to work 24/7.  
 24 Q. If a decision had been made to install barriers on  
 25 London Bridge or another bridge at an earlier stage, is

73

1 there any particular reason why it couldn't have been  
 2 done with similar speed?  
 3 A. So, again, I think this is a really tricky question. At  
 4 the time that I made my decision we were in a -- in the  
 5 UK we were on our third terror attack, so in a way,  
 6 cutting through the red tape is much easier in extremis,  
 7 and I know there are a lot of complexities in terms of  
 8 the ownership of the bridges, the funding of it in terms  
 9 of the barriers being put in place.  
 10 So I think it's really difficult for me to say -- so  
 11 if you removed all of those -- arguably the things that  
 12 prevent us in down time from putting barriers in  
 13 bridges, then yes, it is easy to put it in quickly, but  
 14 actually when we're not in extremis there are a lot of  
 15 other factors that make it very complicated to put the  
 16 bridges in and, you know, we're here in 2019 and we  
 17 still haven't got permanent measures in on the bridges,  
 18 which I think amplifies the complexity of it.  
 19 Q. So before the London Bridge attack, without the  
 20 intelligence of a threat to bridges and without the  
 21 repeat attack having happened, if there had been  
 22 a suggestion of installing barriers on bridges, is it  
 23 perfectly feasible that the owners would have been  
 24 resistant or hesitant to the idea of temporary barriers,  
 25 which may increase road traffic casualties, which had

74

1 considerable engineering challenges, and which weren't  
 2 in sympathy with the streetscape?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Now, can I move on to protective security at  
 5 Borough Market and engagement with Borough Market.  
 6 You've told us that Borough Market was a tier 3 crowded  
 7 place site. Are you able to say why it didn't fall into  
 8 tier 2, which as you've told us was a category  
 9 encompassing places with a profile above local?  
 10 A. So there were two reasons that Borough Market didn't  
 11 fall into the crowded places. One, it didn't meet the  
 12 crowd density requirement, and just for clarity, I have  
 13 myself gone through the matrix and put Borough Market  
 14 through the matrix and I can understand the reasons why  
 15 it didn't meet the tiering. So it was two reasons: it  
 16 didn't meet the crowd density, and one of the other  
 17 areas that I talked about earlier was having a clear  
 18 ownership and a clearly defined area that it was.  
 19 So it's more lended, as the Crowded Places Model  
 20 talked about, in terms of being a place, in terms of,  
 21 you know, a cinema or shopping centre, whereas this is  
 22 a multitude -- you know, the ownership in there is  
 23 complex.  
 24 Q. You said the ownership was complex, we know that  
 25 premises in Borough Market were and are owned by a range

75

1 of places, including the Borough Market Charitable  
 2 Trust, the local authority, Transport for London, and  
 3 private owners and so on; is that right?  
 4 A. That's correct.  
 5 Q. As part of its Protect work, does the local police  
 6 engage with all of those owners to advise about  
 7 protective security?  
 8 A. Yes, they do. So part of -- by being in the tier 3  
 9 category, obviously there is engagement through the  
 10 focus desk. They're able to deal with the owners  
 11 individually or as we have seen through the history in  
 12 the appendix, actually there are coordinators who bring  
 13 together all of the people who operate in that area to  
 14 get protective security advice.  
 15 Q. By referring to the focus desk's Protect plan, were you  
 16 able to identify a number of locations significant to  
 17 these Inquests where the local police had provided  
 18 specific counter terrorism Protect advice?  
 19 A. Yes, I was. So those locations were Boro Bistro  
 20 restaurant, Brindisa restaurant, Southwark Tavern pub,  
 21 Wheatsheaf pub, Elliot's Café, Black & Blue restaurant  
 22 and Barrow Boy & Banker pub.  
 23 Q. As well as the formal engagement with particular sites,  
 24 was there also some police engagement in the form of  
 25 patrolling counter terrorist officers simply having

76

1 discussions with business owners as they went about  
 2 their duties?  
 3 A. Yes, absolutely. Part of the patrols which, as I say,  
 4 Borough Market was in PSP4, is around putting officers  
 5 into that area for them to have engagement with the  
 6 local community in that area and provide advice.  
 7 Q. Were there also periodic counter terrorism policing  
 8 events coordinated locally?  
 9 A. Yes, there were, and there are two types of event, one  
 10 is Project Argus and the other is Project Griffin, and  
 11 these latterly have been replaced through our Action  
 12 Counters Terrorism projects, but in effect,  
 13 Project Argus is a three-hour engagement with managers  
 14 and decision-makers at certain properties, again in  
 15 businesses with a sort of view that that will be  
 16 cascaded downwards and there will be amplification of  
 17 the advice.  
 18 Project Griffin is more targeted at front-of-house  
 19 staff and again is over a couple of hours, is  
 20 an engagement activity, and we've seen recently some of  
 21 our learning was to get the reach broader, we needed to  
 22 take that into an online product which in relation to  
 23 Project Griffin now is an online product that businesses  
 24 can sign up for and push that out across all of their  
 25 personnel.

77

1 Q. May I ask you about specific engagement and advice that  
 2 followed some of the attacks prior to the London Bridge  
 3 attack. First of all, the Paris attacks of 2015, after  
 4 those was a tasking sent out to counter terrorist focus  
 5 groups to identify significant French locations on their  
 6 boroughs?  
 7 A. Yes. So this was sent to the focus desks, of which  
 8 there is one -- there was one officer on every borough  
 9 across London, and this was around identifying  
 10 significant French locations on their boroughs and  
 11 having engagement with them. So there are a number of  
 12 them across London. Some the engagement was, you know,  
 13 higher, so some of the French schools, some of the  
 14 French government properties, but at Borough Market  
 15 location, Boro Bistro and La Cave restaurant and wine  
 16 bar and a French fruit and vegetable retailer were  
 17 identified and there was engagement. Some of that was  
 18 about reassurance as much as engagement.  
 19 Q. Following the Nice attack in July 2016, was there any  
 20 particular advice or engagement with businesses in the  
 21 Borough Market area?  
 22 A. So I can't find anything specific in terms of engagement  
 23 about the attack with Borough Market following Nice, but  
 24 there was a substantial level of general engagement  
 25 throughout the year of 2016, an example being

78

1 an engagement event at Borough Market which resulted in  
 2 571 person-to-person engagements being undertaken.  
 3 But I suppose I would come back to the point that  
 4 our engagement following Nice was very much around  
 5 protecting large-scale events from a vehicle-borne  
 6 attack.  
 7 Q. I think there was a large-scale event with that many  
 8 engagements on 2 September 2016?  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. The Berlin attack in December 2016 of course involved  
 11 a market, although it was a seasonal market. Were there  
 12 any particular efforts made to engage with  
 13 Borough Market as a market location after that attack?  
 14 A. Yes. So in my appendix 4 there are a number of entries  
 15 on the Protect plan, dated 20 December. What I would  
 16 say is the engagement around markets -- Christmas  
 17 markets started way before that. We see Winter  
 18 Wonderland starts at the beginning of November so we do  
 19 have engagement really at the start of the autumn.  
 20 As a result of the Berlin market attack, the  
 21 activity I can find in relation to Borough Market, it  
 22 was included in the taskings. There was an assessment  
 23 of the hostile vehicle mitigation needs was considered  
 24 in collaboration with the CTSA, and contact was made  
 25 with the market manager on 19 December, and also the

79

1 counter terrorism focus desk was requested to re-engage  
 2 with Borough Market regarding placement of some hostile  
 3 vehicle mitigation that they had placed in the area.  
 4 Q. After those meetings -- after that set of entries, were  
 5 there further visits to the market over the following  
 6 days to provide additional counter terrorism awareness?  
 7 A. Yes, there were.  
 8 Q. Did those involve, for example, on 29 December a meeting  
 9 of the local counter terrorism security advisor and  
 10 others with market management and a walk-through of the  
 11 market to discuss security and in particular hostile  
 12 vehicle mitigation?  
 13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 14 Q. In early 2017, were there also discussions between the  
 15 counter terrorism focus desk officer and the local  
 16 authority about possible installation of hostile vehicle  
 17 mitigation measures in Stoney Street?  
 18 A. Yes. So in early 2017 there are several entries on the  
 19 plan which indicate that vulnerabilities had been  
 20 identified in a number of areas, which was  
 21 Stoney Street, and that related to the hostile vehicle  
 22 mitigation.  
 23 There was no hostile vehicle mitigation to  
 24 an accredited standard at Stoney Street prior to 3 June.  
 25 Q. Was there some further investigation of possible

80

1 installation of such measures?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. In the end, of course, Stoney Street was not an area  
 4 attacked by a vehicle. There were many other streets in  
 5 the area which would have had a comparable profile to  
 6 Stoney Street; is that right?  
 7 A. That's correct.  
 8 Q. Moving on to the Westminster Bridge attack and the  
 9 Manchester attack that followed, so in March and  
 10 then May 2017, was there any specific engagement with  
 11 Borough Market businesses after and relating to those  
 12 incidents?  
 13 A. So I mean there was continuous engagement with the  
 14 market, but I can't see any engagement specific to the  
 15 taskings originating from either the Westminster Bridge  
 16 or the Manchester Arena attacks, but there is just  
 17 generally a substantial amount of engagement around that  
 18 period and a lot of that was in relation to specific  
 19 awareness and potential for testing in that area.  
 20 Q. If we look on screen at {WS5032/28}, have you listed  
 21 here a series of dates from after the Westminster Bridge  
 22 attack to before the London Bridge and Borough Market  
 23 attack, the various presentations, communications and  
 24 reviews carried out in relation to Borough Market  
 25 specifically by counter terrorist officers?

81

1 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 2 Q. So a number of such events every month, and in fact,  
 3 increasing over the course of the month of May?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct, and you'll see at the bottom of --  
 5 in paragraph 121, that on 30 May there was  
 6 a Project Argus exercise which is the three-hour  
 7 exercise with decision-makers and there were 58 people  
 8 in attendance from the market and local businesses.  
 9 This was intended to be linked into a practical  
 10 evacuation and test of the market in July 2017, but  
 11 obviously due to the subsequent attack this did not take  
 12 place.  
 13 Q. And you have told us about the level of ARV traffic in  
 14 the Borough Market area in the late afternoon before the  
 15 attack. May I ask you about the level of counter  
 16 terrorist policing in the area of Borough Market and its  
 17 environs before 3 June. For this purpose may we have on  
 18 screen the next page, {WS5032/29}.  
 19 If we maximise the table, does this table show us  
 20 the deployments of various types of counter terrorist  
 21 officer in the Borough Market area and for 500 metres  
 22 around?  
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 24 Q. So do we see armed foot patrols in that area for the  
 25 entire six-day period leading up to the day of the

82

1 attack?  
 2 A. Yes, so there's three categories of officers who are  
 3 deployed into that area. One is the core protective  
 4 security patrols and the uplifted protective security  
 5 patrols, so they are unarmed police officers, that's the  
 6 high-visibility policing deterrent that I talked about  
 7 earlier.  
 8 Then you've got the armed mobile patrol in PSP4. So  
 9 this would be the Hercules officers and potentially some  
 10 ARV officers, but predominantly the Hercules officers,  
 11 and then the armed foot patrol in and around that area.  
 12 Q. I think at paragraph 124 you have identified the  
 13 particular patrol times on 3 June; can you help us with  
 14 those?  
 15 A. Yes, so on 3 June there was a serial of officers, which  
 16 is a sergeant and seven officers, assigned to patrol  
 17 PSP4 from 7 o'clock in the morning until 3 o'clock in  
 18 the afternoon. There was a mobile armed patrol covering  
 19 the 24-hour period from 7 o'clock in the morning to  
 20 7 o'clock the following morning, and an armed foot  
 21 patrol at a nearby location.  
 22 So the armed foot patrol wasn't necessarily for  
 23 Borough Market; that's within the agreed parameters that  
 24 were in place for armed foot patrols within PSP4. And  
 25 there's also a review that shows armed response vehicles

83

1 patrolling the market and its environs from 11 o'clock  
 2 on 2 June to 10 o'clock on 3 June.  
 3 Q. Yes, we can look at that if we go to {WS5032/47} of the  
 4 same document. Do you record here that there were five  
 5 armed response vehicles patrolling the area of  
 6 Borough Market and its environs between 3.00 pm and  
 7 10.00 pm on 3 June, the day of the attack?  
 8 A. Yes, so I mean there's a lot of data around sort of  
 9 patrolling officers and armed response vehicles. These  
 10 are just some snapshots of particular units at that  
 11 particular location, but, yes, it does show that there  
 12 are armed response vehicles that patrolled that area.  
 13 Q. If we, on the large screens, can scroll down to show all  
 14 three maps, please.  
 15 And in addition to all of those specifically counter  
 16 terrorist deployments, would there also be patrols of  
 17 local beat officers from the Metropolitan Police?  
 18 A. Yes, so there would be local officers on patrol in and  
 19 around that area dealing with business as usual.  
 20 Q. And as well some footfall of British Transport Police  
 21 and City of London Police officers?  
 22 A. That's correct, due to the proximity of the station,  
 23 there's definitely a presence of  
 24 British Transport Police and obviously its proximity to  
 25 the City of London.

84

1 Q. You also deal from page 30 of your witness statement on  
 2 general public safety awareness about protective  
 3 security and terrorism. I can deal with this relatively  
 4 briefly. Is it right to say in general terms that  
 5 counter terrorist police also have awareness campaigns  
 6 for the general public to give them advice about  
 7 protective security and terrorist attacks?  
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 9 Q. Do those include the Action Counters Terrorism or ACT  
 10 campaign, launched in March 2017, encouraging reports to  
 11 the Anti-Terrorist Hotline?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Do they also contain -- include safety advice for  
 14 firearms and weapons attacks known as Run, Hide, Tell?  
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 16 Q. I think both of those campaigns have involved films  
 17 being developed which have had a wide circulation?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. And specific advice products I think have been developed  
 20 after particular attacks; is that right?  
 21 A. Yes, that's correct, although they were under  
 22 consideration way before the attacks, and I suppose  
 23 a really significant one was for our campaign which  
 24 reached out to young people, so we did develop -- for  
 25 inclusion in schools we did develop an interactive

85

1 exercise that schools can do which was really the first  
 2 of its kind in the United Kingdom to start reaching out  
 3 to a younger audience, and I suppose what's behind all  
 4 of it is that if, to, you know, make the UK a hostile  
 5 environment for terrorists to operate in, whilst it's  
 6 absolutely a responsibility for policing and government  
 7 and other agencies, we also want to encourage the public  
 8 to play their part in reporting suspicious activity and  
 9 creating that hostile space, and also so that they can  
 10 be as safe as they possibly can be in the event that  
 11 they were to find themselves in a terrorist attack.  
 12 Q. Finally, may I ask you for some reflections on the  
 13 attack and all the work you have done in looking at it.  
 14 From your position, what are the most significant  
 15 pieces of learning that have been derived and steps  
 16 taken since the attack to minimise the risk or  
 17 seriousness of such attacks in future?  
 18 A. So we have conducted a review of the Crowded Places  
 19 Model. I think that that was really important to do  
 20 that, and we've been working closely with the government  
 21 to review that.  
 22 We are waiting to move to that new model and we felt  
 23 it prudent to wait until after the Inquest to see if  
 24 there was any further learning that came out, and  
 25 I think for me the crowded places needs to very much

86

1 expand into being spaces as much as places, as we have  
 2 seen the involvement of different attack methodology,  
 3 and particularly for me with that crowded places and  
 4 spaces model, it needs to have the agility to change  
 5 quite quickly to respond to a changing threat picture  
 6 and intelligence.

7 Also, we have amplified our work with the private  
 8 sector, so we have significantly engaged now with the  
 9 private sector. We have a number of representatives  
 10 from different sectors of the commercial world who are  
 11 now vetted to a higher level so that we can share  
 12 information and intelligence with them to understand  
 13 what it is we need to share with them in order for them  
 14 to make important decisions around protective security.

15 I think the other bit for me that does resonate is  
 16 very much the absence of legislation and regulations  
 17 around protective security. It is still very much  
 18 discretionary activity by everybody, and I want that  
 19 queue of people outside a venue to feel as safe as the  
 20 people who have gone through a security regime to get in  
 21 there, so I very much welcome the review that the  
 22 government are doing around legislation because I think  
 23 it's somewhere we need to move forward in and think  
 24 about how we put a requirement on people to consider  
 25 protective security, both in the public sector and in

87

1 the commercial sector.

2 Q. You said at the start of that answer that there was  
 3 a value in extending the crowded places regime to look  
 4 at spaces beyond places. Is that a recognition that the  
 5 crowded places regime originally focused on quite  
 6 geographically-defined locations like buildings or  
 7 particular installations?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And that these attacks have highlighted the need to look  
 10 at spaces like roadways or open spaces to a greater  
 11 extent and provide more advice in relation to those?

12 A. So I think we should not be constraining ourselves by  
 13 that sort of geographic location and the presence of  
 14 a single owner of a particular site, and we have had two  
 15 test locations within the UK where we are trialling  
 16 a different way of looking at protective security,  
 17 particularly, I suppose, in areas like Borough Market  
 18 where there is no one single owner, there are a lot of  
 19 operators within a space, and how we can sort of bring  
 20 that together to make sure that there is strong  
 21 protective security advice, strong engagement.

22 But ultimately this is a discretionary activity that  
 23 it is the choice of those operators to put it in or not.

24 Q. We all appreciate that barriers can't be installed  
 25 everywhere and that it's impossible to armour-plate

88

1 every street in the capital or the wider country, but  
 2 one of the striking features of the Cerastes work is  
 3 that when that company put itself into the shoes of  
 4 terrorists, they were able to identify a location as  
 5 vulnerable, and a particular attack method with what  
 6 proved to be quite a degree of prescience.

7 Is there any value in having people like that,  
 8 operatives like that, reviewing areas in the capital to  
 9 help inform you as part of the wider process about where  
 10 to devote resources and implement barriers and the like?

11 A. So I always think there's value in experts applying  
 12 themselves to think about how terrorists would operate  
 13 at a particular location. I think what's important for  
 14 me is the training and the accreditation of those  
 15 individuals because if you are looking to procure  
 16 somebody to do that you need to be absolutely confident  
 17 of their credentials and their training as to whether or  
 18 not they are the right people to be delivering that. So  
 19 yes, there is value, but it has to be the right people  
 20 to deliver that.

21 And also, as I've said, unfortunately, commercial  
 22 sector operators who provide that advice are not  
 23 cognisant of the threat picture and the intelligence  
 24 picture and I think you could conduct that report on any  
 25 location across London through the eyes of a terrorist.

89

1 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Those are all my questions.  
 2 There will be some others.

3 A. Thank you.

4 Questions by MR PATTERSON QC

5 MR PATTERSON: Officer, I ask questions on behalf of the  
 6 families of the six of those who were killed --

7 A. Sorry, I can't quite hear you.

8 Q. I ask questions on behalf of the families of six of  
 9 those who were killed in the attacks, and that includes  
 10 Christine Archibald who, as you know, was one of the two  
 11 who was killed on the bridge.

12 You are senior national coordinator for protective  
 13 security, you told us?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And that includes not just a role within London, but  
 16 a national role; is that correct?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. You rightly drew attention to the lessons that were  
 19 there to be learned from the Nice attack on Bastille  
 20 Day, and the Berlin attack, both of which used vehicles  
 21 targeting and killing large numbers of people; yes?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. And equally, before we get to the Westminster attack,  
 24 you were aware of the propaganda coming out of the  
 25 Middle East and Isis, weren't you: Adnani and his fatwa

90

1 and his exhortations to attack the public in the West?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. And we've heard from a number of witnesses about the  
 4 simplicity of attack that was being advocated, and you  
 5 were aware of that, weren't you?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Lift a knife and go out onto the streets and attack the  
 8 non-believers; that was the sort of message that was  
 9 being propagated, wasn't it?

10 A. That was one of the messages, yes.

11 Q. And the use of vehicles as well?

12 A. Yes, that was correct.

13 Q. And in publications, such as Inspire magazine, and Dabiq  
 14 magazine, publications which the police sadly have had  
 15 to deal with for many years, there have been references  
 16 to using vehicles against the public, haven't there?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. One of them speaks to a particular vehicle which would  
 19 make a good "mowing machine", a horrific choice of verb;  
 20 would you agree?

21 A. It did refer to a "mowing machine", yes.

22 Q. And other such references, more than once, appear in  
 23 those sorts of magazines, don't they, about using  
 24 vehicles to target the public?

25 A. Yes.

91

1 Q. We will be hearing, I think later today, from another  
 2 officer from the City of London Police, Commander Jane  
 3 Gyford. Do you know Commander Gyford?

4 A. I do, yes.

5 Q. And no doubt in your role as the senior national  
 6 coordinator you have had dealings with her; is that  
 7 right?

8 A. No, not -- I haven't.

9 Q. But has your work as the national coordinator not  
 10 involved you meeting with her or having dealings with  
 11 her?

12 A. No, not specifically with her, so I would more deal with  
 13 the deputy commissioner in the City, so I have had some  
 14 conversations with him and also the City of London  
 15 Police are represented by somebody of a lower rank at  
 16 the Security Review Committee, so that was my  
 17 fortnightly contact with the City, is by their  
 18 representative who comes to my meeting.

19 Q. So regular contact with the City of London Police at  
 20 those SRC meetings?

21 A. Fortnightly at the SRC meeting.

22 Q. And obviously your role in London involves  
 23 geographically you dealing with the City of London,  
 24 albeit part of it as we know is carved out and has City  
 25 of London Police jurisdiction?

92

1 A. So I deal with the Metropolitan Police area in terms of  
 2 my London responsibility, and as part of the regional  
 3 operating model for counter terrorism policing, then  
 4 City of London Police are part of the London region,  
 5 which includes the Metropolitan Police and the City of  
 6 London.  
 7 Q. We know that within the City of London Police there were  
 8 some concerns about vehicles prior to the Westminster  
 9 attack. Were you aware of any of those concerns about  
 10 vehicles?  
 11 A. No.  
 12 Q. Can we see, please, {WS5031/6}, please.  
 13 These are minutes from the City of London Security  
 14 Group from 2 February 2017, and we will hear later today  
 15 from Commander Gyford that these security group meetings  
 16 dealt with what was relevant for Protect and Prepare CT  
 17 activity within that part of London. Presumably minutes  
 18 like this would be fed back to somebody like you with a  
 19 national overview, would they?  
 20 A. No, I don't get minutes on a national level from local  
 21 security group meetings. As I said, I think at the  
 22 beginning, the way that the collaboration agreement is  
 23 is that ownership and responsibility for delivering  
 24 protective security rests with the individual police  
 25 chief constables, and the accountability of that is

93

1 through the police crime commissioners.  
 2 Q. So was anyone from your team attending these meetings,  
 3 or involved in this work that was being carried out by  
 4 the City of London Police?  
 5 A. Not that I'm aware of.  
 6 Q. Do you recognise any of those names, for example?  
 7 A. I think it's only the surnames, if I'm looking at the  
 8 same one. No.  
 9 Q. And if we go, please, to {WS5031/7} the next page,  
 10 discussions took place about the National Barrier Asset,  
 11 which is those temporary barriers that have been  
 12 available for many years that you were telling us about;  
 13 yes?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. And there was a review being undertaken, and over,  
 16 please, onto {WS5031/8}, on 16 March, again in minutes  
 17 from that group, going to {WS5031/9}, please, an officer  
 18 raised -- made comments about vehicles, and we can see  
 19 at 4.6 that Detective Superintendent Shaw -- pausing  
 20 there, do you know that officer?  
 21 A. No.  
 22 Q. He was described on the previous page as being  
 23 a director of intelligence, but he was commenting that  
 24 he feels reassured that the police have now started  
 25 treating vehicle threats seriously. He speaks about

94

1 a recent meeting; can you help us with STRA meetings?  
 2 A. That's the -- a STRA meeting takes place in each  
 3 individual force and it is the Strategic Threat Risk  
 4 Assessment for a force area which then enables a force  
 5 to decide on, for example, the number of armed officers  
 6 that it wants based against what the threat and risk  
 7 assessment is telling them, but that's on a force basis.  
 8 Q. "He said that the public have an expectation that the  
 9 police have all the answers but does not believe that we  
 10 do, as a force. He questioned whether that is  
 11 acceptable and if we should be doing something more  
 12 towards the CT picture. Historically, the NCA..."  
 13 And that's the National Crime Agency?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. "... and SO15..."  
 16 That's counter terrorism police within the  
 17 Metropolitan Police?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. "... have worked around the [marauding terrorist threat]  
 20 and taking guns off the streets but Detective  
 21 Superintendent Shaw said he was not aware that the City  
 22 of London Police had contributed people to it. We do  
 23 such great work with things such as Servator..."  
 24 Which is a project for armed officers and patrolling  
 25 officers within the City of London; is that right?

95

1 A. I can't comment, sir, on what it looks like in the City  
 2 of London, but in the Metropolitan Police area they are  
 3 unarmed police officers who do --  
 4 Q. Unarmed?  
 5 A. Unarmed.  
 6 Q. Mobile patrol, we will be turning to that later, and he  
 7 went on:  
 8 "... but may now need to revisit the potential  
 9 threats from articulated lorries or HGVs which drive  
 10 through [certain] areas..."  
 11 So that was going on with the City of London Police  
 12 before the Westminster attack. Presumably concerns of  
 13 those types were going through your mind in that period  
 14 after Nice and after Berlin?  
 15 A. Yes, so as I've said, in relation to Nice and Berlin,  
 16 they were both seen as attacks on specific events. So  
 17 I can comment for Berlin, certainly I was gold commander  
 18 for New Year's Eve, so again, one of the things that we  
 19 looked at very intensely was re-looking at hostile  
 20 vehicle mitigation around big events with crowded places  
 21 around them with lots of people inside, and it was  
 22 important that we put that ring around an event to stop  
 23 somebody from being able to drive into the people  
 24 attending that event, which we will all see routinely  
 25 now at events across the capital.

96

1 The same was taking place in terms of engagement  
 2 with the Christmas markets. Again, some of those are  
 3 private, commercially operated, and again, the National  
 4 Barrier Asset was available to them if they wanted to  
 5 consider hiring the National Barrier Asset.  
 6 Q. Now, you told us that the approach in relation to  
 7 protecting the public in crowded places had been revised  
 8 in about 2014?  
 9 A. Correct.  
 10 Q. Why was it that Westminster Bridge -- and I'll come in  
 11 a moment to London Bridge -- but why was it that  
 12 Westminster Bridge wasn't even featuring on that list of  
 13 many, many crowded places?  
 14 A. Because it didn't meet the two criteria that I gave  
 15 evidence is a requirement for it to even be considered  
 16 as a crowded place.  
 17 Q. So on any straightforward understanding of the words  
 18 "crowded place", you would agree that it had huge  
 19 numbers of people on it at varying times of the day;  
 20 yes?  
 21 A. So the public interpretation and a layman's  
 22 interpretation of crowded place and density is different  
 23 to the consideration for the Crowded Places Model.  
 24 Q. Yes. But dealing with the ordinary meaning of the words  
 25 "density of people", it ticked that box, didn't it?

97

1 A. So in terms of the Crowded Places Model, it did not fit  
 2 the crowd density requirement.  
 3 Q. What, because the huge number of commuters crisscrossing  
 4 that bridge or pausing to take photographs didn't have  
 5 sufficient density to require protection?  
 6 A. No, so I'm talking about protective security, so in  
 7 terms of the definition of crowd density, there were  
 8 five illustrative diagrams which in the interests of  
 9 national security wouldn't be appropriate to share. You  
 10 had to meet a certain criteria and it didn't feature in  
 11 terms of the criteria of crowd density, and having  
 12 looked at the guidance, I'm confident that it did not  
 13 meet that criteria.  
 14 Q. And despite all the other features of it, an iconic  
 15 place, right next to the Palace of Westminster,  
 16 a tourist attraction, despite all of those features, it  
 17 didn't feature in protective security arrangements; is  
 18 that right?  
 19 A. It didn't feature in the Crowded Places Model because it  
 20 didn't meet the criteria.  
 21 Q. And then London Bridge, did London Bridge feature in the  
 22 crowded places list?  
 23 A. I can't comment on that because London Bridge wasn't  
 24 part of the Metropolitan Police, so you would require  
 25 a different witness to answer whether it was on their

98

1 crowded places list.  
 2 Q. So you don't know today the answer to that; is that  
 3 right?  
 4 A. No, so I can only talk about our crowded places list,  
 5 it's held at a secret level, so that's shared with  
 6 people who have the requirement to know. So I'm not  
 7 aware of what are nationally on people's crowded places  
 8 lists, because, again, the collaboration agreement means  
 9 a responsibility for chief constables, the commissioner  
 10 of the City, to own the protective security within their  
 11 area.  
 12 Q. So even though you are the senior national coordinator  
 13 for protective security with a national role, you don't  
 14 know whether it's on that list of crowded places?  
 15 A. I don't, no.  
 16 Q. Even though, no doubt, you are cleared to a very high  
 17 level?  
 18 A. But I think if you look at the collaboration  
 19 arrangements, I mean, I have a strategic oversight of  
 20 protective security as the national coordinator; the  
 21 responsibility of operational delivery rests at a local  
 22 level.  
 23 Q. Well, no doubt there will be a witness later who will be  
 24 able to tell us whether it was on the list or not.  
 25 Were bridges falling outside the picture when it

99

1 comes to thinking about public protection and crowded  
 2 places or any other arrangements?  
 3 A. No, they weren't falling outside of the picture, but we  
 4 were looking at the holistic picture, the threat  
 5 assessment, what the intelligence was telling us, and  
 6 considering where in terms of crowded places, where we  
 7 needed to focus our protective security advice.  
 8 As I've said in my earlier evidence, there is  
 9 a prioritisation process that we have to apply to make  
 10 sure that our resources are deployed in the right area,  
 11 where they have the greatest impact.  
 12 Q. Even after the Westminster attack, when asked questions  
 13 about why no barriers were put up on London Bridge, you  
 14 said on more than one occasion that there was an absence  
 15 of intelligence suggesting that it was an area where  
 16 there might be an attack; is that correct?  
 17 A. I said there was no intelligence to tell me that bridges  
 18 were a focus of attack.  
 19 Q. And you say, as I understand your evidence, that that's  
 20 a very significant factor even after the attack on  
 21 Westminster Bridge?  
 22 A. Yes, I think that's very important that we consider the  
 23 threat picture and the intelligence so we can prioritise  
 24 our resources in terms of protective security,  
 25 investigations, so that they're in the right place.

100

1 Q. But you would agree that a lack of specific intelligence  
2 isn't a reason why you should close your mind, for  
3 example, to the possibility of the need for barriers?  
4 A. So I don't think we would close our mind, but we have to  
5 look at all of the areas across London, there are lots  
6 of iconic locations, there are lots of roadways which  
7 would have a similar definition to how you've described,  
8 lots of iconic locations, so we have to be able to  
9 prioritise where our engagement is for protective  
10 security.  
11 Q. Just to finish this point, I'm conscious of the time,  
12 but if I can just show on screen, please, {WS5040/445},  
13 and if we could expand paragraph 4.20, you're aware, no  
14 doubt, of Lord Harris' report in October 2016 into  
15 London's preparedness to respond to a major terrorist  
16 incident?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. And he met with a whole host of organisations, including  
19 senior police officers, and had been asked by the Mayor,  
20 following Paris and Brussels, to have an independent  
21 review of the city's preparedness, and on this topic of  
22 there's no intelligence saying something, he had this to  
23 say:  
24 "Any decision about the allocation of resources  
25 needs to be taken on the basis of the intelligence

101

1 available, and I am satisfied that the police have  
2 access to the most up to date and robust intelligence  
3 via the intelligence services, [and JTAC] and others.  
4 However, given that no intelligence picture can ever be  
5 complete, it is important that a full assessment is made  
6 of the risk and impact of certain events, even where  
7 intelligence does not necessarily indicate it is  
8 a likely occurrence. A lack of specific intelligence  
9 should not be used as a reason for the police to close  
10 their minds to other possibilities."  
11 No doubt, officer, you would agree with all of those  
12 sentiments?  
13 A. Yes, I would.  
14 Q. We had this with MI5 repeatedly: that there was  
15 an absence of intelligence which rather begs the  
16 question how much investigation or analysis of the issue  
17 is going on such that you can weigh the absence of  
18 intelligence; do you see the point?  
19 A. I do, and I think if you look at the Crowded Places  
20 Model, there is no specific intelligence around some of  
21 those locations, but we apply a process to it, a risk  
22 assessment process, which draws us to consider areas  
23 that need to have protective security advice. If we  
24 were -- if we were to close our minds, we wouldn't put  
25 half of those premises into the Crowded Places Model.

102

1 Q. Even though you had known for years that terrorists were  
2 very conscious of surveillance and were taking extensive  
3 steps to hide their planning, such that an absence of  
4 intelligence would carry rather little weight, I would  
5 suggest.  
6 A. But we considered the whole thing in the mix in terms of  
7 the threat assessment, the intelligence, and the advice  
8 that we give out. You know, we don't not give out  
9 advice to commercial properties and other places just  
10 because of an absence of intelligence, and I think the  
11 Crowded Places Model for me is a true example of showing  
12 where we do give great thought and consideration and  
13 make sure that we share protective security advice.  
14 Q. But Masood successfully hid his plans as to  
15 Westminster Bridge, and Butt successfully hid his plans  
16 as to London Bridge, didn't they?  
17 A. They did. I mean, unfortunately we have to prioritise  
18 where we put our resources and we can't protect -- as  
19 much as I would absolutely like to protect everybody all  
20 of the time, that's simply not possible.  
21 MR PATTERSON: My Lord, I see the time, I'm sorry I've  
22 strayed slightly ...  
23 THE CHIEF CORONER: It made sense, Mr Patterson, to finish  
24 that particular topic.  
25 Can I just for the benefit partly of me, but I

103

1 suspect also -- you've indicated that you think we'll  
2 get onto Commander Gyford or Assistant  
3 Commissioner Gyford, I think I should call her.  
4 MR PATTERSON: I will have about 30 or 40 minutes more with  
5 this witness myself, and I know Mr Adamson has some  
6 questions.  
7 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.  
8 MR ADAMSON: I suspect after Mr Patterson I will be 20  
9 minutes or so.  
10 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you.  
11 MR HOUGH: We can be confident we will get to Deputy Chief  
12 Constable Gyford this afternoon on that basis. She is  
13 aware that she is unlikely to finish today.  
14 THE CHIEF CORONER: Okay, very good. Thank you.  
15 (1.05 pm)  
16 (The Luncheon Adjournment)  
17 (2.06 pm)  
18 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes, Mr Patterson.  
19 MR PATTERSON: Officer, we were looking at that security  
20 group that was being held -- those meetings of the  
21 security group within the City of London Police and if  
22 we could see on screen, please, {WS5019/1} we have  
23 a witness statement from a witness from whom we'll hear  
24 later this week called Superintendent Helen Isaac. Do  
25 you know Superintendent Isaac?

104

1 A. I've met her once.  
 2 Q. And in this statement at paragraph 3 she refers to  
 3 PC Hone, about whose work you were asked by Mr Hough,  
 4 and you will see halfway through that paragraph,  
 5 Superintendent Isaac records that in relation to this  
 6 security group within the City of London Police it had  
 7 counter terrorism taskings and a new role was created  
 8 that was filled by Constable Hone, namely counter  
 9 terrorist coordinator, and she became his direct line  
 10 manager and there were regular taskings by this security  
 11 group.  
 12 If this had all been within the Metropolitan Police  
 13 it's possible, isn't it, that you would have been aware  
 14 of the work of this group and of this counter terrorism  
 15 coordinator; would you agree?  
 16 A. I mean, I think that's a really hypothetical question  
 17 because the Metropolitan Police doesn't have that  
 18 structure.  
 19 Q. The fact that part of the geography of London was carved  
 20 out and dealt with by a different police force did  
 21 nothing to assist in the feeding through to you of  
 22 relevant information or thoughts about protective  
 23 security; would you agree?  
 24 A. So there is a national conference that takes place every  
 25 year for the counter terrorism security advisors, which

105

1 is an outlet for them to be able to share their views,  
 2 and that's a professional conference which takes place  
 3 once a year, called Radius(?).  
 4 Q. {WS5014/17}, please. The day after the  
 5 Westminster Bridge attack the City of London Police  
 6 counter terrorism coordinator, Mr Hone, was emailing the  
 7 superintendent about tactics and advice -- I'm told it's  
 8 two days after, I thought the attack was 22 March.  
 9 Yes, so the day after, on 23 March, if we look at  
 10 the third paragraph, he deals with crowded places as  
 11 designated by the Home Office; do you see that?  
 12 A. I do.  
 13 Q. And he posed the questions that I suggest would have  
 14 been going through your mind at the time:  
 15 "What about London Bridge during rush hours?  
 16 Apparently, London Bridge wasn't even mentioned during  
 17 last night's SG ..."  
 18 Which presumably is a reference to the City of  
 19 London's security group meetings:  
 20 "... I believe that this is our most vulnerable  
 21 location from marauding vehicle attack along with ..."  
 22 And then he refers to another location that has been  
 23 redacted, and he has mentioned this various times when  
 24 emailing the counter terrorism taskings to City of  
 25 London group.

106

1 "Something needs to change ..."  
 2 And he goes on to speak about, in that final  
 3 sentence:  
 4 "I believe that we could be far more effective and  
 5 also be deploying our resources at locations that better  
 6 suit the threats we face."  
 7 So you see that this counter terrorism coordinator  
 8 is clearly concerned about the bridges, isn't he, and  
 9 London Bridge in particular?  
 10 A. I can see from the email that he mentions London Bridge,  
 11 yes.  
 12 Q. And he obviously doesn't see the previous day's attack  
 13 as just an attack on Police Constable Palmer or  
 14 an attack just on our seat of government; he is  
 15 obviously thinking about the four members of the public  
 16 who were killed on that bridge and the many others who  
 17 were seriously injured when Masood drove on and off, on  
 18 and off, on and off that bridge, isn't he?  
 19 A. I can't really comment on what his view was. I've  
 20 already given my evidence as to what was going through  
 21 my mind at the time as part of CT policing.  
 22 Q. Well, what was going through your mind the day after the  
 23 attack about the bridges of London?  
 24 A. So the day after the attack, I've explained that we were  
 25 looking at what the threat assessment was telling us,

107

1 what the intelligence was telling us, what was coming  
 2 through in terms of the investigation and then in terms  
 3 of the evidence that I've given, the activity that took  
 4 place across the Metropolitan Police area was extensive.  
 5 It was reviewing the crowded places locations. It was  
 6 putting 250 additional officers out on patrol and  
 7 increasing the number of firearms officers that were on  
 8 patrol, and this was about looking at what the threat --  
 9 we believed to be the threat and the intelligence and  
 10 prioritising our resources accordingly.  
 11 Q. Did you specifically consider the bridges?  
 12 A. I answered that previously and said I didn't  
 13 specifically consider bridges. I considered the whole  
 14 picture.  
 15 Q. Why didn't you specifically consider bridges given that  
 16 the day before there had been a terrorist attack in  
 17 which four members of the public had been killed when  
 18 the car went up and off, up and off one of the bridges  
 19 of central London?  
 20 A. So the consideration was around government premises, it  
 21 was around police officers, it was understanding in our  
 22 perspective that the bridge was nothing more than  
 23 a roadway to get to a location as part of a terrorist  
 24 attack, and I know that Nick Aldworth covered that at  
 25 the Westminster Inquest and I do agree with his

108

1 observations during the Inquest.  
 2 Q. Forgive me. One of the issues that the family of  
 3 Christine Archibald is concerned about is why there was  
 4 no consideration of the part of the attack, that  
 5 two-part attack by Masood, why there was no  
 6 consideration of the first part which showed him  
 7 deliberately targeting civilians on the pavement of the  
 8 London Bridge?  
 9 A. I do understand their concerns, but the bits that we  
 10 were reflecting on and our consideration was around  
 11 areas which were the crowded places, which he had told  
 12 us that we needed to focus on it by applying the risk  
 13 matrix formula, understanding the threat assessment and  
 14 the intelligence, and prioritising our resources  
 15 accordingly.  
 16 There were many more vulnerable places in London  
 17 that needed prioritisation.  
 18 Q. But the facts spoke for themselves: it was on the  
 19 pavement of a London bridge that all of those people  
 20 were targeted and injured and killed, wasn't it?  
 21 A. No. Not all of the people were targeted on  
 22 Westminster Bridge; it was in relation to Parliament as  
 23 well.  
 24 Q. Yes. Four people were killed in the attack on the  
 25 bridge; yes?

109

1 A. That's correct.  
 2 Q. How many were injured in the attack on the bridge?  
 3 A. In relation to Westminster Bridge?  
 4 Q. Yes.  
 5 A. I can't remember the exact number.  
 6 Q. But a very large number; yes?  
 7 A. I can't remember the exact number.  
 8 Q. Did you review the CCTV footage, the very graphic and  
 9 shocking footage?  
 10 A. Of course the CCTV footage was reviewed as part of the  
 11 investigation. I mean, it was widely available, at  
 12 times on social media there was some footage, so  
 13 absolutely, I can -- you know, and I have seen the  
 14 footage myself.  
 15 Q. Did you review it in the days after the 22nd?  
 16 A. I did have a look at the footage, yes.  
 17 Q. And what did you see?  
 18 A. Exactly what you've described.  
 19 Q. Yes. Did you see people being thrown in the air like  
 20 rag dolls?  
 21 A. I saw people who the vehicle was deliberately driven  
 22 into them, yes, it was horrific. I mean, it was  
 23 something that nobody would choose to have to watch and,  
 24 you know, I feel absolutely for the families of those  
 25 people that were murdered.

110

1 Q. The next day, on 24 March, could we go to page 14,  
 2 please, of this document. So this is all over two  
 3 months before we get to the London Bridge attack,  
 4 Constable Hone, the counter terrorism coordinator at the  
 5 City of London Police, is analysing all of these details  
 6 in this email, speaking about the tiering by the Office  
 7 for Security and Counter Terrorism which you've been  
 8 telling us about; do you see that?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And further down the page, analysing intelligence from  
 11 the security services; do you see that?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. But not just that. He also analyses Isis and Al-Qaeda  
 14 propaganda, what, why and where they're suggesting to  
 15 attack and their methodologies. He analyses attack  
 16 methodologies from across the globe. He looks  
 17 specifically for his area, which is the City of London,  
 18 your area, of course, is the rest of London and  
 19 national, he looks at crowded places, critical national  
 20 infrastructure, iconic sites, main arterial routes,  
 21 transport hubs, lightning reports, if it's deemed to be  
 22 genuine hostile reconnaissance, SB, a reference perhaps  
 23 to Special Branch, and he is applying his mind entirely  
 24 appropriately in a necessary way to the relevant risks  
 25 and factors, isn't he?

111

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. And he focuses on, for example, the top five list of  
 3 places more likely to be hit by an attack. He speaks  
 4 about the multiple factors which he has included. So he  
 5 is not just focusing, by any stretch of the imagination,  
 6 on intelligence, is he?  
 7 A. No, he is focusing on threat as well as intelligence,  
 8 which is exactly the same position that we are.  
 9 Q. Well, it looks as though he is not closing his mind to  
 10 anything, he's got a completely open mind; would you  
 11 agree?  
 12 A. I can absolutely see what he's covering. I can't  
 13 comment on what he's thinking, but a lot of the  
 14 information he's talking about there is readily  
 15 available from our partner agencies.  
 16 Q. And then he highlights London Bridge's vulnerability, a  
 17 crowded place, iconic site, the predictable eastern  
 18 pavement crowds, and then as we move on, please, to the  
 19 rest of his email, he says that he has copied in Mark  
 20 Haddon, who is a CTSA supervisor. Help us, that's one  
 21 of those counter terrorism specialist advisors; is that  
 22 right?  
 23 A. I don't know how the structure works in the City in  
 24 terms of what a CTSA supervisor is, so you would have to  
 25 ask Jane Gyford that.

112

1 Q. CTSAs, what are they?  
 2 A. The CTSAs are one of 200 people nationally that are  
 3 trained to City & Guilds level around protective  
 4 security advice.  
 5 Q. And he says:  
 6 "... I am aware that he has been asked to come up  
 7 with the 'top 5' for NaCTSO".  
 8 So NaCTSO, is that the national body you were  
 9 telling us about?  
 10 A. Yes, that's the National Counter Terrorism Security  
 11 Office .  
 12 Q. So here, officer , we have this counter terrorism  
 13 coordinator analysing all these factors . Where do we  
 14 see your notes where you analysed all these factors and  
 15 the lessons to be learned from the attack that had taken  
 16 place two days earlier?  
 17 A. If you could go back to the previous email for me, the  
 18 previous slide .  
 19 Q. Page 14, please.  
 20 A. So all of those bits that he talks about there in terms  
 21 of the bullet point starting with crowded places, they  
 22 are regularly discussed at the Security Review Committee  
 23 fortnightly , there are products from the intelligence  
 24 services that give us threat assessments in relation to  
 25 those types of locations , and obviously as part of the

113

1 Security Review Committee, the taskings were asking  
 2 people to look at locations within their force areas  
 3 which they may feel needed enhanced protective security .  
 4 I think the absence of a document doesn't mean to  
 5 say that it wasn't considered, because it was at the  
 6 Security Review Committee.  
 7 Q. Yes. So is there a document somewhere where you have  
 8 recorded the factors that you considered when deciding  
 9 whether the bridges needed to be the subject of  
 10 barriers?  
 11 A. Not a document, no.  
 12 Q. So you considered -- you did not consider the bridges  
 13 were a specific focus for terrorist attack?  
 14 A. Not after Westminster, no.  
 15 Q. Even though, as you've identified , there are railings on  
 16 some bridges, such as Tower Bridge, for example; yes?  
 17 A. I don't know. It's not within the Metropolitan Police  
 18 area, so I wouldn't know the specifics .  
 19 Q. But you're the national coordinator for protective  
 20 security?  
 21 A. But as I have said before, in terms of the operational  
 22 delivery that is done at a local level , so it would be,  
 23 in my view, completely unrealistic to think that I would  
 24 have a knowledge of all of the crowded places, iconic  
 25 locations , across the whole country personally.

114

1 Q. Is there one figure who has oversight of all of these  
 2 places?  
 3 A. No, because the section 22 collaboration arrangement  
 4 places that responsibility with chief constables who  
 5 have ownership of the protective security for the four  
 6 Ps.  
 7 Q. You see, we saw in Westminster that although there was  
 8 a barrier that went round, sweeping round the tower of  
 9 Big Ben, we were repeatedly reminded through that  
 10 Inquest that that wasn't there to prevent a vehicle  
 11 attack, albeit that it did have a very successful  
 12 deterrent attack and caused the terrorist's car to have  
 13 to go sweeping around that area. As Mr Hough suggested  
 14 earlier , you would agree that the presence of railings  
 15 on bridges will be a strong deterrent when a terrorist  
 16 with a vehicle is planning an attack?  
 17 A. So railings could be a deterrent, absolutely. As to how  
 18 effective they are depends on the level , the type of  
 19 railings or the type of barrier .  
 20 Q. But London Bridge was a bridge which had very wide  
 21 pavements with a low kerb that was easy to get up onto  
 22 and off of and it was quite simply wide open for attack ,  
 23 wasn't it?  
 24 A. It is a wide pavement and there is always the  
 25 possibility in multiple locations across London, some of

115

1 them with a similar type of setting as you describe,  
 2 that they could be susceptible to a terrorist attack .  
 3 Our role is to prioritise our resources considering  
 4 the threat assessment and the intelligence as to where  
 5 to place them.  
 6 Q. As we discussed before lunch, it's not just about the  
 7 intelligence , is it?  
 8 A. No, it's about the threat assessment as well.  
 9 Q. And in terms of iconic bridges, after Westminster Bridge  
 10 and perhaps Tower Bridge, London Bridge, we just have to  
 11 think of the famous nursery rhyme to remind ourselves of  
 12 just how iconic London Bridge is for any terrorist  
 13 trying to pick an attractive target to send a message;  
 14 would you agree?  
 15 A. I mean, I think a number of places are iconic across  
 16 London and terrorists may well view London Bridge to be  
 17 an iconic location . You know, we know that there is  
 18 an attractiveness by terrorists to iconic sites , but  
 19 there are hundreds of them across the capital and we  
 20 have to consider them in relation to the threat  
 21 assessment and the intelligence .  
 22 Q. You chaired a meeting very shortly after the Westminster  
 23 attack in order to set the direction ; is that correct?  
 24 A. Is this the SRC(e) meeting that ...?  
 25 Q. Yes.

116

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. And is that correct: you chaired it?  
 3 A. I chaired it, yes.  
 4 Q. So this is an extraordinary meeting of the Security  
 5 Review Committee led by the police DACSO, so that's you;  
 6 correct?  
 7 A. That's correct.  
 8 Q. The purpose was to coordinate, monitor and set the  
 9 direction for Protect and Prepare work; is that correct?  
 10 A. That's correct.  
 11 Q. And was that on the evening of Masood's attack or the  
 12 next day, can you help us with when that meeting was?  
 13 A. I can't remember exactly. Could you take me to the  
 14 paragraph in my statement that you're referring to?  
 15 Q. Well, I'm actually referring to a statement by  
 16 Sarah Nacey from the Home Office, and the date isn't  
 17 given, but if anyone could help with the date I would be  
 18 grateful. Thank you, I'm told paragraph 19 -- ah, 98.  
 19 A. Thank you.  
 20 THE CHIEF CORONER: That, I think, is following the --  
 21 MR PATTERSON: Yes, that's a different meeting.  
 22 THE CHIEF CORONER: -- London Bridge, I think the question  
 23 Mr Patterson was asking about was following  
 24 Westminster Bridge.  
 25 MR PATTERSON: Yes. It may be you can remember, officer,

117

1 because clearly it was a very significant meeting, the  
 2 first terror attack in London since 7/7?  
 3 A. Yes, sir, I think it was a significant meeting.  
 4 Unfortunately and regrettably there are a number of  
 5 SRC(e)s throughout 2017 that -- yes, I do remember  
 6 chairing the meeting.  
 7 MR HOUGH: If I can assist, there's a footnote to  
 8 paragraph 71 which refers to two national Emergency  
 9 Security Review Committee meetings on 22 and on 23 May.  
 10 MR PATTERSON: Thank you very much.  
 11 So on the day and/or the next day. So we can all  
 12 remember the shock, both in the public and in the media  
 13 and no doubt for you, officer, as the senior national  
 14 coordinator, as that horrific news began to filter  
 15 through; yes?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. And it may be that there were Cobra meetings that you  
 18 were notified of; is that right?  
 19 A. There were Cobra meetings, but my boss went to the Cobra  
 20 meetings.  
 21 Q. And so no doubt Downing Street and everyone with  
 22 responsibilities was very anxious to know what happened  
 23 and what needed to be done?  
 24 A. Correct.  
 25 Q. And you told us that you had viewed the footage and saw

118

1 just how lethal a vehicle can be when it's used as  
 2 a weapon in the way it was on the pavement of  
 3 Westminster Bridge; yes?  
 4 A. Correct.  
 5 Q. That wasn't a lorry, that wasn't a van; it was a rented  
 6 Hyundai SUV, 4x4; yes?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And you were alive to the possibility that there could  
 9 be a copycat attack; yes?  
 10 A. Well, there is always the possibility of a copycat  
 11 attack, but as I said earlier, certainly the view was  
 12 that the bridge was a road that was used by the  
 13 terrorist, Masood, to carry out his attack on  
 14 Parliament.  
 15 Q. Well, that may have been his intentions, but what about  
 16 other would-be terrorists who, as had happened in the  
 17 past, gained inspiration from others and chose  
 18 themselves to carry out a vehicle attack? Did you  
 19 consider that?  
 20 A. Well, always there's a consideration. I mean, we were  
 21 aware of global incidents where that had taken place,  
 22 but in relation to specifically for Western Europe, the  
 23 only examples we had seen of that were in relation to  
 24 two specific events, one being a market and the other in  
 25 relation to the Bastille Day celebration, which was, you

119

1 know, a very large event and we had taken significant  
 2 measures in terms of growing the National Barrier Asset  
 3 to put ourselves in a position where we could protect  
 4 the public -- people who are attending such events.  
 5 Q. What about Lord Harris' recommendations even before  
 6 Westminster about the need for greater protective  
 7 bollards, what consideration had you given those back  
 8 in October of 2016?  
 9 A. I wasn't in post in 2016, so I was still in frontline  
 10 policing, so I personally didn't give that any  
 11 consideration.  
 12 Q. When did your responsibility begin?  
 13 A. December 2016.  
 14 Q. So when you came in, did you look at the report made  
 15 just about eight weeks or so beforehand, a very recent  
 16 report, dealing with the preparedness of London to  
 17 respond to a major terrorist incident?  
 18 A. Yes, I did, and there was a strong governance process in  
 19 place. As I said preparedness sits under the public  
 20 order branch and at that time the assistant  
 21 commissioner with responsibility there had a strong  
 22 governance process in place to make sure that we either  
 23 complied with the recommendations, agreed with the  
 24 recommendations, or if we had an alternative view, that  
 25 we discussed that, and that fed into a central

120

1 governance process through the Mayor's office .  
 2 Q. So the very topic of bollards or protective measures had  
 3 been raised very recently in a significant report that  
 4 was on your desk when you took post?  
 5 A. Correct. Well, it was in the public -- I mean, I think  
 6 it was in the public domain then or shortly afterwards  
 7 as well.  
 8 Q. Yes. You would have given its recommendations anxious  
 9 scrutiny, wouldn't you?  
 10 A. Amongst a number of documents. As I'm sure you can  
 11 appreciate in any new role there are a significant  
 12 amount of documents such as reading the sort of national  
 13 risk assessment, a lot of the JTAC products,  
 14 understanding the document from Lord Harris.  
 15 I mean, I was very keen to appraise myself of a lot  
 16 of information but a lot was, you know, from the  
 17 Security Service and other key partners of ours as much  
 18 as the Lord Harris report.  
 19 Q. But that independent report, {WS5040/450}, please, and  
 20 if we expand, please, the top of the page, 5.39 and  
 21 5.40, if that's possible, he specifically addresses  
 22 hostile vehicle mitigation mobile barriers in relation  
 23 to the Government Secure Zone, he speaks about the  
 24 lessons of the Nice attacks:  
 25 "... these could allow more effective mitigation of

121

1 similar attacks here than the expensive systems ... in  
 2 place. A business case for these flexible barriers has  
 3 previously been considered by the Home Office, but may  
 4 be revisited. They should review this urgently and move  
 5 to fund a solution.  
 6 "5.40. Consideration should also be given by the  
 7 GLA [so the Assembly] and relevant local authorities to  
 8 the wider installation of protective bollards in areas  
 9 of vulnerability around London and to explore the case  
 10 for retractable bollards in certain areas."  
 11 So the topic of bollards and protective measures was  
 12 raised fairly and squarely in that report, wasn't it?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And despite that, when the attack took place by Masood  
 15 in the days that followed, you still didn't think there  
 16 was a risk on the bridges?  
 17 A. No. So there was activity that had taken place in  
 18 relation to some of those recommendations around the  
 19 Government Secure Zone and also about securing  
 20 additional funding from the Home Office to fund --  
 21 expand the National Barrier Asset, which was a huge  
 22 positive, and without naming the locations, there have  
 23 been some permanent measures put in place in and around  
 24 parts of London which reflect those recommendations.  
 25 Q. But the debate in the public included, in the days that

122

1 followed Masood's attack, the issue of protective  
 2 security, didn't it?  
 3 A. I can't remember.  
 4 Q. Well, let me remind you. Can we look, please, at  
 5 {DC8333/1}. Here we have the BBC News report on  
 6 28 March, so six days after the attack, on the topic of  
 7 how can we be protected from terrorism. You were no  
 8 doubt agonising over these various issues yourself at  
 9 that time, were you?  
 10 A. Well, we're always thinking about how we can deliver  
 11 effective protective security and, as I've said before,  
 12 whilst I'd like to protect everybody all of the time,  
 13 and that would be my ambition and my colleagues', we  
 14 have to have a prioritisation process.  
 15 Q. And as we can see in this report, it begins by reminding  
 16 us that there were four people who were left dead:  
 17 "... dozens injured, and millions of people around  
 18 the world asking why.  
 19 "In the aftermath of ... Masood's assault on London,  
 20 the BBC received a number of questions from people  
 21 concerned about safety and security on our streets."  
 22 And the home affairs correspondent answers the most  
 23 popular of these questions that were coming into the  
 24 national broadcaster. Over on to {DC8333/2}, please:  
 25 "Will the pavement safety barriers removed from

123

1 nearby London Bridge be restored?"  
 2 The very topic that we're focusing on was being  
 3 highlighted. The BBC home affairs correspondent  
 4 addresses these concerns that the public had raised  
 5 about the use of safety barriers:  
 6 "The police, local authorities and transport bosses  
 7 will all discuss where to install extra measures to  
 8 protect the public.  
 9 "The mayor of London's office says it is currently  
 10 considering where more barriers could be installed."  
 11 Is that right? Was the Mayor looking into it?  
 12 A. I don't know specifically. I mean obviously he was --  
 13 the Mayor's office had the Lord Harris report and it was  
 14 always a consideration.  
 15 Q. Well, you were the national coordinator of protective  
 16 security, that's why I'm asking you. Were you working  
 17 with the Mayor's office to consider --  
 18 A. Not specifically on bollards, but I'm present at their  
 19 CONTEST board which is the London CONTEST board that  
 20 reviews protective security and I'm a participant at  
 21 that meeting.  
 22 Q. And the issues continue about building a barrier,  
 23 a concrete barrier on the bridge pavements to protect  
 24 pedestrians from the traffic, and then the correspondent  
 25 writes that:

124

1 "The independent review commissioned by the Mayor of  
 2 London... last year ..."  
 3 That's the Lord Harris review, is that right?  
 4 A. I presume so, yes.  
 5 Q. Or is there another one?  
 6 A. I'm not aware of another one.  
 7 Q. It had recommended more bollards in busy parts of London  
 8 to protect pedestrians from a Nice or Berlin - style  
 9 attack, lorries driven into crowds.  
 10 "The ... author, Lord Harris ... also called on the  
 11 authorities to make more use the temporary barriers  
 12 during big public events."  
 13 So the public debate was addressing this very topic,  
 14 reported in the news reports, about: do we need barriers  
 15 on the bridges to protect pedestrians; yes?  
 16 A. Well, in relation to your second -- the second part that  
 17 you have just touched on, I mean that's exactly what we  
 18 did do, which was installing, you know, using barriers  
 19 more at events. We've seen a huge growth in the size of  
 20 the National Barrier Asset, significant investment by  
 21 the government into counter terrorism policing to grow  
 22 that, we've got events now where it is common practice  
 23 for us all who attend those events to see barriers in  
 24 place, to make sure that crowds of people at big public  
 25 events are protected.

125

1 So, you know, temporary barriers during public  
 2 events is a growth -- is a huge growth industry and  
 3 a growth area. If I look at the evolvement of New  
 4 Year's Eve over the five years that I was the gold  
 5 commander, it's much, much bigger in terms as we've  
 6 reflected on the attack methodology, the amount of  
 7 barriers that are used.  
 8 Q. But officer, we've seen Constable Hone was applying his  
 9 mind to the risks on London Bridge, the public and the  
 10 press are applying their minds to the dangers on  
 11 London Bridge, yet you have told us that you did not  
 12 consider bridges to be a specific focus for terrorist  
 13 attack. Was that a mistake by you to discount bridges  
 14 as a specific focus for a potential attack?  
 15 A. No.  
 16 Q. If we go, please, to {DC7899/1}, we had on 28 March  
 17 a meeting that you attended at City Hall. If we go to  
 18 {DC7899/3}, please. We have a reference here in this  
 19 document, a London regional counter terrorism protective  
 20 security update document to 28 March when you, the  
 21 senior national coordinator of Protect and Prepare met  
 22 with London business security leads at City Hall; is  
 23 that correct?  
 24 A. So I was there to give an address, I wasn't there for  
 25 the whole meeting, but I was there for a short part,

126

1 yes.  
 2 Q. It says here that you were updating them on the  
 3 terrorist incident at Westminster Bridge; is that  
 4 correct?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Over on to the next page, please {DC7899/4}, this  
 7 publication provided an update about what happened in  
 8 the attack and the references to Masood in his Hyundai  
 9 mounting the pavement and targeting pedestrians and over  
 10 35 people hurt, a reference near the bottom to the CCTV  
 11 footage which provided a clear visual chronology of the  
 12 events; yes?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Over on to page 5, please {DC7899/5}. Towards the  
 15 bottom, publishing or suggesting that the London  
 16 policing response included, at bullet point 2:  
 17 "A review of protective security at key locations  
 18 and events based on the intelligence picture.  
 19 "Working with businesses through our Counter  
 20 Terrorism Security Advisors, Event Security Coordinators  
 21 and Counter Terrorism Focus Desks to review security  
 22 plans, especially any requirement for hostile vehicle  
 23 mitigation."  
 24 Yes?  
 25 A. Correct.

127

1 Q. So were you specifically applying your mind to the need  
 2 for the barriers, hostile vehicle mitigation?  
 3 A. So we would always consider hostile vehicle mitigation.  
 4 What we have to do is put in place a process which  
 5 I think I've articulated several times which helps us  
 6 prioritise those locations where we need to consider  
 7 hostile vehicle mitigation and there were a number of  
 8 locations which have benefited from either temporary or  
 9 permanent protective security in the form of sort of  
 10 barriers or bollards, whatever you want to call them.  
 11 Q. But in the aftermath of Masood's attack with his car  
 12 over London Bridge, this rather suggests that you were  
 13 considering vehicle mitigation or barriers in relation  
 14 to the Westminster Bridge attack and those issues?  
 15 A. We'd been considering it from way before the Westminster  
 16 attack. I think the question suggests that this is  
 17 something that we only started thinking about after the  
 18 Westminster attack. Of course we'd been thinking about  
 19 it before, specifically following Nice, I think that was  
 20 something that made us certainly think about it in  
 21 relation to events, but also some sector-specific  
 22 threats required us to consider hostile vehicle  
 23 mitigation and how we could protect the public and other  
 24 sectors.  
 25 Q. Were you aware that the public and the press were

128

1 raising issues about protecting London Bridge?  
 2 A. I mean, unfortunately after all the attacks there's  
 3 a lot of experts that decide to place themselves on  
 4 social media or in press coverage and there's a lot of  
 5 people who choose to have an opinion, and I think it's  
 6 healthy that there is a public debate. I mean, I am  
 7 a professional in protective security, I have to  
 8 prioritise where we put our protective security in place  
 9 and to do that I'm part of a very big organisation which  
 10 works very closely with the Security Service to help me  
 11 prioritise .  
 12 Q. You say about experts after the event, all I was doing  
 13 was asking about members of the public and the media --  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. -- who were saying after Westminster that there's  
 16 an issue about protecting London Bridge pavement from  
 17 terrorist attack, and they were dead right, weren't  
 18 they?  
 19 A. I think if you take it in isolation, the problem is the  
 20 public aren't aware of all of those other locations,  
 21 some of which are at much higher risk than the locations  
 22 that you're talking about.  
 23 Q. You said that after the London Bridge attack that it was  
 24 the morally right thing to do to put up the barriers.  
 25 You're not suggesting, are you, that they weren't

129

1 actually needed, are you?  
 2 A. I'm saying in my statement that the threat assessment in  
 3 the intelligence picture showed me that there was no  
 4 specific threat or intelligence to suggest that bridges  
 5 were at risk from terrorist attack. However, what my  
 6 statement also says is that I was concerned about  
 7 a copycat attack because we had now had two, and  
 8 I personally felt that morally it felt the right thing  
 9 to do to put the barriers in on the bridges, and I also  
 10 feel that the public had a right to see some form of  
 11 protective security, and that was a moral decision  
 12 rather than one that was based on a threat assessment  
 13 and intelligence .  
 14 Q. {DC7849/1}, please. On 25 May there was a meeting of  
 15 the London CONTEST Board Sub-Group dealing with hostile  
 16 vehicle mitigation. So, again, this is before the  
 17 London Bridge attack. Can you help us with what this  
 18 meeting was?  
 19 A. No.  
 20 Q. We see Superintendent Aldworth present; is he somebody  
 21 who works with you?  
 22 A. So Superintendent Aldworth was in charge of protective  
 23 security operations.  
 24 Q. So does he work with you?  
 25 A. Yes.

130

1 Q. And we can see that the agenda includes reference to the  
 2 "Current HVM landscape": is that hostile vehicle  
 3 mitigation?  
 4 A. It is .  
 5 Q. And there are references to "Changes ... following the  
 6 Westminster attack", and "planning and funding  
 7 arrangements"?  
 8 A. It does say that, yes.  
 9 Q. So what was going on in relation to the bridges? Were  
 10 bridges being considered?  
 11 A. So this wasn't specifically -- it doesn't infer that it  
 12 was specifically to do with bridges. It's very  
 13 difficult for me to talk about the context of something  
 14 which I wasn't present at the meeting.  
 15 What I can comment on is that at that time there  
 16 was, certainly from a counter terrorism policing  
 17 perspective, there was ongoing dialogue with the  
 18 government in relation to securing additional funding to  
 19 grow the National Barrier Asset, and we were also  
 20 seeking funding in relation to some specific areas which  
 21 we called the streetscape programme for protective  
 22 security, but, again, for national security reasons it  
 23 wouldn't be appropriate for me to discuss those specific  
 24 areas.  
 25 Q. But if it were thought that funding played a part in the

131

1 decision not to put barriers on London Bridge, what  
 2 would you say to such a suggestion?  
 3 A. In terms -- sorry, could you repeat the question?  
 4 Q. Yes. If it were suggested that funding might have  
 5 played a part in the decision not to put barriers on  
 6 London Bridge, would that be correct?  
 7 A. No, I'm not aware of a discussion about barriers for  
 8 London Bridge. I mean, that's something that would  
 9 probably be better placed for Jane Gyford.  
 10 Q. If we go, please, to {WS5014/28}, in May Mr Hone was  
 11 continuing to raise his concerns about London Bridge;  
 12 can you help us with who he was raising them with? Do  
 13 you know any of these individuals, David Timmins or  
 14 David Service or Mark Haddon?  
 15 A. No.  
 16 Q. If we go to {WS5014/21}, please, of the same document.  
 17 On other occasions he was raising his concerns in May,  
 18 so this is all still some weeks before the attack.  
 19 Richard Woolford, do you know Richard Woolford to whom  
 20 he was emailing on this occasion?  
 21 A. I do know Richard, yes.  
 22 Q. If you look at the fourth paragraph:  
 23 "London Bridge should be considered the most  
 24 vulnerable to low sophisticated attacks using  
 25 a vehicle."

132

1 From your knowledge of Richard Woolford was that  
 2 something that was ever fed through to you?  
 3 A. So that was never fed through to me.  
 4 Q. On 16 May, if we go, please, to page 29 {WS5014/29},  
 5 this counter terrorism coordinator of the City of London  
 6 Police was emailing Superintendent Isaac on 16 May about  
 7 an attached document, and if we go, please, to  
 8 {WS5014/33}, under the heading of "Highlighted concern",  
 9 he was writing about:  
 10 "The location that causes most concern is  
 11 London Bridge. The reasons why I highlight this  
 12 location are due to many factors which are listed  
 13 below."  
 14 And then he lists all the factors, including high  
 15 crowd density:  
 16 "... (arguably the highest density of pedestrians at  
 17 any bridge in the UK... )... "  
 18 And he speaks about the footfall at particular times  
 19 in day and there's up to 2,500 people an hour crossing  
 20 the bridge, and the fact that there is no vehicle  
 21 mitigation in place:  
 22 "... on the north east side of the bridge the  
 23 pavement is lowered ... "  
 24 So that's the side of the bridge from which the  
 25 attack was launched:

133

1 "... zero chance of a hostile damaging their tyres  
 2 while mounting the kerb."  
 3 Just what happened, it seems, it mounted the kerb  
 4 without damage at that stage to its tyres.  
 5 "It does not have a guard force ...  
 6 "... the longest unimpeded direct routes along its  
 7 pavement with nowhere for pedestrians to escape to. In  
 8 total the bridge is approximately 450 metres in length,  
 9 which means that a 2.5 tonne 4x4 ... will be travelling  
 10 at over 60 miles per hour and carrying over  
 11 900 kilojoules of energy."  
 12 Then these prophetic words:  
 13 "It is one of the most attractive targets in the  
 14 City of London for low sophisticated attacks due to the  
 15 points made above.  
 16 "Consideration should be given to installing hostile  
 17 vehicle mitigation on London Bridge ..."  
 18 So all those factors, were you considering any of  
 19 those factors at this time?  
 20 A. I mean, not in relation to London Bridge, no.  
 21 Q. Despite the public debate about London Bridge and  
 22 barriers?  
 23 A. But London Bridge, I didn't have a geographic  
 24 responsibility for London Bridge.  
 25 Q. But you had a national oversight role, didn't you?

134

1 A. I did, but as I have said before, I can ask people to do  
 2 things but it's not my direction to do things, and  
 3 actually the collaboration agreement, the very purpose  
 4 of it and at the heart of that collaboration agreement  
 5 is the responsibility for local chief constables or  
 6 the commissioners to own that themselves for their force  
 7 area.  
 8 Q. It might be thought that they would respond to that by  
 9 saying: if we received clear advice from the central  
 10 figure, namely DACSO, we would have done what we were  
 11 advised to do; what would you say to that?  
 12 A. I can't comment on that.  
 13 Q. On {WS5014/34}, on 24 May he is again, is this counter  
 14 terrorism coordinator, raising his concerns with his  
 15 superintendent. Did you know any of these people who  
 16 were being notified of the concerns on this occasion?  
 17 A. No.  
 18 Q. Matthew Timms, Ryan Jefferies, Peter Lucas?  
 19 A. No.  
 20 Q. Capitals:  
 21 "I HIGHLY RECOMMEND that serious consideration is  
 22 taken to carry out my suggestions from the friendly  
 23 hostile report."  
 24 So none of that reached you at that stage either; is  
 25 that right?

135

1 A. That's correct.  
 2 Q. {WS5015/17}, please. It was made plain, as Mr Hough  
 3 showed you in that extract from the Cerastes report,  
 4 that the location and the layout of the bridge lends  
 5 itself to a ramming attack with no physical barriers in  
 6 place to prevent a vehicle from mounting the pavement in  
 7 either direction.  
 8 Now, given that that was the conclusion or advice of  
 9 Cerastes, can you help with why it is that the people  
 10 that you commissioned to advise you didn't pick up those  
 11 sorts of concerns themselves?  
 12 A. So I didn't commission anything in relation to  
 13 London Bridge. I mean, this work was commissioned by  
 14 the City of London Police who gave a number of locations  
 15 for the commercial company to look at. I mean, you  
 16 could replicate this report for multiple locations  
 17 across London.  
 18 Q. But weren't you using Metropolitan Police units, PSO  
 19 units, to try and identify vulnerable locations?  
 20 A. So after Westminster we did apply our thinking towards  
 21 prioritising a number of locations using methodology  
 22 that we believe that terrorists were using, yes, and  
 23 that identified in the Metropolitan Police area a number  
 24 of locations.  
 25 Q. And in your statement you deal with this saying that

136

1 a large number of locations were identified but  
 2 London Bridge wasn't identified in any way?  
 3 A. Can you just take me to that part?  
 4 Q. Yes, it's paragraph 73.  
 5 A. So I did say that London Bridge was mentioned, but  
 6 actually by mistake, it was plainly a reference to Tower  
 7 Bridge.  
 8 Q. Yes, so obviously forgetting that error, London Bridge  
 9 wasn't identified as a vulnerable area?  
 10 A. That's correct.  
 11 Q. Even though you would agree that there were quite  
 12 a large number of features that suggested, as Mr Hone  
 13 and as Cerastes had listed, that it was vulnerable?  
 14 A. But we had replicated a methodology it was believed  
 15 terrorist were using to identify potential targets, and  
 16 using that methodology, that's how we created a top ten  
 17 list of locations.  
 18 Q. Page {WS5015/21}, please, of this document, under the  
 19 heading of "Physical security measures", the advisors  
 20 and experts from Cerastes carried out work to see if  
 21 they could identify as potential terrorists might areas  
 22 of vulnerability, and they in their reports indicated to  
 23 the City of London Police that:  
 24 "Hostile vehicle mitigation measures around several  
 25 of the sites also had a similar impact on plans for any

137

1 use of a vehicle-borne explosive device."  
 2 In other words, if you do have barriers, if you do  
 3 have measures, it does have an effect, it does  
 4 successfully deter somebody from targeting a place that  
 5 they might otherwise target; would you agree?  
 6 A. So I think this takes us back to the point I was talking  
 7 about earlier on this morning in my evidence, which is  
 8 around the difference between threat and risk. So there  
 9 are always measures that you can put in place in terms  
 10 of dealing with risk, but threat looks at the capability  
 11 and intent and that enables us to make some  
 12 prioritisation around where to put protective security  
 13 measures in. I'm aware that across London there are  
 14 many, many commercial bodies that commission and procure  
 15 companies such as this to undertake recommendations at  
 16 their locations, and again, there is a prioritisation  
 17 process that we would need to put in place, and I think  
 18 looking at threat is very much looking at capability and  
 19 intent which was my evidence earlier on this morning,  
 20 whereas this document very much looks at risk. So they  
 21 might be protecting one of these properties that they  
 22 looked at against a very serious bombing, but actually  
 23 the threat assessment might show us that the capability  
 24 of terrorists for that is very low, so therefore you  
 25 could make a choice whether to put that protective

138

1 security in or not.  
 2 Q. Yes, but officer, nobody disputes for one moment that it  
 3 is necessary to look at all of London or all of the  
 4 country, and no one suggests that resources aren't  
 5 relevant, but when you make the decision, a highly  
 6 relevant factor will be the iconic nature of  
 7 London Bridge and the fact that it's almost an appealing  
 8 place for a terrorist thinking of an attractive spot to  
 9 target the public in the capital city?  
 10 A. I mean, I can't comment on what a terrorist finds  
 11 appealing, their prioritisation of which iconic site is  
 12 more appealing than others. We saw very different  
 13 attacks throughout the whole of 2017, you know, one was  
 14 an arena. At the point that London Bridge happened we  
 15 were still in the 14-day plan to put in protective  
 16 security post an arena attack, which was about an IED,  
 17 so we were focusing very much in relation to that, and  
 18 previously to that obviously we had Westminster Bridge,  
 19 and then we saw later on in the year again a different  
 20 type of attack methodology. So it is very difficult  
 21 to -- that's why very much we use the process that I've  
 22 outlined several times in terms of helping us to  
 23 prioritise.  
 24 Q. One of the places that Butt and his colleagues may have  
 25 been targeting was Oxford Street; yes?

139

1 A. So I don't -- there's nothing I've seen from the  
 2 investigation that shows that we can say that as a fact.  
 3 What we can say is that Oxford Street, I understand, was  
 4 in the GPS, the satnav.  
 5 Q. Yes, if we go to {DC8242/1}, please. Lewis Ludlow  
 6 recently convicted of terrorist offences was himself  
 7 targeting Oxford Street, wasn't he?  
 8 A. I don't know the detail of that case.  
 9 Q. And if we just skim through this press report, we can  
 10 see that earlier this year he was sentenced at this  
 11 court for offences in relation to a vehicle attack in  
 12 central London, and if you go, please, to page 4  
 13 {DC8242/4}, in March of 2018, undercover officers  
 14 observed him travelling to central London where he took  
 15 photographs of landmarks and crowded areas like the  
 16 Disney Store on Oxford Street, and we can see that  
 17 amongst the evidence that was presented in that  
 18 prosecution, there was a list of potential attack sites,  
 19 which included Oxford Street, do you see that in the  
 20 pieced-together note at the bottom?  
 21 A. I can see the note, yes.  
 22 Q. He is analysing the busiest time, yes? One of the  
 23 things that Constable Hone was analysing in his email;  
 24 yes?  
 25 A. I mean, I would need to take a bit more time to look at

140

1 a bit more detail of the investigation rather than rely  
 2 on a newspaper article, so I would like to look at that.  
 3 I can always come back to it .  
 4 Q. {DC8242/5}, the bottom of the page, in a note headed  
 5 "Crowded London areas", he is addressing Oxford Street,  
 6 on the right-hand side, "No van mounting", just below  
 7 the word Oxford:  
 8 "Bollards, barriers, pavement, busiest time, truck,  
 9 maximise, busy street, nearly ..."  
 10 A figure at the bottom right, is that nearly 100 or  
 11 1,000 that could be killed in the attack?  
 12 So as the press has reported, these are the sorts of  
 13 things that terrorists are addressing and considering,  
 14 isn't it, in their planning; would you agree?  
 15 A. I think there's a whole range of attack methodologies  
 16 that terrorists are considering. I mean, a slide shown  
 17 this morning showed the disrupted terrorist plots which  
 18 show a huge variety of attack methodology. I can see  
 19 what the paper says there. There are lots of  
 20 conversations that we are having with lots of people  
 21 around protective security across London on a daily  
 22 basis.  
 23 Q. And {WS5015/22}, please. The conclusions of Cerastes in  
 24 relation to London Bridge at the bottom of that section  
 25 were that:

141

1 "The absence of physical security measures...  
 2 encouraged [actually encouraged] hostile team attack  
 3 plans. The absence of barriers separating vehicles from  
 4 pedestrians along the length of London Bridge resulted  
 5 in vehicle ramming attacks at this location being  
 6 considered as viable."  
 7 And they were proved right, weren't they?  
 8 A. Well, I think -- I mean that paragraph could be placed  
 9 in a report for multiple locations across London, which  
 10 is why -- which Cerastes would not have, which is the  
 11 threat assessment and the intelligence picture and being  
 12 alive to current investigations that are taking place  
 13 enables us to prioritise where we put protective  
 14 security in place.  
 15 I also would say there is no legislation that  
 16 empowers policing to put in barriers in a lot of these  
 17 locations. That is the responsibility of the private  
 18 owner of that location.  
 19 Q. I asked you earlier, officer, if there hadn't been  
 20 a separate police force covering the geographical area  
 21 of the City of London, whether all of this concern and  
 22 these interim reports, if all of that or some of it  
 23 might have filtered through to you, that's exactly one  
 24 of the things that Lord Harris had been addressing,  
 25 hadn't it, in one of the other recommendations in his

142

1 report back in 2016?  
 2 A. I mean, I think there are 127 recommendations, I'm not  
 3 sure which one that you specifically mean?  
 4 Q. Well, if we go, please, to page 453 of his report,  
 5 {WS5040/453}. And bottom right, if we could expand  
 6 5.61, please. He had stated that:  
 7 "Notwithstanding the successes of the [City of  
 8 London Police] as with the BTP [so the Transport Police]  
 9 there is obviously a potential incoherence in having  
 10 a small section of the capital carved out from the area  
 11 covered by [the Metropolitan Police], with  
 12 responsibility given to a separate police force. It is  
 13 at least likely that interoperability and response might  
 14 be improved if a single force covered the policing,  
 15 particularly for counter terrorism purposes, of the  
 16 whole of London."  
 17 And then his recommendation was:  
 18 "... the Home Office should undertake a full  
 19 assessment of the benefits of merging the MPS and the  
 20 CoLP, perhaps with the national financial and fraud  
 21 functions moving to the National Crime Agency... I do  
 22 not underestimate the complexity and resistance that  
 23 there will be to such a merger, however, in my view  
 24 these are not sufficient reasons to outweigh the value  
 25 of there being an assessment of the operational benefits

143

1 of having a single force overseeing policing across the  
 2 capital."  
 3 Now, do you agree that there might be real benefits  
 4 by removing the possibility for things to fall between  
 5 two stools, as they clearly did with the Cerastes  
 6 report?  
 7 A. I mean, I think that this is -- as signposted in the  
 8 report, this is something that I would be expecting the  
 9 government to reflect on. From an operational  
 10 perspective I have been involved in multiple operations  
 11 that involve the City of London Police, and I've never  
 12 found that there is a hindrance to interoperability with  
 13 the current structure.  
 14 Q. That was two and a half years ago; what was the  
 15 conclusion from the Home Office?  
 16 A. I don't know.  
 17 Q. Do we know when their report, a response to this  
 18 recommendation, is expected?  
 19 A. I think that's probably a question for another witness.  
 20 Q. You were asked by Mr Hough about the NBA barriers; would  
 21 they have been available and possibly could they have  
 22 been used if the decision was made even just for a few  
 23 months, to put barriers on the bridge?  
 24 A. Yes, they are available. Obviously if everybody asked  
 25 for them we would have to have a prioritisation process,

144

1 but they are available , they're available to policing  
 2 and, as I said earlier , they're available for private  
 3 sector, commercial bodies, to rent as well.  
 4 THE CHIEF CORONER: I understand your question,  
 5 Mr Patterson, to be would they have been available --  
 6 MR PATTERSON: Exactly.  
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: -- to go on the bridge before 3 June.  
 8 I think that's the point you are driving at.  
 9 MR PATTERSON: Precisely. Had the decision been presumably  
 10 they could have been installed in relatively short order  
 11 and removed again perhaps some months later when the  
 12 threat level or the concerns might have died down, less  
 13 chance of a copycat attack, for example.  
 14 A. So the actual availability , I would need to go back and  
 15 have a look and see where it was all across the country,  
 16 but --  
 17 THE CHIEF CORONER: But I think in your earlier answer to  
 18 a question from Mr Hough, when the barriers were put on  
 19 they were barriers which were available rather than  
 20 specific barriers having to be made available --  
 21 A. That's correct, yes.  
 22 THE CHIEF CORONER: So I think the answer to your question  
 23 is probably a yes, Mr Patterson, in principle , but of  
 24 course it would depend on what other calls there were on  
 25 those barriers at that time.

145

1 MR PATTERSON: Yes, and, officer , a few final distinct  
 2 topics, if I may. ARVs, you told us about the increase  
 3 in the number of ARVs following, I think, was it the  
 4 Nice attack?  
 5 A. No, it was following Bataclan.  
 6 Q. The Bataclan in 2015. Thank you. That increase was  
 7 from when, from what previous figure?  
 8 A. So I have gone through Ross McKibbin's evidence and  
 9 I think he covered a lot of it in there, but in effect  
 10 there was a decision to -- I mean, without getting into  
 11 specific numbers, it would be about double the increase  
 12 in armed response vehicles.  
 13 Q. You appreciate to consider that and to judge it a  
 14 relevant consideration will be what is the starting  
 15 point? Was it an unusually low starting point, perhaps,  
 16 because of austerity cuts or, as has been the subject of  
 17 public debate, whether police resources might have been  
 18 lower than they might otherwise have been some years  
 19 ago?  
 20 A. Well, I think the starting point was from a position of  
 21 never considering -- never having considered  
 22 a Bataclan-type multi-seated terrorist attack with  
 23 people with high velocity weaponry, and what happened  
 24 once that had taken place was that the then commissioner  
 25 and assistant commissioner, Mark Rowley, then

146

1 specifically looked at if we were to apply that to  
 2 London would we have the capacity and capability to deal  
 3 with it, and that led to a significant investment by  
 4 government to increase the number of armed response  
 5 vehicles and other armed officers and additional funding  
 6 was given through to counter terrorism policing to  
 7 deliver the policing across the UK. That wasn't  
 8 specific to London, that had national implications .  
 9 Q. You mentioned the ARV patrols in the Borough Market area  
 10 on the day. As I understand it, none of those were  
 11 involved in the actual engagement with the attackers; is  
 12 that correct?  
 13 A. I wouldn't know. I haven't looked at that. I could  
 14 research it if you need me to.  
 15 Q. You also touched upon foot patrols of armed officers .  
 16 This was Operation Hercules; is that correct?  
 17 A. So Operation Hercules was bigger than just foot patrols ,  
 18 it did have additional armed officers , but within it  
 19 there were some armed officers not at this same  
 20 experience in training as armed response vehicles, but  
 21 needless to say, armed officers .  
 22 Q. Yes.  
 23 A. And some of those were dropped off at particular  
 24 locations for short, what we call pulse patrols, and  
 25 then back on, but as I said, that was a very well

147

1 thought through and discussion with local communities  
 2 and some of the businesses to be affected as to whether  
 3 or not it was appropriate in some areas.  
 4 Q. We touched upon this with Superintendent McKibbin, who  
 5 made the point that as a general rule there are not  
 6 armed officers on foot in the City other than at  
 7 specific locations .  
 8 A. That's right .  
 9 Q. So yes, in vehicles, yes in specific locations , but not  
 10 generally patrolling .  
 11 A. Correct.  
 12 Q. Another exception is the railway stations , we heard  
 13 about that from the BTP.  
 14 A. And the airports .  
 15 Q. But help us with this : Operation Hercules it seems was  
 16 an occasion when for several months there were armed  
 17 officers patrolling on foot not just anchored to  
 18 a particular location ; is that correct?  
 19 A. A very, very small amount of foot patrols . It wasn't --  
 20 the bulk of Operation Hercules was mobile officers .  
 21 Q. For how many months did that go on?  
 22 A. So it started -- I did give the dates earlier , actually ,  
 23 but it finished in August 2017 and I think it started  
 24 in August 2016.  
 25 Q. So about 12 months?

148

1 A. Approximately 12 months.  
 2 Q. So that would be a visible deterrent to any would-be  
 3 terrorist reconnaissance operations; yes?  
 4 A. I would hope so, yes.  
 5 Q. It would give confidence to the public?  
 6 A. Obviously the subject of armed policing, there are a  
 7 number of people with a divergence of opinion about  
 8 armed police officers because fundamentally UK policing,  
 9 you know, at the heart of it is unarmed policing.  
 10 Q. Do you know this: was there any assessment at the end of  
 11 that 12-month period of the effects of that operation,  
 12 of the impact, of the benefits?  
 13 A. I'm not aware of any assessment because the whole reason  
 14 for Operation Hercules was to, in effect, plug the gap  
 15 whilst the uplift of armed officers took place. So we  
 16 were always moving to a position that once we were  
 17 confident that the uplift of armed response vehicles  
 18 was sufficient then we would withdraw from Operation  
 19 Hercules, and the preference has always, and still is  
 20 today, to have a high number of armed response vehicles  
 21 who are highly trained to respond quickly across the  
 22 capital.  
 23 Q. If there were any assessment or reviews, would that be  
 24 something that might be -- you might be willing to  
 25 disclose? You appreciate that one of the issues that

149

1 the families are concerned about is whether there would  
 2 be benefits of having armed officers of that type  
 3 patrolling to some degree?  
 4 A. Yes, I mean I absolutely understand the concerns of the  
 5 family. I -- again, I probably reference back to Ross  
 6 McKibbin's statement, which I do fully endorse, which  
 7 is, you know, having a fast response of highly trained  
 8 and highly skilled people is definitely our preference  
 9 in terms of being able to neutralise a threat.  
 10 I'm not aware of a report because, again, the foot  
 11 patrols were simply part of Hercules which was to plug  
 12 the gap until we got up to a level, which was double the  
 13 amount of armed officers across London.  
 14 And I think, you know, terribly tragic  
 15 circumstances, but we did see a very fast response by  
 16 armed officers and we see that across the capital every  
 17 day and I am very proud of the armed policing response  
 18 and the armed officers in the capital.  
 19 Q. But is that something you would be willing to check for  
 20 us?  
 21 A. We can check, yes.  
 22 Q. I'm grateful. And those armed foot patrols on the day,  
 23 were they actually in and around the area at the time of  
 24 the attack?  
 25 A. I haven't got that information.

150

1 Q. {WS5032/29}. As I understand your statement, you were  
 2 indicating in that table that there was an armed foot  
 3 patrol in the area, it's that final entry: yes, yes,  
 4 yes, yes, yes for each of the days up to and including  
 5 3 June?  
 6 A. That's correct. But those armed foot patrol officers  
 7 were more likely at some of the tier 1 and tier 2 sites  
 8 that may well be in that vicinity, because we would have  
 9 had significant negotiations with some of those sites  
 10 around the presence of armed foot patrols.  
 11 THE CHIEF CORONER: As I understand it, Mr Patterson, this  
 12 is taking a radius of 500 metres from Borough Market.  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 THE CHIEF CORONER: So it's...  
 15 MR PATTERSON: So we see that they were on duty until  
 16 22.00 hours, which is, whatever, 9 minutes before the  
 17 attack.  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. So were they focusing on specific locations within this  
 20 wide area or just patrolling freely within this wide  
 21 area which includes Borough Market?  
 22 A. I think a blend of both.  
 23 Q. A blend of both. And so are you able to help with  
 24 whether any of them were close to the attack when it  
 25 occurred?

151

1 A. I haven't got that information to hand. I mean, that is  
 2 something that we could see if the technology enables us  
 3 to do that. We could have a look at that and bring it  
 4 back if it was required.  
 5 But, I mean, in terms of the response time to the  
 6 attack, I would suggest that they were within the area,  
 7 and of course, this will only show Metropolitan Police  
 8 officers, it won't show British Transport Police, or it  
 9 wouldn't show City of London Police.  
 10 Q. So in that general area, I think 500 square metres --  
 11 THE CHIEF CORONER: It's described as a 500-metre radius at  
 12 paragraph 123, which is on the screen, so as  
 13 I understand it, the table, the grid we've got there,  
 14 takes that in relation to each of the types of policing  
 15 we've spoken about.  
 16 A. It does.  
 17 MR PATTERSON: If we go back, officer, to {WS5032/19} of  
 18 your report. Is this the PSP area? PSP4, is that the  
 19 area we are talking about?  
 20 A. No, PSP4 is much bigger than that. As the Coroner said,  
 21 it takes into account the 500-metre radius from within  
 22 Borough Market, but PSP4 is much wider.  
 23 Q. Right, so this area that did contain armed officers on  
 24 foot was even smaller than that area we see on the  
 25 screen and how many patrolling officers would have been

152

1 in this area with a radius of 500 metres?

2 A. I mean, I would have to look at exactly how many were  
3 there. It doesn't mean to say they were necessarily  
4 there all at the same time, it would be over the period  
5 of a shift that they would be in that area.

6 Q. But typically would it be just a pair, or might it be  
7 eight or ten?

8 A. I can't say, I would need to specifically look at that.

9 Q. You appreciate why I am asking these questions: if there  
10 were armed officers on foot in and around that area,  
11 just minutes before the attack, the question obviously  
12 that then flows is where were they at the time the  
13 attack occurred?

14 A. Yes, I mean, I'm not aware of armed officers that were  
15 immediately within Borough Market.

16 Q. One of the issues that Lord Harris in his report also  
17 dealt with was tasers, recommending and advising that  
18 greater use could be made of tasers in order to  
19 incapacitate an attacker; is that something that you  
20 have considered as part of your responsibilities?

21 A. So earlier we talked about the strategic threat and risk  
22 assessment process which every force looks at. That  
23 process looks at the percentage of officers that should  
24 have a certain skill set, and for the  
25 Metropolitan Police that, again, we conduct our own STRA

153

1 process and we will look at the number of officers that  
2 we think require taser to deal with the threat and risk  
3 that's posed across London on a daily basis.

4 Q. What he said specifically about targeting lone attackers  
5 was {WS5040/450}, and at the top left, in his report he  
6 spoke about attacks in Leytonstone and Russell Square  
7 when tasers -- or, to use the technical terms,  
8 conductive energy devices, CEDs were used effectively by  
9 police to subdue attackers. There is reference to a new  
10 model that might be coming through and the  
11 recommendation that action should urgently be taken to  
12 approve the new device. And then at 5.37:  
13 "In addition to [this] ... the Mayor and  
14 the Commissioner should give joint consideration to  
15 whether there is a case for equipping more, properly  
16 trained and supervised, officers with CEDs [what we call  
17 tasers]..."

18 And then these important words:  
19 "... given the threat from lone actors using bladed  
20 weapons."

21 Presumably, officer, you would welcome anything that  
22 might assist the police to incapacitate an attacker  
23 engaged in a marauding terrorist attack?

24 A. Yes, so I'm the national lead for less than lethal  
25 weapons which includes taser, so in relation, if I can

154

1 break it down into three parts. So the new taser, which  
2 is the X2, is in effect across the UK. In relation to  
3 the Met and its increase in officers with taser,  
4 the commissioner over the last 12 months, we have seen  
5 in the Metropolitan Police an increase in the number of  
6 officers that have access to taser.

7 In relation to the effectiveness of taser, I think  
8 for Borough Market one of the things with training  
9 around taser is it's a three-day training course and one  
10 of the key points is that at the point -- it is an  
11 individual decision whether or not to use your taser but  
12 we do need to always make sure that officers know that  
13 they need to give consideration to whether or not they  
14 would make the situation worse, and if we look at the  
15 three suspects involved in Borough Market with belts on  
16 that could have caused them to think differently and not  
17 use taser anyway.

18 Q. Has the formal response to the taser recommendation come  
19 through yet, or are you still waiting for that?

20 A. Has the ...?

21 Q. Has the formal response from the Home Office to the  
22 taser recommendation --

23 A. So the --

24 Q. Has that been received yet?

25 A. In relation to the Home Office, we've already

155

1 implemented the new device across the UK.

2 THE CHIEF CORONER: Just help me with when the taser 2 came  
3 out, because I think it was after this, wasn't it?

4 A. It was after this, yes.

5 MR PATTERSON: Boro Bistro, you touched upon issues in  
6 relation to Boro Bistro. Was there some intelligence  
7 that French restaurants might be targeted in the City?

8 A. Sorry, I'm not sure about what issues I raised. I mean  
9 I said there was a tasking after the Paris attacks for  
10 people to consider French premises within their boroughs  
11 of which Boro Bistro was considered by that borough.

12 Q. Yes, because -- for the obvious reasons it was  
13 identified that the French community in London, possibly  
14 there might be attacks targeting French restaurants?

15 A. I think the issue was are there premises that are  
16 identifiable or people could perceive to be French  
17 premises and therefore to engage with them around their  
18 protective security. Also there are particular  
19 communities across London, schools, lots of different  
20 places.

21 Q. And you've listed in your report some of the contact  
22 with the Boro Bistro restaurant. Have you been engaged  
23 in or encouraged engagement in terms of trying to  
24 strengthen the security that staff at these sorts of  
25 locations might make use of?

156

1 A. So I think protective security is very much  
 2 a partnership between policing and all premises across  
 3 London and across the UK. In the Metropolitan Police  
 4 area that is one of the points of the counter terrorism  
 5 focus desk, which is to reach out to communities and  
 6 seek to engage with them around protective security. We  
 7 are slightly sort of hand-tied by the engagement that  
 8 comes back from the specific premises.  
 9 Q. It can vary?  
 10 A. Yes, it can vary significantly .  
 11 Q. And finally this , and it may be you can't help me with  
 12 this , but the rental of vehicles , is that something that  
 13 your responsibilities extend to?  
 14 A. So in terms of hire car, I think Sarah Nacey would be  
 15 a better witness to answer that. There has been some  
 16 work, extensive work by the government to look at how we  
 17 can work with the private rental car sector in terms of  
 18 making it a more hostile environment for terrorists to  
 19 operate in .  
 20 Q. Despite the fact that Masood rented a car and used it in  
 21 the Westminster Bridge attack, by the time we get to  
 22 3 June and the London Bridge attack, there were still no  
 23 significant obstacles in the place of any terrorist  
 24 suspect wanting to rent a vehicle?  
 25 A. So I think there is still a lot of work taking place to

157

1 create a hostile environment for terrorists to operate  
 2 in, and certainly there is a scheme that is in place  
 3 that I know a lot of the private sector are engaged with  
 4 in terms of putting some measures in place, but Sarah  
 5 would definitely be a better witness for that.  
 6 MR PATTERSON: Thank you for your help.  
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Adamson, I'm going to suggest we just  
 8 take our afternoon break there. I know Mr Patterson has  
 9 been rather longer than the time he suggested, no  
 10 criticism at all, Mr Patterson, but we'll take a break  
 11 there but I'm going to suggest we just have a 10-minute  
 12 break.  
 13 MR HOUGH: Sir, and I understand we will be sitting until  
 14 5.00 in order to make some progress with DCC Gyford, if  
 15 possible.  
 16 (3.23 pm)  
 17 (A short break)  
 18 (3.39 pm)  
 19 Questions by MR ADAMSON  
 20 MR ADAMSON: My name is Dominic Adamson and I ask questions  
 21 on behalf of the parents of Xavier Thomas and his  
 22 partner, Christine Delcros.  
 23 Could I ask you to have up on screen, please,  
 24 {WS5014/33}. Now, you will recall this is a document  
 25 we've looked at already, and this is the highlighted

158

1 concern which flowed from Mr Hone's summary of the work  
 2 done by Cerastes, as I understand it. There he  
 3 identifies the site, London Bridge, as that which causes  
 4 most concern, and then he identifies the reasons why he  
 5 has reached that conclusion.

6 Do you disagree with any of the observations made by  
 7 Mr Hone in that document?

8 A. If I go through them point by point, I think the first  
 9 point, it's really difficult for me to comment on that,  
 10 because although I've walked over a couple of times over  
 11 London Bridge recently, I couldn't comment on the crowd  
 12 density because he has obviously looked at it slightly  
 13 more closely, but I mean, in principle ...  
 14 Q. Assuming his analysis of the density is correct, you  
 15 don't disagree with the point he has made at point 1?  
 16 A. No.  
 17 Q. You wouldn't disagree with the point that at that time  
 18 there was no hostile vehicle mitigation in place?  
 19 A. No, I wouldn't disagree with that.  
 20 Q. You wouldn't disagree with his observations in relation  
 21 to the lowered pavement?  
 22 A. No.  
 23 Q. You wouldn't disagree with his observation that there's  
 24 no guard force or anyone responsible at site?  
 25 A. I actually don't know what guard force is. I think

159

1 that's a City of London Police and the Corporation ...  
 2 Q. And you wouldn't disagree with his observation that it  
 3 has one of the longest unimpeded direct routes along its  
 4 pavement with nowhere for pedestrians to escape to?  
 5 A. I mean, I think that's quite a subjective view by the  
 6 author, by PC Hone, so I couldn't comment on that. If  
 7 I was to consider it across the whole of London, I don't  
 8 know whether it would be the longest [un]impeded direct  
 9 route.  
 10 Q. Would you agree that it is a potent analysis?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. And it presents a compelling case for the implementation  
 13 of hostile vehicle mitigation on London Bridge?  
 14 A. I mean, that's being considered in isolation, so  
 15 I think, you know, certainly for me, for the  
 16 Metropolitan Police area, I would be considering it  
 17 amongst a whole multitude of other sites .  
 18 Q. I understand that, but could you answer my question: do  
 19 you agree that it presents a compelling case for the  
 20 implementation of vehicle mitigation on London Bridge?  
 21 A. When considered on its own, yes.  
 22 Q. Yes. And it was a compelling case which, and you've  
 23 been referred to these documents by Mr Patterson, which  
 24 appears to have influenced his mindset for some period  
 25 of time prior to the production of this document?

160

1 A. Influenced the officer's mindset?  
 2 Q. Yes.  
 3 A. I mean, I can't really comment on that.  
 4 Q. We were shown by Mr Patterson emails and communications  
 5 that suggested in March, for example, that he was  
 6 identifying London Bridge as a place of concern?  
 7 A. Yes, the document shows he's commenting on  
 8 London Bridge, yes.  
 9 Q. Yes. And so if we just call up one such document by way  
 10 of example, {WS5014/14}, and this is an email from  
 11 Mr Hone on 24 March, two days after the Westminster  
 12 attack, and towards the bottom of that page:  
 13 "If you require a 'Top 5' list of places that are  
 14 more likely to be hit by an attack, it is very difficult  
 15 but I would suggest that the list below is as accurate  
 16 as I could possibly be."  
 17 And then London Bridge is identified; yes?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And over the page, {WS5014/15} we discover that that is  
 20 a view that that is supported by Mr Haddon, the CTSA  
 21 supervisor?  
 22 A. Yes, it says that Mark concurs with the list.  
 23 Q. Yes. So we've got two officers independently forming  
 24 this view, and we also know that Cerastes in their  
 25 analysis formed the view that this was an attractive

161

1 site?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Yes. So there is a compelling body of evidence, is  
 4 there not, that multiple people regarded this place as  
 5 a particular risk?  
 6 A. Well, we've got PC Hone who identifies it as a risk and  
 7 his supervisor who is identifying it as a risk.  
 8 Q. Yes.  
 9 A. I don't know the context of how they're thinking about  
 10 that with all of the other locations within the City of  
 11 London Police. I don't -- I just simply don't know how  
 12 he came about that.  
 13 Q. Yes, but you see the point is that you say it on  
 14 a number of occasions that it has to be considered in  
 15 the broader context.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. When you're looking at risk, you have to identify your  
 18 priorities.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. The point that I'm putting to you is that we've got  
 21 a number of people who are identifying this as  
 22 a specific problem, this is a specific area where there  
 23 is real concern?  
 24 A. Yes, so my view is he's identifying it as a specific  
 25 area of risk, but obviously I'm back to my point around

162

1 the threat. If we look at my slide that I put up this  
 2 morning which shows the disrupted plots as well as those  
 3 attacks that did happen, but if you look at the 13  
 4 disrupted plots, there would have been potentially a lot  
 5 of other locations had Cerastes been tasked to them  
 6 which would equally have come up with risk.  
 7 So it is a prioritisation process, but I absolutely  
 8 accept from the report in front of me that London Bridge  
 9 was one of five locations that that officer put forward  
 10 based on the methodology that he had set out.  
 11 Q. And is there any significance, in your view, if we just  
 12 go back to the previous page, {WS5014/14}, that in his  
 13 statement:  
 14 "If you require a 'Top 5' list of places that are  
 15 more likely to be hit by an attack ..."  
 16 Is there a significance that he defines it in that  
 17 way as opposed to "crowded places"?  
 18 A. He follows it on by saying "It is very difficult".  
 19 I mean, he says -- he does say:  
 20 "If you require a 'top 5' list of places that are  
 21 more likely to be hit by an attack, it is very  
 22 difficult ..."  
 23 But he makes a suggestion. But I think he does  
 24 recognise what I've tried to articulate: that it is  
 25 difficult in terms of prioritisation when you're faced

163

1 with a raft of information and intelligence and threat  
 2 assessments.  
 3 Q. You touch upon the definition of crowded places in your  
 4 statement, paragraphs 46. For the screen, {WS5032/11}.  
 5 THE CHIEF CORONER: That, I think, is the 2011 definition.  
 6 MR ADAMSON: Yes, the 2011, 2014 working definition.  
 7 And at paragraph 46, you refer to the CONTEST 2011  
 8 documentation and the description of crowded places  
 9 there is including:  
 10 "... shopping centres, sports stadia, bars, pubs and  
 11 clubs which are easily accessible to the public and  
 12 attractive to terrorists."  
 13 Then you refer to:  
 14 "A working definition in use since 2014 is:  
 15 "'A crowded place is a location or environment to  
 16 which members of the public have access that may be  
 17 considered more at risk from a terrorist attack by  
 18 virtue of its crowd density [or the nature of the  
 19 site ]"  
 20 And that bit is in square brackets?  
 21 A. That's right.  
 22 Q. Now the footnote there is to the Crowded Places Planning  
 23 System. Just before we turn to that document, is there  
 24 a reason why you have got "or the nature of the site" in  
 25 square brackets?

164

1 A. No, I've taken that as a direct lift, I think.  
 2 Q. Can we have up on screen, please, {DC8338/1}, and  
 3 I think this is the Crowded Places Planning System  
 4 document to which you are referring, and if we can move  
 5 through to page 5 of that {DC8338/5}, paragraph 1.04 is  
 6 the one that I'm after.  
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think it may have been back a page.  
 8 MR ADAMSON: Back a page {DC8338/4}.  
 9 THE CHIEF CORONER: Perhaps at page 3 {DC8338/3}.  
 10 MR ADAMSON: Thank you very much. And we see there:  
 11 "A crowded place is a location or an environment to  
 12 which members of the public have access that may be  
 13 considered potentially liable to terrorist attack by  
 14 virtue of its crowd density."  
 15 There's no bit in square brackets "or the nature of  
 16 the site" there, and then it goes on to say:  
 17 "What counts as a crowded place is a matter of  
 18 judgment."  
 19 Now, was it the case that in determining whether or  
 20 not something was a crowded place, that the focus was on  
 21 density, or did the nature of the site form part of the  
 22 analysis?  
 23 A. Are we talking about 2014 --  
 24 Q. Yes.  
 25 A. -- not previous to that?

165

1 Q. Yes, 2014.  
 2 A. So there were two criteria that it needed to meet which  
 3 I spoke about this morning. One of those criteria is  
 4 the crowd density, and if it didn't meet the crowd  
 5 density, it didn't progress in relation to the  
 6 assessment, and the crowd density, there were some  
 7 sensitive diagrams that were released to help assist  
 8 people with understanding the criteria for crowd  
 9 density. What I would say is having seen them, I think  
 10 what we as members of the public would see as being  
 11 dense doesn't mean that it meets the crowd density  
 12 criteria for the Crowded Places Model.  
 13 Q. Yes. Forgive me, can I focus, then, again, on your  
 14 wording in paragraph 47 of your statement. You said:  
 15 "... may be considered more at risk from a terrorist  
 16 attack by virtue of its crowd density [or the nature of  
 17 the site ]."  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Now, it sounds to me that that is not an accurate  
 20 reflection of how to define crowded places on the basis  
 21 of your evidence, because you're saying if it's not  
 22 sufficiently dense, you don't move on, that's the end of  
 23 the analysis?  
 24 A. Well, "or the nature of the site", the other half of the  
 25 two criteria is that it had to be sort of a place, it

166

1 had to have an owner, so that was another specific  
 2 requirement.  
 3 Q. So in fact it's crowd density and the nature of the  
 4 site?  
 5 A. Well, the two criteria are applicable, yes.  
 6 Q. Yes. But do you understand --  
 7 A. So if you failed in one, you are not going to progress  
 8 to the next stage of the process in terms of the matrix.  
 9 Q. Right. So it sounds from what you're saying that  
 10 actually it's not really a matter of judgment as set out  
 11 in the guidance document; it's you're either in or  
 12 you're out?  
 13 A. There is an element of judgment. I mean, I have gone  
 14 through the process myself, and there is an element of  
 15 judgment that you have to bring to bear on the  
 16 assessment, so when you're -- you're being given some  
 17 guidance around what crowd density means, but you are  
 18 applying your professional judgment as to where you  
 19 think it is on the scale of crowd density.  
 20 Q. But if it doesn't tick the boxes, whatever those boxes  
 21 may be, but somebody carrying out the assessment thinks:  
 22 well, this is a target, this is an area which cries out  
 23 for being treated as if it's a crowded place, it sounds  
 24 to me from what you're saying that such a location would  
 25 not progress in those circumstances?

167

1 A. No, I think somewhere I did mention that there were  
 2 a few locations that the CTSA's just decided to put in  
 3 because they can.  
 4 I mean, we would never be prescriptive enough to not  
 5 allow somebody's professional judgment, I mean, in my  
 6 view, that would be quite draconian.  
 7 Q. Because one of the observations made by the City of  
 8 London Police Commander Gyford's statement -- that she  
 9 makes in that statement, is that the guidance was rigid.  
 10 A. Well, I can only comment on the Metropolitan Police.  
 11 I mean, that's more of a question for Commander Gyford,  
 12 but the tiering process was very clear, but I certainly  
 13 am aware of cases where a CTSA has chosen to add  
 14 somebody into the pot from a professional perspective,  
 15 professional judgment.  
 16 Q. Can we call up on the screen, please, {WS5015/39}.  
 17 Sorry, I do apologise. We'll go back a page just so we  
 18 can get some context. {WS5015/38}. Yes, this is the  
 19 security group meeting on 13 April 2017, and if one goes  
 20 to the page that I just referred you to, item 4.2:  
 21 "[Commander] Gyford questioned the definition of  
 22 Crowded Places in connection with the Government  
 23 Security Zone and asked whether we should feed this back  
 24 to JTAC. Detective Chief Superintendent Barnard agreed  
 25 that ... is the issue here, rather than protecting

168

1 crowded places as we know them. The financial sector is  
 2 unique and falls outside of the Government Security  
 3 Zone. The Home Office definition is quite rigid and  
 4 does not include sites such as [x] which is one of our  
 5 crowded places and iconic sites.”

6 A. Yes, that’s what it says.

7 Q. Yes. So there’s a sense in this minute that the Crowded  
 8 Places Model isn’t really working in identifying places  
 9 that require additional levels of protection; do you  
 10 agree with that?

11 A. I think what I would say is what I’ve said this morning:  
 12 I think there is definitely some learning around the  
 13 Crowded Places Model. It is very much focused on  
 14 crowded places, not spaces. We have had a review that’s  
 15 been taking place over a number of months.

16 I also feel that the flexibility and agility of the  
 17 model would benefit from being able to be slightly  
 18 quicker than it has been in the past, and I think for me  
 19 we’ve got two test sites taking place elsewhere in the  
 20 UK where we’re looking to try a different model.

21 It’s very difficult, I mean I’m not aware of anybody  
 22 else who has got a Crowded Places Model, so I think we  
 23 have had some experts that developed a model, it might  
 24 not be perfect, it needs improvement, but actually it  
 25 does help us to come to a prioritisation process when

169

1 considered against the threat picture, the intelligence,  
 2 and the live investigations to help amplify protective  
 3 security. But in no way would I sit here and ever say  
 4 it’s perfect because I think any model has room for  
 5 improvement.

6 Q. You say it allows you to identify priorities, but it  
 7 appears that at no stage did the model identify either  
 8 Westminster Bridge or London Bridge as a crowded place  
 9 which demanded prioritisation?

10 A. The model -- I can’t comment on London Bridge, but I can  
 11 comment that the model did not identify  
 12 Westminster Bridge as meeting the criteria for a crowded  
 13 place under the model.

14 Q. And is that because it was being applied either too  
 15 rigidly or it was, in fact, too rigid?

16 A. No, I think it took the criteria that was there and it  
 17 didn’t meet the criteria, but what it did mean is that  
 18 there were over 400 other sites that did which required  
 19 us to focus and prioritise protective security advice  
 20 and including, obviously, the Government Security Zone.

21 Q. And is it also the case that when CTSAs like Mr Hone  
 22 were applying their judgment to the facts that faced  
 23 them, they were identifying places like London Bridge as  
 24 crying out in need of further protection?

25 A. So I can’t comment on PC Hone. We have a number of

170

1 CTSAs in the Metropolitan Police who work on this  
 2 constantly, and are engaged with various different  
 3 owners of numerous places across the capital. I mean,  
 4 we are engaged with people who don’t fit the Crowded  
 5 Places Model but come to us and proactively seek  
 6 protective security advice. We provide advice to people  
 7 and the owners of those locations. It is discretionary  
 8 whether they choose to put that in place or not.

9 Q. So was it a deficient system being applied rigidly or  
 10 not?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Can we have on screen, please, an extract from  
 13 Sarah Nacey’s statement, {WS5022/8}. At paragraph 28  
 14 she identifies a more formalised definition. Just by  
 15 way of context, if one looks at paragraph 27 of her  
 16 statement, she cites the passage to which you also refer  
 17 in paragraph, I think, 46 of your statement, and then at  
 18 paragraph 28, Ms Nacey moves on to the definition  
 19 from February 2018, I won’t read it out, it’s very long,  
 20 and the Home Office has seen fit to shorten it,  
 21 paragraph 29, and we see there that there are three  
 22 categories identified: permanent buildings, temporary  
 23 events, and crowded spaces {WS5022/9}, and bridges is  
 24 specifically identified under that particular subset, so  
 25 paragraph 30:

171

1 ”Crowded spaces’ therefore form a subset of crowded  
 2 places.”

3 Does that development of the approach to crowded  
 4 places indicate that there was a flaw in the Crowded  
 5 Places Model that was being applied previously in that  
 6 it did not specifically identify places like bridges as  
 7 being capable of being a crowded place?

8 A. I mean, I can’t comment, I wasn’t in this role at the  
 9 time that those considerations were taking place, but it  
 10 would tend to suggest that we’re constantly looking at  
 11 a lot of our processes, our policies, our procedures,  
 12 and we do that in collaboration with the government, and  
 13 therefore it would tend to suggest, which I think would  
 14 be correct, that we’re reviewing it and looking at how  
 15 we can develop the model. I mean, we always want to  
 16 make these things better, you know, we want to make them  
 17 as good as we can to protect the public and make  
 18 a hostile environment for terrorists.

19 Q. Well quite.

20 Can I move on to a different topic. You’ve  
 21 explained how after London Bridge there was a concerted  
 22 effort to implement barriers on eight London bridges.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And that was achieved within six days.

25 A. Six days that they were in place and then there was

172

1 a couple of weeks to fine-tune it .

2 Q. Yes. But in substance you had implemented that decision

3 to install those barriers within six days, and then

4 there was some tinkering to be done thereafter?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. That demonstrates, does it not, that when there is

7 a will, there is a way, and so if action is demanded, it

8 will be done?

9 A. So I think it demonstrates, as I said earlier, in

10 extremis there's a lot of things that can be ruled out

11 which we would normally have to consider and have a duty

12 to consider. So we were in a case of extremis, it was

13 my recommendation that they went in and, yes, they were

14 installed within six days.

15 Q. Yes, and presumably part of the rationale for you making

16 that recommendation was that the sorts of considerations

17 identified by Mr Hone were correct: that those concerns

18 that he had identified accurately reflected the threat?

19 A. No. So I said this morning, I think, I hope I was

20 really clear about what my rationale was. My rationale

21 was that it was now a second attack on a bridge, I had

22 a real concern in relation to future copycats from

23 terrorists, and morally it felt the right thing to do.

24 But there was still an absence of any threat assessment

25 or intelligence or any of the current live operations to

173

1 suggest that bridges were a target. So my decision was

2 based on those reasons. I had no knowledge of PC Hone's

3 report, and it was just, that was my decision.

4 Q. Yes. But when you say you were concerned about copycat

5 attacks, you were concerned about the very risks that

6 PC Hone was identifying materialising yet again, were

7 you not?

8 A. I mean, I was simply worried about a copycat attack.

9 The sort of -- you know, the landscape of the bridges,

10 you know, I wasn't aware of the height of pavements on

11 different bridges, I wasn't aware of the pavement size

12 on different bridges, I was just concerned that somebody

13 might want to do a copycat attack on a bridge. I didn't

14 get down in a way -- rightly or wrongly, I wasn't bogged

15 down in the detail of what they looked like, I was just

16 concerned there could be a copycat attack and morally it

17 felt absolutely the right thing to do.

18 Q. The complexities of installing barriers on bridges were

19 something that effectively were overridden in those

20 circumstances?

21 A. Yes, they were. I mean, if -- I have since discovered

22 the complexity of engineering on bridges, which makes it

23 even more commendable, I think, that those involved in

24 putting the barriers in, what they achieved, but yes,

25 it's eye-wateringly complex, specifically from

174

1 an engineering perspective.

2 Q. Yes, because we see, in fact, in both Commander Gyford's

3 statement and in Mr Hone's statement, references to the

4 fact that when they were contemplating the issue of

5 barriers, they weren't imagining it being installed in

6 a short time frame, they were thinking that it would

7 take a considerable period of time for that to be

8 installed.

9 It's troubling, isn't it, that it takes fatalities

10 to actually override those difficulties of red tape; do

11 you agree?

12 A. I think it's always the case that in extremis things

13 become easier, and that's just my experience of how

14 things are. But, you know, my view is that certainly

15 from an engineering perspective, you know, people work

16 tirelessly to find solutions to what is a really tricky

17 environment.

18 There are a lot of other complexities, not least

19 around who owns the bridges, whose responsibility is it,

20 the financing of it, the proportionality of putting

21 barriers on bridges, that's always something that, you

22 know, users or owners of those locations will want to

23 consider when considered against the threat assessment

24 and the intelligence.

25 Q. And, for example, let me just -- this is what

175

1 Commander Gyford says in her statement:

2 "Had the Security Group been made aware of the

3 report [this is the Cerastes report] and/or the summary

4 prepared by PC Hone, both of which I've now read,

5 I believe it's highly unlikely that temporary HVM would

6 have been placed on London Bridge for the same reasons

7 as set out above."

8 And there's a similar theme given by Mr Hone in his

9 statement about the period of time that it would take.

10 Ought there to be a mechanism whereby decisions of

11 this nature can be taken much more rapidly?

12 A. Well, I mean, again, in normal -- not in extremis we

13 would be making recommendations to the owners of those

14 areas in order to put protective security measures in

15 place.

16 I mean, it's difficult for me to comment on the

17 discussions that were taking place in the City of London

18 or, indeed, what their thinking was at that time, but

19 certainly my thinking between Westminster Bridge and the

20 London Bridge attack was that there was no threat

21 assessment to say that bridges were a target of

22 terrorist activity.

23 MR ADAMSON: Thank you very much.

24 THE CHIEF CORONER: Good afternoon, Ms Leek.

25 Questions by MS LEEK QC

176

1 MS LEEK: Officer, I have one discrete issue that I would  
 2 like to ask you about on behalf of the Home Office:  
 3 CTSA's are charged with identifying attractive sites for  
 4 NaCTSO, their top five or, in the case of the  
 5 Metropolitan Police Service, the top ten; is that right?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And that is fed upwards to NaCTSO who moderate the list  
 8 of sites together with the OSCT, the Office for Security  
 9 and Counter-Terrorism?  
 10 A. So not necessarily in relation to the top five sites,  
 11 that was a specific requirement of an SRC tasking. So  
 12 in relation to the Crowded Places Model, then the answer  
 13 is yes.  
 14 Q. They feed that upwards?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And if at any particular time, or having regard to  
 17 particular events, CTSA's identify a site as attractive  
 18 to terrorists or vulnerable for a particular reason, am  
 19 I right in thinking that there is nothing stopping them  
 20 from engaging with the owners and operators of that site  
 21 to give them advice?  
 22 A. Absolutely, that's correct.  
 23 MS LEEK: Thank you, sir, I have no further questions.  
 24 Questions by MR HORWELL QC  
 25 MR HORWELL: I've got just six topics to deal with.

177

1 The Cerastes report and the Hone emails and  
 2 meetings. You have said that you were not made aware of  
 3 them before the attack. Can I just ask you to confirm,  
 4 please, as you have said in your statement, that as far  
 5 as you understand the position, no one within the  
 6 Metropolitan Police Service was aware of that report or  
 7 of those emails and meetings?  
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 9 Q. Now, just to summarise your evidence on  
 10 Westminster Bridge and other London locations. You have  
 11 said that it was your understanding that the attack at  
 12 Westminster was an attack on Westminster Palace.  
 13 A. That's correct.  
 14 Q. And that Masood drove his vehicle at pedestrians before  
 15 the attack on the Palace rather than against pedestrians  
 16 on Westminster Bridge?  
 17 A. That's correct.  
 18 Q. There having been no intelligence that terrorists were  
 19 targeting pedestrians on bridges rather than pedestrians  
 20 generally?  
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 22 Q. You also said on a number of occasions that there are  
 23 many locations in London where pedestrians are  
 24 vulnerable to attack from a vehicle.  
 25 A. Yes, I did.

178

1 Q. Was it your view, is it your view that it is  
 2 proportionate, let alone desirable, to place barriers at  
 3 each and every one of those locations?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Barrier London, as sometimes the press chooses to call  
 6 it?  
 7 A. Oh, no, sorry, yes, so no, I mean, I do say to people  
 8 I do not encourage us to become Barrier Britain, that is  
 9 not the way to deal with the threat that we face from  
 10 international terrorism, so we need to have a very  
 11 balanced and proportionate approach which is predicated  
 12 on the threat assessment and the intelligence picture  
 13 that shows us where and takes us where we need to  
 14 prioritise protective security advice. It's just simply  
 15 not practical or proportionate to put barriers  
 16 everywhere.  
 17 Q. Lord Harris pointed out in his report, as indeed have  
 18 others during the course of this Inquest, the obvious  
 19 point that intelligence will never be perfect, and you  
 20 have said that the Metropolitan Police force relies on  
 21 intelligence but also threat and risk assessments at  
 22 a multiplicity of locations?  
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 24 Q. And that's been the long-standing process in London.  
 25 A. It has been, yes.

179

1 Q. And finally this: you have said again on a number of  
 2 occasions, because you have been asked on many  
 3 occasions, whether in your national role or your  
 4 Metropolitan Police Service role, you've said that  
 5 London Bridge was not your responsibility?  
 6 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 7 Q. Now, reporting sometimes is inaccurate and unfair, and  
 8 I'm going to deal with what might have been implied by  
 9 some of the questions to you directly.  
 10 Are you seeking to distance yourself from the bridge  
 11 to avoid responsibility for what happened?  
 12 A. Absolutely not.  
 13 Q. It's a statement of fact?  
 14 A. It is a statement of fact: it does not sit under my  
 15 jurisdiction.  
 16 Q. It is, and was the responsibility of the City of London,  
 17 which has its own counter terrorism unit?  
 18 A. Yes, in terms of protective security, yes.  
 19 MR HORWELL: That's all I ask, thank you.  
 20 A. Thank you.  
 21 Further questions by MR HOUGH QC  
 22 MR HOUGH: Deputy Assistant Commissioner, one final point,  
 23 please. You were shown an email from Police Constable  
 24 Hone on 24 March 2017. {WS5014/14}, thank you. In  
 25 fact, you were shown this a couple of times and you were

180

1 asked about Mr Hone saying: if you really need a top  
 2 five list of attractive places, it's very difficult, but  
 3 here they are.  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. I would just like to deal with the genesis of that email  
 6 and why he was looking for five attractive sites. May  
 7 we please look at {WS5015/31}. This is a NaCTSO tasking  
 8 sheet from the day before that email; do you see that?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And then the next page, please, page 32 {WS5015/32}.  
 11 Can we see that the tasking given to counter terrorism  
 12 security advisors from a request made earlier that day  
 13 was for the submission of a "top five Crowded Place  
 14 sites for your Region"?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And a request from DACSO noted requesting reassurance  
 17 about activity undertaken to engage with those sites?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct. I think this is linked to the SRC  
 19 actions.  
 20 Q. So, just to be clear, directly after the  
 21 Westminster Bridge attack, you, through the SRC, gave  
 22 an action which required at a local level CTAs to  
 23 identify top five sites?  
 24 A. Yes, so I think as I talked about earlier, I ask forces  
 25 to do something, it's their decision but, yes, my

181

1 requirement was that they looked at those locations.  
 2 Q. So the email which you were shown and which it was  
 3 suggested involved PC Hone going through a careful  
 4 analysis of sites in his locality, that flowed from  
 5 a request made by you?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much, those are all my questions.  
 8 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you very much. Thank you.  
 9 A. Thank you.  
 10 MR HOUGH: Sir, the next witness is Deputy Chief Constable  
 11 Gyford.  
 12 DEPUTY CHIEF CONSTABLE JANE GYFORD (sworn)  
 13 THE CHIEF CORONER: Good afternoon. Please take a seat.  
 14 I'm sorry we won't finish your evidence today but we'll  
 15 make a start, if that's all right.  
 16 Mr Hough, we'll sit through until about 5 o'clock.  
 17 Questions by MR HOUGH QC  
 18 MR HOUGH: Yes, sir.  
 19 Would you please give your name for the court?  
 20 A. My name is Jane Gyford. I was previously the Commander  
 21 of Operations and Security within the City of London  
 22 Police, and my current role is Deputy Chief Constable of  
 23 Cambridgeshire Constabulary.  
 24 Q. I think you took up your current role in Cambridgeshire  
 25 last month; is that right?

182

1 A. On 13 May.  
 2 Q. So at the time of the London Bridge attack, is this  
 3 right, you were a commander in the City of London  
 4 Police?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. And do you appreciate that you're here to give evidence  
 7 about the City of London Police's protective security  
 8 arrangements before and at the time of the attack?  
 9 A. Yes, I do.  
 10 Q. You made a witness statement about these matters on  
 11 27 February 2019. You may refer to that as you wish.  
 12 A. Thank you.  
 13 Q. A few questions about your own career, first of all.  
 14 Did you start your policing career in the Metropolitan  
 15 Police Service in 1992?  
 16 A. I did. I started in the Met in March 1992, and I served  
 17 in various areas within the Met for 24 and a half years,  
 18 just under, with pretty much the full scope of  
 19 experience within the Met before transferring to the  
 20 City of London.  
 21 Q. And did you transfer to the City of London Police in  
 22 2016 at the rank of detective chief superintendent?  
 23 A. That's right, yes, and I was in charge of the  
 24 Intelligence and Information Directorate, which pretty  
 25 much deals with all of the intelligence flows coming

183

1 into the City of London Police, but also testing and  
 2 exercising, operational planning and resource management  
 3 and also command and control.  
 4 Q. Then from February 2017, did you work in the Operations  
 5 and Security Directorate of the City of London Police,  
 6 first as a temporary commander, then as a full  
 7 commander?  
 8 A. So, if I can explain it, that wasn't the directorate or  
 9 the command. My responsibility was pretty much for  
 10 operations and security for the whole of the City of  
 11 London Police. So I actually was responsible for more  
 12 than just a directorate; it was pretty much the force  
 13 and running of the force where it comes to operations  
 14 and security.  
 15 Q. So you were the lead for all aspects of operational  
 16 policing and security?  
 17 A. Yes. So, if you will, it's not just the crime or  
 18 counter terrorism element, it's uniformed policing, it's  
 19 everything that I talked about in intelligence  
 20 management, it's quite vast, and also the Secure City  
 21 Programme which was, if you like, the revamp of the Ring  
 22 of Steel at the time, which I initiated.  
 23 Q. Thank you. Are you also, looking at matters of relevant  
 24 background, an experienced firearms commander and  
 25 somebody who has commanded many firearms operations?

184

1 A. I am. When I was in the Metropolitan Police the last  
 2 command I served in was the Specialist Firearms Command  
 3 and I trained as a strategic firearms commander and also  
 4 then became specialist strategic firearms commander,  
 5 which allows me the accreditation to run complex  
 6 proactive counter terrorism jobs, operations within  
 7 London and beyond because it's a national register .  
 8 Q. May I now turn to protective security in the City of  
 9 London and Project Servator. Is it right that the City  
 10 of London Police has had for a long time a protective  
 11 system of entry points for the City you've referred to  
 12 already as the Ring of Steel?  
 13 A. Yes, that's correct. There's a history behind the Ring  
 14 of Steel which is walked through in my statement if you  
 15 want me to go through it for the court?  
 16 Q. I'm not going to ask you to read out your statement. If  
 17 I can just ask for your confirmation of this, and you  
 18 can add any observations you wish. Broadly speaking,  
 19 does the system work by limiting the number of vehicle  
 20 entry points and having uniformed officers stationed at  
 21 them at specific times to assess vehicles?  
 22 A. Yes, that's how it did work, yes.  
 23 Q. And you've indicated that you instituted a revamp of  
 24 that procedure over time. Is there any aspect of that  
 25 revamp that's relevant to, for our purposes, protective

185

1 security in the context of these Inquests?  
 2 A. I think it's important to note that I'm very proud of  
 3 having been a member of the City of London Police around  
 4 some of the advanced thinking that we were doing, and in  
 5 particular around the Ring of Steel and understanding  
 6 that within the 21st century, many changes are  
 7 happening, and still continue to happen, and that was  
 8 one of the reasons why the Secure City Programme  
 9 considered many aspects of the Ring of Steel which were  
 10 very different from what we saw in the 1990s.  
 11 Q. So the Ring of Steel has been developed in  
 12 a sophisticated way to deal with modern threats?  
 13 A. Absolutely, and continues to be developed, I should say.  
 14 Q. Now, in recent years, has the City of London Police also  
 15 developed a tactic called Project Servator?  
 16 A. Yes, they have, they were the vanguard force for  
 17 Project Servator and worked with CPNI. Again, it shows  
 18 the agility of the City of London Police, of the scale  
 19 of it, the fact that I always say it's a small force  
 20 with a big gig, because it needed to ensure that it was  
 21 serving the communities, which is very different from  
 22 other communities we see in UK policing.  
 23 Q. Can you summarise what Project Servator was and is?  
 24 A. Project Servator is a tactic that we use in policing.  
 25 In really, really simple terms it's high-impact, if you

186

1 like, flash police officers into one location where they  
 2 distribute leaflets, are highly visible, they talk to  
 3 people, they watch behaviour, but also it's also the  
 4 police presence that's coupled with some of the social  
 5 media and the messaging that goes out when we are  
 6 effecting Project Servator.  
 7 Q. Is its intention to disrupt criminal activity of various  
 8 kinds including, but not limited to, terrorism?  
 9 A. Yes, disrupt, and also obviously there's part of it that  
 10 has to be detection, so if someone is acting strangely  
 11 then that would obviously lead to a line of inquiry that  
 12 would be followed up, speaking to them on the ground, or  
 13 whatever they saw at any one particular time would need  
 14 to be addressed.  
 15 Q. Is one particular focus of the tactic to identify and  
 16 disrupt hostile reconnaissance, so that's to say  
 17 gathering of intelligence by those planning terrorist or  
 18 other criminal acts?  
 19 A. Yes, the pre-planning phase of any terrorist behaviour,  
 20 that's what that particularly means and what we would be  
 21 looking for in Project Servator.  
 22 Q. In simple terms, one of the jobs of those officers is to  
 23 look for people behaving in a strange manner which  
 24 suggests that they may be checking places out for  
 25 potential criminal acts?

187

1 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 2 Q. Did the City of London Police pilot this tactic from  
 3 2011 along with the Centre for Protection of the  
 4 National Infrastructure?  
 5 A. Yes, working with CPNI, the City of London Police, as  
 6 I said, because of the location, the importance of it,  
 7 both for the UK and internationally, and also the size  
 8 and scale, it's a really good place to test some of  
 9 these tactics and advance them and also it's in the  
 10 capital city.  
 11 Q. Now, I'll ask you shortly about the involvement of the  
 12 company Cerastes Limited in relation to the tactic.  
 13 Before I do, may I ask you some questions about counter  
 14 terrorist deployments. We've already seen referred to  
 15 in these Inquests today minutes of a body called the  
 16 Security Group. Is this a group that meets regularly  
 17 within the City of London Police?  
 18 A. It is. It's a group, the Security Group is chaired by  
 19 myself -- or was -- commander ops and security, and it's  
 20 attended by all levels of those within the force that  
 21 need to input into it, and it pretty much is  
 22 representation across the force, so you would people  
 23 from not only the crime directorate, but also the  
 24 uniform directorate. Everyone attends that group to  
 25 talk about protective security and counter terrorism

188

1 matters.

2 And I think essentially, if I can make it really  
3 clear at this point, the Security Group always sits just  
4 after the Security Review Committee that the DACSO  
5 talked about, so I think it's important to understand  
6 that that meeting sits, quite rightly gives the advice  
7 that the DACSO explained, and it's brought back to the  
8 Security Group where we actually think about what we  
9 need to do locally, and that is what we were seeing in  
10 those Security Group meetings.

11 So to be clear, they are local minutes, they're not  
12 for the passage upward into the SRC. The SRC is giving  
13 us, if you like, the position for us to bring back into  
14 the City of London Police.

15 Q. So the way it works is that every two weeks there will  
16 be a Security Review Committee meeting which deals, as  
17 Ms D'Orsi said, with matters across London as a whole,  
18 and that is followed on each occasion within the City of  
19 London Police by a Security Group meeting which takes  
20 account of the points made in that Security Review  
21 Committee meeting?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. Does the Security Group consider as one of its functions  
24 operations and deployments of police for counter  
25 terrorism work?

189

1 A. Yes, it's one of the primary functions.

2 Q. What are the broad purposes of Security Group meetings?  
3 What is considered and decided upon at those meetings?

4 A. Well, I have it in front of me. I'll read it out, just  
5 to be clear: decide what is relevant to the City of  
6 London, so the narrative behind that is how I've  
7 described the SRC, input will be brought back and we  
8 will apply it to the City of London; provide strategic  
9 directions for the Protect and Prepare counter terrorism  
10 activity; review the intelligence in determining risk to  
11 the City of London; identify relevant emergent issues;  
12 oversee and quality assure the tasking returns from the  
13 previous period, which is always two weeks before and  
14 then two weeks forward, and coordination with the  
15 Protect and Prepare counter terrorism activity -- sorry,  
16 consideration to the firearms authority restrictions and  
17 cross-border protocols must be included; review the City  
18 of London Police response to a change in the threat  
19 level; review building security for the City of London  
20 Police estate; mitigate any further security threats to  
21 the City of London Police through Cyber Insider and  
22 external means; review the management of security  
23 threats to the City of London and review the management  
24 of security threats to all City of London Police assets,  
25 including people, information, premises and property.

190

1 So it is dealing with all counter terrorism and all  
2 protective security matters and the reference to the  
3 taskings is Security Group sits every two weeks, so we  
4 review two weeks backwards and then we review two weeks  
5 forwards, and I sign off on those two weeks, or whoever  
6 is chairing if I can't chair.

7 Q. When you refer to taskings, do you mean deployment of  
8 officers to particular places at particular times for  
9 counter terrorism and security purposes?

10 A. Yes, to particular locations.

11 Q. Is it right that you chaired most of the Security Group  
12 meetings from March to May 2017, and we'll look at the  
13 particular dates as we go?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. We've heard about counter terrorism security advisors,  
16 specially trained officers who provide advice in local  
17 areas about counter terrorism measures, including  
18 protective security. At the times with which we're  
19 concerned was PC Hone such an officer in the City of  
20 London area?

21 A. Yes, he was.

22 Q. Was he somebody with considerable experience in that  
23 role?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Did he attend meetings of the Security Group?

191

1 A. He did, not all the time, the same as I couldn't chair  
2 all the time, but a lot of the time he did.

3 Q. In deciding on deployments of officers for counter  
4 terrorism purposes, would that group receive guidance  
5 from Mr Hone, taking account of the intelligence  
6 available to him?

7 A. He would present the proposed taskings and also within  
8 the review of the backward look, provide a kind of  
9 advice of how they'd worked if they were still  
10 specifically directed to the intelligence picture, the  
11 threat picture, and if they'd changed for the forward  
12 look.

13 Q. Would he sometimes or often provide suggestive taskings  
14 by email to other members of the group in advance?

15 A. If he couldn't attend, the practice of using emails is  
16 not to do the business on emails; it's to provide the  
17 papers for a forward look, so the paper bundles can then  
18 be used in the meetings.

19 Q. In addition to the advice given by a CTSA, would the  
20 deployment and tasking process also take account of  
21 sites identified as priority locations?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, would those be places in tier 1 and tier 2 of the  
24 Crowded Places Model?

25 A. Yes.

192

1 Q. When making his recommendations about deployments, would  
 2 Mr Hone provide a rationale, taking account of the  
 3 intelligence from MI5, terrorist propaganda, and methods  
 4 used in attacks worldwide?  
 5 A. PC Hone was very thorough when it came to his rationale  
 6 around providing CT taskings into Security Group.  
 7 Q. Would he consider a wide range of sites in the City, not  
 8 only those in tier 1 and tier 2 of the Crowded Places  
 9 Model?  
 10 A. Yes, he would also consider other places.  
 11 Q. After the Security Group had decided on the taskings for  
 12 deployment of officers for counter terrorism purposes,  
 13 how would they be communicated to others?  
 14 A. So we would make sure that they were put on our  
 15 electronic system, so the taskings would then go out to  
 16 everyone and they would be accessed through a system,  
 17 an electronic system, where each of the resources could  
 18 be allocated to it. They would also be present in our  
 19 daily management meeting which sat every day, Monday to  
 20 Friday, but also reviewed by the control room inspector  
 21 seven days a week.  
 22 So the mechanism was on a, if you like,  
 23 business-as-usual, steady state practice of making sure  
 24 that officers were tasked to the directions of the CT  
 25 tasking sheet.

193

1 Q. Did London Bridge regularly feature in the counter  
 2 terrorism taskings?  
 3 A. Yes, it did.  
 4 Q. That, although I think it was not a priority crowded  
 5 place under the OSCT approach?  
 6 A. No, it was something that we included because our own,  
 7 if you like, operationalising what the intelligence  
 8 picture, threat picture was at the time, was to include  
 9 it within our taskings.  
 10 Q. Now, just to be clear on this, the question was asked of  
 11 DAC D'Orsi as to whether London Bridge was in any of the  
 12 tiers of the crowded places structure; was it?  
 13 A. No, it wasn't, but we included it anyway.  
 14 Q. Are you able to say why it didn't feature in any of  
 15 those tiers? Whether it failed any particular test in  
 16 order not to go into one of those tiers?  
 17 A. Yes. It didn't -- the crowded places, the density model  
 18 that I think DACSO talked about didn't fit with  
 19 London Bridge. It also, although anyone can say that it  
 20 was crowded, which is why we included it, also it  
 21 doesn't have security professionals to liaise with at  
 22 the site and therefore it was very difficult for a CTSA  
 23 or a contact officer to be appointed to liaise and talk  
 24 about what could be done around that particular site.  
 25 Q. So taking those in turn, first of all we've heard that

194

1 the Crowded Places Model had a very specific definition  
 2 of what crowd density was required for somewhere to  
 3 qualify as a crowded place in any of the tiers, and  
 4 London Bridge didn't satisfy that definition?  
 5 A. No.  
 6 Q. But then you also said that there wouldn't have been  
 7 a particular building owner with whom the CTSA could  
 8 liaise in giving advice.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. As we saw with Ms D'Orsi, the purpose of the Crowded  
 11 Places Model is to allow advice and engagement to be  
 12 provided --  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. -- by the CTSA's. So is it your evidence that there are  
 15 difficulties in applying the products of that model, the  
 16 advice, to a road or roadway rather than a building?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. But nevertheless, if you have a stretch of road which  
 19 generates concern from a counter terrorism perspective,  
 20 there will be a responsible highway authority which will  
 21 have the powers and the means to install barriers if  
 22 they want to?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. So to that extent it's possible to engage with somebody  
 25 concerning even a roadway?

195

1 A. That's correct, and that's something that we started to  
 2 work on. So the engagement had begun and with the  
 3 Corporation of London, also Transport for London, where  
 4 we started to work on a matrix through PC Hone around  
 5 those top sites that we needed to look at.  
 6 So London Bridge was in there and it actually scored  
 7 at number 6, and therefore we started to work what we  
 8 needed to do at that location, amongst many others.  
 9 Interestingly London Bridge marker was for a vehicle  
 10 attack, but there were other locations, to give some  
 11 context, that would have other strands as well as  
 12 a vehicle attack. The vulnerability to London Bridge  
 13 was over a vehicle attack, to be clear, and I think  
 14 PC Hone makes that clear in his statement.  
 15 Q. Yes, we'll come to the communications he sent and the  
 16 views he took.  
 17 Can we deal with the Cerastes studies next. Were  
 18 the Cerastes studies originally commissioned in order to  
 19 support and inform deployments of uniformed officers for  
 20 Project Servator?  
 21 A. That's correct, yes.  
 22 Q. Is this right: in simple terms, Cerastes is a company  
 23 which has operatives looking at places through the eyes  
 24 of a terrorist and then producing reports advising on  
 25 how to improve protection?

196

1 A. Yes. In simple terms the company will ask operatives to  
2 pretend to be terrorists in attack planning.

3 Q. And in the case of the studies commissioned for City of  
4 London, were they specifically with a view to reporting  
5 on how deployments of officers might be made more  
6 effective ?

7 A. Yes, we were, as I said when I opened, the City of  
8 London are a forward-thinking force, so this was  
9 a proactive approach to working continually to improve  
10 our -- the way we deployed.

11 Q. Was there a first study commissioned and funded by the  
12 CPNI, the Centre for Protection of National  
13 Infrastructure from Cerastes?

14 A. Yes, there was.

15 Q. When did that take place?

16 A. That was conducted at the end of 2012, October  
17 to December 2012, and it was focused on a vehicle entry  
18 point. So that's much more to do with the Ring of  
19 Steel, and that report and the study was delivered to  
20 CPNI on 8 July 2013, and it developed Project Servator  
21 from there.

22 Q. Was there next another study, again commissioned and  
23 funded by CPNI?

24 A. Yes, that's correct, and the next study  
25 was February 2014, February/March 2014, and that was

197

1 testing how Project Servator and the capability had  
2 changed the hostile perspective. So in simple terms,  
3 was it being effective? Was it still current? Was it  
4 working?

5 Q. Where was that second study focused?

6 A. It was focused on crowded places within the City of  
7 London.

8 Q. Did it consider London Bridge at all?

9 A. No, it didn't.

10 Q. When was the report from that study delivered?

11 A. The exact date is unknown, but the final report was  
12 in April 2014.

13 Q. Was a third study then commissioned by the City of  
14 London Police itself in 2016?

15 A. That's correct, yes, at the end of 2016.

16 Q. Over what period was that study carried out?

17 A. That was from December through to March 2017, so that's  
18 when Cerastes deployed and looked at how they could test  
19 the hostile reconnaissance and the effective nature of  
20 the City of London Police.

21 Q. Was that study after being commissioned later split into  
22 two parts and the subject of two separate interim  
23 reports on each part?

24 A. Yes, and we've termed it as interim 1 and interim 2.  
25 That's how it's referred to in my statement.

198

1 Q. In broad terms, what was the purpose of this third  
2 study?

3 A. The third study was looking at the analysis of the  
4 deployments and the tactics to examine the efficiency  
5 and effectiveness of Project Servator, and improving the  
6 ability of our officers and how they deploy, and  
7 continuing to look at best practice and how we could  
8 improve.

9 It must be said that the locations we gave Cerastes  
10 were given by the City of London Police. We talk about  
11 obviously London Bridge in this context, but there were  
12 many locations given by the City of London Police to  
13 Cerastes to test.

14 Q. And were the locations to study in fact chosen by  
15 PC Hone, the CTSA?

16 A. Yes. As you can see he used many criteria to decide on  
17 which locations should go in, and in the first report,  
18 interim 1, London Bridge didn't appear, but interim 2,  
19 London Bridge then was added, and that's not unusual,  
20 incrementally phasing a number of locations in to ensure  
21 that they can be tested appropriately.

22 Q. When was interim report 1 produced and delivered?

23 A. Bear with me a second.

24 Q. It's towards the bottom of your paragraph 24.

25 A. 24, I'll just get the right date. So Cerastes provided

199

1 the interim report on 3 February and it was given to  
2 Matt Hone on 6 February and that's interim 1.

3 Q. That's the one that doesn't refer to London Bridge?

4 A. No, it doesn't.

5 Q. If we look at {WS5014/16}, can we see that Mr Hone sent  
6 a summary report of the findings of the Cerastes work to  
7 you, amongst others, on 21 February 2017?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. The second part of this third study, did that extend to  
10 further locations?

11 A. It did, yes.

12 Q. Did those include London Bridge?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did Cerastes study that location for the first time  
15 in February and March 2017?

16 A. It did.

17 Q. Was an interim report 2 produced in relation to that  
18 part of the study?

19 A. A further interim report, interim 2, was dated 31 March,  
20 but Cerastes had a huge workload at the time and so  
21 PC Hone didn't receive it until 28 April 2017, and then  
22 he had obviously, because it's the CTSA's job to review  
23 the report and to decide on what the recommendations are  
24 that come out of the report.

25 Q. Were you yourself provided with that report before the

200

1 London Bridge attack on 3 June?  
 2 A. No, I wasn't.  
 3 Q. Were you aware that that report had been provided before  
 4 then?  
 5 A. No, I wasn't.  
 6 Q. Now, much of that report is irrelevant for our purposes,  
 7 but are you aware that the report has been provided in  
 8 its entirety to the Inquest team and reviewed by  
 9 appropriately clear people?  
 10 A. I am aware of that.  
 11 Q. And naturally a report exploring vulnerabilities in the  
 12 City of London is not something one would want to  
 13 release to the entire world?  
 14 A. No, absolutely not.  
 15 Q. So has, nevertheless, a summary been produced which  
 16 contains the relevant content of that report?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. And we can see that at {WS5015/15}. If we go to  
 19 {WS5015/14}, please, we can see the introduction to that  
 20 report, and do we see that from that introduction that  
 21 the work was focused on supporting the Project Servator  
 22 tactic?  
 23 A. That's correct.  
 24 Q. And then if we go to the next page, {WS5015/15}, do we  
 25 see from the executive summary that the Cerastes

201

1 operatives reported that:  
 2 "Exposure to Project Servator deployments during  
 3 [the] reporting period was low, but probably [reflected]  
 4 realistic levels."  
 5 And that the exposure that their operatives had to  
 6 Servator deployments:  
 7 "... is still likely to disrupt hostile activity by  
 8 limiting reconnaissance and generating doubts about any  
 9 intended hostile acts."  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. So they were recognising that the tactic was, from their  
 12 perspective, having some beneficial effects?  
 13 A. Yes. And if I can just say at this point, I mean,  
 14 speaking about Cerastes to give, again, some more  
 15 context, because we're a learning organisation in the  
 16 City of London Police, the direction was to ensure that  
 17 they reported on what we needed to develop and learn  
 18 from, because to report on lots of positivity is  
 19 probably just a nice-to-have, and that was not the  
 20 purpose of the tasking.  
 21 Q. And then if we go on to {WS5015/17}, please, we've seen  
 22 this already today. The authors identified  
 23 London Bridge as being an attractive location for  
 24 a terrorist attack using a vehicle because of the lack  
 25 of barriers on the bridge and the congestion on the

202

1 bridge at certain times of day?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. And then over the page to page 18 {WS5015/18}, they  
 4 identified a particular attack method involving  
 5 a hostile vehicle being driven southbound over the  
 6 bridge, followed by a potential attack with bladed  
 7 weapons?  
 8 A. That's correct.  
 9 Q. Now, appreciating that the Cerastes operatives were  
 10 looking at this from the perspective of trying to advise  
 11 on hostile reconnaissance, and how that could be  
 12 disrupted, if you had seen this report or a summary of  
 13 it in, say, the middle of May 2017, what would have been  
 14 your view of these sections identifying the  
 15 vulnerability and attractiveness of London Bridge?  
 16 A. Well, it clearly needed action, and that action started.  
 17 So we started the engagement with the Corporation of  
 18 London and Transport for London, and they also have  
 19 a feeder board, which is called a security board, where  
 20 we started looking at what we needed to do not only on  
 21 this site but on other sites, but using the term that's  
 22 frequently used in policing, we weren't in extremis, so  
 23 we were acting on the current threat and intelligence  
 24 picture, as has already been spoken about, which  
 25 I completely agree with, and we were taking our action

203

1 and operationalising this report with others, and that's  
 2 how we were taking it forward.  
 3 Q. Are you aware from your own work that this report was  
 4 being studied and actioned by anybody before the attack?  
 5 A. Before the ...?  
 6 Q. Before the London Bridge attack.  
 7 A. No.  
 8 Q. If you had become aware of it before the attack and you  
 9 had seen this description of the particular attack  
 10 method on a bridge which, as you say, can get very  
 11 congested, would you have thought that any immediate  
 12 action was required?  
 13 A. Not immediate action because this is not intelligence  
 14 per se. It is referring to a vulnerable site and it  
 15 referred to other vulnerable sites too, so we were  
 16 considering the whole picture. It did mean that we had  
 17 to think about what action we needed to take, but we  
 18 were working with partners to try and sort out what we  
 19 needed to do around the sites. So it's not that we were  
 20 acting in a dynamic phase; we were acting in a steady  
 21 state.  
 22 Q. You've told us and we will see, I imagine tomorrow  
 23 morning, that London Bridge had been identified as one  
 24 of the priority sites for consideration by Mr Hone --  
 25 A. Yes.

204

	INDEX	PAGE
1 Q. Before he received this report?	1	
2 A. Yes.	2	
3 Q. If you had been told by him two or three weeks before	3	DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER .....1
4 the attack, "Ma'am, I have always been concerned about		LUCY D'ORSI (sworn)
5 London Bridge as an area of vulnerability, I have	4	
6 previously considered that barriers might be a good idea		Questions by MR HOUGH QC .....1
7 on London Bridge", and here we have some very	5	
8 experienced operatives putting themselves in the		Questions by MR PATTERSON QC .....90
9 position of terrorists, identifying exactly the same	6	
10 serious vulnerabilities in London Bridge, would you then		Questions by MR ADAMSON .....158
11 have decided that something ought to be done either in	7	
12 terms of action or at least in terms of advice directly		Questions by MS LEEK QC .....176
13 at that moment to TfL and the City of London	8	
14 Corporation?		Questions by MR HORWELL QC .....177
15 A. It depends -- it depends on how he was terming it to me,	9	
16 so as time went on, particularly after the attacks we		Further questions by MR HOUGH QC .....180
17 heard about in 2016, PC Hone's draw on the intelligence,	10	
18 on the international threat picture of terrorism, and		DEPUTY CHIEF CONSTABLE JANE GYFORD .....182
19 the methodology of attacks changed. So in the landscape	11	(sworn)
20 that we're in now, yes, the answer would be I would have	12	Questions by MR HOUGH QC .....182
21 said that we need to start giving that security advice	13	
22 now, but if it was before, when he was working towards	14	
23 the matrix and the pen testing that we've seen Cerastes	15	
24 be commissioned to do, then perhaps not because the	16	
25 methodology of attacks was changing over the year on	17	
	18	
205	19	
	20	
1 year.	21	
2 So it's a timing element to this. Quite rightly	22	
3 PC Hone was looking at London Bridge I think more in the	23	
4 beginning of 2017 because of the attack methodology had	24	
5 changed, but having said that, just for more context,	25	
6 really, the CT taskings in the City of London Police		
7 from around January 2016 included London Bridge because		207
8 we saw it as somewhere that we needed to deploy to		
9 around CT taskings and Project Servator.		208
10 MR HOUGH: I'm next going to turn to Security Group meetings		
11 and CT taskings.		
12 Would it be convenient to break there?		
13 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think it's probably the sensible time		
14 to break, Mr Hough, because that topic will take us		
15 a little while to deal with.		
16 So we will pause there and we will resume tomorrow		
17 morning at 10 o'clock if we may. Thank you very much.		
18 (5.00 pm)		
19 (The court adjourned until 10.00 am on		
20 Wednesday, 19 June 2019)		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

<p><b>A</b></p> <p><b>ability (2)</b> 37:24 199:6</p> <p><b>able (22)</b> 16:2 34:16 36:7 37:24 38:2 39:1 47:2 51:24 52:11 55:13 75:7 76:10,16 89:4 96:23 99:24 101:8 106:1 150:9 151:23 169:17 194:14</p> <p><b>above (5)</b> 24:5 33:2 75:9 134:15 176:7</p> <p><b>absence (13)</b> 21:4,24 47:8 87:16 100:14 102:15,17 103:3,10 114:4 142:1,3 173:24</p> <p><b>absolute (2)</b> 17:19 36:1</p> <p><b>absolutely (23)</b> 48:12 58:17 67:20 70:25 72:21 73:1,23 77:3 86:6 89:16 103:19 110:13,24 112:12 115:17 150:4 163:7 174:17 177:22 180:12 186:13 188:1 201:14</p> <p><b>academic (2)</b> 68:18 69:3</p> <p><b>accept (3)</b> 69:11 70:19 163:8</p> <p><b>acceptable (1)</b> 95:11</p> <p><b>access (7)</b> 25:22 36:19 66:23 102:2 155:6 164:16 165:12</p> <p><b>accessed (1)</b> 193:16</p> <p><b>accessible (4)</b> 25:18 36:22 71:16 164:11</p> <p><b>accordingly (3)</b> 60:3 108:10 109:15</p> <p><b>account (8)</b> 28:23 29:5 32:7 152:21 189:20 192:5,20 193:2</p> <p><b>accountability (3)</b> 8:25 9:7 93:25</p> <p><b>accountable (2)</b> 8:17 9:1</p> <p><b>accreditation (3)</b> 24:7 89:14 185:5</p> <p><b>accredited (3)</b> 24:13,22 80:24</p> <p><b>accurate (2)</b> 161:15 166:19</p> <p><b>accurately (1)</b> 173:18</p> <p><b>achieved (2)</b> 172:24 174:24</p> <p><b>acquired (1)</b> 62:16</p> <p><b>acquiring (1)</b> 62:15</p> <p><b>across (61)</b> 10:24,25 12:7 15:22 21:18 24:9 26:23 35:15 36:5 43:2,20,21,23 47:7 48:9,17 49:20 50:7,14 51:3 52:11 54:25 55:20 57:21 64:5,7 66:5 68:7 71:1 77:24 78:9,12 89:25 96:25 101:5 108:4 111:16 114:25 115:25 116:15,19 136:17 138:13 141:21 142:9 144:1 145:15 147:7 149:21 150:13,16 154:3 155:2 156:1,19 157:2,3 160:7 171:3 188:22 189:17</p>	<p><b>acting (4)</b> 187:10 203:23 204:20,20</p> <p><b>action (20)</b> 13:9 28:22 35:1 37:19 39:23 49:17 71:13,21 77:11 85:9 154:11 173:7 181:22 203:16,16,25 204:12,13,17 205:12</p> <p><b>actioned (1)</b> 204:4</p> <p><b>actions (9)</b> 6:15 40:1,14,19 71:2,7,9 72:2 181:19</p> <p><b>activities (2)</b> 8:13 45:7</p> <p><b>activity (25)</b> 6:11 7:10 34:24 37:20 38:19 43:9 52:17,19 53:10 64:7 73:6 77:20 79:21 86:8 87:18 88:22 93:17 108:3 122:17 176:22 181:17 187:7 190:10,15 202:7</p> <p><b>actor (1)</b> 18:19</p> <p><b>actors (1)</b> 154:19</p> <p><b>acts (3)</b> 187:18,25 202:9</p> <p><b>actual (4)</b> 4:14 55:19 145:14 147:11</p> <p><b>actually (28)</b> 11:5 17:22 26:2,3 35:9 36:25 38:23 49:6 55:17 57:24 65:15 74:14 76:12 117:15 130:1 135:3 137:6 138:22 142:2 148:22 150:23 159:25 167:10 169:24 175:10 184:11 189:8 196:6</p> <p><b>adamson (11)</b> 104:5,8 158:7,19,20,20 164:6 165:8,10 176:23 207:6</p> <p><b>add (3)</b> 64:10 168:13 185:18</p> <p><b>added (2)</b> 47:25 199:19</p> <p><b>addition (11)</b> 5:6 10:21 12:16 20:6 42:4 50:13 56:9,21 84:15 154:13 192:19</p> <p><b>additional (16)</b> 40:23 41:23 47:14 49:8,18 50:12 56:25 58:4 73:6 80:6 108:6 122:20 131:18 147:5,18 169:9</p> <p><b>address (2)</b> 57:14 126:24</p> <p><b>addressed (3)</b> 39:6 49:1 187:14</p> <p><b>addresses (2)</b> 121:21 124:4</p> <p><b>addressing (4)</b> 125:13 141:5,13 142:24</p> <p><b>adjourned (1)</b> 206:19</p> <p><b>adjournment (1)</b> 104:16</p> <p><b>adnani (1)</b> 90:25</p> <p><b>adoption (1)</b> 11:11</p> <p><b>advance (2)</b> 188:9 192:14</p> <p><b>advanced (1)</b> 186:4</p> <p><b>advice (62)</b> 11:9,12,14 22:15 23:3,14 24:3,11,23 25:8 26:18,20 28:11 29:4 31:1,2 34:5,22 35:5,20,21 36:16,22</p>	<p>37:13 47:3 59:3,6 76:14,18 77:6,17 78:1,20 85:6,13,19 88:11,21 89:22 100:7 102:23 103:7,9,13 106:7 113:4 135:9 136:8 170:19 171:6,6 177:21 179:14 189:6 191:16 192:9,19 195:8,11,16 205:12,21</p> <p><b>advise (5)</b> 20:3 37:16 76:6 136:10 203:10</p> <p><b>advised (4)</b> 35:12 54:10 57:19 135:11</p> <p><b>advising (2)</b> 153:17 196:24</p> <p><b>advisor (4)</b> 24:21 38:22 39:2 80:9</p> <p><b>advisors (12)</b> 24:8,18 27:14 34:21 35:18 38:2 105:25 112:21 127:20 137:19 181:12 191:15</p> <p><b>advisory (4)</b> 13:7 14:2,9,11</p> <p><b>advocated (1)</b> 91:4</p> <p><b>aegis (1)</b> 59:19</p> <p><b>affairs (2)</b> 123:22 124:3</p> <p><b>affect (1)</b> 20:12</p> <p><b>affected (1)</b> 148:2</p> <p><b>after (53)</b> 16:24 26:14 27:4 30:23 38:11 39:9,23 41:16 43:6 44:11,16 55:4 65:24 78:3 79:13 80:4,4 81:11,21 85:20 86:23 96:14,14 100:12,20 104:8 106:4,8,9 107:22,24 110:15 114:14 116:9,22 123:6 128:17 129:2,12,15,23 136:20 156:3,4,9 161:11 165:6 172:21 181:20 189:4 193:11 198:21 205:16</p> <p><b>aftermath (3)</b> 14:3 123:19 128:11</p> <p><b>afternoon (6)</b> 82:14 83:18 104:12 158:8 176:24 182:13</p> <p><b>afterwards (1)</b> 121:6</p> <p><b>again (36)</b> 5:12 6:2 16:9 31:24 51:8 54:15 57:6 61:3 64:1,11,21 66:12 74:3 77:14,19 94:16 96:18 97:2,3 99:8 130:16 131:22 135:13 138:16 139:19 145:11 150:5,10 153:25 166:13 174:6 176:12 180:1 186:17 197:22 202:14</p> <p><b>against (18)</b> 7:24 20:12 21:2 22:4 23:11 52:25 59:4 60:4,22 67:12 68:5,21 91:16 95:6 138:22 170:1 175:23 178:15</p> <p><b>agencies (3)</b> 21:12 86:7 112:15</p> <p><b>agency (2)</b> 95:13 143:21</p> <p><b>agenda (1)</b> 131:1</p> <p><b>agility (4)</b> 52:8 87:4</p>	<p>169:16 186:18</p> <p><b>ago (3)</b> 59:8 144:14 146:19</p> <p><b>agonising (1)</b> 123:8</p> <p><b>agree (23)</b> 39:22 46:9 52:4 70:25 91:20 97:18 101:1 102:11 105:15,23 108:25 112:11 115:14 116:14 137:11 138:5 141:14 144:3 160:10,19 169:10 175:11 203:25</p> <p><b>agreed (3)</b> 83:23 120:23 168:24</p> <p><b>agreement (7)</b> 8:12,14,15 93:22 99:8 135:3,4</p> <p><b>ah (1)</b> 117:18</p> <p><b>aim (2)</b> 26:17 36:18</p> <p><b>air (1)</b> 110:19</p> <p><b>airport (3)</b> 2:3,3 26:16</p> <p><b>airports (1)</b> 148:14</p> <p><b>aladnanis (1)</b> 18:24</p> <p><b>albeit (2)</b> 92:24 115:11</p> <p><b>aldworth (4)</b> 39:21 108:24 130:20,22 142:12</p> <p><b>allied (1)</b> 8:21</p> <p><b>allocated (1)</b> 193:18</p> <p><b>allocation (1)</b> 101:24</p> <p><b>allow (3)</b> 121:25 168:5 195:11</p> <p><b>allowed (1)</b> 37:2</p> <p><b>allows (2)</b> 170:6 185:5</p> <p><b>almost (2)</b> 49:10 139:7</p> <p><b>alone (1)</b> 179:2</p> <p><b>along (5)</b> 106:21 134:6 142:4 160:3 188:3</p> <p><b>alqaeda (4)</b> 18:10,23 29:12 111:13</p> <p><b>already (11)</b> 14:22 17:2 31:8 63:8 107:20 155:25 158:25 185:12 188:14 202:22 203:24</p> <p><b>also (106)</b> 2:3,4,17,20 3:19 4:8 5:1,16,16,20 6:1,1,3 9:1,20 12:8,10,13,14 15:25 16:7,8 18:14 19:12,22 20:12 21:20 24:7,25 26:16 31:4 32:14 40:9,10 41:23 43:20 49:21 51:5,20 55:25 58:1,2,24 61:4,24 62:18 65:13 66:14 70:19 76:24 77:7 79:25 80:14 83:25 84:16 85:1,5,13 86:7,9 87:7 89:21 92:14 104:1 107:5 111:13 122:6,19 125:10 128:21 130:6,9 131:19 137:25 142:15 147:15 153:16 156:18 161:24 169:16 170:21 171:16 178:22 179:21 184:1,3,20,23 185:3 186:14 187:3,3,9 188:7,9,23 192:7,20 193:10,18,20 194:19,20 195:6 196:3 203:18</p>	<p><b>alternative (1)</b> 120:24</p> <p><b>although (10)</b> 50:9 60:16 72:7 73:21 79:11 85:21 115:7 159:10 194:4,19</p> <p><b>always (26)</b> 31:13 35:25 48:7,12 65:7 66:7 69:16 89:11 115:24 119:10,20 123:10 124:14 128:3 138:9 141:3 149:16,19 155:12 172:15 175:12,21 186:19 189:3 190:13 205:4</p> <p><b>amalgamated (1)</b> 24:5</p> <p><b>ambition (2)</b> 28:6 123:13</p> <p><b>ambitious (1)</b> 65:4</p> <p><b>ambulance (1)</b> 12:12</p> <p><b>amended (1)</b> 20:9</p> <p><b>amongst (7)</b> 42:6,13 121:10 140:17 160:17 196:8 200:7</p> <p><b>amount (7)</b> 51:11 73:15 81:17 121:12 126:6 148:19 150:13</p> <p><b>amplification (1)</b> 77:16</p> <p><b>amplified (1)</b> 87:7</p> <p><b>amplifies (1)</b> 74:18</p> <p><b>amplify (1)</b> 170:2</p> <p><b>analysed (1)</b> 113:14</p> <p><b>analyses (2)</b> 111:13,15</p> <p><b>analysing (5)</b> 111:5,10 113:13 140:22,23</p> <p><b>analysis (10)</b> 12:9 14:23 102:16 159:14 160:10 161:25 165:22 166:23 182:4 199:3</p> <p><b>anchored (1)</b> 148:17</p> <p><b>and/or (3)</b> 11:13 118:11 176:3</p> <p><b>andrew (1)</b> 6:8</p> <p><b>annex (1)</b> 27:9</p> <p><b>announced (1)</b> 49:7</p> <p><b>annual (1)</b> 19:4</p> <p><b>another (10)</b> 68:21 73:25 92:1 106:22 125:5,6 144:19 148:12 167:1 197:22</p> <p><b>answer (10)</b> 47:21 88:2 98:25 99:2 145:17,22 157:15 160:18 177:12 205:20</p> <p><b>answered (1)</b> 108:12</p> <p><b>answers (2)</b> 95:9 123:22</p> <p><b>antiterrorism (1)</b> 20:7</p> <p><b>antiterrorist (1)</b> 85:11</p> <p><b>anxious (3)</b> 48:20 118:22 121:8</p> <p><b>anybody (5)</b> 18:24 19:1 66:15 169:21 204:4</p> <p><b>anyone (5)</b> 69:12 94:2 117:17 159:24 194:19</p> <p><b>anything (7)</b> 18:25 46:23 69:24 78:22 112:10 136:12 154:21</p> <p><b>anyway (2)</b> 155:17 194:13</p> <p><b>apologies (1)</b> 1:11</p> <p><b>apologise (2)</b> 1:9 168:17</p> <p><b>apparently (1)</b> 106:16</p> <p><b>appealing (3)</b> 139:7,11,12</p>	<p><b>appear (3)</b> 5:2 91:22 199:18</p> <p><b>appears (2)</b> 160:24 170:7</p> <p><b>appendix (6)</b> 10:12 34:9 38:19 53:19 76:12 79:14</p> <p><b>applicable (2)</b> 21:20 167:5</p> <p><b>applied (6)</b> 26:4 35:15 43:20 170:14 171:9 172:5</p> <p><b>apply (6)</b> 26:2 100:9 102:21 136:20 147:1 190:8</p> <p><b>applying (9)</b> 89:11 109:12 111:23 126:8,10 128:1 167:18 170:22 195:15</p> <p><b>appointed (1)</b> 194:23</p> <p><b>appraise (1)</b> 121:15</p> <p><b>appreciate (8)</b> 2:17 73:14 88:24 121:11 146:13 149:25 153:9 183:6</p> <p><b>appreciated (1)</b> 3:6</p> <p><b>appreciating (1)</b> 203:9</p> <p><b>approach (11)</b> 12:17 26:22 35:15,17 36:20 61:6 97:6 172:3 179:11 194:5 197:9</p> <p><b>approaches (1)</b> 35:12</p> <p><b>approaching (2)</b> 42:23 43:12</p> <p><b>appropriate (5)</b> 13:24 21:14 98:9 131:23 148:3</p> <p><b>appropriately (3)</b> 111:24 199:21 201:9</p> <p><b>approve (1)</b> 154:12</p> <p><b>approximately (2)</b> 134:8 149:1</p> <p><b>april (4)</b> 46:6 168:19 198:12 200:21</p> <p><b>archibald (2)</b> 90:10 109:3</p> <p><b>area (93)</b> 9:17 17:5 18:4,6 24:20 27:25 29:7,16 34:20 37:9 38:12,24 39:5 41:8,9 44:5 47:24 48:20 51:22 52:1,2,17,21,22 53:10,24 54:5,8,14,17,19,23 55:1,14 65:22 68:17,21 75:18 76:13 77:5,6 78:21 80:3 81:3,5,19 82:14,16,21,24 83:3,11 84:5,12,19 93:1 95:4 96:2 99:11 100:10,15 108:4 111:17,18 114:18 115:13 126:3 135:7 136:23 137:9 142:20 143:10 147:9 150:23 151:3,20,21 152:6,10,18,19,23,24 153:5,10,10 157:4 160:16 162:22,25 167:22 191:20 205:5</p> <p><b>areas (30)</b> 42:13 43:9 50:20,21 51:11,14</p>	<p>67:16 69:14 70:5,6 75:17 80:20 88:17 89:8 96:10 101:5 102:22 109:11 114:2 122:8,10 131:20,24 137:21 140:15 141:5 148:3 176:14 183:17 191:17</p> <p><b>arena (3)</b> 81:16 139:14,16</p> <p><b>arent (2)</b> 129:20 139:4</p> <p><b>arguably (2)</b> 74:11 133:16</p> <p><b>argus (3)</b> 77:10,13 82:6</p> <p><b>arm (1)</b> 12:17</p> <p><b>armed (70)</b> 49:8,10,11,19,22,25 50:3,5,7,14,18,19 51:3,12,14,15 52:1,6,11,13,22 54:9,18,18 55:1,2,11,20 56:3,9 82:24 83:8,11,18,20,22,24,25 84:5,9,12 95:5,24 146:12 147:4,5,15,18,19,20,21 148:6,16 149:6,8,15,17,20 150:2,13,16,17,18,22 151:2,6,10 152:23 153:10,14</p> <p><b>armourplate (1)</b> 88:25</p> <p><b>around (79)</b> 8:25 12:23 13:1 17:8,10 21:24 23:4 35:17 37:15 40:9 43:21 47:18 51:3,16 52:12,19 53:5 59:11 60:10,16 61:1 62:24 63:4 64:22 65:12 66:12 68:19,22 70:13 71:15,17 77:4 78:9 79:4,16 81:17 82:22 83:11 84:8,19 87:14,17,22 95:19 96:20,21,22 102:20 108:20,21 109:10 113:3 115:13 122:9,18,23 123:17 137:24 138:8,12 141:21 150:23 151:10 153:10 155:9 156:17 157:6 162:25 167:17 169:12 175:19 186:3,5 193:6 194:24 196:4 204:19 206:7,9</p> <p><b>arrangement (1)</b> 115:3</p> <p><b>arrangements (8)</b> 8:6 14:19 15:14 98:17 93:8 100:2 131:7 183:8</p> <p><b>arrests (2)</b> 5:10,15</p> <p><b>arriving (2)</b> 55:3,5</p> <p><b>arrows (1)</b> 53:22</p> <p><b>arterial (1)</b> 111:20</p> <p><b>article (2)</b> 19:20 141:2</p> <p><b>articulate (1)</b> 163:24</p> <p><b>articulated (2)</b> 96:9 128:5</p> <p><b>arv (8)</b> 52:16 53:10,13 54:22 55:3 82:13 83:10 147:9</p> <p><b>arvs (5)</b> 50:18 52:10</p>
--	--	---	--	--	--	--



174:1,9,11,12,18,22 175:19,21 176:21 178:19 briefings (1) 13:9 briefly (2) 15:2 85:4 brindisa (1) 76:20 bring (10) 10:13 30:2 34:2 45:2 59:15 76:12 88:19 152:3 167:15 189:13 bringing (2) 27:22 48:18 britain (1) 179:8 british (5) 9:22 12:12 84:20,24 152:8 broad (9) 2:18 25:25 39:24 43:4 50:21 66:1,22 190:2 199:1 broadcaster (1) 123:24 broader (6) 32:7 47:22 48:21 67:17 77:21 162:15 broadly (4) 5:9 8:5 60:19 185:18 broke (1) 36:12 brought (6) 28:2 31:24,25 50:13 189:7 190:7 brussels (1) 101:20 btp (2) 143:8 148:13 building (6) 20:13 21:19 124:22 190:19 195:7,16 buildings (2) 88:6 171:22 bulk (2) 37:4 148:20 bullet (2) 113:21 127:16 bundles (1) 192:17 bus (2) 45:23,25 busiest (2) 140:22 141:8 business (7) 29:6 56:23 77:1 84:19 122:2 126:22 192:16 businessasusual (2) 3:23 193:23 businesses (8) 21:13 77:15,23 78:20 81:11 82:8 127:19 148:2 busy (5) 65:19,21 66:1 125:7 141:9 butt (2) 103:15 139:24 buying (1) 23:8 bystanders (1) 46:4	86:24 120:14 156:2 162:12 193:5 campaign (2) 85:10,23 campaigns (2) 85:5,16 canisters (2) 58:5,9 cant (27) 39:4 41:11 46:21 67:4,11 78:22 81:14 88:24 90:7 96:1 98:23 103:18 107:19 110:5,7 112:12 117:13 123:3 135:12 139:10 153:8 157:11 161:3 170:10,25 172:8 191:6 capabilities (1) 19:13 capability (12) 17:8,14,22,23 18:2 49:15,19 138:10,18,23 147:2 198:1 capable (4) 55:22 65:5 70:21 172:7 capacity (6) 36:8,8 37:3 39:1 50:5 147:2 capital (14) 50:15 68:7 89:1,8 96:25 116:19 139:9 143:10 144:2 149:22 150:16,18 171:3 188:10 capitals (1) 135:20 car (7) 62:19 108:18 115:12 128:11 157:14,17,20 career (4) 3:7 58:20 183:13,14 careful (1) 182:3 carried (6) 31:18 44:4 81:24 94:3 137:20 190:18 carriers (1) 50:18 carry (9) 29:13 30:8 58:7 63:11 70:2 103:4 119:13,18 135:22 carrying (2) 134:10 167:21 carved (3) 92:24 105:19 143:10 cascaded (1) 77:16 cases (1) 168:13 casualties (6) 62:10 63:15 66:17 68:20 69:10 74:25 categories (2) 83:2 171:22 category (3) 41:21 75:8 76:9 cause (4) 15:13 47:15,23 48:4 caused (3) 47:23 115:12 155:16 causes (2) 133:10 159:3 causing (1) 65:5 cautious (1) 70:15 cave (1) 78:15 cctv (3) 110:8,10 127:10 ceds (2) 154:8,16 celebration (1) 119:25 celebrations (2) 3:20 61:10 central (5) 108:19 120:25 135:9 140:12,14 centre (7) 12:9 14:23 22:25 59:3 75:21	188:3 197:12 centres (2) 25:16 164:10 century (1) 186:6 cerastes (33) 44:5,15,22 47:1 89:2 136:3,9 137:13,20 141:23 142:10 144:5 159:2 161:24 163:5 176:3 178:1 188:12 196:17,18,22 197:13 198:18 199:9,13,25 200:6,14,20 201:25 202:14 203:9 205:23 ceremonial (2) 3:18 5:24 certain (10) 28:15 45:12 69:14 77:14 96:10 98:10 102:6 122:10 153:24 203:1 chain (1) 10:14 chair (3) 71:5 191:6 192:1 chaired (8) 9:3 29:24 30:7 116:22 117:2,3 188:18 191:11 chairing (2) 118:6 191:6 challenge (1) 50:1 challenges (4) 47:10 73:11,15 75:1 challenging (2) 48:9 73:18 chance (2) 134:1 145:13 change (10) 18:22 19:2 30:13,15 31:8,17 32:17 87:4 107:1 190:18 changed (5) 28:11 192:11 198:2 205:19 206:5 changes (2) 131:5 186:6 changing (3) 31:7 87:5 205:25 characteristics (1) 70:24 charge (2) 130:22 183:23 charged (1) 177:3 charitable (1) 76:1 chart (1) 11:20 cheaply (1) 62:16 check (3) 13:19 150:19,21 checking (1) 187:24 chief (48) 1:3,7 8:17,19 10:11,22 11:4 13:16 14:1 39:20 43:15,17 57:5,10 93:25 99:9 103:23 104:7,10,11,14,18 115:4 117:20,22 135:5 145:4,7,17,22 151:11,14 152:11 156:2 158:7 164:5 165:7,9 168:24 176:24 182:8,10,12,13,22 183:22 206:13 207:10 chiefs (1) 9:2 chinese (1) 3:16 choice (4) 52:11 88:23 91:19 138:25 choose (3) 110:23 129:5 171:8	chooses (1) 179:5 choosing (1) 23:7 chose (1) 119:17 chosen (3) 53:15 168:13 199:14 christine (3) 90:10 109:3 158:22 christmas (5) 63:23 64:1,5 79:16 97:2 chronology (1) 127:11 cinema (1) 75:21 circulation (1) 85:17 circumstances (6) 20:17 56:7,7 150:15 167:25 174:20 cites (1) 171:16 city (104) 2:3 9:10,20 24:16 39:6 42:5,8 43:13 44:5,6 45:11 46:6,21 65:22 66:20 84:21,25 92:2,13,14,17,19,23,24 93:4,5,7,13 94:4 95:21,25 96:1,11 99:10 104:21 105:6 106:5,18,24 111:5,17 112:23 113:3 126:17,22 133:5 134:14 136:14 137:23 139:9 142:21 143:7 144:11 148:6 152:9 156:7 160:1 162:10 168:7 176:17 180:16 182:21 183:3,7,20,21 184:1,5,10,20 185:8,9,11 186:3,8,14,18 188:2,5,10,17 189:14,18 190:5,8,11,17,19,21,23,24 191:19 193:7 197:3,7 198:6,13,20 199:10,12 201:12 202:16 205:13 206:6 cities (1) 101:21 civil (1) 20:4 civilians (1) 109:7 clarify (1) 28:4 clarity (1) 75:12 classed (1) 33:11 clear (18) 21:22,24 44:21 48:5 50:17 75:17 127:11 135:9 168:12 173:20 181:20 189:3,11 190:5 194:10 196:13,14 201:9 cleared (1) 99:16 clearly (6) 68:18 75:18 107:8 118:1 144:5 203:16 close (6) 62:17 101:2,4 102:9,24 151:24 closely (3) 86:20 129:10 159:13 closing (1) 112:9 clubs (2) 25:17 164:11 cobra (3) 118:17,19,19 cognisant (2) 65:7 89:23 cojoin (1) 69:1 collaboration (14) 8:9,12,14 9:21 24:2 59:8 79:24 93:22	99:8,18 115:3 135:3,4 172:12 collateral (1) 69:17 colleague (1) 46:25 colleagues (5) 3:2 4:10 55:23 123:13 139:24 collectively (1) 31:25 collisions (3) 68:20 69:5 70:13 colocated (1) 10:4 colour (2) 4:14,14 colours (2) 53:25 54:1 colp (1) 143:20 column (2) 27:12,19 combination (1) 24:12 come (15) 13:5 16:22 25:11 26:6 73:8 79:3 97:10 113:6 141:3 155:18 163:6 169:25 171:5 196:15 200:24 comes (5) 5:1 92:18 100:1 157:8 184:13 comfortable (1) 1:8 coming (7) 6:11,25 90:24 108:1 123:23 154:10 183:25 command (7) 3:15 11:3 61:25 184:3,9 185:2,2 commanded (1) 184:25 commander (26) 3:13,19 11:3,5 16:10 51:24 63:6 92:2,3 93:15 96:17 104:2 126:5 168:8,11,21 175:2 176:1 182:20 183:3 184:6,7,24 185:3,4 188:19 commenced (1) 50:8 commendable (2) 73:20 174:23 commensurate (1) 33:20 comment (23) 39:4 46:21 47:25 48:3 67:11 96:1,17 98:23 107:19 112:13 131:15 135:12 139:10 159:9,11 160:6 161:3 168:10 170:10,11,25 172:8 176:16 commenting (2) 94:23 161:7 comments (3) 47:3 66:19 94:18 commercial (7) 87:10 88:1 89:21 103:9 136:15 138:14 145:3 commercially (1) 97:3 commission (3) 14:12 136:12 138:14 commissioned (12) 20:19 44:6 125:1 136:10,13 196:18 197:3,11,22 198:13,21 205:24 commissioner (21) 1:5,6,17,21,24 3:1 9:4,8,10 49:7 50:6 92:13 99:9 104:3 120:21 146:24,25 154:14 155:4 180:22 207:3 commissioners (4) 8:19	10:4 94:1 135:6 committee (14) 9:3 11:24 42:5,9 71:6 92:16 113:22 114:1,6 117:5 118:9 189:4,16,21 common (1) 125:22 commonly (1) 13:17 communicated (1) 193:13 communications (3) 81:23 161:4 196:15 communities (6) 51:2 148:1 156:19 157:5 186:21,22 community (5) 16:1,5 51:16 77:6 156:13 commuters (1) 98:3 companies (1) 138:15 company (6) 44:4 89:3 136:15 188:12 196:22 197:1 comparable (1) 81:5 compelling (4) 160:12,19,22 162:3 compiled (1) 36:22 complete (1) 102:5 completely (3) 112:10 114:23 203:25 complex (7) 8:15 17:5 19:10 75:23,24 174:25 185:5 complexities (4) 73:22 74:7 174:18 175:18 complexity (3) 74:18 143:22 174:22 complicated (1) 74:15 compiled (1) 120:23 components (1) 17:3 comprehensive (1) 8:15 concept (4) 16:22 17:4 18:23 32:13 concepts (2) 14:21 32:7 concern (15) 47:23,24 58:8 65:2,2,9 133:8,10 142:21 159:1,4 161:6 162:23 173:22 195:19 concerned (14) 35:23 44:12 48:3 107:8 109:3 123:21 130:6 150:1 174:4,5,12,16 191:19 205:4 concerning (2) 59:4 195:25 concerns (13) 93:8,9 96:12 109:9 124:4 132:11,17 135:14,16 136:11 145:12 150:4 173:17 concerted (1) 172:21 conclusion (4) 62:21 136:8 144:15 159:5 conclusions (1) 141:23 concrete (1) 124:23 concur (1) 161:22 condolences (1) 3:4 conduct (3) 63:21 89:24 153:25 conducted (5) 16:9 30:11 45:6 86:18 197:16 conductive (1) 154:8 confectionery (1) 45:25	confederation (1) 61:22 conference (2) 105:24 106:2 conferences (2) 59:13,17 confidence (3) 23:9 149:5,17 confident (3) 89:16 98:12 104:11 confirm (2) 41:12 178:3 confirmation (1) 185:17 confirmed (1) 38:9 conflict (1) 70:6 congested (2) 66:21 204:11 congestion (2) 45:13 202:25 connection (1) 168:22 conscious (2) 101:11 103:2 consent (1) 50:25 consequence (2) 17:10 40:17 consider (45) 6:16 14:4 17:18 21:6,15,18 22:8 28:22 49:12,14 51:20 56:24 62:6 64:12 67:12,17 69:13,25 70:5 71:6 87:24 97:5 100:22 102:22 108:11,13,15 114:12 116:20 119:19 124:17 126:12 128:3,6,22 146:13 156:10 160:7 173:11,12 175:23 189:23 193:7,10 198:8 considerable (4) 60:20 75:1 175:7 191:22 consideration (28) 2:19 38:1 42:13,25 48:7 62:8 66:7 69:6,21 85:22 97:23 103:12 108:20 109:4,6,10 119:20 120:7,11 122:6 124:14 134:16 135:21 146:14 154:14 155:13 190:16 204:24 considerations (2) 172:9 173:16 considered (36) 13:11 25:22 35:12 37:11 43:7 48:2,13 52:25 60:2 68:12 72:23 79:23 97:15 103:6 108:13 114:5,8,12 122:3 131:10 132:23 142:6 146:21 153:20 156:11 160:14,21 162:14 164:17 165:13 166:15 170:1 175:23 186:9 190:3 205:6 considering (21) 12:23 42:7 43:7 46:13 47:22 51:16,17 56:1,2 60:19 100:6 116:3 124:10 128:13,15 134:18 141:13,16 146:21 160:16 204:16 consistent (1) 35:15 consisting (1) 56:16 consists (1) 9:19 constable (13) 10:22 14:1 104:12 105:8
<b>C</b>						
caf (1) 76:21 caliphate (3) 18:14,17,21 call (11) 8:7 18:17 32:1 40:13 104:3 128:10 147:24 154:16 161:9 168:16 179:5 called (17) 7:11 9:18 11:23 14:15 22:24 24:25 29:22 34:23 44:4 59:9 104:24 106:3 125:10 131:21 186:15 188:15 203:19 calls (1) 145:24 cambridgeshire (2) 182:23,24 came (10) 18:18 28:7 38:11 59:19 64:14	cause (4) 15:13 47:15,23 48:4 caused (3) 47:23 115:12 155:16 causes (2) 133:10 159:3 causing (1) 65:5 cautious (1) 70:15 cave (1) 78:15 cctv (3) 110:8,10 127:10 ceds (2) 154:8,16 celebration (1) 119:25 celebrations (2) 3:20 61:10 central (5) 108:19 120:25 135:9 140:12,14 centre (7) 12:9 14:23 22:25 59:3 75:21	changes (2) 131:5 186:6 changing (3) 31:7 87:5 205:25 characteristics (1) 70:24 charge (2) 130:22 183:23 charged (1) 177:3 charitable (1) 76:1 chart (1) 11:20 cheaply (1) 62:16 check (3) 13:19 150:19,21 checking (1) 187:24 chief (48) 1:3,7 8:17,19 10:11,22 11:4 13:16 14:1 39:20 43:15,17 57:5,10 93:25 99:9 103:23 104:7,10,11,14,18 115:4 117:20,22 135:5 145:4,7,17,22 151:11,14 152:11 156:2 158:7 164:5 165:7,9 168:24 176:24 182:8,10,12,13,22 183:22 206:13 207:10 chiefs (1) 9:2 chinese (1) 3:16 choice (4) 52:11 88:23 91:19 138:25 choose (3) 110:23 129:5 171:8	chooses (1) 179:5 choosing (1) 23:7 chose (1) 119:17 chosen (3) 53:15 168:13 199:14 christine (3) 90:10 109:3 158:22 christmas (5) 63:23 64:1,5 79:16 97:2 chronology (1) 127:11 cinema (1) 75:21 circulation (1) 85:17 circumstances (6) 20:17 56:7,7 150:15 167:25 174:20 cites (1) 171:16 city (104) 2:3 9:10,20 24:16 39:6 42:5,8 43:13 44:5,6 45:11 46:6,21 65:22 66:20 84:21,25 92:2,13,14,17,19,23,24 93:4,5,7,13 94:4 95:21,25 96:1,11 99:10 104:21 105:6 106:5,18,24 111:5,17 112:23 113:3 126:17,22 133:5 134:14 136:14 137:23 139:9 142:21 143:7 144:11 148:6 152:9 156:7 160:1 162:10 168:7 176:17 180:16 182:21 183:3,7,20,21 184:1,5,10,20 185:8,9,11 186:3,8,14,18 188:2,5,10,17 189:14,18 190:5,8,11,17,19,21,23,24 191:19 193:7 197:3,7 198:6,13,20 199:10,12 201:12 202:16 205:13 206:6 cities (1) 101:21 civil (1) 20:4 civilians (1) 109:7 clarify (1) 28:4 clarity (1) 75:12 classed (1) 33:11 clear (18) 21:22,24 44:21 48:5 50:17 75:17 127:11 135:9 168:12 173:20 181:20 189:3,11 190:5 194:10 196:13,14 201:9 cleared (1) 99:16 clearly (6) 68:18 75:18 107:8 118:1 144:5 203:16 close (6) 62:17 101:2,4 102:9,24 151:24 closely (3) 86:20 129:10 159:13 closing (1) 112:9 clubs (2) 25:17 164:11 cobra (3) 118:17,19,19 cognisant (2) 65:7 89:23 cojoin (1) 69:1 collaboration (14) 8:9,12,14 9:21 24:2 59:8 79:24 93:22	99:8,18 115:3 135:3,4 172:12 collateral (1) 69:17 colleague (1) 46:25 colleagues (5) 3:2 4:10 55:23 123:13 139:24 collectively (1) 31:25 collisions (3) 68:20 69:5 70:13 colocated (1) 10:4 colour (2) 4:14,14 colours (2) 53:25 54:1 colp (1) 143:20 column (2) 27:12,19 combination (1) 24:12 come (15) 13:5 16:22 25:11 26:6 73:8 79:3 97:10 113:6 141:3 155:18 163:6 169:25 171:5 196:15 200:24 comes (5) 5:1 92:18 100:1 157:8 184:13 comfortable (1) 1:8 coming (7) 6:11,25 90:24 108:1 123:23 154:10 183:25 command (7) 3:15 11:3 61:25 184:3,9 185:2,2 commanded (1) 184:25 commander (26) 3:13,19 11:3,5 16:10 51:24 63:6 92:2,3 93:15 96:17 104:2 126:5 168:8,11,21 175:2 176:1 182:20 183:3 184:6,7,24 185:3,4 188:19 commenced (1) 50:8 commendable (2) 73:20 174:23 commensurate (1) 33:20 comment (23) 39:4 46:21 47:25 48:3 67:11 96:1,17 98:23 107:19 112:13 131:15 135:12 139:10 159:9,11 160:6 161:3 168:10 170:10,11,25 172:8 176:16 commenting (2) 94:23 161:7 comments (3) 47:3 66:19 94:18 commercial (7) 87:10 88:1 89:21 103:9 136:15 138:14 145:3 commercially (1) 97:3 commission (3) 14:12 136:12 138:14 commissioned (12) 20:19 44:6 125:1 136:10,13 196:18 197:3,11,22 198:13,21 205:24 commissioner (21) 1:5,6,17,21,24 3:1 9:4,8,10 49:7 50:6 92:13 99:9 104:3 120:21 146:24,25 154:14 155:4 180:22 207:3 commissioners (4) 8:19	10:4 94:1 135:6 committee (14) 9:3 11:24 42:5,9 71:6 92:16 113:22 114:1,6 117:5 118:9 189:4,16,21 common (1) 125:22 commonly (1) 13:17 communicated (1) 193:13 communications (3) 81:23 161:4 196:15 communities (6) 51:2 148:1 156:19 157:5 186:21,22 community (5) 16:1,5 51:16 77:6 156:13 commuters (1) 98:3 companies (1) 138:15 company (6) 44:4 89:3 136:15 188:12 196:22 197:1 comparable (1) 81:5 compelling (4) 160:12,19,22 162:3 compiled (1) 36:22 complete (1) 102:5 completely (3) 112:10 114:23 203:25 complex (7) 8:15 17:5 19:10 75:23,24 174:25 185:5 complexities (4) 73:22 74:7 174:18 175:18 complexity (3) 74:18 143:22 174:22 complicated (1) 74:15 compiled (1) 120:23 components (1) 17:3 comprehensive (1) 8:15 concept (4) 16:22 17:4 18:23 32:13 concepts (2) 14:21 32:7 concern (15) 47:23,24 58:8 65:2,2,9 133:8,10 142:21 159:1,4 161:6 162:23 173:22 195:19 concerned (14) 35:23 44:12 48:3 107:8 109:3 123:21 130:6 150:1 174:4,5,12,16 191:19 205:4 concerning (2) 59:4 195:25 concerns (13) 93:8,9 96:12 109:9 124:4 132:11,17 135:14,16 136:11 145:12 150:4 173:17 concerted (1) 172:21 conclusion (4) 62:21 136:8 144:15 159:5 conclusions (1) 141:23 concrete (1) 124:23 concur (1) 161:22 condolences (1) 3:4 conduct (3) 63:21 89:24 153:25 conducted (5) 16:9 30:11 45:6 86:18 197:16 conductive (1) 154:8 confectionery (1) 45:25	confederation (1) 61:22 conference (2) 105:24 106:2 conferences (2) 59:13,17 confidence (3) 23:9 149:5,17 confident (3) 8

107:13 111:4 126:8	<b>copycat (10)</b> 65:8,10	189:24 190:9,15	41:1,17 51:7 52:25	63:12 66:1 72:5 82:25	14:22	196:19 197:5 199:4
140:23 180:23	119:9,10 130:7 145:13	191:1,9,15,17 192:3	60:18 71:16,24	84:7 90:20 97:19	<b>decisions (3)</b> 13:2 87:14	202:2,6
182:10,12,22 207:10	174:4,8,13,16	193:12 194:1 195:19	75:6,11,19 86:18,25	106:4,9 107:22,24	176:10	<b>deputy (15)</b>
<b>constables (8)</b> 8:17,19	<b>copycats (1)</b> 173:22	<b>counteract (1)</b> 71:3	87:3 88:3,5 96:20	108:16 111:1 117:12	<b>declaration (2)</b> 18:17,21	1:5,6,17,21,24 10:3
13:16 56:16 93:25	<b>core (1)</b> 83:3	<b>counters (3)</b> 60:7 77:12	97:7,13,16,18,22,23	118:11,11 119:25	<b>declared (1)</b> 18:14	14:1 92:13 104:11
99:9 115:4 135:5	<b>coroner (31)</b> 1:3,7,19	85:9	98:1,19,22 99:1,4,7,14	133:19 147:10	<b>decluttering (2)</b> 68:19	180:22 182:10,12,22
<b>constabulary (1)</b> 182:23	43:15,17 57:5,10	<b>counterterrorism (3)</b>	100:1,6 102:19,25	150:17,22 181:8,12	69:4	207:3,10
<b>constant (1)</b> 30:4	103:23 104:7,10,14,18	7:1,4 177:9	103:11 106:10 108:5	193:19 203:1	<b>deemed (1)</b> 111:21	<b>derived (1)</b> 86:15
<b>constantly (2)</b> 171:2	117:20,22	<b>country (8)</b> 12:7 24:19	109:11 111:19 112:17	<b>days (19)</b> 6:25 16:24	<b>deficient (1)</b> 171:9	<b>describe (3)</b> 7:8 23:4
172:10	145:4,7,17,22	48:9 51:3 89:1 114:25	113:21 114:24 140:15	25:11 73:5 80:6 106:8	<b>define (1)</b> 166:20	116:1
<b>constraining (1)</b> 88:12	151:11,14 152:11,20	139:4 145:15	141:5 163:17	107:12 110:15 113:16	<b>defined (7)</b> 7:21	<b>described (14)</b> 9:6
<b>contact (6)</b> 37:5 79:24	156:2 158:7 164:5	<b>counts (1)</b> 165:17	164:3,8,15,22	122:15,25 123:6 151:4	25:12,14 31:18 33:16	22:12,18 23:1 25:15
92:17,19 156:21	165:7,9 176:24	<b>couple (5)</b> 73:6 77:19	165:3,11,17,20	161:11 172:24,25	40:25 75:18	30:9 31:8 33:18 60:23
194:23	182:8,13 206:13	159:10 173:1 180:25	166:12,20 167:23	173:3,14 193:21	<b>defines (1)</b> 163:16	94:22 101:7 110:18
<b>contain (2)</b> 85:13	<b>corporation (4)</b> 160:1	<b>coupled (1)</b> 187:4	168:22	<b>daytoday (1)</b> 11:21	<b>definitely (5)</b> 37:2 84:23	152:11 190:7
152:23	196:3 203:17 205:14	<b>course (20)</b> 4:4,20 5:5	169:1,5,7,13,14,22	<b>dc78491 (1)</b> 130:14	150:8 158:5 169:12	<b>description (3)</b> 45:18
<b>contained (1)</b> 58:5	<b>correct (119)</b> 4:5 5:4,7	16:16 23:15 24:16,22	170:8,12 171:4,23	<b>dc78991 (1)</b> 126:16	<b>definition (16)</b> 25:19,20	164:8 204:9
<b>containing (1)</b> 58:9	6:20 7:14,19 10:17	62:8 63:12 70:10	172:1,1,3,4,7 177:12	<b>dc78993 (1)</b> 126:18	66:5,6 98:7 101:7	<b>designated (1)</b> 106:11
<b>contains (2)</b> 59:23	11:22 14:7,13 16:20	79:10 81:3 82:3	181:13 192:24 193:8	<b>dc78994 (1)</b> 127:6	164:3,5,6,14 168:21	<b>designed (1)</b> 60:1
201:16	17:1 18:7,12 19:18	110:10 111:18 128:18	194:4,12,17,20	<b>dc78995 (1)</b> 127:14	169:3 171:14,18	<b>desirable (1)</b> 179:2
<b>contemplating (1)</b>	20:1,5,10,22 22:17,21	145:24 152:7 155:9	195:1,3,10 198:6	<b>dc82421 (1)</b> 140:5	195:1,4	<b>desk (7)</b> 25:1 37:6
175:4	23:18,21 24:24 25:6	179:18	<b>crowds (3)</b> 112:18	<b>dc82424 (1)</b> 140:13	<b>definitions (1)</b> 25:25	76:10 80:1,15 121:4
<b>content (2)</b> 44:23	26:9 27:11,18	<b>cover (1)</b> 40:3	125:9,24	<b>dc82425 (1)</b> 141:4	<b>degree (3)</b> 11:15 89:6	157:5
201:16	28:1,19,25	<b>coverage (1)</b> 129:4	<b>crying (1)</b> 170:24	<b>dc82931 (1)</b> 27:4	150:3	<b>desks (3)</b> 76:15 78:7
<b>contest (16)</b> 2:9	29:3,10,17,20 32:9,16	<b>covered (6)</b> 49:5 52:4	<b>ct (13)</b> 8:25 9:15 10:1	<b>dc829322 (1)</b> 28:14	<b>delcros (1)</b> 158:22	127:21
7:7,12,12,17,19 10:6	34:7,12 41:20,22,25	108:24 143:11,14	38:17 55:8 93:16	<b>dc829329 (1)</b> 27:8	<b>deliberately (2)</b> 109:7	<b>despite (5)</b> 98:14,16
18:8 19:3 22:13	42:3,8,24 44:25 48:23	146:9	95:12 107:21 193:6,24	<b>dc83331 (1)</b> 123:5	110:21	122:14 134:21 157:20
25:13,15 124:19,19	54:25 56:13 59:2,21	<b>covering (3)</b> 83:18	206:6,9,11	<b>dc83332 (1)</b> 123:24	<b>deliver (7)</b> 7:10	<b>destroy (1)</b> 58:22
130:15 164:7	60:24 63:18 71:20	112:12 142:20	<b>ctsa (17)</b> 25:4 37:1,11	<b>dc83381 (1)</b> 165:2	23:13,14 49:25 89:20	<b>detail (4)</b> 23:1 140:8
<b>context (12)</b> 3:25 47:22	72:3 76:4 79:9 80:13	<b>cpni (11)</b> 23:19 24:2	38:16 46:5,11 48:1,3	<b>dc83383 (1)</b> 165:9	123:10 147:7	141:1 174:15
131:13 162:9,15	81:7 82:1,4,23 84:22	59:6,9 60:1 70:11	79:24 112:20,24	<b>dc83384 (1)</b> 165:8	<b>delivered (5)</b> 22:14	<b>details (2)</b> 16:2 111:5
168:18 171:15 186:1	85:8,15,18,21	186:17 188:5	161:20 168:13 192:19	<b>dc83385 (1)</b> 165:5	26:18 197:19 198:10	<b>detect (1)</b> 6:12
196:11 199:11 202:15	90:16,17,22 91:2,12	197:12,20,23	194:22 195:7 199:15	<b>dcc (1)</b> 158:14	199:22	<b>detection (1)</b> 187:10
206:5	95:18 97:9 100:16	<b>crash (1)</b> 46:3	<b>ctsas (23)</b> 25:7 26:18	<b>dead (2)</b> 123:16 129:17	<b>delivering (5)</b> 12:11	<b>detective (4)</b> 94:19
<b>contingencies (1)</b> 20:4	110:1 116:23	<b>create (5)</b> 15:22 56:18	27:14 28:21 29:5,13	<b>deal (20)</b> 6:17,23 36:8	24:11 70:13 89:18	95:20 168:24 183:22
<b>continually (1)</b> 197:9	117:2,6,7,9,10 118:24	58:6 64:25 158:1	35:20 36:1,7 37:12	37:3 76:10 85:1,3	93:23	<b>deter (4)</b> 8:10 56:18
<b>continue (4)</b> 38:21 64:4	119:4 121:5 126:23	<b>created (4)</b> 31:21 41:5	48:7 63:10 67:6	91:15 92:12 93:1	<b>delivery (5)</b> 11:21 26:19	70:22 138:4
124:22 186:7	127:4,25 132:6 136:1	105:7 137:16	113:1,2 168:2 170:21	136:25 147:2 154:2	35:1 99:21 114:22	<b>determine (1)</b> 68:13
<b>continued (3)</b> 50:10,10	137:10 145:21	<b>creating (2)</b> 61:20 86:9	171:1 177:3,17 181:22	177:25 179:9 180:8	<b>demand (1)</b> 5:23	<b>determined (2)</b> 50:6
64:2	147:12,16 148:11,18	<b>credentials (1)</b> 89:17	195:14 200:22	181:5 186:12 196:17	<b>demanded (2)</b> 170:9	51:13
<b>continues (1)</b> 186:13	151:6 159:14 172:14	<b>cries (1)</b> 167:22	<b>current (14)</b> 12:24	206:15	173:7	<b>determining (2)</b> 165:19
<b>continuing (2)</b> 132:11	173:5,17 177:22	<b>crime (8)</b> 8:18 19:24,25	16:13 33:6,8 50:3	<b>dealing (9)</b> 61:7,20	<b>demonstrates (3)</b> 55:12	190:10
199:7	178:8,13,17,21 179:23	94:1 95:13 143:21	71:24 131:2 142:12	84:19 92:23 97:24	173:6,9	<b>deterrence (1)</b> 56:11
<b>continuous (1)</b> 81:13	180:6 181:18 182:6	184:17 188:23	144:13 173:25	120:16 130:15 138:10	<b>dense (2)</b> 166:11,22	<b>deterrent (7)</b> 61:8
<b>contractor (1)</b> 60:11	183:5 185:13 189:22	<b>criminal (3)</b> 187:7,18,25	182:22,24 198:3	191:1	<b>density (30)</b> 25:24	72:25 83:6
<b>contributed (1)</b> 95:22	196:1,21 197:24	<b>crisscrossing (1)</b> 98:3	203:23	<b>dealings (2)</b> 92:6,10	33:11,17,22 75:12,16	115:12,15,17 149:2
<b>control (2)</b> 184:3	198:15 201:23 203:8	<b>criteria (18)</b> 31:24,25	<b>currently (2)</b> 40:2 124:9	<b>deals (3)</b> 106:10 183:25	97:22,25 98:2,5,7,11	<b>develop (5)</b> 59:9
193:20	<b>correspondent (3)</b>	43:19 97:14	<b>cuts (1)</b> 146:16	189:16	133:15,16 159:12,14	85:24,25 172:15
<b>convenient (2)</b> 57:3	123:22 124:3,24	98:10,11,13,20	<b>cutting (1)</b> 74:6	<b>dealt (3)</b> 93:16 105:20	164:18 165:14,21	202:17
206:12	<b>couldnt (5)</b> 74:1 159:11	166:2,3,8,12,25 167:5	<b>cyber (1)</b> 190:21	153:17	166:4,5,6,9,11,16	<b>developed (18)</b> 22:14
<b>convention (1)</b> 19:20	160:6 192:1,15	170:12,16,17 199:16		<b>death (1)</b> 69:5	167:3,17,19 194:17	26:7,10,12 33:6,7
<b>conversations (2)</b> 92:14	<b>counter (93)</b> 2:4,15 3:2	<b>critical (6)</b> 5:17 15:9		<b>debate (5)</b> 122:25	195:2	56:10 59:11,16 60:2
141:20	5:13 6:16,22 7:7,9,10	16:24 40:10 41:18		125:13 129:6 134:21	<b>department (1)</b> 54:11	63:7 85:17,19 169:23
<b>convicted (1)</b> 140:6	8:3,6,7,8,12 9:2,4	111:19		146:17	<b>depend (2)</b> 62:23	186:11,13,15 197:20
<b>coordinate (1)</b> 117:8	10:4,9 11:3,8 12:17	<b>criticism (1)</b> 158:10	<b>dabiq (1)</b> 91:13	<b>december (8)</b> 63:23	145:24	<b>developing (2)</b> 7:6
<b>coordinated (2)</b> 10:1	14:4 23:22,24	<b>crossborder (1)</b> 190:17	<b>dac (1)</b> 194:11	79:10,15,25 80:8	<b>depending (4)</b> 20:16	60:21
77:8	24:8,18,20 25:1 34:21	<b>crossindustry (1)</b> 61:15	<b>dacso (6)</b> 117:5 135:10	120:13 197:17 198:17	35:1 36:11 37:23	<b>development (4)</b> 24:2
<b>coordinating (2)</b> 7:6	35:17 37:5 38:1,22	<b>crossing (2)</b> 65:21	181:16 189:4,7 194:18	<b>decide (6)</b> 72:16 95:5	<b>depends (3)</b> 115:18	30:14 32:1 172:3
25:5	39:2 54:20 56:22	133:19	<b>daesh (2)</b> 18:14 19:6	129:3 190:5 199:16	205:15,15	<b>device (5)</b> 59:15 60:5
<b>coordination (2)</b> 9:2	59:19 61:14 68:22	<b>crowd (24)</b> 25:24	<b>daily (3)</b> 141:21 154:3	200:23	<b>depictions (1)</b> 43:13	138:1 154:12 156:1
190:14	76:18,25 77:7 78:4	33:10,17,22 63:15	193:19	<b>decided (4)</b> 168:2 190:3	<b>deploy (3)</b> 16:12 199:6	<b>devices (3)</b> 26:14 59:1
<b>coordinator (25)</b> 2:6	80:1,6,9,15 81:25	75:12,16 98:2,7,11	<b>damage (2)</b> 58:22 134:4	193:11 205:11	206:8	154:8
9:24 10:10,16 11:19	82:15,20 84:15 85:5	133:15 159:11 164:18	<b>damaging (1)</b> 134:1	<b>deciding (2)</b> 114:8	<b>deployed (8)</b>	<b>devote (1)</b> 89:10
12:3 15:20 23:25	93:3 95:16	165:14	<b>dangers (1)</b> 126:10	192:3	40:21,23,24 41:24	<b>diagram (6)</b> 4:1,3,13
90:12 92:6,9 99:12,20	105:7,8,14,25	166:4,4,6,8,11,16	<b>data (1)</b> 84:8	<b>decision (20)</b> 69:16	83:3 100:10 197:10	5:1 6:21 10:21
105:9,15 106:6 107:7	106:6,24 107:7	167:3,17,19 195:2	<b>date (5)</b> 102:2	72:5,7,9,18 73:24 74:4	198:18	<b>diagrams (2)</b> 98:8 166:7
111:4 113:13 114:19	111:4,7 112:21	<b>crowded (115)</b>	117:16,17 198:11	101:24 130:11 132:1,5	<b>deploying (1)</b> 107:5	<b>dialogue (1)</b> 131:17
118:14 124:15 126:21	113:10,12 125:21	25:10,10,12,12,14,16,21	199:25	139:5 144:22 145:9	<b>deployment (7)</b> 5:18	<b>didnt (39)</b> 1:9 32:17
133:5 135:14	126:19 127:19,21	26:4,7,11,12,19,23	<b>dated (3)</b> 31:4 79:15	146:10 155:11 173:2	14:4 42:7 63:2 191:7	33:21 36:15 44:21
<b>coordinators (3)</b> 10:2	131:16 133:5 135:13	27:6,10,15 28:8,16,22	200:19	174:1,3 181:25	192:20 193:12	62:5 75:7,10,11,15,16
76:12 127:20	143:15 147:6 157:4	29:6,8,15,22	<b>dates (3)</b> 81:21 148:22	<b>decisionmakers (2)</b>	<b>deployments (12)</b> 52:11	97:14,25
<b>cope (1)</b> 36:8	180:17 181:11 184:18	31:13,19,20 32:14	191:13	77:14 82:7	82:20 84:16 188:14	98:4,10,17,19,20
<b>copied (2)</b> 72:20 112:19	185:6 188:13,25	33:11,15 37:9 39:3,18	<b>david (2)</b> 132:13,14	<b>decisionmaking (1)</b>	189:24 192:3 193:1	103:16 108:12,15
			<b>day (30)</b> 2:23 45:13			
			53:11 55:24 61:10			

D

120:10 122:15 123:2	<b>disrupted (13)</b> 4:4,15,19,21,22,24 5:2 65:15 67:18 141:17 163:2,4 203:12	<b>doubts (1)</b> 20:8	<b>eight (7)</b> 4:21,22 72:10,16 120:15 153:7 172:22	177:20	170:3	<b>explosive (7)</b> 26:14 58:6,10 59:1,15 60:5 138:1
134:23,25 136:10,12	<b>disrupting (1)</b> 44:12	<b>down (10)</b> 36:12 41:16 61:11 74:12 84:13 111:10 145:12 155:1 174:14,15	<b>either (13)</b> 18:4 45:16 50:18 52:22 81:15 120:22 128:8 135:24 136:7 167:11 170:7,14 205:11	<b>engineers (6)</b> 60:1 73:15 75:1 174:22 175:1,15	<b>every (12)</b> 11:23 37:6 78:8 82:2 89:1 105:24 150:16 153:22 179:3 189:15 191:3 193:19	<b>exposed (3)</b> 66:17 69:14,23
166:4,5 170:17 174:13	<b>disruptions (1)</b> 4:17	<b>downing (1)</b> 118:21	<b>election (1)</b> 5:23	<b>enhanced (1)</b> 114:3	<b>everybody (7)</b> 66:8 73:14,19 87:18 103:19 123:12 144:24	<b>exposure (2)</b> 202:2,5
194:14,17,18 195:4	<b>distance (1)</b> 180:10	<b>downwards (1)</b> 77:16	<b>elect (1)</b> 35:5	<b>enormous (1)</b> 50:1	<b>everyone (3)</b> 118:21 188:24 193:16	<b>expressed (1)</b> 58:8
198:9 199:18 200:21	<b>distinct (2)</b> 17:16 146:1	<b>dozens (1)</b> 123:17	<b>electronic (2)</b> 193:15,17	<b>enough (1)</b> 168:4	<b>everything (2)</b> 67:12 184:19	<b>extend (2)</b> 157:13 200:9
<b>died (2)</b> 63:19 145:12	<b>distinction (3)</b> 17:2 35:13 36:12	<b>draw (1)</b> 205:17	<b>element (5)</b> 26:20 167:13,14 184:18 206:2	<b>ensure (5)</b> 39:24 55:21 186:20 199:20 202:16	<b>evolved (1)</b> 18:15	<b>extending (1)</b> 88:3
<b>difference (2)</b> 64:19 138:8	<b>distribute (1)</b> 187:2	<b>drawing (1)</b> 27:15	<b>elements (1)</b> 24:1	<b>ensures (1)</b> 23:6	<b>evolution (1)</b> 126:3	<b>extensive (5)</b> 43:22 63:7 103:2 108:4 157:16
<b>differences (1)</b> 17:17	<b>divergence (1)</b> 149:7	<b>drawn (1)</b> 67:16	<b>elliots (1)</b> 76:21	<b>entering (1)</b> 45:11	<b>evolving (1)</b> 6:13	<b>extent (3)</b> 69:20 88:11 195:24
<b>different (25)</b> 5:2 22:18 34:1,11 57:24 59:23,24 60:4 87:2,10 88:16 97:22 98:25 105:20 117:21 139:12,19 156:19 169:20 171:2 172:20 174:11,12 186:10,21	<b>diversity (2)</b> 4:11 6:18	<b>draws (1)</b> 102:22	<b>else (5)</b> 58:10 67:12 69:17,19 169:22	<b>entire (2)</b> 82:25 201:13 <b>entirely (5)</b> 11:12 21:8 28:10 31:2 111:23	<b>exact (3)</b> 110:5,7 198:11	<b>external (1)</b> 190:22
<b>differentiation (1)</b> 28:9	<b>divide (1)</b> 15:15	<b>drew (1)</b> 90:18	<b>elsewhere (2)</b> 58:11 169:19	<b>entirety (1)</b> 201:8	<b>exactly (9)</b> 55:21 110:18 112:8 117:13 125:17 142:23 145:6 153:2 205:9	<b>extra (1)</b> 124:7
<b>differently (1)</b> 155:16	<b>divided (2)</b> 9:14 36:24	<b>drive (2)</b> 96:9,23	<b>email (11)</b> 107:10 111:6 112:19 113:17 140:23 161:10 180:23 181:5,8 182:2 192:14	<b>entrance (1)</b> 45:24	<b>exam (1)</b> 199:4	<b>extract (2)</b> 136:3 171:12
<b>difficult (17)</b> 47:4,21 56:6 67:4 68:17 74:10 131:13 139:20 159:9 161:14 163:18,22,25 169:21 176:16 181:2 194:22	<b>document (29)</b> 18:16 27:3,5,6,9 28:14,20 29:21 34:3 84:4 111:2 114:4,7,11 121:14 126:19,20 132:16 133:7 137:18 138:20 158:24 159:7 160:25 161:7,9 164:23 165:4 167:11	<b>driven (6)</b> 18:23 60:18 70:21 110:21 125:9 203:5	<b>emailed (1)</b> 46:11	<b>entries (3)</b> 79:14 80:4,18	<b>example (19)</b> 18:1 22:1,7 48:2 58:25 65:21,22 78:25 80:8 94:6 95:5 101:3 103:11 112:2 114:16 145:13 161:5,10 175:25	<b>extraordinary (1)</b> 117:4
<b>difficulties (3)</b> 51:25 175:10 195:15	<b>documentation (1)</b> 164:8	<b>driving (2)</b> 70:23 145:8	<b>emailing (4)</b> 106:6,24 132:20 133:6	<b>entry (4)</b> 151:3 185:11,20 197:17	<b>examined (1)</b> 18:15	<b>extremis (7)</b> 74:6,14 173:10,12 175:12 176:12 203:22
<b>difficulty (1)</b> 66:8	<b>documents (5)</b> 6:16 17:9 121:10,12 160:23	<b>dropped (1)</b> 147:23	<b>emails (5)</b> 161:4 178:1,7 192:15,16	<b>environment (11)</b> 15:23 25:21 56:18 61:21 86:5 157:18 158:1 164:15 165:11 172:18 175:17	<b>eyes (2)</b> 89:25 196:23	<b>eyewateringly (1)</b> 174:25
<b>diffuse (1)</b> 6:5	<b>does (38)</b> 7:2 8:5 10:24 11:19 12:2,5 14:17,20 15:12 16:16 22:14,19 23:9 26:3 36:7 48:13 60:9 76:5 82:19 84:11 87:15 95:9 102:7 130:24 131:8 134:5 138:3,3 152:16 163:19,23 169:4,25 172:3 173:6 180:14 185:19 189:23	<b>drove (2)</b> 107:17 178:14	<b>embedded (1)</b> 24:1	<b>environments (1)</b> 60:15 <b>environs (3)</b> 82:17 84:1,6	<b>evolved (1)</b> 18:15	<b>face (2)</b> 107:6 179:9
<b>diplomatic (1)</b> 2:2	<b>doing (5)</b> 31:1 87:22 95:11 129:12 186:4	<b>due (4)</b> 82:11 84:22 133:12 134:14	<b>emergencies (1)</b> 20:3	<b>equally (2)</b> 90:23 163:6	<b>evolution (1)</b> 126:3	<b>faced (3)</b> 19:9 163:25 170:22
<b>direct (7)</b> 37:13 38:17 105:9 134:6 160:3,8 165:1	<b>dolls (1)</b> 110:20	<b>duke (1)</b> 46:2	<b>emergency (6)</b> 4:8 20:2 40:14 42:10 71:6 118:8	<b>equipment (4)</b> 23:6,8,12,13	<b>evolving (1)</b> 6:13	<b>factor (3)</b> 70:19 100:20 139:6
<b>directed (3)</b> 44:6 62:14 192:10	<b>domain (2)</b> 5:19 121:6	<b>during (14)</b> 4:25 5:20,24 15:9 39:21 59:12 66:15 106:15,16 109:1 125:12 126:1 179:18 202:2	<b>emergent (1)</b> 190:11	<b>equipping (1)</b> 154:15	<b>exam (1)</b> 199:4	<b>factors (13)</b> 31:23 37:25 51:13 74:15 111:25 112:4 113:13,14 114:8 133:12,14 134:18,19
<b>direction (8)</b> 11:25 36:21 45:17 116:23 117:9 135:2 136:7 202:16	<b>dominant (1)</b> 158:20	<b>duties (5)</b> 19:19 20:6,11 50:14 77:2	<b>emphasise (1)</b> 14:9	<b>error (1)</b> 137:8	<b>examples (1)</b> 119:23	<b>failed (2)</b> 167:7 194:15
<b>directions (2)</b> 190:9 193:24	<b>done (13)</b> 11:9 36:6 60:20 74:2 86:13 114:22 118:23 135:10 159:2 173:4,8 194:24 205:11	<b>duty (8)</b> 19:23 20:2 21:1,11 22:1,3 151:15 173:11	<b>employed (1)</b> 49:9	<b>escape (3)</b> 66:2 134:7 160:4	<b>exception (1)</b> 148:12	<b>fair (2)</b> 19:14 42:21
<b>directly (5)</b> 10:14 43:11 180:9 181:20 205:12	<b>doesn't (11)</b> 70:14 105:17 107:12 114:4 131:11 153:3 166:11 167:20 194:21 200:3,4	<b>dynamic (1)</b> 204:20	<b>empowers (1)</b> 142:16	<b>especially (2)</b> 65:20 127:22	<b>exceptionally (2)</b> 65:19,25	<b>fairly (1)</b> 122:12
<b>director (1)</b> 94:23	<b>doing (5)</b> 31:1 87:22 95:11 129:12 186:4	<b>earlier (26)</b> 10:7 11:15 30:25 64:23 65:14 67:3,19 70:11 73:25 75:17 83:7 100:8 113:16 115:14 119:11 138:7,19 140:10 142:19 145:2,17 148:22 153:21 173:9 181:12,24	<b>enables (5)</b> 15:20 95:4 138:11 142:13 152:2	<b>essential (1)</b> 58:23	<b>examine (1)</b> 199:4	<b>fall (3)</b> 75:7,11 144:4
<b>directorship (6)</b> 183:24 184:5,8,12 188:23,24	<b>dont (26)</b> 13:24 22:2 47:15 60:7 70:16 91:23 93:20 99:2,13,15 101:4 103:8 112:23 114:17 124:12 140:1,8 144:16 159:15,25 160:7 162:9,11,11 166:22 171:4	<b>east (2)</b> 90:25 133:22	<b>encompass (1)</b> 26:1	<b>essentially (2)</b> 31:22 189:2	<b>examined (1)</b> 18:15	<b>falling (2)</b> 99:25 100:3
<b>disagree (7)</b> 159:6,15,17,19,20,23 160:2	<b>domains (2)</b> 5:19 121:6	<b>eastern (1)</b> 112:17	<b>encompassing (1)</b> 75:9	<b>estate (1)</b> 190:20	<b>examples (1)</b> 119:23	<b>falls (1)</b> 169:2
<b>disclose (2)</b> 16:2 149:25	<b>dominic (1)</b> 158:20	<b>easy (4)</b> 51:19 73:21 74:13 115:21	<b>encourage (2)</b> 86:7 179:8	<b>evacuation (1)</b> 82:10	<b>exception (1)</b> 148:12	<b>familiar (1)</b> 63:4
<b>discount (1)</b> 126:13	<b>done (13)</b> 11:9 36:6 60:20 74:2 86:13 114:22 118:23 135:10 159:2 173:4,8 194:24 205:11	<b>easily (3)</b> 25:17 62:16 164:11	<b>encouraged (4)</b> 18:19 142:2,2 156:23	<b>even (19)</b> 21:1 31:15 63:8 97:12,15 99:12,16 100:12,20 102:6 103:1 106:16 114:15 120:5 137:11 144:22 152:24 174:23 195:25	<b>exactly (9)</b> 55:21 110:18 112:8 117:13 125:17 142:23 145:6 153:2 205:9	<b>families (5)</b> 3:4 90:6,8 110:24 150:1
<b>discovered (1)</b> 174:21	<b>dont (26)</b> 13:24 22:2 47:15 60:7 70:16 91:23 93:20 99:2,13,15 101:4 103:8 112:23 114:17 124:12 140:1,8 144:16 159:15,25 160:7 162:9,11,11 166:22 171:4	<b>east (2)</b> 90:25 133:22	<b>encouraging (2)</b> 21:13 85:10	<b>evangelical (1)</b> 82:10	<b>examine (1)</b> 199:4	<b>family (2)</b> 109:2 150:5
<b>discrete (1)</b> 177:1	<b>dots (1)</b> 53:23	<b>eastern (1)</b> 112:17	<b>end (8)</b> 24:17 35:8 46:1 81:3 149:10 166:22 197:16 198:15	<b>even (19)</b> 21:1 31:15 63:8 97:12,15 99:12,16 100:12,20 102:6 103:1 106:16 114:15 120:5 137:11 144:22 152:24 174:23 195:25	<b>examined (1)</b> 18:15	<b>famous (1)</b> 116:11
<b>discretionary (8)</b> 11:12 21:8 31:2 35:2 64:13 87:18 88:22 171:7	<b>double (2)</b> 146:11 150:12	<b>easy (4)</b> 51:19 73:21 74:13 115:21	<b>endorse (1)</b> 150:6	<b>evangelical (1)</b> 82:10	<b>examples (1)</b> 119:23	<b>fantastic (1)</b> 48:8
<b>discuss (4)</b> 30:2 80:11 124:7 131:23	<b>double (2)</b> 146:11 150:12	<b>effect (15)</b> 14:22 19:21 23:8 24:6 28:10 32:18 36:20 49:10 58:10 64:16 77:12 138:3 146:9 149:14 155:2	<b>energy (3)</b> 62:14 134:11 154:8	<b>even (19)</b> 21:1 31:15 63:8 97:12,15 99:12,16 100:12,20 102:6 103:1 106:16 114:15 120:5 137:11 144:22 152:24 174:23 195:25	<b>examine (1)</b> 199:4	<b>far (4)</b> 39:14 51:13 107:4 178:4
<b>discussed (3)</b> 113:22 116:6 120:25	<b>doubled (1)</b> 5:14	<b>effect (15)</b> 14:22 19:21 23:8 24:6 28:10 32:18 36:20 49:10 58:10 64:16 77:12 138:3 146:9 149:14 155:2	<b>engage (10)</b> 13:22 35:11 38:25 64:4 76:6 79:12 156:17 157:6 181:17 195:24	<b>even (19)</b> 21:1 31:15 63:8 97:12,15 99:12,16 100:12,20 102:6 103:1 106:16 114:15 120:5 137:11 144:22 152:24 174:23 195:25	<b>examined (1)</b> 18:15	<b>fast (2)</b> 150:7,15
<b>discussing (2)</b> 57:12 68:25	<b>doubt (8)</b> 92:5 99:16,23 101:14 102:11 118:13,21 123:8	<b>effecting (1)</b> 187:6	<b>engaged (6)</b> 87:8 154:23 156:22 158:3 171:2,4	<b>evening (1)</b> 117:11	<b>expanded (2)</b> 59:17 63:8	<b>fatalities (2)</b> 65:6 175:9
<b>discussion (3)</b> 12:18 132:7 148:1	<b>double (2)</b> 146:11 150:12	<b>effective (8)</b> 39:25 107:4 115:18 121:25 123:11 197:6 198:3,19	<b>engagement (39)</b> 34:14,15,18,18 38:17,22 64:6 75:5 76:9,23,24 77:5,13,20 78:1,11,12,17,18,20,22,24 79:1,4,16,19 81:10,13,14,17 88:21 97:1 101:9 147:11 156:23 157:7 195:11 196:2 203:17	<b>evening (1)</b> 117:11	<b>expanded (2)</b> 59:17 63:8	<b>fatwa (1)</b> 90:25
<b>discussions (5)</b> 62:1 77:1 80:14 94:10 176:17	<b>double (2)</b> 146:11 150:12	<b>efficiency (1)</b> 199:4	<b>engagements (2)</b> 79:2,8	<b>evening (1)</b> 117:11	<b>expanded (2)</b> 59:17 63:8	<b>feasible (1)</b> 74:23
<b>disney (1)</b> 140:16	<b>double (2)</b> 146:11 150:12	<b>efforts (4)</b> 42:11 62:14 64:22 79:12	<b>engaging (2)</b> 16:4	<b>evening (1)</b> 117:11	<b>expanded (2)</b> 59:17 63:8	<b>feature (9)</b> 26:25 29:7 41:13 98:10,17,19,21 194:1,14
<b>disorder (2)</b> 19:24,25	<b>double (2)</b> 146:11 150:12			<b>evening (1)</b> 117:11	<b>expanded (2)</b> 59:17 63:8	<b>featured (1)</b> 57:20
<b>disputes (1)</b> 139:2	<b>double (2)</b> 146:11 150:12			<b>evening (1)</b> 117:11	<b>expanded (2)</b> 59:17 63:8	<b>features (5)</b> 43:12 89:2 98:14,16 137:12
<b>disrupt (4)</b> 187:7,9,16 202:7	<b>double (2)</b> 146:11 150:12			<b>evening (1)</b> 117:11	<b>expanded (2)</b> 59:17 63:8	<b>featuring (1)</b> 97:12

feels (1) 94:24	62:12 63:17 88:5	frame (2) 4:24 175:6	geographicallydefined (1) 88:6	172:12	happening (2) 58:12	126:18 127:2 168:25
fell (2) 51:6 52:19	169:13 197:17 198:5,6	fraud (1) 143:20	geography (1) 105:19	governments (1) 2:9	186:7	170:3 181:3 183:6
felt (6) 73:1 86:22	201:21	free (1) 26:17	get (22) 1:9 35:25 36:4	gps (1) 140:4	harder (1) 6:12	205:7
130:8,8 173:23 174:17	focuses (1) 112:2	freely (2) 62:22 151:20	53:5 55:11 64:25	gradings (2) 28:17	harm (1) 33:19	hes (6) 112:10,12,13,14
fencing (1) 59:24	124:2 139:17 151:19	freetoaccess (1) 26:20	68:17 76:14 77:21	32:14	harris (10) 101:14 120:5	161:7 162:24
few (6) 50:23,24 144:22	124:2 139:17 151:19	freight (1) 61:23	87:20 90:23 93:20	gradually (2) 36:12	121:14,18 124:13	hesitant (1) 74:24
146:1 168:2 183:13	followed (11) 12:25	french (10)	104:2,11 108:23 111:3	59:17	125:3,10 142:24	hgv (1) 64:16
fifth (1) 30:20	26:16 43:1,1 78:2 81:9	78:5,10,13,14,16	115:21 157:21 168:18	graphic (1) 110:8	153:16 179:17	hgvs (1) 96:9
figure (4) 115:1 135:10	122:15 123:1 187:12	156:7,10,13,14,16	174:14 199:25 204:10	grateful (2) 117:18	haulage (2) 61:21 62:20	hid (2) 103:14,15
141:10 146:7	189:18 203:6	33:13	getting (1) 146:10	150:22	havent (7) 57:23 74:17	hide (2) 85:14 103:3
filled (1) 105:8	following (19) 14:14	33:13	gig (1) 186:20	great (4) 26:1 48:7	91:16 92:8 147:13	high (7) 3:15 27:16
films (1) 85:16	26:12 30:23 61:11	frequently (1) 203:22	give (24) 1:15 16:21	95:23 103:12	150:25 152:1	56:15 99:16 133:14
filter (1) 118:14	63:1,6 72:25 78:19,23	friday (1) 193:20	24:23 34:4 37:8 48:7	greater (4) 50:7 88:10	having (29) 12:23 15:11	146:23 149:20
filtered (1) 142:23	79:4 80:5 83:20	friendly (1) 135:22	53:7 66:19 85:6	120:6 153:18	33:10 41:21 52:21,24	higher (8) 23:17 34:5
filtering (1) 27:20	101:20 117:20,23	friends (1) 3:4	103:8,8,12 113:24	greatest (2) 41:24	68:3 69:19 74:21	36:16 52:13 53:3
final (5) 107:2 146:1	128:19 131:5 146:3,5	front (2) 163:8 190:4	120:10 126:24 148:22	100:11	75:17 76:25 78:11	78:13 87:11 129:21
151:3 180:22 198:11	follows (2) 45:8 163:18	frontline (2) 3:10 120:9	149:5 154:14 155:13	grenfell (1) 6:3	89:7 92:10 98:11	highest (4) 24:18 28:23
finally (3) 86:12 157:11	followup (1) 31:4	frontofhouse (1) 77:18	177:21 182:19 183:6	grid (1) 152:13	141:20 143:9 144:1	34:6 133:16
180:1	foot (26) 50:20,22	fruit (1) 78:16	196:10 202:14	griffin (3) 77:10,18,23	145:20 146:21 150:2,7	highimpact (1) 186:25
finance (1) 37:24	51:12,14,15,19	fuel (1) 58:9	given (37) 11:14 19:21	grossly (1) 32:4	166:9 177:16 178:18	highlight (2) 52:18
financial (2) 143:20	52:1,5,9 82:24	full (7) 48:16,17 70:22	22:15 31:15 35:6,20	ground (2) 47:18 187:12	185:20 186:3 202:12	133:11
169:1	83:11,20,22,24	102:5 143:18 183:18	37:5 39:20 42:25 47:3	group (40) 11:23	206:5	highlighted (7) 15:4
financing (1) 175:20	147:15,17 148:6,17,19	184:6	54:12 59:3 62:9 65:24	13:7,21 14:11 24:10	hazardous (2) 40:9	30:24 54:4 88:9 124:3
find (5) 30:19 78:22	150:10,22 151:2,6,10	fully (2) 15:17 150:6	69:6,11,21 102:4	28:7 29:22 48:8	41:18	133:8 158:25
79:21 86:11 175:16	152:24 153:10	functionally (1) 10:1	107:20 108:3,15	93:14,15,21 94:17	head (2) 6:8 9:4	highlights (1) 112:16
findings (1) 200:6	footage (8)	functions (4) 34:4	117:17 120:7 121:8	104:20,21 105:6,11,14	headed (1) 141:4	highly (16) 12:19 15:8
finds (1) 139:10	110:8,9,10,12,14,16	143:21 189:23 190:1	122:6 134:16 136:8	106:19,25 168:19	heading (4) 27:12 45:5	16:14,15 25:7 36:23
fine (1) 1:8	118:25 127:11	fund (2) 122:5,20	143:12 147:6 154:19	176:2	133:8 137:19	52:13 55:22 73:20
finetune (1) 173:1	footfall (3) 33:10 84:20	fundamentally (1)	167:16 176:8 181:11	188:16,16,18,18,24	headquarters (1) 10:5	135:21 139:5 149:21
finish (5) 50:9 101:11	133:18	149:8	192:19 199:10,12	189:3,8,10,19,23	health (1) 21:22	150:7,8 176:5 187:2
103:23 104:13 182:14	footnote (2) 118:7	funded (2) 197:11,23	200:1	190:2 191:3,11,25	healthy (1) 129:6	highprofile (1) 63:22
finished (1) 148:23	164:22	funding (9) 49:18 74:8	222:20 131:6,18,20,25	192:4,14 193:6,11	hear (18) 6:25 14:1	highvisibility (1) 83:6
fire (2) 12:12 20:12	force (27) 18:9 24:20	132:4 147:5	132:4 147:5	206:10	24:21 25:11 29:18	highway (1) 195:20
firearms (10) 5:3 50:12	66:20 95:3,4,4,7,10	25:19 33:22 34:15,18	further (22) 14:14	grouping (1) 27:23	38:18 39:6 42:4	hill (1) 46:2
85:14 108:7 184:24,25	105:20 114:2 134:5	35:6,12 48:2 56:10	25:19 33:22 34:15,18	groups (2) 57:21 78:5	44:3,15 46:11 66:19	himself (1) 140:6
185:2,3,4 190:16	135:6 142:20	63:8 72:12 80:5,25	143:12,14 144:1	grow (2) 125:21 131:19	67:21 68:2 69:6 90:7	hindrance (1) 144:12
first (24) 1:4,9,18 2:17	153:22 159:24,25	86:24 111:10 170:24	6:5,25 13:15 40:2	growing (2) 58:20 120:2	93:14 104:23	hindsight (1) 68:17
41:17 53:15 55:3	179:20 184:12,13	177:23 180:21 190:20	41:17 53:15 55:3	growth (4) 125:19	heard (11) 9:12 14:24	hire (1) 157:14
57:16 71:13 78:3 86:1	186:16,19 188:20,22	200:10,19 207:9	57:16 71:13 78:3 86:1	126:2,2,3	18:10,18 55:2 61:9	hiring (1) 97:5
109:6 118:2 159:8	197:8	70:2 86:17 173:22	109:6 118:2 159:8	guard (3) 134:5	91:3 148:12 191:15	historically (2) 58:24
183:13 184:6 194:25	forces (7) 8:9 11:16	future (5) 50:4 69:2	183:13 184:6 194:25	159:24,25	194:25 205:17	95:12
197:11 199:17 200:14	12:4 13:9 14:4,10	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	guidance (10) 13:4 24:6	hearing (1) 92:1	history (3) 55:16 76:11
197:11 199:17 200:14	181:24	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	33:25 34:22 35:6	heart (2) 135:4 149:9	185:13
firstly (1) 15:16	forgetting (1) 137:8	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	98:12 167:11,17 168:9	heartfelt (1) 3:3	hit (4) 112:3 161:14
fit (5) 66:4 98:1	forgive (2) 109:2 166:13	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	192:4	heathrow (1) 2:3	163:15,21
171:4,20 194:18	form (6) 34:17 76:24	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	guided (1) 63:9	heavily (1) 66:21	hoganhowe (1) 49:7
five (16) 3:19 4:17 15:5	128:9 130:10 165:21	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	guides (1) 22:23	heavy (7) 62:5,10,13,21	holistic (1) 100:4
54:3 60:4 84:4 98:8	172:1	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	guilds (2) 24:17 113:3	63:24 65:4 70:21	home (16) 7:5 20:19
112:2 126:4 163:9	formal (3) 76:23	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	guns (1) 95:20	height (1) 174:10	27:9 106:11 117:16
177:4,10	155:18,21	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	gyford (17) 14:1 92:3,3	held (5) 3:10,15 12:20	122:3,20 123:22 124:3
181:2,6,13,23	formalised (1) 171:14	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	93:15 104:2,3,12	99:5 104:20	143:18 144:15
flash (1) 187:1	formed (1) 161:25	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	112:25 132:9 158:14	helen (1) 104:24	155:21,25 169:3
flaw (1) 172:4	forming (1) 161:23	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	168:11,21 176:1	help (19) 23:19 83:13	171:20 177:2
flexibility (1) 169:16	forms (3) 2:20 34:15	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	182:11,12,20 207:10	89:9 95:1 112:20	hone (38) 46:6,11 65:17
flexible (1) 122:2	62:9	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14	gyfords (2) 168:8 175:2	117:12,17 129:10	66:19 105:3,8 106:6
flowed (3) 27:6 159:1	formula (1) 109:13	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		130:17 132:12 136:9	111:4 128:8 132:10
182:4	fortnightly (3) 92:17,21	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		148:15 151:23 156:2	137:12 140:23 159:7
flowing (1) 62:2	113:23	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		157:11 158:6 166:7	160:6 161:11 162:6
flows (2) 153:12 183:25	fortunately (1) 38:25	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		169:25 170:2	170:21,25 173:17
focus (40) 7:23 14:17	forward (6) 87:23 163:9	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		helpful (2) 21:17 60:6	174:6 176:4,8 178:1
26:25 28:21 32:11	190:14 192:11,17	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		helping (1) 139:22	180:24 181:1 182:3
37:6 42:11 43:23 44:2	204:2	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		helps (6) 16:10	191:19 192:5 193:2,5
58:15,17 62:1,3,6	forwardreaching (1)	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		17:13,14,24 50:16	196:4,14 199:15
64:2,22 65:11,16	38:24	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		128:5	200:2,5,21 204:24
66:9,13 67:7,15	forwards (1) 191:5	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		hercules (13) 50:8	206:3
76:10,15 78:4,7	forwardthinking (1)	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		52:14,15 54:24	hones (4) 159:1 174:2
80:1,15 100:7,18	197:8	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		83:9,10 147:16,17	175:3 205:17
109:12 114:13	found (1) 144:12	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		148:15,20 149:14,19	137:12 140:23 159:7
126:12,14 127:21	four (9) 5:5 7:13,17,21	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		150:11	160:6 161:11 162:6
157:5 165:20 166:13	107:15 108:17 109:24	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		here (19) 4:3 7:17 28:4	170:21,25 173:17
170:19 187:15	115:5 123:16	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		32:20 34:8 63:21	174:6 176:4,8 178:1
focused (15) 25:1 26:17	fourth (1) 132:22	70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		74:16 81:21 84:4	180:24 181:1 182:3
32:5,6 40:15 41:6 43:9		70:2 86:17 173:22	197:11 199:17 200:14		113:12 122:1 123:5	191:19 192:5 193:2,5

hostile (50) 15:22 44:12  
45:6,12,22 46:14 48:1  
56:18 60:14,21  
61:2,7,20 70:15 72:9  
79:23  
80:2,11,16,21,23  
86:4,9 96:19 111:22  
121:22 127:22  
128:2,3,7,22 130:15  
131:2 134:1,16 135:23  
137:24 142:2 157:18  
158:1 159:18 160:13  
172:18 187:16  
198:2,19 202:7,9  
203:5,11  
hotline (1) 85:11  
hough (30) 1:3,4,14,15  
43:16 44:3 57:2,5,11  
90:1 104:11 105:3  
115:13 118:7 136:2  
144:20 145:18 158:13  
180:21,22  
182:7,10,16,17,18  
206:10,14 207:4,9,12  
hour (4) 65:20 66:21  
133:19 134:10  
hours (5) 53:12,13  
77:19 106:15 151:16  
however (9) 8:15 11:11  
33:23 38:16 39:13  
72:24 102:4 130:5  
143:23  
hubs (1) 111:21  
huge (9) 6:2 73:14  
97:18 98:3 122:21  
125:19 126:2 141:18  
200:20  
hugely (1) 48:11  
human (2) 19:20,21  
hundreds (1) 116:19  
hurt (1) 127:10  
hvm (2) 131:2 176:5  
hypothetical (3) 47:5  
67:9 105:16  
hyundai (2) 119:6 127:8

---

I

iconic (21) 42:11,12  
43:3,14,19,21 71:23  
98:14 101:6,8 111:20  
112:17 114:24  
116:9,12,15,17,18  
139:6,11 169:5  
id (1) 123:12  
idea (6) 37:8 43:2 69:12  
70:1 74:24 205:6  
identifiable (1) 156:16  
identification (1) 42:1  
identified (27) 31:4,17  
34:8 40:2 41:10 44:17  
46:7 48:5 71:17 78:17  
80:20 83:12 114:15  
136:23 137:1,2,9  
156:13 161:17  
171:22,24 173:17,18  
192:21 202:22 203:4  
204:23  
identifies (4) 159:3,4  
162:6 171:14  
identify (21) 7:17 29:15  
37:15 41:5 71:22 72:1  
76:16 78:5 89:4  
136:19 137:15,21

162:17 170:6,7,11  
172:6 177:17 181:23  
187:15 190:11  
identifying (14) 4:3  
35:8 42:6 78:9 161:6  
162:7,21,24 169:8  
170:23 174:6 177:3  
203:14 205:9  
ied (1) 139:16  
ieds (1) 5:3  
ill (4) 97:10 188:11  
190:4 199:25  
illustrate (1) 10:11  
illustrating (1) 55:10  
illustrative (3) 53:17  
54:2 98:8  
im (52) 1:17,17,18 3:6  
8:23 16:2 30:10 39:20  
43:16 46:23 47:7  
58:17 66:7 69:24  
73:14 94:5,7 98:6,12  
99:6 101:11 103:21  
106:7 117:15,18  
121:10 124:16,18,20  
125:6 129:9 130:2  
132:7 138:13 143:2  
149:13 150:10,22  
153:14 154:24 156:8  
158:7,11 162:20,25  
165:6 169:21 180:8  
182:14 185:16 186:2  
206:10  
imagination (1) 112:5  
imagine (1) 204:22  
imagining (1) 175:5  
immediate (6) 8:20  
56:11,19 71:7  
204:11,13  
immediately (4) 14:14  
39:10 45:9 153:15  
imminently (1) 15:10  
impact (8) 8:1 51:16  
69:17,19 100:11 102:6  
137:25 149:12  
implement (2) 89:10  
172:22  
implementation (3)  
13:23 160:12,20  
implemented (3) 71:19  
156:1 173:2  
implementing (1) 7:6  
implications (1) 147:8  
implied (1) 180:8  
importance (1) 188:6  
important (14) 6:15  
31:11 48:12 69:18  
70:3 86:19 87:14  
89:13 96:22 100:22  
102:5 154:18 186:2  
189:5  
impossible (1) 88:25  
impression (1) 53:7  
improve (6) 34:25 37:20  
38:3 196:25 197:9  
199:8  
improved (1) 143:14  
improvement (6) 30:12  
31:5 34:23 37:19  
169:24 170:5  
improving (1) 199:5  
improvised (1) 60:5  
inaccurate (1) 180:7  
inappropriate (1) 73:17

incapacitate (2) 153:19  
154:22  
incident (3) 101:16  
120:17 127:3  
incidents (2) 81:12  
119:21  
include (8) 2:19 12:2,18  
85:9,13 169:4 194:8  
200:12  
included (13) 29:8 58:3  
61:24 79:22 112:4  
122:25 127:16 140:19  
190:17 194:6,13,20  
206:7  
includes (7) 42:9  
90:9,15 93:5 131:1  
151:21 154:25  
including (17) 2:21 5:3  
12:2 18:19 19:24 20:4  
25:16 61:13 76:1  
101:18 133:14 151:4  
164:9 170:20 187:8  
190:25 191:17  
inclusion (1) 85:25  
incoherence (1) 143:9  
inconvenience (1) 1:12  
increase (11) 49:21,25  
50:17 52:16 74:25  
146:2,6,11 147:4  
155:3,5  
increased (5) 5:17 14:4  
50:5 67:24 68:11  
increasing (5) 6:6 42:7  
55:19 82:3 108:7  
incrementally (1)  
199:20  
independent (3) 101:20  
121:19 125:1  
independently (1)  
161:23  
index (1) 207:1  
indicate (4) 53:22 80:19  
102:7 172:4  
indicated (5) 36:10  
45:12 104:1 137:22  
185:23  
indicating (2) 42:15  
151:2  
indication (1) 16:17  
indicator (1) 16:21  
individual (8) 8:17,19  
13:10,22 15:24 93:24  
95:3 155:11  
individually (1) 76:11  
individuals (7) 17:14  
19:11 24:9,10 37:24  
89:15 132:13  
industry (4) 61:18  
62:4,19 126:2  
inescapable (1) 62:21  
infer (1) 131:11  
inflict (2) 62:10 63:14  
influenced (2) 160:24  
161:1  
inform (3) 15:12 89:9  
196:19  
information (15) 17:16  
28:23 29:1,11 39:13  
57:23 87:12 105:22  
112:14 121:16 150:25  
152:1 164:1 183:24  
190:25  
infrastructure (10)

22:25 23:4 40:11  
41:7,19 58:23 59:4  
111:20 188:4 197:13  
initial (2) 49:17 62:3  
initially (1) 35:11  
initiated (1) 184:22  
injured (5) 3:5 107:17  
109:20 110:2 123:17  
input (3) 12:23 188:21  
190:7  
inquest (8) 20:18 44:8  
86:23 108:25 109:1  
115:10 179:18 201:8  
inquests (4) 39:17  
76:17 186:1 188:15  
inquiry (1) 187:11  
inside (1) 96:21  
insider (1) 190:21  
inspector (1) 193:20  
inspiration (1) 119:17  
inspire (2) 65:3 91:13  
install (6) 72:9,16 73:24  
124:7 173:3 195:21  
installation (7) 41:7  
67:10 73:4,12 80:16  
81:1 122:8  
installations (1) 88:7  
installed (8) 60:10 73:3  
88:24 124:10 145:10  
173:14 175:5,8  
installing (5) 73:16  
74:22 125:18 134:16  
174:18  
instituted (1) 185:23  
instrumental (1) 14:6  
intelligence (80) 4:8  
5:13 12:25 17:13  
23:16 42:15 43:8,24  
44:1 47:10,19 48:15  
52:25 56:2 64:22  
65:12 66:12 67:13  
70:4 72:12,21 74:20  
87:6,12 89:23 94:23  
100:5,15,17,23  
101:1,22,25  
102:2,3,4,7,8,15,18,20  
103:4,7,10 108:1,9  
109:14 111:10 112:6,7  
113:23 116:4,7,21  
127:18 130:3,4,13  
142:11 156:6 164:1  
170:1 173:25 175:24  
178:18 179:12,19,21  
183:24,25 184:19  
187:17 190:10  
192:5,10 193:3 194:7  
203:23 204:13 205:17  
intended (2) 82:9 202:9  
intending (2) 51:23  
58:7  
intensely (1) 96:19  
intensity (1) 67:14  
intent (9) 17:8,15,22  
18:2,22 19:11 58:5  
138:11,19  
intention (2) 56:17  
187:7  
intentions (1) 119:15  
interactive (1) 85:25  
interest (3) 18:3 41:10  
65:12  
interestingly (1) 196:9  
interests (1) 98:8

interim (12) 142:22  
198:22,24,24  
199:18,18,22  
200:1,2,17,19,19  
international (3) 33:1  
179:10 205:18  
internationally (3)  
32:22 58:15 188:7  
interoperability (2)  
143:13 144:12  
interpretation (2)  
97:21,22  
into (41) 5:18 9:14  
15:15 24:6 32:7  
36:10,24 38:1 60:18  
65:22 67:25 68:17  
75:7,11 77:5,22 82:9  
83:3 87:1 89:3 96:23  
101:14 102:25 110:22  
120:25 123:23 124:11  
125:9,21 146:10  
152:21 155:1 168:14  
184:1 187:1 188:21  
189:12,13 193:6  
194:16 198:21  
introduce (2) 32:14  
34:2  
introduced (1) 30:22  
introduction (2)  
201:19,20  
investigate (1) 8:10  
investigation (6) 80:25  
102:16 108:2 110:11  
140:2 141:1  
investigations (3)  
100:25 142:12 170:2  
investigative (1) 40:17  
investment (4) 55:19  
56:24 125:20 147:3  
involve (5) 37:14 56:14  
58:2 80:8 144:11  
involved (12) 47:11  
64:15 73:19 79:10  
85:16 92:10 94:3  
144:10 147:11 155:15  
174:23 182:3  
involvement (2) 87:2  
188:11  
involves (1) 92:22  
involving (4) 11:24 49:2  
61:12 203:4  
irelandrelated (2) 29:12  
58:21  
irish (2) 18:11 58:24  
irrelevant (2) 45:4  
201:6  
isaac (5) 46:12  
104:24,25 105:5 133:6  
isis (2) 90:25 111:13  
islamic (2) 18:14,15  
islamist (1) 57:20  
isnt (9) 101:2 105:13  
107:8,18 111:25  
117:16 141:14 169:8  
175:9  
isolation (2) 129:19  
160:14  
issued (2) 14:2 46:5  
issues (10) 109:2 123:8  
124:22 128:14 129:1  
149:25 153:16 156:5,8  
190:11  
issuing (1) 14:6

item (1) 168:20  
its (119) 13:24 14:18  
15:16 16:7 23:9 24:20  
25:23 26:17,25 30:1  
32:23 37:13 38:5,5  
39:4 41:21 44:23 46:8  
47:21 51:19 53:24  
60:4,6,16 64:13,20  
66:22 67:3,9 68:20  
69:17 70:3 73:22  
74:10 75:19 76:5  
82:16 84:1,6,24 86:2,5  
87:23 88:25 94:7  
99:5,14 105:13 106:7  
111:21 114:17 116:6,8  
119:1 121:8 126:5  
129:5 131:12 134:4,6  
135:2 137:4 139:7  
151:3,14 152:11  
155:3,9 159:9  
160:3,21 164:18  
165:14 166:16,21  
167:3,10,11,23 169:21  
170:4 171:19 174:25  
175:9,12 176:5,16  
179:14 180:13,17  
181:2,25  
184:17,18,18,20 185:7  
186:2,19,25 187:3,7  
188:8,9,18,19  
189:5,7,23 190:1  
192:16 195:24 198:25  
199:24 200:22 201:8  
204:19 206:2,13  
itself (5) 45:14 47:15  
89:3 136:5 198:14  
ive (30) 10:7,11 17:5  
27:1 30:25 32:1 52:18  
59:14 64:23 68:16  
89:21 96:15 100:8  
103:21 105:1  
107:19,24 108:3  
123:11 128:5 139:21  
140:1 144:11 159:10  
163:24 165:1 169:11  
176:4 177:25 190:6

---

J

jane (6) 92:2 112:25  
132:9 182:12,20  
207:10  
january (2) 49:8 206:7  
jefferies (1) 135:18  
job (2) 56:8 200:22  
jobs (2) 185:6 187:22  
join (1) 3:7  
joined (2) 12:8,10  
joint (3) 12:9 14:23  
154:14  
jointly (1) 5:13  
jtc (11) 12:9,23 14:23  
15:3 17:4 22:22 23:19  
57:19 102:3 121:13  
168:24  
judge (1) 146:13  
judgment (8) 165:18  
167:10,13,15,18  
168:5,15 170:22  
july (5) 61:10,16 78:19  
82:10 197:20  
junction (1) 46:2  
june (19) 1:1 31:4  
53:10,12 68:6 71:5

72:20 80:24 82:17  
83:13,15 84:2,2,7  
145:7 151:5 157:22  
201:1 206:20  
jurisdiction (2) 92:25  
180:15

---

K

keen (1) 121:15  
kerb (3) 115:21 134:2,3  
key (5) 12:10 17:3  
121:17 127:17 155:10  
killed (8) 90:6,9,11  
107:16 108:17  
109:20,24 141:11  
killing (1) 90:21  
kilojoules (1) 134:11  
kind (3) 65:19 86:2  
192:8  
kindly (1) 55:16  
kinds (1) 187:8  
kingdom (2) 8:9 86:2  
knife (1) 91:7  
know (88) 4:24 16:8  
17:20 19:19 21:22  
22:7 30:25 35:2 36:3  
37:22,23 39:5 46:5,22  
49:1,5 52:9 61:19  
64:1,15,20 65:8 66:5  
67:5 68:17,22 70:23  
74:7,16 75:21,22,24  
78:12 86:4 90:10  
92:3,24 93:7 94:20  
99:2,6,14 103:8  
104:5,25 108:24  
110:13,24 112:23  
114:17,18 116:17,17  
118:22 120:1 121:16  
124:12 125:18 126:1  
132:13,19,21 135:15  
139:13 140:8  
144:16,17 147:13  
149:9,10 150:7,14  
155:12 158:3,8 159:25  
160:8,15 161:24  
162:9,11 169:1 172:16  
174:9,10 175:14,15,22  
knowledge (8) 21:1  
24:5 27:17 46:18 47:8  
114:24 133:1 174:2  
known (8) 7:7 26:10  
28:5,7 32:23 33:12  
85:14 103:1

---

L

la (1) 78:15  
lack (3) 101:1 102:8  
202:24  
land (1) 51:22  
landmarks (1) 140:15  
landscape (6) 21:16,19  
68:19 131:2 174:9  
205:19  
large (15) 3:22 40:20  
41:23 45:25 52:21  
54:16 63:13,14,15  
84:13 90:21 110:6  
120:1 137:1,12  
largely (1) 50:25  
largescale (3) 63:22  
79:5,7

last (6) 20:18 59:20 106:17 155:4 182:25 185:1	liable (1) 165:13 liaise (3) 194:21,23 195:8	133:10,12 136:4 142:5,18 148:18 164:15 165:11 167:24 187:1 188:6 196:8 200:14 202:23	134:14,17,20,21,23,24 136:13,14,17 137:2,5,8,23 138:13 139:3,7,14 140:12,14 141:5,21,24 142:4,9,21 143:8,16 144:11 147:2,8 150:13 152:9 154:3 156:13,19 157:3,22 159:3,11 160:1,7,13,20 161:6,8,17 162:11 163:8 168:8 170:8,10,23 172:21,22 176:6,17,20 178:10,23 179:5,24 180:5,16 182:21 183:2,3,7,20,21 184:1,5,11 185:7,9,10 186:3,14,18 188:2,5,17 189:14,17,19 190:6,8,11,18,19,21,23,24 191:20 194:1,11,19 195:4 196:3,3,6,9,12 197:4,8 198:7,8,14,20 199:10,11,12,18,19 200:3,12 201:1,12 202:16,23 203:15,18,18 204:6,23 205:5,7,10,13 206:3,6,7	203:10,20 206:3 looks (9) 96:1 111:16,19 112:9 138:10,20 153:22,23 171:15 lorries (2) 96:9 125:9 lorry (1) 119:5 loss (1) 33:20 lot (26) 37:25 54:22 63:3 68:16,18 69:3 74:7,14 81:18 84:8 88:18 112:13 121:13,15,16 129:3,4 142:16 146:9 157:25 158:3 163:4 172:11 173:10 175:18 192:2 lots (8) 96:21 101:5,6,8 141:19,20 156:19 202:18 low (9) 15:5 17:23 18:19 115:21 132:24 134:14 138:24 146:15 202:3 lower (3) 37:23 92:15 146:18 lowered (2) 133:23 159:21 lucas (1) 135:18 lucy (4) 1:5,6,17 207:3 ludlow (1) 140:5 lunch (1) 116:6 luncheon (1) 104:16	marathon (1) 63:5 marauding (7) 48:25 49:2 57:13 58:18 95:19 106:21 154:23 march (26) 4:16 27:5 39:10 40:4 50:9 54:7 58:14 64:14 81:9 85:10 94:16 106:8,9 111:1 123:6 126:16,20 140:13 161:5,11 180:24 183:16 191:12 198:17 200:15,19 mark (5) 4:15 112:19 132:14 146:25 161:22 marked (1) 4:7 marker (1) 196:9 market (59) 4:18 9:8 29:18 38:9,21 41:13 52:2,17,19,19 53:5,10 54:17 63:24 64:1 75:5,6,10,13,25 76:1 77:4 78:14,21,23 79:1,11,11,13,13,20,21,25 80:2,5,10,11 81:11,14,22,24 82:8,10,14,16,21 83:23 84:1,6 88:17 119:24 147:9 151:12,21 152:22 153:15 155:8,15 markets (4) 64:5 79:16,17 97:2 masood (8) 103:14 107:17 109:5 119:13 122:14 127:8 157:20 178:14 masoods (4) 117:11 123:1,19 128:11 mass (2) 62:10 66:17 material (2) 36:19 45:4 materialising (1) 174:6 materials (1) 59:25 matrix (12) 26:2,4,24 27:10 32:19 35:24 75:13,14 109:13 167:8 196:4 205:23 matt (1) 200:2 matter (4) 12:19 21:15 165:17 167:10 matters (8) 8:21 13:17 14:17 183:10 184:23 189:1,17 191:2 matthew (1) 135:18 maximise (4) 7:16 53:8 82:19 141:9 mayor (5) 101:19 124:9,11 125:1 154:13 mayors (3) 121:1 124:13,17 mckibbin (2) 49:5 148:4 mckibbins (3) 5:2,3 146:8 150:6 mean (79) 17:5 22:15 35:22 36:6 37:8,18 43:22 46:21 47:4,5 49:14 53:17 56:6 61:6 63:18 64:19 65:7 67:3 68:16 69:16 70:14 81:13 84:8 99:19 103:17 105:16 110:11,22 114:4 116:15 119:20 121:5,15 124:12	125:17 129:2,6 132:8 134:20 136:13,15 139:10 140:25 141:16 142:8 143:2,3 144:7 146:10 150:4 152:1,5 153:2,3,14 156:8 159:13 160:5,14 161:3 163:19 166:11 167:13 168:4,5,11 169:21 170:17 171:3 172:8,15 174:8,21 176:12,16 179:7 191:7 202:13 204:16 meaning (1) 97:24 means (7) 34:17 99:8 134:9 167:17 187:20 190:22 195:21 meant (1) 40:4 measure (1) 23:11 measures (32) 11:10 16:6 17:20 19:23 37:16 47:14,16 60:14 22:25,25 64:10 67:11 71:18,25 74:17 80:17 81:1 120:2 121:2 122:11,23 124:7 137:19,24 138:3,9,13 142:1 158:4 176:14 191:17 mechanism (2) 176:10 193:22 media (5) 110:12 118:12 129:4,13 187:5 medium (1) 72:1 mediums (1) 26:21 meet (13) 26:3 33:21 59:25 75:11,15,16 97:14 98:10,13,20 166:2,4 170:17 meeting (46) 11:23 12:6,8,15,22 13:12 14:8,14 28:15 30:6 40:15 47:1 61:12,15 62:2,3 12 71:5,10 80:8 92:10,18,21 95:1,2 116:22,24 117:4,12,21 118:1,3,6 124:21 126:17,25 130:14,18 131:14 168:19 170:12 189:6,16,19,21 193:19 meetings (28) 12:18,20 13:5 40:12 42:25 62:8 66:15 80:4 92:20 93:15,21 94:2 95:1 104:20 106:19 118:9,17,19,20 178:2,7 189:10 190:2,3 191:12,25 192:18 206:10 meets (2) 166:11 188:16 member (1) 186:3 members (8) 25:22 107:15 108:17 129:13 164:16 165:12 166:10 192:14 mention (1) 168:1 mentioned (7) 14:23 17:2 41:14 106:16,23 137:5 147:9 mentioning (1) 16:7 mentions (1) 107:10 merger (1) 143:23
<b>M</b>						
maam (1) 205:4 machine (2) 91:19,21 magazine (2) 91:13,14 magazines (1) 91:23 main (4) 18:10 26:25 61:8 111:20 maintain (1) 22:2 major (4) 61:9 68:14 101:15 120:17 majority (1) 58:3 makes (5) 36:1 163:23 168:9 174:22 196:14 making (8) 38:6 56:1 67:8 157:18 173:15 176:13 193:1,23 managed (1) 5:13 management (8) 20:25 40:17 80:10 184:2,20 190:22,23 193:19 manager (3) 46:12 79:25 105:10 managers (2) 47:11 77:13 manchester (6) 4:6,23 5:6 16:24 81:9,16 mandatory (1) 64:13 manger (1) 45:24 manner (1) 187:23 many (33) 18:2 20:23 26:1 31:13 43:13 50:21,23 60:21 61:11 64:8 79:7 81:4 91:15 94:12 97:13,13 107:16 109:16 110:2 133:12 138:14,14 148:21 152:25 153:2 178:23 180:2 184:25 186:6,9 196:8 199:12,16 maps (2) 53:19 84:14						

merging (1) 143:19  
 merit (1) 33:11  
 message (5) 13:7,13,14  
 91:8 116:13  
 messages (4) 13:7 14:2  
 42:4 91:10  
 messaging (3) 14:8,11  
 187:5  
 met (7) 101:18 105:1  
 126:21 155:3  
 183:16,17,19  
 method (3) 89:5 203:4  
 204:10  
 methodologies (6) 4:11  
 33:18 60:6 111:15,16  
 141:15  
 methodology (20)  
 30:16 41:4,10 49:13  
 58:4,19 59:14  
 72:19,23 87:2 126:6  
 136:21 137:14,16  
 139:20 141:18 163:10  
 205:19,25 206:4  
 methods (3) 5:2 58:2  
 193:3  
 metres (5) 82:21 134:8  
 151:12 152:10 153:1  
 metropolitan (44) 1:22  
 2:14 3:1,8 9:9,19 10:3  
 14:18 34:20 35:14  
 36:6 37:9 39:5 40:20  
 41:2 46:23 47:24  
 61:13 84:17 93:1,5  
 95:17 96:2 98:24  
 105:12,17 108:4  
 114:17 136:18,23  
 143:11 152:7 153:25  
 155:5 157:3 160:16  
 168:10 171:1 177:5  
 178:6 179:20 180:4  
 183:14 185:1  
 mi5 (9) 5:13 6:8  
 12:3,9,23 23:15,19  
 102:14 193:3  
 middle (2) 90:25 203:13  
 midday (1) 47:1  
 midmorning (1) 57:4  
 might (40) 17:19 18:2,3  
 20:24 23:13 34:19  
 37:14 43:14 47:3  
 48:20 65:3,25  
 67:24,25 100:16 132:4  
 135:8 137:21  
 138:5,21,23 142:23  
 143:13 144:3 145:12  
 146:17,18 149:24,24  
 153:6 154:10,22  
 156:7,14,25 169:23  
 174:13 180:8 197:5  
 205:6  
 miles (2) 43:22 134:10  
 military (2) 5:18 12:14  
 millions (1) 123:17  
 mind (13) 29:15 68:11  
 96:13 101:2,4 106:14  
 107:21,22 111:23  
 112:9,10 126:9 128:1  
 minds (3) 102:10,24  
 126:10  
 mindset (2) 160:24  
 161:1  
 minimise (1) 86:16  
 ministry (2) 9:21 12:13

minute (1) 169:7  
 minutes (15) 12:21  
 55:4,6,7 57:6  
 93:13,17,20 94:16  
 104:4,9 151:16 153:11  
 188:15 189:11  
 mistake (2) 126:13  
 137:6  
 mitigate (3) 7:25 21:6  
 190:20  
 mitigating (1) 60:17  
 mitigation (33) 37:16  
 46:14 48:1 60:4,14,21  
 61:3,5 62:24 72:10  
 79:23  
 80:3,12,17,22,23  
 96:20 121:22,25  
 127:23  
 128:2,3,7,13,23  
 130:16 131:3 133:21  
 134:17 137:24 159:18  
 160:13,20  
 mix (1) 103:6  
 mobile (8) 50:18 54:9  
 56:3 83:8,18 96:6  
 121:22 148:20  
 model (63) 25:11  
 26:5,6,11,19,25  
 28:5,10,12  
 30:3,3,9,10,11,13,14,17,18  
 31:9,19,21 32:2,4,12  
 33:15 38:10,11 41:1  
 75:19 86:19,22 87:4  
 93:3 97:23 98:1,19  
 102:20,25 103:11  
 154:10 166:12  
 169:8,13,17,20,22,23  
 170:4,7,10,11,13  
 171:5 172:5,15 177:12  
 192:24 193:9 194:17  
 195:1,11,15  
 models (1) 31:24  
 moderate (2) 15:6  
 177:7  
 modern (1) 186:12  
 moment (6) 4:7 16:22  
 57:3 97:11 139:2  
 205:13  
 monday (1) 193:19  
 money (1) 56:24  
 monitor (2) 11:25 117:8  
 month (3) 82:2,3  
 182:25  
 months (9) 111:3  
 144:23 145:11  
 148:16,21,25 149:1  
 155:4 169:15  
 monument (1) 45:10  
 moral (1) 130:11  
 morally (5) 73:1 129:24  
 130:8 173:23 174:16  
 more (61) 5:9,14  
 6:11,12 17:7 19:12  
 23:1 25:23 30:6 31:13  
 33:7 35:21,21 48:5  
 57:24 60:19 63:2 66:4  
 67:25 69:14,15 73:7  
 75:19 77:18 88:11  
 91:22 92:12 95:11  
 100:14 104:4 107:4  
 108:22 109:16 112:3  
 121:25 124:10  
 125:7,11,19 139:12

140:25 141:1 151:7  
 154:15 157:18 159:13  
 161:14 163:15,21  
 164:17 166:15 168:11  
 171:14 174:23 176:11  
 184:11 197:5,18  
 202:14 206:3,5  
 morning (15) 1:3,4,7  
 83:17,19,20 138:7,19  
 141:17 163:2 166:3  
 169:11 173:19 204:23  
 206:17  
 most (13) 29:7 35:23  
 40:25 58:1 86:14  
 102:2 106:20 123:22  
 132:23 133:10 134:13  
 159:4 191:11  
 mounted (1) 134:3  
 mounting (6) 45:16,24  
 127:9 134:2 136:6  
 141:6  
 move (18) 11:18 14:21  
 22:11 25:10 30:14  
 48:25 51:19 52:7,12  
 70:8 75:4 86:22 87:23  
 112:18 122:4 165:4  
 166:22 172:20  
 moved (3) 28:12 50:19  
 60:10  
 movement (2) 53:24  
 54:4  
 moves (1) 171:18  
 moving (6) 32:4,12 39:9  
 81:8 143:21 149:16  
 mow (1) 61:11  
 mowing (2) 91:19,21  
 mps (4) 37:9 40:15,25  
 143:19  
 ms (8) 171:18  
 176:24,25 177:1,23  
 189:17 195:10 207:7  
 much (50) 3:6 11:7  
 12:22 17:7,9 18:1  
 29:11 37:23 51:15  
 56:23 57:2 62:3 67:5  
 74:6 78:18 79:4 86:25  
 87:1,16,17,21 90:1  
 102:16 103:19 118:10  
 121:17 126:5,5 129:21  
 138:18,20 139:17,21  
 152:20,22 157:1  
 165:10 169:13  
 176:11,23 182:7,8  
 183:18,25 184:9,12  
 188:21 197:18 201:6  
 206:17  
 multidimensional (1)  
 6:13  
 multiple (7) 65:5 112:4  
 115:25 136:16 142:9  
 144:10 162:4  
 multiplicity (1) 179:22  
 multiseated (1) 146:22  
 multitude (3) 47:17  
 75:22 160:17  
 murdered (2) 3:5  
 110:25  
 murderous (1) 42:23  
 must (4) 18:13 33:17  
 190:17 199:9  
 myself (8) 10:21 16:10  
 75:13 104:5 110:14  
 121:15 167:14 188:19

N  
 nacey (3) 117:16  
 157:14 171:18  
 naceys (2) 23:2 171:13  
 nactso (7) 24:7 27:9  
 113:7,8 177:4,7 181:7  
 name (5) 1:15 41:11  
 158:20 182:19,20  
 namely (2) 105:8  
 135:10  
 names (1) 94:6  
 naming (1) 122:22  
 narrative (1) 190:6  
 nation (1) 6:19  
 national (82) 2:5,5,6,11  
 8:3,5,8,11 9:2,24,25  
 10:2,10,15 11:19 12:3  
 14:24 15:12,20,24  
 16:3,13 22:11,16,25  
 23:4,22,25 24:14,23  
 32:25 33:19 39:11  
 40:10 41:18 59:3,7,9  
 63:3 64:8 73:9,10  
 90:12,16 92:5,9  
 93:19,20 94:10 95:13  
 97:3,5 98:9  
 99:12,13,20 105:24  
 111:19,19 113:8,10  
 114:19 118:8,13 120:2  
 121:12 122:21 123:24  
 124:15 125:20 126:21  
 131:19,22 134:25  
 143:20,21 147:8  
 154:24 180:3 185:7  
 188:4 197:12  
 nationally (9) 10:19  
 22:14 32:21 34:13  
 36:25 58:15 64:3 99:7  
 113:2  
 naturally (2) 62:16  
 201:11  
 nature (12) 2:23 25:24  
 139:6 164:18,24  
 165:15,21 166:16,24  
 167:3 176:11 198:19  
 nba (1) 144:20  
 nca (1) 95:12  
 near (1) 127:10  
 nearby (2) 83:21 124:1  
 152:20,22 157:1  
 necessarily (6) 48:17  
 54:1 83:22 102:7  
 153:3 177:10  
 necessary (2) 111:24  
 139:3  
 need (38) 13:2 15:22  
 17:12,15,20 31:15  
 43:23 45:23 47:18  
 48:13 60:7 66:9  
 87:13,23 88:9 89:16  
 96:8 101:3 102:23  
 120:6 125:14 128:1,6  
 138:17 140:25 145:14  
 147:14 153:8  
 155:12,13 170:24  
 179:10,13 181:1  
 187:13 188:21 189:9  
 205:21  
 needed (23) 20:21  
 33:16 44:1 56:24  
 72:24 77:21 100:7  
 109:12,17 114:3,9  
 118:23 130:1 166:2

186:20 196:5,8 202:17  
 203:16,20 204:17,19  
 206:8  
 needless (1) 147:21  
 needs (6) 79:23 86:25  
 87:4 101:25 107:1  
 169:24  
 negotiate (1) 51:21  
 negotiated (2) 51:9,11  
 negotiation (2) 48:10  
 49:17  
 negotiations (1) 151:9  
 neil (1) 9:4  
 network (14) 8:4,7,11  
 9:1,15,25 10:1,19  
 11:9,16 13:13 22:16  
 24:9 43:20  
 networkwide (1) 13:14  
 neutralise (4) 49:15  
 55:15,23 150:9  
 never (8) 30:5 64:23  
 133:3 144:11  
 146:21,21 168:4  
 179:19  
 nevertheless (5) 33:1  
 45:1 70:22 195:18  
 201:15  
 news (3) 118:14 123:5  
 125:14  
 newspaper (1) 141:2  
 next (17) 2:23 23:22  
 82:18 94:9 98:15  
 111:1 117:12 118:11  
 127:6 167:8 181:10  
 182:10 196:17  
 197:22,24 201:24  
 206:10  
 nice (13) 61:9 62:7  
 63:12 78:19,23 79:4  
 90:19 96:14,15 121:24  
 125:8 128:19 146:4  
 nicetohave (1) 202:19  
 nick (2) 39:21 108:24  
 night (1) 52:2  
 nightclub (1) 26:16  
 nights (1) 106:17  
 nine (1) 40:14  
 nobody (2) 110:23  
 139:2  
 nonbelievers (1) 91:8  
 none (2) 135:24 147:10  
 normal (2) 50:13 176:12  
 normally (2) 11:24  
 173:11  
 north (1) 133:22  
 northbound (1) 45:19  
 northern (3) 18:11  
 29:12 58:21  
 notable (3) 32:24  
 33:2,13  
 note (5) 5:16 140:20,21  
 141:4 186:2  
 noted (1) 181:16  
 notes (1) 113:14  
 nothing (7) 64:11  
 65:8,8 105:21 108:22  
 140:1 177:19  
 notified (2) 118:18  
 135:16  
 notwithstanding (1)  
 143:7  
 november (2) 4:16  
 79:18

nowhere (2) 134:7  
 160:4  
 nra (1) 33:21  
 nuclear (1) 17:20  
 number (71) 2:10,17  
 3:10,15,18 5:12,15,24  
 7:13 15:15 16:24 26:3  
 30:19 31:23 36:7  
 38:20 40:1,5,20 41:23  
 47:6 49:10,22 50:3,17  
 53:3 54:11 55:20  
 57:16 61:18,23 63:15  
 68:11 76:16 78:11  
 79:14 80:20 82:2 87:9  
 91:3 95:5 98:3 108:7  
 110:5,6,7 116:15  
 118:4 121:10 123:20  
 128:7 136:14,21,23  
 137:1,12 146:3 147:4  
 149:7,20 154:1 155:5  
 162:14,21 169:15  
 170:25 178:22 180:1  
 185:19 196:7 199:20  
 numbers (4) 63:13  
 90:21 97:19 146:11  
 numerous (3) 17:9  
 43:19 171:3  
 nursery (1) 116:11  
 O  
 observation (2) 159:23  
 160:2  
 observations (7) 45:12  
 52:5 109:1 159:6,20  
 168:7 185:18  
 observed (1) 140:14  
 obstacles (1) 157:23  
 obvious (3) 72:15  
 156:12 179:18  
 obviously (38) 12:16  
 29:10 30:4 35:2,22  
 38:25 41:11 49:25  
 51:19 54:15 57:22  
 62:6 63:1,18 67:5 68:4  
 69:20 76:9 82:11  
 84:24 92:22 107:12,15  
 113:25 124:12 137:8  
 139:18 143:9 144:24  
 149:6 153:11 159:12  
 162:25 170:20  
 187:9,11 199:11  
 200:22  
 occasion (5) 100:14  
 132:20 135:16 148:16  
 189:18  
 occasionally (1) 13:18  
 occasions (7) 5:17 58:4  
 132:17 162:14 178:22  
 180:2,3  
 occurred (3) 4:17  
 151:25 153:13  
 occurrence (1) 102:8  
 o'clock (8)  
 83:17,17,19,20 84:1,2  
 182:16 206:17  
 october (4) 6:10 101:14  
 120:8 197:16  
 offences (2) 140:6,11  
 offer (2) 3:3 35:5  
 offered (2) 34:22 37:1  
 office (24) 7:1,4,5 20:19  
 23:23 27:9 106:11  
 111:6 113:11 117:16

121:1 122:3,20  
 124:9,13,17 143:18  
 144:15 155:21,25  
 169:3 171:20 177:2,8  
 officer (26) 21:10 25:3  
 37:5 52:9 78:8 80:15  
 82:21 90:5 92:2  
 94:17,20 102:11  
 104:19 113:12 117:25  
 118:13 126:8 139:2  
 142:19 146:1 152:17  
 154:21 163:9 177:1  
 191:19 194:23  
 officers (95) 24:13,25  
 25:1,4 38:18 40:23,24  
 42:7 49:8,10  
 50:1,4,5,12,13,18,19,22  
 51:4,8,14,23  
 52:1,14,22 53:4,14  
 55:2,22 56:10 58:8  
 65:13 66:14 76:25  
 77:4 81:25  
 83:2,5,9,10,10,15,16  
 84:9,17,18,21  
 95:5,24,25 96:3  
 101:19 108:6,7,21  
 140:13  
 147:5,15,18,19,21  
 148:6,17,20 149:8,15  
 150:2,13,16,18 151:6  
 152:8,23,25  
 153:10,14,23 154:1,16  
 155:3,6,12 161:1,23  
 185:20 187:1,22  
 191:8,16 192:3  
 193:12,24 196:19  
 197:5 199:6  
 official (1) 12:21  
 often (3) 48:10 58:25  
 192:13  
 oh (1) 179:7  
 okay (1) 104:14  
 old (1) 31:23  
 olympics (1) 30:23  
 once (8) 41:14 52:9  
 61:3 91:22 105:1  
 106:3 146:24 149:16  
 ones (1) 35:22  
 ongoing (1) 131:17  
 online (2) 77:22,23  
 onto (6) 11:18 16:22  
 91:7 94:16 104:2  
 115:21  
 onwards (1) 6:23  
 open (3) 88:10 112:10  
 115:22  
 opened (1) 197:7  
 operate (8) 8:5 15:23  
 56:19 76:13 86:5  
 89:12 157:19 158:1  
 operated (1) 97:3  
 operating (3) 6:13  
 31:19 93:3  
 operation (11) 50:8  
 52:14,15 54:23  
 147:16,17 148:15,20  
 149:11,14,18  
 operational (9) 11:2  
 23:16 24:6 99:21  
 114:21 143:25 144:9  
 184:2,15  
 operationalising (2)  
 194:7 204:1

<p><b>operations (20)</b> 1:22,25 2:2 11:4 23:17 40:16,18 41:3 72:23 130:23 144:10 149:3 173:25 182:21 184:4,10,13,25 185:6 189:24 <b>operatives (7)</b> 89:8 196:23 197:1 202:1,5 203:9 205:8 <b>operators (4)</b> 88:19,23 89:22 177:20 <b>opinion (2)</b> 129:5 149:7 <b>opinions (1)</b> 67:6 <b>opportunity (2)</b> 63:11,20 <b>opposed (1)</b> 163:17 <b>ops (1)</b> 188:19 <b>optimising (1)</b> 40:15 <b>options (1)</b> 31:17 <b>order (16)</b> 3:13 11:6 29:15 47:13 58:22 64:10 71:6 87:13 116:23 120:20 145:10 153:18 158:14 176:14 194:16 196:18 <b>orders (1)</b> 20:8 <b>ordinary (2)</b> 6:18 97:24 <b>organisation (4)</b> 24:5 51:1 129:9 202:15 <b>organisations (2)</b> 19:11 101:18 <b>origin (1)</b> 4:12 <b>original (1)</b> 28:9 <b>originally (3)</b> 36:10 88:5 196:18 <b>originating (1)</b> 81:15 <b>osct (8)</b> 7:8 22:19 23:19 26:9 29:24 30:7 177:8 194:5 <b>others (14)</b> 22:24 42:6 61:2 80:10 90:2 102:3 107:16 119:17 139:12 179:18 193:13 196:8 200:7 204:1 <b>otherwise (2)</b> 138:5 146:18 <b>ought (3)</b> 29:8 176:10 205:11 <b>ours (1)</b> 121:17 <b>ourselves (4)</b> 47:18 88:12 116:11 120:3 <b>outlet (1)</b> 106:1 <b>outlined (1)</b> 139:22 <b>output (1)</b> 13:4 <b>outside (9)</b> 22:7 45:24 72:7,8,17 87:19 99:25 100:3 169:2 <b>outweigh (1)</b> 143:24 <b>over (44)</b> 2:23 4:19 5:9 6:25 19:3 24:21 25:11 35:13 36:12,25 38:20 43:22 45:19 59:17 60:21,23 71:21 77:19 80:5 82:3 94:15 111:2 123:8,24 126:4 127:6,9,14 128:12 134:10,10 153:4 155:4 159:10,10 161:19 169:15 170:18 185:24 196:13 198:16 203:3,5 205:25 <b>overall (1)</b> 28:6</p>	<p><b>overridden (1)</b> 174:19 <b>override (1)</b> 175:10 <b>oversee (2)</b> 11:20 190:12 <b>overseeing (2)</b> 13:23 144:1 <b>oversees (1)</b> 24:7 <b>oversight (4)</b> 10:23 99:19 115:1 134:25 <b>overview (2)</b> 12:25 93:19 <b>own (14)</b> 3:7 13:19 23:14 24:20 41:21 61:25 99:10 135:6 153:25 160:21 180:17 183:13 194:6 204:3 <b>owned (2)</b> 51:22 75:25 <b>owner (8)</b> 37:13,14,17 88:14,18 142:18 167:1 195:7 <b>owners (11)</b> 21:13 74:23 76:3,6,10 77:1 171:3,7 175:22 176:13 177:20 <b>ownership (6)</b> 74:8 75:18,22,24 93:23 115:5 <b>owns (1)</b> 175:19 <b>oxford (7)</b> 139:25 140:3,7,16,19 141:5,7</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>P</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>pace (2)</b> 4:11 6:14 <b>pair (1)</b> 153:6 <b>palace (4)</b> 43:12 98:15 178:12,15 <b>palmer (1)</b> 107:13 <b>paper (2)</b> 141:19 192:17 <b>papers (1)</b> 192:17 <b>parade (1)</b> 6:1 <b>paragaph (32)</b> 5:9 6:7 7:16 15:4 28:21 30:10 32:12 33:14 40:6 82:5 83:12 101:13 105:2,4 106:10 117:14,18 118:8 132:22 137:4 142:8 152:12 164:7 165:5 166:14 171:13,15,17,18,21,25 199:24 <b>paragraphs (1)</b> 164:4 <b>parameters (1)</b> 83:23 <b>parents (1)</b> 158:21 <b>paris (8)</b> 49:2,13,23 55:17 63:20 78:3 101:20 156:9 <b>parker (1)</b> 6:8 <b>parliament (4)</b> 42:22,23 109:22 119:14 <b>parliamentary (1)</b> 2:1 <b>part (44)</b> 2:4 7:15 23:24 26:18 32:11 42:12 45:1 52:15 54:17,20 56:4 60:18 73:8 76:5,8 77:3 86:8 89:9 92:24 93:2,4,17 98:24 105:19 107:21 108:23 109:4,6 110:10 113:25 125:16 126:25 129:9 131:25 132:5 137:3 150:11 153:20 165:21 173:15 187:9 198:23 200:9,18 <b>participant (1)</b> 124:20</p>	<p><b>participants (1)</b> 61:13 <b>particular (58)</b> 13:4 18:4,6 22:8 39:15 41:24 45:13 46:7 51:18 52:6,8 53:11,23 54:5,14 59:15 62:1 66:1 72:5,12 73:11 74:1 76:23 78:20 79:12 80:11 83:13 84:10,11 85:20 88:7,14 89:5,13 91:18 103:24 107:9 133:18 147:23 148:18 156:18 162:5 171:24 177:16,17,18 186:5 187:13,15 191:8,8,10,13 194:15,24 195:7 203:4 204:9 <b>particularly (12)</b> 45:18 46:19 51:2 54:23 65:20 66:16 71:9 87:3 88:17 143:15 187:20 205:16 <b>partly (1)</b> 103:25 <b>partner (4)</b> 7:8 22:19 112:15 158:22 <b>partners (6)</b> 12:10,13 61:18 64:17 121:17 204:18 <b>partnership (3)</b> 22:12 61:19 157:2 <b>parts (7)</b> 49:20 57:24 62:19 122:24 125:7 155:1 198:22 <b>party (2)</b> 59:12,17 <b>passage (2)</b> 171:16 189:12 <b>passenger (1)</b> 61:22 <b>past (2)</b> 119:17 169:18 <b>patrol (20)</b> 49:22 50:22 51:14,15 52:20 53:2 54:16 83:8,11,13,16,18,21,22 84:18 96:6 108:6,8 151:3,6 <b>patrolled (1)</b> 84:12 <b>patrolling (13)</b> 51:6 54:22 56:9 76:25 84:1,5,9 95:24 148:10,17 150:3 151:20 152:25 <b>patrols (23)</b> 40:23 41:7 50:20 51:12,19 52:1 54:9 56:3,16 77:3 82:24 83:4,5,24 84:16 147:9,15,17,24 148:19 150:11,22 151:10 <b>patterson (27)</b> 90:4,5 103:21,23 104:4,8,18,19 117:21,23,25 118:10 145:5,6,9,23 146:1 151:11,15 152:17 156:5 158:6,8,10 160:23 161:4 207:5 <b>pause (1)</b> 206:16 <b>pausing (2)</b> 94:19 98:4 <b>pavement (24)</b> 18:1 22:2,3,4 45:16,25 66:22,23 68:1 109:7,19 112:18 115:24 119:2 123:25</p>	<p>127:9 129:16 133:23 134:7 136:6 141:8 159:21 160:4 174:11 <b>pavements (6)</b> 22:1 43:4 66:2 115:21 124:23 174:10 <b>pc (17)</b> 46:6 105:3 160:6 162:6 170:25 174:2,6 176:4 182:3 191:19 193:5 196:4,14 199:15 200:21 205:17 206:3 <b>peak (1)</b> 40:22 <b>pedestrian (5)</b> 67:24 68:4,10,13 69:8 <b>pedestrians (15)</b> 45:11 67:24 124:24 125:8,15 127:9 133:16 134:7 142:4 160:4 178:14,15,19,19,23 <b>pen (1)</b> 205:23 <b>people (82)</b> 2:21 12:2,5 16:10 21:18,23 22:2,7,9 23:7 31:1 36:18,23 43:18 48:8 50:18 51:8,19,21 52:5 56:25 61:5,11,24 63:4,13,19 64:4 73:23 76:13 82:7 85:24 87:19,20,24 89:7,18,19 90:21 95:22 96:21,23 97:19,25 99:6 109:19,21,24 110:19,21,25 113:2 114:2 120:4 123:16,17,20 125:24 127:10 129:5 133:19 135:1,15 136:9 141:20 146:23 149:7 150:8 156:10,16 162:4,21 168:8 171:4,6 175:15 179:7 187:3,23 188:22 190:25 201:9 <b>peoples (1)</b> 99:7 <b>per (2)</b> 134:10 204:14 <b>perceive (1)</b> 156:16 <b>percentage (1)</b> 153:23 <b>perfect (3)</b> 169:24 170:4 179:19 <b>perfectly (2)</b> 69:22 74:23 <b>perhaps (7)</b> 111:22 116:10 143:20 145:11 146:15 165:9 205:24 <b>period (19)</b> 4:25 5:9,14,20,24 6:5 57:17 81:18 82:25 83:19 96:13 149:11 153:4 160:24 175:7 176:9 190:13 198:16 202:3 <b>periodic (1)</b> 77:7 <b>permanent (5)</b> 60:25 74:17 122:23 128:9 171:22 <b>permission (1)</b> 51:8 <b>perpetrate (1)</b> 20:24 <b>personally (4)</b> 69:24 114:25 120:10 130:8 <b>personnel (2)</b> 5:18 77:25 <b>persontoperson (1)</b> 79:2</p>	<p><b>perspective (16)</b> 2:14 15:18,19 21:10 56:22 69:25 108:22 131:17 144:10 168:14 175:1,15 195:19 198:2 202:12 203:10 <b>peter (1)</b> 135:18 <b>phase (2)</b> 187:19 204:20 <b>phasing (1)</b> 199:20 <b>photographs (2)</b> 98:4 140:15 <b>physical (7)</b> 38:5 45:15 61:4 70:24 136:5 137:19 142:1 <b>physically (3)</b> 59:22 70:20 73:5 <b>pick (3)</b> 53:20 116:13 136:10 <b>picture (34)</b> 13:1 19:10 29:11 31:7 43:8 47:10 48:15,21 56:2 64:22 65:12 67:13 87:5 89:23,24 95:12 99:25 100:3,4,23 102:4 108:14 127:18 130:3 142:11 170:1 179:12 192:10,11 194:8,8 203:24 204:16 205:18 <b>piece (2)</b> 23:13 67:17 <b>piecedtogether (1)</b> 140:20 <b>pieces (1)</b> 86:15 <b>pillars (6)</b> 7:12,17,21 10:6,16 11:19 <b>pilot (1)</b> 188:2 <b>pink (1)</b> 4:14 <b>place (99)</b> 5:5,22 16:17 17:21 21:8 25:21 31:6 34:25 38:7,20 39:3,14,18,23 40:19 45:15 47:13 51:23 55:14 59:13 60:18 61:1,16 63:4,7 64:5,7 67:15 69:12 70:23 74:9 75:7,20 82:12 83:24 94:10 95:2 97:1,16,18,22 98:15 100:25 105:24 106:2 108:4 112:17 113:16 116:5 119:21 120:19,22 122:2,14,17,23 125:24 128:4 129:3,8 133:21 136:6 138:4,9,17 139:8 142:12,14 146:24 149:15 157:23,25 158:2,4 159:18 161:6 162:4 164:15 165:11,17,20 166:25 167:23 169:15,19 170:8,13 171:8 172:7,9,25 176:15,17 179:2 181:13 188:8 194:5 195:3 197:15 <b>placed (8)</b> 29:18 32:19 38:12 47:13 80:3 132:9 142:8 176:6 <b>placement (1)</b> 80:2 <b>places (122)</b> 9:13 25:10,11,12,12,14,16 26:1,3,4,7,11,12,19,23 27:6,10,15,20</p>	<p>28:7,8,15,16,22 29:6,8,16,22 31:14,19,20 32:15 33:11,15 37:9 41:1,17 51:7 53:1 69:23 71:16,24 75:9,11,19 76:1 86:18,25 87:1,3 88:3,4,5 96:20 97:7,13,23 98:1,19,22 99:1,4,7,14 100:2,6 102:19,25 103:9,11 106:10 108:5 109:11,16 111:19 112:3 113:21 114:24 115:2,4 116:15 139:24 156:20 161:13 163:14,17,20 164:3,8,22 165:3 166:12,20 168:22 169:1,5,8,8,13,14,22 170:23 171:3,5 172:2,4,5,6 177:12 181:2 187:24 191:8 192:23,24 193:8,10 194:12,17 195:1,11 196:23 198:6 <b>placing (3)</b> 5:22 51:25 52:5 <b>plain (1)</b> 136:2 <b>plainly (2)</b> 41:15 137:6 <b>plan (12)</b> 20:3 31:6 35:1 40:22 53:8,9 54:20 63:7 76:15 79:15 80:19 139:15 <b>planning (12)</b> 21:19 45:5 67:14 103:3 115:16 131:6 141:14 164:22 183:4 184:2 187:17 197:2 <b>plans (5)</b> 103:14,15 127:22 137:25 142:3 <b>play (1)</b> 86:8 <b>played (2)</b> 131:25 132:5 <b>please (54)</b> 1:7,15 10:13 20:23 27:4,8 32:10 45:2,20 71:21 84:14 93:12,12 94:9,16,17 101:12 104:22 106:4 111:2 112:18 113:19 121:19,20 123:4,24 126:16,18 127:6,14 130:14 132:10,16 133:4,7 136:2 137:18 140:5,12 141:23 143:4,6 158:23 165:2 168:16 171:12 178:4 180:23 181:7,10 182:13,19 201:19 202:21 <b>plots (12)</b> 4:4,16,19,21,22,25 5:3 65:15 67:18 141:17 163:2,4 <b>plug (2)</b> 149:14 150:11 <b>pm (7)</b> 84:6,7 104:15,17 158:16,18 206:18 <b>pointed (1)</b> 179:17 <b>points (11)</b> 53:22,23 65:18 66:24 67:8 134:15 155:10 157:4 185:11,20 189:20 <b>police (166)</b> 1:22 2:15,15 3:1,8 5:11</p>	<p>6:17 7:9 8:9,11,14,18 9:2,9,11,19,20,21,22 10:3 11:12 12:4,12 13:10,22 14:10,18 21:10,12 22:23 23:17 24:12,13 34:20 35:14 36:7 37:9 39:5,7 40:20,21 41:2,7,23 42:6,8 44:6 46:6,21,23 47:24 50:25 55:11 59:8 61:13 65:13 66:14,20 76:5,17,24 83:5 84:17,20,21,24 85:5 91:14 92:2,15,19,25 93:1,4,5,7,24 94:1,4,24 95:9,16,17,22 96:2,3,11 98:24 101:19 102:1,9 104:21 105:6,12,17,20 106:5 107:13 108:4,21 111:5 114:17 117:5 124:6 133:6 136:14,18,23 137:23 142:20 143:8,8,11,12 144:11 146:17 149:8 152:7,8,9 153:25 154:9,22 155:5 157:3 160:1,16 162:11 168:8,10 171:1 177:5 178:6 179:20 180:4,23 182:22 183:4,15,21 184:1,5,11 185:1,10 186:3,14,18 187:1,4 188:2,5,17 189:14,19,24 190:18,20,21,24 198:14,20 199:10,12 202:16 206:6 <b>polices (2)</b> 24:3 183:7 <b>policies (3)</b> 38:7 62:18 172:11 <b>policing (61)</b> 2:4 3:2 5:14,23 6:23 7:9 8:4,6,7,8,25 9:5,15 10:1,5,9 11:9 15:19 23:24 29:23 47:8 50:2,7,14,25 55:1,9,9 56:15,22,25 59:20 61:25 77:7 82:16 83:6 86:6 93:3 107:21 120:10 125:21 127:16 131:16 142:16 143:14 144:1 145:1 147:6,7 149:6,8,9 150:17 152:14 157:2 183:14 184:16,18 186:22,24 203:22 <b>policy (5)</b> 7:8 22:19,20 26:10 27:3 <b>popular (1)</b> 123:23 <b>posed (3)</b> 49:16 106:13 154:3 <b>position (10)</b> 6:9 73:5 86:14 112:8 120:3 146:20 149:16 178:5 189:13 205:9 <b>positive (3)</b> 55:12,13 122:22 <b>positivity (1)</b> 202:18 <b>possibilities (1)</b> 102:10 <b>possibility (7)</b> 15:7</p>
---	---	---	---	--	---	---

64:20 101:3 115:25 119:8,10 144:4 <b>possible (10)</b> 15:6 34:15 55:19 80:16,25 103:20 105:13 121:21 158:15 195:24 <b>possibly (4)</b> 86:10 144:21 156:13 161:16 <b>post (4)</b> 40:12 120:9 121:4 139:16 <b>postparis (1)</b> 49:6 <b>pot (1)</b> 168:14 <b>potent (1)</b> 160:10 <b>potential (12)</b> 34:18 41:5 71:23 81:19 96:8 126:14 137:15,21 140:18 143:9 187:25 203:6 <b>potentially (7)</b> 51:21 58:9,13 69:16 83:9 163:4 165:13 <b>power (1)</b> 20:6 <b>powers (1)</b> 195:21 <b>pp (1)</b> 71:14 <b>practical (6)</b> 9:20 34:10 51:25 58:11 82:9 179:15 <b>practice (7)</b> 22:15 24:15 34:17 125:22 192:15 193:23 199:7 <b>practitioner (1)</b> 30:6 <b>practitioners (1)</b> 30:2 <b>precautions (3)</b> 20:12 21:2,14 <b>preceded (1)</b> 42:22 <b>precise (1)</b> 29:2 <b>precisely (1)</b> 145:9 <b>predicated (2)</b> 31:22 179:11 <b>predictable (3)</b> 32:24 33:13 112:17 <b>predominantly (1)</b> 83:10 <b>preference (2)</b> 149:19 150:8 <b>preferential (1)</b> 35:25 <b>preferred (1)</b> 52:10 <b>premises (13)</b> 17:18 21:13 35:2 51:7 75:25 102:25 108:20 156:10,15,17 157:2,8 190:25 <b>preparation (1)</b> 44:8 <b>prepare (27)</b> 2:8 7:22,23,25 10:8,10,15,18,23,24 11:1,5,7,18,20 12:7 13:15,21 19:16 21:11 22:13 24:1 93:16 117:9 126:21 190:9,15 <b>prepared (2)</b> 4:3 176:4 <b>preparedness (6)</b> 13:20 25:5 101:15,21 120:16,19 <b>preplanning (1)</b> 187:19 <b>prescience (1)</b> 89:6 <b>prescriptive (1)</b> 168:4 <b>presence (15)</b> 12:7 50:14 51:3,11 53:13 54:14,19 55:1 56:17 57:1 84:23 88:13 115:14 151:10 187:4 <b>present (10)</b> 12:14 42:9	49:11 61:19,21 124:18 130:20 131:14 192:7 193:18 <b>presentations (1)</b> 81:23 <b>presented (1)</b> 140:17 <b>presents (2)</b> 160:12,19 <b>preset (1)</b> 15:13 <b>president (1)</b> 3:17 <b>press (6)</b> 126:10 128:25 129:4 140:9 141:12 179:5 <b>presumably (7)</b> 44:22 93:17 96:12 106:18 145:9 154:21 173:15 <b>presume (1)</b> 125:4 <b>pret (1)</b> 45:24 <b>pretend (1)</b> 197:2 <b>pretty (5)</b> 183:18,24 184:9,12 188:21 <b>prevent (6)</b> 7:22 8:10 45:16 74:12 115:10 136:6 <b>preventing (3)</b> 62:15 63:17 69:5 <b>previous (12)</b> 27:23 30:17,18 49:5 94:22 107:12 113:17,18 146:7 163:12 165:25 190:13 <b>previously (9)</b> 27:2 32:17 58:22 108:12 122:3 139:18 172:5 182:20 205:6 <b>primarily (6)</b> 44:11 50:12 60:4,16 61:7 62:12 <b>primary (2)</b> 26:17 190:1 <b>principal (1)</b> 19:7 <b>principle (4)</b> 10:25 50:24 145:23 159:13 <b>principles (2)</b> 8:16 29:14 <b>prior (7)</b> 4:17 46:1 58:19 78:2 80:24 93:8 160:25 <b>priorities (3)</b> 22:20 162:18 170:6 <b>prioritisation (13)</b> 17:24 47:20 100:9 109:17 123:14 138:12,16 139:11 144:25 163:7,25 169:25 170:9 <b>prioritise (14)</b> 47:12 66:9 67:7 100:23 101:9 103:17 116:3 128:6 129:8,11 139:23 142:13 170:19 179:14 <b>prioritised (2)</b> 41:11 48:22 <b>prioritising (7)</b> 16:5 23:20 34:4 48:19 108:10 109:14 136:21 <b>priority (8)</b> 28:17 32:14 36:5 48:6 67:16 192:21 194:4 204:24 <b>private (19)</b> 11:13 20:24,25,25 21:21 24:12 37:14 51:7 60:10 64:8,9 76:3 87:7,9 97:3 142:17 145:2 157:17 158:3 <b>proactive (4)</b> 34:14,17 185:6 197:9 <b>proactively (1)</b> 171:5	<b>probably (10)</b> 28:4 50:16 68:24 132:9 144:19 145:23 150:5 202:3,19 206:13 <b>problem (2)</b> 129:19 162:22 <b>procedure (1)</b> 185:24 <b>procedures (4)</b> 2:21 3:23 38:7 172:11 <b>process (34)</b> 17:24 27:13,14,20 28:13 29:14 33:23 35:8,24 56:4 73:7,21 89:9 100:9 102:21,22 120:18,22 121:1 123:14 128:4 138:17 139:21 144:25 153:22,23 154:1 163:7 167:8,14 168:12 169:25 179:24 192:20 <b>processes (3)</b> 51:7 61:5 172:11 <b>procure (2)</b> 89:15 138:14 <b>procured (1)</b> 73:9 <b>produce (1)</b> 28:2 <b>produced (9)</b> 27:3,10 44:16 45:3 52:15 53:9 199:22 200:17 201:15 <b>producing (1)</b> 196:24 <b>product (2)</b> 77:22,23 <b>production (1)</b> 160:25 <b>products (4)</b> 85:19 113:23 121:13 195:15 <b>professional (7)</b> 24:15 106:2 129:7 167:18 168:5,14,15 <b>professionals (1)</b> 194:21 <b>profile (6)</b> 3:15 5:10 33:1 36:11 75:9 81:5 <b>programme (13)</b> 26:7,11 67:22 68:2,7,9,14 69:11,13,23 131:21 184:21 186:8 <b>progress (5)</b> 33:22 158:14 166:5 167:7,25 <b>project (21)</b> 77:10,10,13,18,23 82:6 95:24 185:9 186:15,17,23,24 187:6,21 196:20 197:20 198:1 199:5 201:21 202:2 206:9 <b>projects (1)</b> 77:12 <b>prominence (1)</b> 33:1 <b>prominently (1)</b> 29:7 <b>propaganda (3)</b> 90:24 111:14 193:3 <b>propagated (1)</b> 91:9 <b>properly (1)</b> 154:15 <b>properties (5)</b> 21:20 77:14 78:14 103:9 138:21 <b>property (2)</b> 51:22 190:25 <b>prophetic (1)</b> 134:12 <b>proportionality (1)</b> 175:20 <b>proportionate (4)</b> 31:16 179:2,11,15 <b>proposed (1)</b> 192:7 <b>prosecution (1)</b> 140:18	<b>protect (51)</b> 2:8 7:22,23,24 10:7,10,15,18,22,24 11:1,2,7,18,20 12:6 13:15,21 19:16,22 21:11 22:3,4,13 23:25 26:7,11 27:5 31:14,14 49:9 67:4 76:5,15,18 79:15 93:16 103:18,19 117:9 120:3 123:12 124:8,23 125:8,15 126:21 128:23 172:17 190:9,15 <b>protected (2)</b> 123:7 125:25 <b>protecting (6)</b> 79:5 97:7 129:1,16 138:21 168:25 <b>protection (14)</b> 2:1,2 7:24 22:25 23:12 59:3,4 98:5 100:1 169:9 170:24 188:3 196:25 197:12 <b>protective (117)</b> 2:2,6,12,13,20 11:3,10 12:11 13:2,20 15:21 16:6 17:24 21:7,18,25 22:9 23:3,6,7 24:3 34:22,23,25 35:5,20 37:19,21 38:3 39:9 40:4,22 41:3 43:23 47:12,14,16 48:11 52:20 53:2 54:10,15,20 64:10,23 66:10 70:1,5 71:15,18,24 75:4 76:7,14 83:3,4 85:2,7 87:14,17,25 88:16,21 90:12 93:24 98:6,17 99:10,13,20 100:7,24 101:9 102:23 103:13 105:22 113:3 114:3,19 115:5 120:6 121:2 122:8,11 123:1,11 124:15,20 126:19 127:17 128:9 129:7,8 130:11,22 131:21 138:12,25 139:15 141:21 142:13 156:18 157:1,6 170:2,19 171:6 176:14 179:14 180:18 183:7 185:8,10,25 188:25 191:2,18 <b>protocols (1)</b> 190:17 <b>proud (2)</b> 150:17 186:2 <b>proved (2)</b> 89:6 142:7 <b>provide (17)</b> 16:16 23:11 37:12 39:1 50:14 56:19 77:6 80:6 88:11 89:22 171:6 190:8 191:16 192:8,13,16 193:2 <b>provided (11)</b> 10:19 34:1,10 76:17 127:7,11 195:12 199:25 200:25 201:3,7 <b>provides (1)</b> 23:15 <b>providing (1)</b> 193:6 <b>provision (3)</b> 11:8 13:8,14 <b>proximity (2)</b> 84:22,24 <b>prudent (1)</b> 86:23	<b>ps (11)</b> 115:6 <b>pso (1)</b> 136:18 <b>psp (1)</b> 152:18 <b>psp4 (8)</b> 54:25 77:4 83:8,17,24 152:18,20,22 <b>pub (3)</b> 76:20,21,22 <b>public (56)</b> 3:13 5:19 11:6,13 15:13,17,18 19:19,23 21:21 24:11 25:18,22 26:13 37:14 85:2,6 86:7 87:25 91:1,16,24 95:8 97:7,21 100:1 107:15 108:17 118:12 120:4,19 121:5,6 122:25 124:4,8 125:12,13,24 126:1,9 128:23,25 129:6,13,20 130:10 134:21 139:9 146:17 149:5 164:11,16 165:12 166:10 172:17 <b>publication (2)</b> 18:16 127:7 <b>publications (2)</b> 91:13,14 <b>publicfacing (1)</b> 24:4 <b>publicised (1)</b> 15:16 <b>publicly (2)</b> 6:10 71:16 <b>published (2)</b> 18:9,13 <b>publishing (1)</b> 127:15 <b>pubs (2)</b> 25:17 164:10 <b>pulse (1)</b> 147:24 <b>purchase (1)</b> 23:7 <b>purpose (14)</b> 4:1 9:7 15:11 37:18 53:18 54:13 55:21 70:14 82:17 117:8 135:3 195:10 199:1 202:20 <b>purposes (9)</b> 54:2 56:11 143:15 185:25 190:2 191:9 192:4 193:12 201:6 <b>pursue (2)</b> 7:22 12:17 <b>pursued (1)</b> 35:6 <b>push (1)</b> 77:24 <b>puts (1)</b> 21:5 <b>putting (10)</b> 47:16 56:3 74:12 77:4 108:6 158:4 162:20 174:24 175:20 205:8	33:25 34:8,13 35:19 36:10,15 37:12 38:9,14,16 39:3,6,9,13,17,23 41:8,16,21,23 42:1,4,11,14,18,21,25 43:10 44:10,15,21 45:1 46:11,17,25 47:25 48:20,24 49:21 50:21 51:13,24 52:15 53:7,15,21 54:6,13,22 55:2 56:5,9,14 58:1,8,14,24 59:3,7,19,22 60:7,10,13,19 61:2,9 62:1,8,14 63:12,23 64:14 65:2,17 66:15,19 67:17,21 68:9 69:6,10,20,25 70:8,10,19 71:2,9,12,21 72:4,11,15 73:3,8,11,21,24 74:19 75:4,24 76:5,15,23 77:7 78:1,19 79:7,10 80:4,8,14,25 81:3,8,20 82:2,13,24 83:12 84:3,13,20 85:1,9,13,16,19 86:12 88:2,9,24 90:8,15,18,23 91:3,7,11,13,18,22 92:1,5,9,19,22 93:7,12 94:2,6,9,15,22 95:8,15,19 96:4,6 97:6,10,17,24 98:3,14,21 99:2,12,16,23 100:12,19 101:1,11,18 102:14 103:1,14 105:2,19 106:4,13 107:12,22 108:11,15 109:2,18,24 110:2,4,6,8,15,17,19 111:1,10,13 112:2,9,16 113:1,5,12,19 114:7,12,15,19 115:1,7,20 116:6,9,22,25 117:2,4,8,11,15 118:17,21,25 119:5,8,15 120:5,12,14 121:2,8,19 122:14,25 123:4,15 124:15,22 125:5,7 126:8,16 127:2,6,14 128:1,11,25 129:12,15,23 130:14,20,24 131:1,5,9,25 132:4,10,16,22 133:4 134:21,25 135:8,13,18,20 136:2,18,25 137:4,8,11,18 139:2,24 140:5,9,22 141:4,23 142:19 143:4 144:14,17,20 146:6,13 147:9,15,22 148:4,9,12,15,21,25 149:2,5,10,23	150:19,22 151:1,19,23 152:10,23 153:6,9,16 154:4 155:18,21,24 156:12,21 157:9,11,20 159:14,17,20,23 160:2,10,12,18,22 161:2,4,9,19,23 162:3,8,13,17,20 163:11 164:3,22 165:2,24 166:1,13,19 167:3,6,9,20 168:7,16 169:7 170:6,14,21 171:9,12 172:19,24 173:2,6,15 174:4,18 175:2,25 177:7,14,16 178:9,14,18,22 179:1,5,17,24 180:1,7,13,16 181:5,10,16,20 182:2,24 183:2,6,10,13,21 184:4,15,23 185:8,16,23 186:11,14,23 187:7,15,22 188:2,11 189:15,23 190:2 191:7,11,15,22,25 192:3,13,19,23 193:1,7,11 194:1,4,10,14,25 195:6,10,14,18,24 196:15,22 197:3,11,15,22 198:5,8,10,13,16,21 199:1,14,22,24 200:3,5,9,12,14,17,25 201:3,6,11,15,18,24 202:11,21 203:3,9 204:3,6,8,22 205:1,3 <b>qc (12)</b> 1:14 90:4 176:25 177:24 180:21 182:17 207:4,5,7,8,9,12 <b>qualification (1)</b> 24:17 <b>qualified (5)</b> 21:2 24:18 36:23 37:2 48:11 <b>qualify (2)</b> 36:15 195:3 <b>quality (1)</b> 190:12 <b>queens (1)</b> 5:25 <b>question (19)</b> 19:14 47:4,21 55:18 67:9 74:3 102:16 105:16 117:22 128:16 132:3 144:19 145:4,18,22 153:11 160:18 168:11 194:10 <b>questioned (2)</b> 95:10 168:21 <b>questions (31)</b> 1:14,18,19 90:1,4,5,8 100:12 104:6 106:13 123:20,23 153:9 158:19,20 176:25 177:23,24 180:9,21 182:7,17 183:13 188:13 207:4,5,6,7,8,9,12 <b>queue (3)</b> 22:7,9 87:19 <b>quick (1)</b> 55:21 <b>quicker (1)</b> 169:18 <b>quickly (7)</b> 6:12 36:6 52:12 73:3 74:13 87:5 149:21
---	---	--	---	---	---	---

Q

quite (17) 54:16,22  
58:6 68:16 87:5 88:5  
89:6 90:7 115:22  
137:11 160:5 168:6  
169:3 172:19 184:20  
189:6 206:2

**R**

radius (5) 106:3 151:12  
152:11,21 153:1  
raf (1) 6:2  
raft (1) 164:1  
rag (1) 110:20  
railings (4) 114:15  
115:14,17,19  
railway (1) 148:12  
raise (3) 48:8 65:9  
132:11  
raised (8) 46:25 65:2,2  
94:18 121:3 122:12  
124:4 156:8  
raising (4) 129:1  
132:12,17 135:14  
ramming (5)  
45:15,19,21 136:5  
142:5  
range (10) 12:2 19:10  
59:25 60:7,14,22  
61:12 75:25 141:15  
193:7  
rank (3) 1:15 92:15  
183:22  
ranks (1) 3:11  
rapidly (2) 6:13 176:11  
rather (14) 19:17 68:1,4  
102:15 103:4 128:12  
130:12 141:1 145:19  
158:9 168:25  
178:15,19 195:16  
rating (2) 28:3 35:23  
rationale (5)  
173:15,20,20 193:2,5  
reach (2) 77:21 157:5  
reached (4) 55:3 85:24  
135:24 159:5  
reaching (1) 86:2  
reaction (1) 47:2  
read (6) 31:11 52:3  
171:19 176:4 185:16  
190:4  
readily (2) 36:21 112:14  
reading (1) 121:12  
real (6) 55:12,13 68:25  
144:3 162:23 173:22  
realistic (1) 202:4  
really (35) 4:8 5:12 6:9  
17:5,12,22 30:4,15  
31:11 47:4 48:9 62:5  
67:11 68:17 72:24  
74:3,10 79:19 85:23  
86:1,19 105:16 107:19  
159:9 161:3 167:10  
169:8 173:20 175:16  
181:1 186:25,25 188:8  
189:2 206:6  
reason (7) 3:21 74:1  
101:2 102:9 149:13  
164:24 177:18  
reasonable (1) 22:4  
reasonably (1) 38:17  
reasoning (1) 53:18  
reasons (15) 16:3 38:23  
41:12 68:10

75:10,14,15 131:22  
133:11 143:24 156:12  
159:4 174:2 176:6  
186:8  
reassurance (2) 78:18  
181:16  
reassured (1) 94:24  
recall (2) 6:1 158:24  
receive (8) 1:19 28:11  
35:19 36:17 38:16,21  
192:4 200:21  
received (6) 37:11 54:8  
123:20 135:9 155:24  
205:1  
receiving (1) 49:18  
recent (3) 95:1 120:15  
186:14  
recently (4) 77:20 121:3  
140:6 159:11  
recognisable (1) 32:22  
recognise (5) 19:6,9  
56:23 94:6 163:24  
recognised (1) 50:2  
recognising (1) 202:11  
recognition (2) 33:12  
88:4  
recommend (1) 135:21  
recommendation (11)  
13:11 14:12 46:13,15  
143:17 144:18 154:11  
155:18,22 173:13,16  
recommendations (14)  
30:12 62:2  
120:5,23,24 121:8  
122:18,24 138:15  
142:25 143:2 176:13  
193:1 200:23  
recommended (3) 26:22  
28:21 125:7  
recommending (2) 14:3  
153:17  
reconnaissance (8)  
44:13 45:7 111:22  
149:3 187:16 198:19  
202:8 203:11  
record (1) 84:4  
recorded (2) 54:8 114:8  
records (1) 105:5  
red (2) 74:6 175:10  
redacted (2) 12:21  
190:4  
redirect (1) 20:7  
reduce (5) 19:24 26:3  
28:6 52:8 63:20  
reduced (3) 30:21,25  
31:3  
reengage (1) 80:1  
refer (7) 91:21 164:7,13  
171:16 183:11 191:7  
200:3  
reference (10) 41:15  
106:18 111:22 126:18  
127:10 131:1 137:6  
150:5 154:9 191:2  
references (5) 91:15,22  
127:8 131:5 175:3  
referred (10) 7:12 8:3  
9:23 18:15 160:23  
168:20 185:11 188:14  
198:25 204:15  
referring (7) 61:3,4  
76:15 117:14,15 165:4  
204:14

refers (5) 7:19 34:14  
105:2 106:22 118:8  
refinement (1) 73:7  
reflect (4) 49:14 55:16  
122:24 144:9  
reflected (6) 6:7 17:9  
68:16 126:6 173:18  
202:3  
reflecting (2) 5:21  
109:10  
reflection (2) 69:2  
166:20  
reflections (1) 86:12  
reflective (1) 35:16  
reflects (1) 4:14  
regard (2) 21:9 177:16  
regarded (1) 162:4  
regarding (2) 48:5 80:2  
regards (2) 10:18 45:20  
regime (3) 87:20 88:3,5  
region (6) 9:18 11:1  
13:25 71:17 93:4  
181:14  
regional (3) 12:6 93:2  
126:19  
regionally (1) 36:3  
regions (9) 9:14,17,18  
10:20 13:19 16:1,5  
71:14,22  
register (1) 185:7  
regrettably (1) 118:4  
regular (5) 35:21  
38:17,21 92:19 105:10  
regularly (3) 113:22  
188:16 194:1  
regulation (5)  
20:8,9,13,13,14  
regulations (2) 21:5  
87:16  
reiterated (1) 18:24  
rejection (1) 13:24  
related (1) 80:21  
relating (2) 8:12 81:11  
relation (54) 9:6 13:2  
20:3 29:11 35:4 44:5  
46:24 47:9 48:10  
54:15 59:16 72:6  
73:15 77:22 79:21  
81:18,24 88:11 96:15  
97:6 105:5 109:22  
110:3 113:24 116:20  
119:22,23,25 121:22  
122:18 125:16  
128:13,21 131:9,18,20  
134:20 136:12 139:17  
140:11 141:24 152:14  
154:25 155:2,7,25  
156:6 159:20 166:5  
173:22 177:10,12  
188:12 200:17  
relatively (9) 27:16 35:9  
43:3 50:23 66:2,23  
68:14 85:3 145:10  
release (1) 201:13  
released (1) 166:7  
relevance (1) 3:21  
relevant (19) 7:20 14:17  
18:8 23:17 32:11 71:9  
72:7 93:16 105:22  
111:24 122:7 139:5,6  
146:14 184:23 185:25  
190:5,11 201:16  
relies (1) 179:20

relooking (1) 96:19  
rely (1) 141:1  
remain (3) 8:17,19  
31:16  
remained (1) 42:16  
remains (1) 32:3  
remember (10) 18:13  
26:15 70:11 110:5,7  
117:13,25 118:5,12  
123:3  
remind (2) 116:11 123:4  
reminded (1) 115:9  
reminding (1) 123:15  
removal (2) 69:8,22  
remove (1) 45:3  
removed (4) 68:3 74:11  
123:25 145:11  
removing (4) 67:23  
68:7,10 144:4  
rent (3) 64:10 145:3  
157:24  
rental (4) 61:24 62:19  
157:12,17  
rented (2) 119:5 157:20  
repeat (2) 74:21 132:3  
repeatedly (2) 102:14  
115:9  
replaced (1) 77:11  
replicate (1) 136:16  
replicated (3) 45:6  
49:20 137:14  
replicating (1) 41:3  
report (74) 13:20  
26:12,22 31:4,17,18  
44:23 45:1,3,5 46:5,13  
47:1,6,7,15,25 49:1  
89:24 101:14  
120:14,16 121:3,18,19  
122:12 123:5,15  
124:13 135:23  
136:3,16 140:9 142:9  
143:1,4 144:6,8,17  
150:10 152:18 153:16  
154:5 156:21 163:8  
174:3 176:3,3 178:1,6  
179:17 197:19  
198:10,11 199:17,22  
200:1,6,17,19,23,24,25  
201:3,6,7,11,16,20  
202:18 203:12 204:1,3  
205:1  
reported (4) 125:14  
141:12 202:1,17  
reporting (5) 10:9 86:8  
180:7 197:4 202:3  
reports (10) 23:25  
44:15 46:24 85:10  
111:21 125:14 137:22  
142:22 196:24 198:23  
represent (2) 46:2 53:23  
representation (1)  
188:22  
representative (1) 92:18  
representatives (4) 12:3  
29:23 62:4 87:9  
represented (2) 19:1  
92:15  
republican (2) 18:11  
58:24  
request (3) 181:12,16  
182:5  
requested (1) 80:1  
requesting (1) 181:16

require (8) 21:18  
98:5,24 154:2 161:13  
163:14,20 169:9  
required (11) 31:20  
37:1 52:8 62:17 73:23  
128:22 152:4 170:18  
181:22 195:2 204:12  
requirement (13) 21:5  
22:8 50:4 64:4 75:12  
87:24 97:15 98:2 99:6  
127:22 167:2 177:11  
182:1  
requires (1) 64:11  
requiring (1) 71:13  
research (3) 68:19 69:3  
147:14  
resistance (1) 143:22  
resistant (1) 74:24  
resonate (1) 87:15  
resonated (1) 67:1  
resource (1) 184:2  
resources (17) 16:12  
23:20 37:2,25 48:22  
89:10 100:10,24  
101:24 103:18 107:5  
108:10 109:14 116:3  
139:4 146:17 193:17  
respect (2) 11:7 33:22  
respond (5) 87:5 101:15  
120:17 135:8 149:21  
responded (1) 63:25  
response (31) 26:10  
31:15 49:11,22  
54:18,18 55:10,20,22  
56:11,20 57:12 83:25  
84:5,9,12 127:16  
143:13 144:17 146:12  
147:4,20 149:17 16:20  
150:7,15,17 152:5  
155:18,21 190:18  
responses (1) 49:3  
responsibilities (4)  
21:23 118:22 153:20  
157:13  
responsibility (21) 1:25  
2:5 10:6,7 86:6  
93:2,23 99:9,21 115:4  
120:12,21 134:24  
135:5 142:17 143:12  
175:19 180:5,11,16  
184:9  
responsible (8) 8:20,22  
21:10 24:4,11 159:24  
184:11 195:20  
rest (2) 111:18 112:19  
restaurant (5)  
76:20,20,21 78:15  
156:22  
restaurants (2)  
156:7,14  
restored (1) 124:1  
restrict (1) 20:7  
restrictions (1) 190:16  
rests (2) 93:24 99:21  
result (3) 13:6 54:23  
79:20  
resulted (4) 5:18 68:2  
79:1 142:4  
resume (1) 206:16  
retailer (1) 78:16  
retained (1) 33:24  
retractable (1) 122:10  
returns (1) 190:12

revamp (3) 184:21  
185:23,25  
reveal (1) 39:14  
review (59) 11:24 14:15  
19:6,9 20:20 26:13,22  
27:4,6 30:4,8,11,19,24  
31:10 40:3,5,12 41:17  
42:5,9 68:13 70:2,7  
71:6,14,24 83:25  
86:18,21 87:21 92:16  
94:15 101:21 110:8,15  
113:22 114:1,6 117:5  
118:9 122:4 125:1,3  
127:17,21 169:14  
189:4,16,20  
190:10,17,19,22,23  
191:4,4 192:8 200:22  
reviewed (3) 110:10  
193:20 201:8  
reviewing (3) 89:8  
108:5 172:14  
reviews (4) 19:4 81:24  
124:20 149:23  
revised (1) 97:7  
revisit (1) 96:8  
revisited (1) 122:4  
rhyme (1) 116:11  
richard (4) 132:19,19,21  
133:1  
righthand (2) 27:19  
141:6  
rightly (4) 90:18 174:14  
189:6 206:2  
rights (2) 19:21,21  
rigid (3) 168:9 169:3  
170:15  
rigidity (2) 170:15 171:9  
ring (8) 96:22 184:21  
185:12,13 186:5,9,11  
197:18  
risk (56) 14:21 16:21,22  
17:3,9,15,18,19 18:5  
25:23 26:24  
27:1,10,13,16,19,22,24  
28:3,16,23 29:9,14  
33:19 37:16 40:25  
41:24 46:7 61:17  
67:25 72:22 86:16  
95:3,6 102:6,21  
109:12 121:13 122:16  
129:21 130:5  
138:8,10,20 153:21  
154:2 162:5,6,7,17,25  
163:6 164:17 166:15  
179:21 190:10  
risks (5) 12:24 67:24  
111:24 126:9 174:5  
road (10) 20:8 43:20  
61:21 62:20 69:5  
70:13 74:25 119:12  
195:16,18  
roads (1) 61:25  
roadway (8) 42:23  
43:11,22 64:24 68:1  
108:23 195:16,25  
roadways (5) 2:19 67:23  
68:14 88:10 101:6  
robust (1) 102:2  
role (28) 1:21 2:7,12 8:3  
9:24 15:20 22:22,24  
30:1 48:9,10,18 55:8  
90:15,16 92:5,22  
99:13 105:7 116:3

121:11 134:25 172:8  
180:3,4 182:22,24  
191:23  
rolls (1) 37:22  
room (2) 170:4 193:20  
rose (2) 3:10 5:15  
ross (4) 49:5 52:3 146:8  
150:5  
round (3) 1:9 115:8,8  
route (2) 36:20 160:9  
routes (4) 66:3 111:20  
134:6 160:3  
routine (1) 56:21  
routinely (1) 96:24  
rowley (1) 146:25  
royalty (1) 2:1  
royce (1) 37:22  
ruled (1) 173:10  
run (2) 85:14 185:5  
running (1) 184:13  
rush (3) 65:20 66:21  
106:15  
russell (1) 154:6  
ryan (1) 135:18

**S**

sadly (1) 91:14  
safe (2) 86:10 87:19  
safety (10) 20:13 21:22  
68:10,14 70:13  
85:2,13 123:21,25  
124:5  
same (12) 28:11 43:19  
84:4 94:8 97:1 112:8  
132:16 147:19 153:4  
176:6 192:1 205:9  
sarah (5) 23:2 117:16  
157:14 158:4 171:13  
sat (1) 193:19  
satisfied (1) 102:1  
satisfy (1) 195:4  
satnav (1) 140:4  
saturday (1) 52:2  
save (1) 41:13  
saved (2) 69:7,10  
saw (13) 11:20 30:13  
31:2 58:20 110:21  
115:7 118:25  
139:12,19 186:10  
187:13 195:10 206:8  
saying (12) 48:13 66:15  
101:22 129:15 130:2  
135:9 136:25 163:18  
166:21 167:9,24 181:1  
sb (1) 111:22  
scale (10) 6:6,14 28:3  
37:8,23 50:22 62:4  
167:19 186:18 188:8  
scene (2) 55:3,4  
scheme (1) 158:2  
schools (4) 78:13 85:25  
86:1 156:19  
scope (2) 61:16 183:18  
scored (1) 196:6  
screen (25) 4:13 6:21  
7:15 8:2 10:13 29:21  
32:10,20 45:2 48:24  
53:7 54:6 71:12 72:4  
81:20 82:18 101:12  
104:22 152:12,25  
158:23 164:4 165:2  
168:16 171:12

screens (1) 84:13	185:8 186:1	serious (3) 135:21	showing (2) 69:3 103:11	177:3,8,10	sorts (6) 66:24 91:23	stage (7) 29:13 72:11
scroll (1) 84:13	188:16,18,19,25	138:22 205:10	shown (6) 40:6 141:16	181:6,14,17,23 182:4	136:11 141:12 156:24	73:25 134:4 135:24
scrutiny (1) 121:9	189:3,4,8,10,16,19,20,23	seriously (3) 48:1 94:25	161:4 180:23,25 182:2	192:21 193:7 196:5	173:16	167:8 170:7
se (1) 204:14	190:2,19,20,22,24	107:17	shows (9) 38:19 53:13	203:21 204:15,19,24	sounds (3) 166:19	stages (1) 27:13
seasonal (1) 79:11	191:2,3,9,11,15,18,25	seriousness (1) 86:17	55:25 83:25 140:2	167:9,23	south (1) 45:9	stance (7) 13:20 15:21
seat (3) 1:8 107:14	193:6,11 194:21	servator (16) 95:23	161:7 163:2 179:13	189:3,6 191:3	southbound (3)	33:6,8 35:7,10 50:7
182:13	203:19 205:21 206:10	185:9 186:15,17,23,24	186:17	sitting (1) 158:13	45:20,22 203:5	stand (1) 71:15
second (11) 13:13 50:19	securitysensitive (1)	187:6,21 196:20	side (5) 54:3 68:1	situation (1) 155:14	southern (1) 46:1	standard (5) 24:14,23
67:1 71:21 72:25	12:19	197:20 198:1 199:5	133:22,24 141:6	six (9) 73:5 90:6,8	112:3 121:23 133:18	26:22 54:22 80:24
125:16,16 173:21	see (78) 4:3,13,17,22	201:21 202:2,6 206:9	sides (1) 68:23	123:6 172:24,25	space (2) 86:9 88:19	standards (4)
198:5 199:23 200:9	5:1 10:14,21 17:8	serve (1) 70:14	sign (2) 48:16,17	173:3,14 177:25	spaces (9) 26:13 87:1,4	23:5,11,14 70:12
secret (2) 12:20 99:5	27:8,13,19 28:20	served (2) 183:16 185:2	sign (2) 77:24 191:5	sixday (1) 82:25	88:4,10,10 169:14	standpoint (1) 71:15
section (5) 8:13 19:25	32:19 33:14 34:8	service (20) 1:23 2:15	significance (3) 27:1	size (3) 125:19 174:11	171:23 172:1	stands (1) 46:1
115:3 141:24 143:10	53:25 54:4 65:14,17	3:1,8 9:19 10:3 11:12	163:11,16	188:7	skill (1) 153:24	start (11) 2:25 9:23
sections (4) 15:16	69:18 70:16,25 71:13	12:12 13:10 14:18	significant (23) 18:22	skill (1) 153:24	skilled (1) 150:8	46:3 47:16 48:5 79:19
16:1,5 203:14	79:17 81:14 82:4,24	36:7 40:20 61:13	19:2 30:19 33:2 34:13	skilled (1) 150:8	skills (1) 37:15	86:2 88:2 182:15
sector (13) 11:13 21:21	86:23 93:12 94:18	121:17 129:10 132:14	36:4 57:16 64:19	skim (1) 140:9	slide (4) 65:14 113:18	183:14 205:21
61:24 64:9 87:8,9,25	96:24 102:18 103:21	177:5 178:6 180:4	76:16 78:5,10 85:23	141:16 163:1	slightly (5) 1:10 103:22	started (12) 79:17
88:1 89:22 145:3	104:22 105:4 106:11	183:15	86:14 100:20 118:1,3	141:16 163:1	157:7 159:12 169:17	94:24 128:17
157:17 158:3 169:1	107:7,10,12 110:17,19	services (9) 4:9 7:9	120:1 121:3,11 125:20	slightly (5) 1:10 103:22	small (5) 51:10,25	148:22,23 183:16
sectors (5) 15:25 24:12	111:8,11 112:12	10:18 11:8 13:22 20:2	147:3 151:9 157:23	2:1 11:9 112:21	143:10 148:19 186:19	196:1,4,7
29:6 87:10 128:24	113:14 115:7 123:15	102:3 111:11 113:24	significantly (5) 10:25	185:2,4	64:15 65:10 87:8	203:16,17,20
sectorspecific (1)	125:23 130:10,20	102:3 111:11 113:24	64:15 65:10 87:8	specialist (7) 1:22,25	157:10	starting (5) 40:5 113:21
128:21	131:1 137:20	servicewide (1) 13:8	157:10	2:1 11:9 112:21	65:3 152:24	146:14,15,20
secure (4) 121:23	140:10,16,19,21	servicing (1) 186:21	signpost (3) 36:18,21	185:2,4	65:3 152:24	starts (2) 12:22 79:18
122:19 184:20 186:8	141:18 145:15	set (12) 11:25 15:3,25	22:19 71:9 80:4	smaller (4) 62:6 64:15	63:11 70:23 89:16	stated (2) 6:10 143:6
securing (2) 122:19	141:18 145:15	116:23 117:8 153:24	148:16	65:3 152:24	63:11 70:23 89:16	statement (45) 4:2 5:8
131:18	150:15,16 151:15	163:10 167:10 176:7	163:10 167:10 176:7	snapshot (1) 53:16	92:15 93:18 96:23	6:7,8,24 7:16 10:12
security (220)	152:2,24 162:13	sets (3) 14:25 17:4 23:5	163:10 167:10 176:7	snapshots (1) 84:10	107:1 110:23	23:2 30:10 32:11 34:9
2:2,6,12,14,20 7:1,4	165:10 166:10 171:21	setting (3) 22:22 70:11	163:10 167:10 176:7	so15 (2) 12:16 95:15	130:20 138:4 167:21	38:19 40:6 52:18
11:4,10,24 12:11	175:2 181:8,11 186:22	116:1	163:10 167:10 176:7	social (3) 110:12 129:4	168:14 174:12 184:25	57:15 85:1 104:23
13:3,20 14:15,18	199:16 200:5	seven (3) 56:16 83:16	163:10 167:10 176:7	187:4	191:22 195:24	105:2 117:14,15
15:21 16:3,6,11 17:25	201:18,19,20,25	193:21	163:10 167:10 176:7	society (1) 4:8	191:22 195:24	130:2,6 136:25 150:6
21:7,12,18,25 22:9,11	204:22	several (6) 45:25 80:18	163:10 167:10 176:7	solution (1) 122:5	191:22 195:24	151:1 163:13 164:4
23:3,6,7,23	seeing (3) 12:25 30:16	128:5 137:24 139:22	163:10 167:10 176:7	solutions (1) 175:16	191:22 195:24	166:14 168:8,9
24:3,8,18,21 25:5,8	189:9	148:16	163:10 167:10 176:7	somebody (15) 30:5	191:22 195:24	171:13,16,17 175:3,3
26:13 33:6,8	seek (2) 157:6 171:5	148:16	163:10 167:10 176:7	63:11 70:23 89:16	191:22 195:24	176:1,9 178:4
34:21,22,23,25	seeking (3) 51:8 131:20	148:16	163:10 167:10 176:7	92:15 93:18 96:23	191:22 195:24	180:13,14 183:10
35:5,7,9,18,20 36:22	180:10	severe (3) 15:7 16:14	163:10 167:10 176:7	107:1 110:23	191:22 195:24	185:14,16 196:14
37:19,21 38:2,3,5,22	seems (2) 134:3 148:15	39:12	163:10 167:10 176:7	128:17,20 131:13	191:22 195:24	198:25
39:2,9,25	seen (24) 6:14 42:18,21	severity (1) 28:3	163:10 167:10 176:7	132:8 133:2 144:8	191:22 195:24	station (2) 65:22 84:22
40:4,12,16,22,23	62:7 63:2 64:6,24	sg (1) 106:17	163:10 167:10 176:7	149:24 150:19 152:2	191:22 195:24	stationed (1) 185:20
41:3,12 42:5,9 43:23	76:11 77:20 87:2	shall (1) 44:15	163:10 167:10 176:7	153:19 157:12 165:20	191:22 195:24	stations (1) 148:12
45:4 47:12,14,16	96:16 110:13 119:23	share (6) 73:17	163:10 167:10 176:7	174:19 175:21 181:25	191:22 195:24	statute (1) 25:14
48:11 52:20 53:2	125:19 126:8 140:1	87:11,13 98:9 103:13	163:10 167:10 176:7	194:6 196:1 201:12	191:22 195:24	steady (2) 193:23
54:10,16,21 64:10,23	155:4 166:9 171:20	106:1	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	204:20
66:10 70:1,5	188:14 202:21 203:12	shared (1) 99:5	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	steel (7) 184:22
71:6,15,18,25 75:4	204:9 205:23	shaw (2) 94:19 95:21	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	185:12,14 186:5,9,11
76:7,14 80:9,11 83:4,4	send (1) 116:13	sheet (2) 181:8 193:25	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	197:19
85:3,7 87:14,17,20,25	senior (12) 2:5 9:23	shift (1) 153:5	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	step (1) 56:25
88:16,21 90:13 92:16	10:2 13:16 15:20	shock (1) 118:12	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	steps (4) 19:22 22:4
93:13,15,21,24	12:10 90:12 92:5	shocking (1) 110:9	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	86:15 103:3
98:6,9,17 99:10,13,20	99:12 101:19 118:13	shoes (1) 89:3	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	still (16) 65:5 74:17
100:7,24 101:10	126:21	shopping (3) 25:16	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	87:17 120:9 122:15
102:23 103:13	126:21	75:21 164:10	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	132:18 139:15 149:19
104:19,21	sense (3) 36:2 103:23	short (11) 4:23 34:16	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	155:19 157:22,25
105:6,10,23,25 106:19	169:7	50:20 57:8 71:18 72:1	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	173:24 186:7 192:9
111:7,11 113:4,10,22	senible (1) 206:13	126:25 145:10 147:24	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	198:3 202:7
114:1,3,6,20 115:5	sensitive (4) 12:22 45:4	158:17 175:6	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	stocktake (1) 31:20
117:4 118:9 121:17	51:1 166:7	shorten (1) 171:20	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	stoney (5) 80:17,21,24
123:2,11,21 124:16,20	sent (5) 42:4 78:4,7	shortly (4) 2:10 116:22	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	81:3,6
126:20,22	196:15 200:5	121:6 188:11	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	stood (1) 3:25
127:17,20,20,21 128:9	sentence (1) 107:3	should (20) 29:5 48:1	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	stools (1) 144:5
129:7,8,10 130:11,23	sentenced (1) 140:10	69:14 70:7 88:12	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	stop (4) 45:23,25 70:17
131:22,22 137:19	sentiments (1) 102:12	95:11 101:2 102:9	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	96:22
138:12 139:1,16	separate (3) 142:20	104:3 122:4,6 132:23	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	stopping (4) 55:6
141:21 142:1,14	143:12 198:22	134:16 143:18 153:23	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	70:15,21 177:19
156:18,24 157:1,6	separated (1) 36:10	154:11,14 168:23	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	storage (1) 40:10
168:19,23 169:2	separately (2) 44:3 73:9	186:13 199:17	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	store (1) 140:16
170:3,19,20 171:6	separating (1) 142:3	show (10) 53:10 82:19	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	stored (1) 60:10
176:2,14 177:8 179:14	september (1) 79:8	84:11,13 101:12	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	stra (3) 95:1,2 153:25
180:18 181:12 182:21	sergeant (2) 56:16	138:23 141:18	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	straightforward (1)
183:7 184:5,10,14,16	83:16	152:7,8,9	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	97:17
	serial (1) 83:15	showed (4) 109:6 130:3	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	
	series (1) 81:21	136:3 141:17	163:10 167:10 176:7	205:11	191:22 195:24	

strands (4) 2:7 19:17 22:13 196:11	132:4 137:12 158:9 161:5 182:3	tactics (8) 11:10 44:12 50:17 56:9 57:12 106:7 188:9 199:4	telling (10) 66:11 67:18 70:4 94:12 95:7 100:5 107:25 108:1 111:8 113:9	48:25 57:13,20 58:18,18 68:5 76:25 78:4 81:25 82:16,20 84:16 85:5,7 86:11 89:25 95:19 101:15 105:9 108:16,23 114:13 115:15 116:2,12 119:13 120:17 126:12 127:3 129:17 130:5 137:15 139:8,10 140:6 141:17 146:22 149:3 154:23 157:23 164:17 165:13 166:15 176:22 187:17,19 188:14 193:3 196:24 202:24	133:24 136:1 137:10,16 139:21 142:23 144:19 145:8,21 148:8 151:6 154:3 160:1,5,14 164:21 166:22 168:11 169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	152:5,12,17,24,25 16:8,13,21,23 17:3,4,4,7,12,13,21 19:7,10 21:6 22:23 27:1 29:1,10 31:7 32:8 39:11 42:16 43:8,24 44:1 47:9,19 48:14 49:15 52:24 55:15,23 56:1 59:25 60:2,17 61:20 62:5,12 64:21 65:11 66:11 67:12 70:3 72:21 74:20 87:5 89:23 95:3,6,19 100:4,23 103:7 107:25 108:8,9 109:13 112:7 113:24 116:4,8,20 130:2,4,12 138:8,10,18,23 142:11 145:12 150:9 153:21 154:2,19 163:1 164:1 170:1 173:18,24 175:23 176:20 179:9,12,21 190:18 192:11 194:8 203:23 205:18
strategic (7) 64:17 95:3 99:19 153:21 185:3,4 190:8	suggestion (4) 43:10 74:22 132:2 163:23	taken (22) 6:16 35:3 39:23,23 40:1 53:17 54:1,1 55:16 69:7 71:2 86:16 101:25 113:15 119:21 120:1 122:17 135:22 146:24 154:11 165:1 176:11	temporary (9) 60:24 74:24 94:11 125:11 126:1 128:8 171:22 176:5 184:6	89:25 95:19 101:15 105:9 108:16,23 114:13 115:15 116:2,12 119:13 120:17 126:12 127:3 129:17 130:5 137:15 139:8,10 140:6 141:17 146:22 149:3 154:23 157:23 164:17 165:13 166:15 176:22 187:17,19 188:14 193:3 196:24 202:24	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	65:11 66:11 67:12 70:3 72:21 74:20 87:5 89:23 95:3,6,19 100:4,23 103:7 107:25 108:8,9 109:13 112:7 113:24 116:4,8,20 130:2,4,12 138:8,10,18,23 142:11 145:12 150:9 153:21 154:2,19 163:1 164:1 170:1 173:18,24 175:23 176:20 179:9,12,21 190:18 192:11 194:8 203:23 205:18
strategies (1) 69:1	suggestions (1) 135:22	talk (6) 99:4 131:13 187:2 188:25 194:23 199:10	ten (7) 41:5 42:1 57:20 71:16 137:16 153:7 177:5	56:18,19 62:15 63:21 66:13,22 86:5 89:4,12 103:1 115:12 116:16,18 119:16 136:22 137:21 138:24 141:13,16 157:18 158:1 164:12 172:18 173:23 177:18 178:18 197:2 205:9	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24
strategy (11) 2:9 7:7,11,18 11:19 18:8,13 19:3 22:13 25:13,15	suggestive (1) 192:13	talked (11) 32:17 59:14 70:11 75:17,20 83:6 153:21 181:24 184:19 189:5 194:18	terms (74) 2:12 3:7 4:11 7:22 15:11 17:18,21 30:1 34:10 36:5 37:3 38:24 39:24 41:6 50:4,21 55:13 56:14 58:6 60:17 61:19 62:18 63:2,10 65:11,14 66:9 68:20 69:4 72:15 73:5 74:7,8 75:20,20 78:22 85:4 93:1 97:1 98:1,7,11 100:6,24 103:6 108:2,2 112:24 113:20 114:21 116:9 120:2 126:5 132:3 138:9 139:22 150:9 152:5 154:7 156:23 157:14,17 158:4 163:25 167:8 180:18 186:25 187:22 196:22 197:1 198:2 86:3 205:12,12	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
streets (5) 51:4 81:4 91:7 95:20 123:21	suggests (5) 13:9 128:12,16 139:4 187:24	talks (1) 113:20	terrorism (95) 2:4 3:2 5:14 7:7,9,10 8:7,8,10,21 9:2,5 10:5,9 11:3,8 12:9,17 14:23 19:11,24 20:4,12 21:2,7 23:22,24 24:8,18,20 29:12 34:21 35:17 37:6 38:2 39:2 54:20 56:22 58:21,24 59:19 68:22 76:18 77:7,12 80:1,6,9,15 85:3,9 93:3 95:16 105:7,14,25 106:6,24 107:7 111:4,7 112:21 113:10,12 123:7 125:21 126:19 127:20,21 131:16 133:5 135:14 143:15 147:6 157:4 179:10 180:17 181:11 184:18 185:6 187:8 188:25 189:25 190:9,15 191:1,9,15,17 192:4 193:12 194:2 195:19 205:18	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
streetscape (3) 69:4 75:2 131:21	superintendent (17) 10:11 11:4 39:21 46:12 94:19 95:21 104:24,25 105:5 106:7 130:20,22 133:6 135:15 148:4 168:24 183:22	tape (2) 74:6 175:10	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
strengthen (2) 7:24 156:24	superintendent (17) 10:11 11:4 39:21 46:12 94:19 95:21 104:24,25 105:5 106:7 130:20,22 133:6 135:15 148:4 168:24 183:22	target (12) 19:1 44:18 62:24 64:24 65:16 91:24 116:13 138:5 139:9 167:22 174:1 176:21	terrorism (95) 2:4 3:2 5:14 7:7,9,10 8:7,8,10,21 9:2,5 10:5,9 11:3,8 12:9,17 14:23 19:11,24 20:4,12 21:2,7 23:22,24 24:8,18,20 29:12 34:21 35:17 37:6 38:2 39:2 54:20 56:22 58:21,24 59:19 68:22 76:18 77:7,12 80:1,6,9,15 85:3,9 93:3 95:16 105:7,14,25 106:6,24 107:7 111:4,7 112:21 113:10,12 123:7 125:21 126:19 127:20,21 131:16 133:5 135:14 143:15 147:6 157:4 179:10 180:17 181:11 184:18 185:6 187:8 188:25 189:25 190:9,15 191:1,9,15,17 192:4 193:12 194:2 195:19 205:18	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
strengths (1) 68:23	supervised (1) 154:16	targeted (5) 58:22 77:18 109:20,21 156:7	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
stretch (2) 112:5 195:18	supervisor (4) 112:20,24 161:21 162:7	targeting (9) 90:21 109:7 127:9 138:4 139:25 140:7 154:4 156:14 178:19	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
striking (1) 89:2	support (6) 35:19 37:1 39:2 40:21,21 196:19	targets (6) 4:11 41:5 42:2 65:16 134:13 137:15	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
strong (6) 15:7 88:20,21 115:15 120:18,21	supporting (2) 24:25 161:20	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
strongest (2) 13:11 14:12	supporting (2) 40:17 201:21	tasers (4) 153:17,18 154:7,17	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
structure (8) 6:22 7:3 10:12 63:10 105:18 112:23 144:13 194:12	suppose (10) 7:8 15:15 22:6 62:20 66:8 68:18 79:3 85:22 86:3 88:17	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
studied (1) 204:4	sure (17) 3:6 38:6 56:1 68:24 69:1 73:14 88:20 100:10 103:13 120:22 121:10 125:24 143:3 155:12 156:8 193:14,23	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
studies (6) 44:4,10,22 196:17,18 197:3	surveillance (1) 103:2	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
study (15) 197:11,19,22,24 198:5,10,13,16,21 199:2,3,14 200:9,14,18	susceptible (1) 116:2	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
sub (2) 33:4 36:24	suspect (4) 69:2 104:1,8 157:24	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
subdue (1) 154:9	sure (17) 3:6 38:6 56:1 68:24 69:1 73:14 88:20 100:10 103:13 120:22 121:10 125:24 143:3 155:12 156:8 193:14,23	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
subgroup (1) 130:15	surnames (1) 94:7	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
subject (7) 12:19 19:3 51:2 114:9 146:16 149:6 198:22	surveillance (1) 103:2	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22	169:6,14 173:5 175:13,21 177:22 178:8,13,17,21 179:23,24 180:6,19 181:18 182:6,15 183:5,23 185:13,22,25 187:4,16,20 189:22 196:1,1,21 197:18,24 198:15,17,25 199:19 200:2,3 201:23 203:8,21 204:1	128:12,16 139:4 187:24	
subjective (1) 160:5	susceptible (1) 116:2	taser (12) 154:2,25 156:2	terrorist (72) 2:15 4:5,7 5:11 6:11,17,22 7:25 8:1,4,6,12 14:4,24 18:10,25 19:7 22:5 25:1,23 27:16 39:22			

tiers (11) 32:14,20 33:4  
34:1,6,11 41:18  
194:12,15,16 195:3  
tiger (2) 26:15,16  
time (70) 4:23 5:20  
7:20 16:18 18:9,12,16  
29:11 35:13 36:13,25  
42:21 44:1,9 46:17  
49:23,23 57:6 59:16  
60:23 63:17,25 65:11  
66:12 67:1,5 74:4,12  
101:11 103:20,21  
106:14 107:21 120:20  
123:9 122 131:15  
134:19 140:22,25  
141:8 145:25 150:23  
152:5 153:4,12 157:21  
158:9 159:17 160:25  
172:9 175:6,7  
176:9,18 177:16  
183:2,8 184:22  
185:10,24 187:13  
192:1,2,2 194:8  
200:14,20 205:16  
206:13  
times (22) 40:22 45:13  
52:23 53:11,15,20  
55:10 65:20 66:1  
83:13 97:19 106:23  
110:12 128:5 133:18  
139:22 159:10 180:25  
185:21 191:8,18 203:1  
timing (1) 206:2  
timmins (1) 132:13  
timms (1) 135:18  
tinkering (1) 173:4  
tirelessly (1) 175:16  
today (12) 1:4 6:11  
15:8 32:3 92:1 93:14  
99:2 104:13 149:20  
182:14 188:15 202:22  
together (9) 27:5,23  
28:2,20 30:2 48:18  
76:13 88:20 177:8  
told (19) 2:11 7:11  
16:23 18:8 22:22  
28:15 75:6,8 82:13  
90:13 97:6 106:7  
109:11 117:18 118:25  
126:11 146:2 204:22  
205:3  
tomorrow (2) 204:22  
206:16  
tonne (1) 134:9  
too (3) 170:14,15  
204:15  
took (14) 1:10 5:5  
38:20 61:16 73:4  
94:10 108:3 121:4  
122:14 140:14 149:15  
170:16 182:24 196:16  
tool (2) 34:22 37:19  
topic (11) 2:13,18  
101:21 103:24 121:2  
122:11 123:6 124:2  
125:13 172:20 206:14  
topics (2) 146:2 177:25  
total (2) 9:14 134:8  
touch (1) 164:3  
touched (5) 67:3 125:17  
147:15 148:4 156:5  
touching (1) 19:17  
tourist (1) 98:16

towards (8) 30:14 64:21  
95:12 127:14 136:20  
161:12 199:24 205:22  
tower (6) 6:4 41:15  
114:16 115:8 116:10  
137:6  
traffic (10) 20:7,8,8  
68:20 69:5,10 70:13  
74:25 82:13 124:24  
tragedy (1) 6:3  
tragic (2) 56:7 150:14  
tragically (1) 63:19  
trained (11) 24:22 25:7  
52:13,13 55:22 113:3  
149:21 150:7 154:16  
185:3 191:16  
training (7) 38:5 50:1  
89:14 177 147:20  
155:8,9  
transcript (1) 52:3  
transfer (1) 183:21  
transferring (1) 183:19  
transport (15) 9:22  
12:12 61:22,23,23,25  
76:2 84:20,24 111:21  
124:6 143:8 152:8  
196:3 203:18  
transpose (1) 66:6  
travel (1) 11:25  
travelling (4) 45:22  
52:22 134:9 140:14  
treated (1) 167:23  
treating (1) 94:25  
treatment (1) 35:25  
tremendous (1) 56:8  
trialling (1) 88:15  
tricky (2) 74:3 175:16  
tried (4) 10:11 17:6  
52:18 163:24  
trip (1) 22:2  
troubling (1) 175:9  
truck (2) 61:11 141:8  
true (1) 103:11  
trump (1) 3:17  
trust (1) 76:2  
try (4) 15:22 136:19  
169:20 204:18  
trying (4) 6:17 116:13  
156:23 203:10  
tuesday (1) 1:1  
turn (5) 71:2 164:23  
185:8 194:25 206:10  
turning (3) 19:14 24:6  
96:6  
twice (1) 15:10  
twopart (1) 109:5  
twoyear (1) 24:16  
type (7) 16:11 52:9  
115:18,19 116:1  
139:20 150:2  
types (11) 6:6 13:4,7  
59:23,25 60:5 77:9  
82:20 96:13 113:25  
152:14  
typically (1) 153:6  
tyres (2) 134:1,4

**U**

uk (39) 4:7,16 5:16,19  
9:14 10:24,25 12:14  
15:8,18,22 16:15  
19:7,9 23:3 24:9 26:24  
32:22 36:4,5 49:20

50:1,24 58:23 61:24  
63:21 64:5 74:5 86:4  
88:15 133:17 147:7  
149:8 155:2 156:1  
157:3 169:20 186:22  
188:7  
uks (1) 7:7  
ultimately (1) 88:22  
unarmed (9) 51:1 52:6  
56:10,20 83:5 96:3,4,5  
149:9  
undercover (1) 140:13  
underestimate (1)  
143:22  
underneath (1) 2:7  
understand (27) 1:18  
2:12,16 12:18 13:1  
17:14 37:12 38:6  
43:18 67:8 75:14  
87:12 100:19 109:9  
140:3 145:4 147:10  
150:4 151:1,11 152:13  
158:13 159:2 160:18  
167:6 178:5 189:5  
understandable (1)  
69:22  
understanding (15)  
3:22 21:3 22:6 25:9  
32:16 47:9 48:21 55:8  
97:17 108:21 109:13  
121:14 166:8 178:11  
186:5  
undertake (3) 24:14  
138:15 143:18  
undertaken (5) 49:12  
73:18 79:2 94:15  
181:17  
undertaking (1) 50:20  
unfair (1) 180:7  
unfortunately (4) 89:21  
103:17 118:4 129:2  
uniform (1) 188:24  
uniformed (4) 56:15  
184:18 185:20 196:19  
unimpeded (3) 134:6  
160:3,8  
unique (2) 41:9 169:2  
unit (4) 11:3 24:1 41:3  
180:17  
united (2) 8:9 86:2  
units (4) 40:21 84:10  
136:18,19  
unknown (1) 198:11  
unlikely (3) 15:5 104:13  
176:5  
unobstructed (2)  
66:2,23  
unprecedented (2) 4:10  
5:12  
unprotected (2) 43:3  
68:15  
unrealistic (1) 114:23  
until (10) 45:23 50:11  
83:17 86:23 150:12  
151:15 158:13 182:16  
200:21 206:19  
unusual (1) 199:19  
unusually (1) 146:15  
update (4) 13:8,17  
126:20 127:7  
updated (1) 60:1  
updating (1) 127:2  
uplift (4) 49:19 52:15

149:15,17  
uplifted (1) 83:4  
upon (9) 19:17 32:5,6  
63:17 147:15 148:4  
156:5 164:3 190:3  
upward (1) 189:12  
upwards (2) 177:7,14  
urgently (2) 122:4  
154:11  
used (24) 18:25 26:14  
31:24 34:23 45:10  
59:14 60:13,16 61:11  
64:25 72:19,25 90:20  
102:9 119:1,12 126:7  
144:22 154:8 157:20  
192:18 193:4 199:16  
203:22  
users (5) 23:11 32:24  
33:3,13 175:22  
using (26) 18:1 20:7  
26:24 37:15 41:4  
46:19 56:10  
58:16,18,24 63:14,24  
65:4 91:16,23 125:18  
132:24 136:18,21,22  
137:15,16 154:19  
192:15 202:24 203:21  
usual (3) 5:25 56:24  
84:19  
usually (4) 13:6,9,10,14

**V**

valuable (1) 21:12  
value (8) 51:17 55:25  
67:5 88:3 89:7,11,19  
143:24  
van (2) 119:5 141:6  
vanguard (1) 186:16  
variety (2) 15:13 141:18  
various (11) 10:19  
19:23 27:24 59:23  
81:23 82:20 106:23  
123:8 171:2 183:17  
187:7  
vary (4) 10:24 36:5  
157:9,10  
varying (3) 5:2 6:5  
97:19  
vast (1) 184:20  
vegetable (1) 78:16  
vehicle (75) 45:16,19,22  
46:3,14,19 48:1 53:24  
57:19 58:9,16 59:14  
60:14,17,19,21  
61:2,17 62:23  
63:14,24 64:15 65:5  
69:15  
70:15,17,21,21,23  
72:10 79:23  
80:3,12,16,21,23 81:4  
91:18 94:25 96:20  
106:21 110:21  
115:10,16 119:1,18  
121:22 127:22  
128:2,3,7,13,22  
130:16 131:2 132:25  
133:20 134:17 136:6  
137:24 140:11 142:5  
157:24 159:18  
160:13,20 178:14,24  
185:19 196:9,12,13  
197:17 202:24 203:5

vehicleasweapon (9)  
43:4 44:18 46:7  
57:14,17 59:5 64:18  
68:12 71:3  
vehiclebased (1) 58:25  
vehicleborne (4) 26:14  
60:5 79:5 138:1  
vehicles (38) 45:10  
49:11,22 54:2,3,19  
55:20 58:5 61:7  
62:5,6,9,10,11,13,15,22  
65:3 83:25 84:5,9,12  
90:20 91:11,16,24  
93:8,10 94:18 142:3  
146:12 147:5,20 148:9  
149:17,20 157:12  
185:21  
velocity (1) 146:23  
venue (3) 22:8 38:8  
87:19  
verb (1) 91:19  
version (1) 12:21  
vetted (1) 87:11  
via (1) 102:3  
viable (2) 44:18 142:6  
vicinity (2) 53:5 151:8  
viewed (2) 63:25 118:25  
views (4) 29:6 67:6  
106:1 196:16  
virtue (4) 25:23 164:18  
165:14 166:16  
visibility (1) 56:15  
visible (6) 50:7,17 55:1  
56:17 149:2 187:2  
visit (1) 3:16  
visits (3) 3:16 38:16  
80:5  
visual (1) 127:11  
vulnerabilities (4) 37:16  
80:19 201:11 205:10  
vulnerability (22) 17:10  
18:5,6 26:23 27:21  
28:5,6 30:9,11,21,25  
31:3 32:5,13 38:10  
46:8 112:16 122:9  
137:22 196:12 203:15  
205:5  
vulnerable (18) 39:24  
40:3 43:4 46:19 48:4  
66:16 69:15 89:5  
106:20 109:16 132:24  
136:19 137:9,13  
177:18 178:24  
204:14,15

**W**

wait (2) 45:23 86:23  
waiting (2) 86:22  
155:19  
walk (1) 67:25  
walked (2) 159:10  
185:14  
walkthrough (1) 80:10  
wanting (2) 38:25  
157:24  
wants (1) 95:6  
wasnt (34) 39:4,16 44:9  
68:8 83:22 91:9 97:12  
98:23 106:16 109:20  
114:5 115:10,23  
119:5,5 120:9 122:12  
126:24 131:11,14  
137:2,9 140:7 147:7

148:19 156:3 172:8  
174:10,11,14 184:8  
194:13 201:2,5  
watch (2) 110:23 187:3  
waterloo (1) 65:23  
watershed (1) 4:7  
way (24) 8:24 17:7  
22:12 32:23 53:1 74:5  
79:17 85:22 88:16  
93:22 111:24 119:2  
128:15 137:2 161:9  
163:17 170:3 171:15  
173:7 174:14 179:9  
186:12 189:15 197:10  
weakness (2) 18:6 32:5  
weaknesses (1) 68:23  
weapon (7) 18:25  
46:4,20 57:19 58:16  
61:17 119:2  
weaponry (2) 58:2  
146:23  
weapons (5) 5:3 85:14  
154:20,25 203:7  
web (1) 36:19  
websites (1) 26:21  
wed (4) 16:12 62:7  
128:15,18  
wednesday (1) 206:20  
week (6) 24:22 44:3  
65:17 69:6 104:24  
193:21  
weeks (14) 11:23 43:1  
73:6 120:15 132:18  
173:1 189:15  
190:13,14 191:3,4,4,5  
205:3  
weigh (1) 102:17  
weight (1) 103:4  
welcome (2) 87:21  
154:21  
welldeveloped (1) 35:7  
went (9) 15:9 28:16  
77:1 96:7 108:18  
115:8 118:19 173:13  
205:16  
werent (12) 28:17 44:23  
75:1 90:25 91:5 100:3  
129:17,25 136:18  
142:7 175:5 203:22  
west (3) 18:18 26:13  
91:1  
western (4) 57:21,21  
58:13 119:22  
westminster (57) 14:3  
20:18 39:9,17,18,21  
40:13 41:16 42:18  
43:16,17 44:11,16  
64:14 65:25 72:19  
81:8,15,21 90:23 93:8  
96:12 97:10,12 98:15  
100:12,21 103:15  
106:5 108:25 109:22  
110:3 114:14 115:7  
116:9,22 117:24 119:3  
120:6 127:3  
128:14,15,18 129:15  
131:6 136:20 139:18  
157:21 161:11  
170:8,12 176:19  
178:10,12,12,16  
181:21  
wests (2) 26:21 27:4  
weve (28) 9:12 11:13

14:24 18:9,18 43:25  
63:2 77:20 86:20 91:3  
125:19,22 126:5,8  
152:13,15 155:25  
158:25 161:23  
162:6,20 169:19  
188:14 191:15 194:25  
198:24 202:21 205:23  
whatever (4) 128:10  
151:16 167:20 187:13  
whats (3) 5:16 86:3  
89:13  
wheatsheaf (1) 76:21  
whereas (4) 13:15 18:5  
75:21 138:20  
whereby (1) 176:10  
whilst (5) 32:25 33:10  
86:5 123:12 149:15  
whoever (1) 191:5  
whole (16) 50:24 54:25  
101:18 103:6 108:13  
114:25 126:25 139:13  
141:15 143:16 149:13  
160:7,17 184:10  
189:17 204:16  
whom (4) 11:13 104:23  
132:19 195:7  
whose (2) 105:3 175:19  
wide (9) 6:17 58:6  
85:17 115:20,22,24  
151:20,20 193:7  
widely (4) 32:23 33:12  
71:1 110:11  
wider (6) 48:14 57:22  
89:1,9 122:8 152:22  
willing (2) 149:24  
150:19  
wine (1) 78:15  
winter (1) 79:17  
wish (3) 1:8 183:11  
185:18  
withdraw (1) 149:18  
witness (18) 1:4 4:2 5:8  
7:16 34:9 46:22 49:5  
85:1 98:25 99:23  
104:5,23,23 144:19  
157:15 158:5 182:10  
183:10  
witnesses (2) 2:18 91:3  
wonderland (1) 79:18  
wont (3) 152:8 171:19  
182:14  
woolford (3) 132:19,19  
133:1  
wording (1) 166:14  
work (46) 11:21,25  
19:16 21:13,23  
22:12,23 23:20 24:1  
37:12 38:8 49:12  
60:20 62:17 73:18,23  
76:5 86:13 87:7 89:2  
92:9 94:3 95:23  
105:3,14 117:9 130:24  
136:13 137:20  
157:16,16,17,25 159:1  
171:1 175:15 184:4  
185:19,22 189:25  
196:2,4,7 200:6  
201:21 204:3  
worked (3) 95:19  
186:17 192:9  
working (18) 8:10  
25:19,20 27:5 28:20

29:22 64:21 86:20  
 124:16 127:19  
 164:6,14 169:8 188:5  
 197:9 198:4 204:18  
 205:22  
**workload (1)** 200:20  
**works (4)** 112:23 129:10  
 130:21 189:15  
**world (4)** 57:25 87:10  
 123:18 201:13  
**worldwide (1)** 193:4  
**worried (1)** 174:8  
**worse (1)** 155:14  
**worth (2)** 5:20 16:7  
**wouldbe (2)** 119:16  
 149:2  
**wouldnt (15)** 39:5 48:16  
 98:9 102:24 114:18  
 121:9 131:23 147:13  
 152:9 159:17,19,20,23  
 160:2 195:6  
**write (2)** 45:8,21  
**writes (1)** 124:25  
**writing (1)** 133:9  
**written (2)** 47:6,17  
**wrongly (1)** 174:14  
**ws501414 (3)** 161:10  
 163:12 180:24  
**ws501415 (1)** 161:19  
**ws501416 (1)** 200:5  
**ws501417 (1)** 106:4  
**ws501421 (1)** 132:16  
**ws501428 (1)** 132:10  
**ws501429 (1)** 133:4  
**ws501433 (2)** 133:8  
 158:24  
**ws501434 (1)** 135:13  
**ws501514 (1)** 201:19  
**ws501515 (2)** 201:18,24  
**ws501517 (3)** 45:2  
 136:2 202:21  
**ws501518 (2)** 45:20  
 203:3  
**ws501521 (1)** 137:18  
**ws501522 (1)** 141:23  
**ws501531 (1)** 181:7  
**ws501532 (1)** 181:10  
**ws501538 (1)** 168:18  
**ws501539 (1)** 168:16  
**ws50191 (1)** 104:22  
**ws50228 (1)** 171:13  
**ws50229 (1)** 171:23  
**ws50316 (1)** 93:12  
**ws50317 (1)** 94:9  
**ws50318 (1)** 94:16  
**ws50319 (1)** 94:17  
**ws503211 (1)** 164:4  
**ws503214 (1)** 32:10  
**ws503219 (2)** 53:8  
 152:17  
**ws503222 (1)** 71:12  
**ws503223 (1)** 71:21  
**ws503228 (1)** 81:20  
**ws503229 (2)** 82:18  
 151:1  
**ws50323 (1)** 7:15  
**ws503232 (1)** 4:2  
**ws503233 (1)** 10:13  
**ws503234 (1)** 34:2  
**ws503247 (1)** 84:3  
**ws5040445 (1)** 101:12  
**ws5040450 (2)** 121:19  
 154:5

**ws5040453 (1)** 143:5  


---

**X**  


---

**x (1)** 169:4  
**x2 (1)** 155:2  
**xavier (1)** 158:21  


---

**Y**  


---

**year (10)** 20:19 59:20  
 78:25 105:25 106:3  
 125:2 139:19 140:10  
 205:25 206:1  
**years (21)** 3:19,20 6:2  
 19:3 38:20 59:8,18  
 60:21 63:6 67:22 68:3  
 91:15 94:12 96:18  
 103:1 126:4,4 144:14  
 146:18 183:17 186:14  
**yesterday (1)** 1:10  
**yet (4)** 126:11  
 155:19,24 174:6  
**youll (2)** 10:21 82:4  
**young (1)** 85:24  
**younger (1)** 86:3  
**youre (16)** 44:19 101:13  
 114:19 117:14  
 129:22,25 162:17  
 163:25 166:21  
 167:9,11,12,16,16,24  
 183:6  
**yours (1)** 46:25  
**yourself (5)** 1:7 9:23  
 123:8 180:10 200:25  
**youve (27)** 2:11 7:12  
 8:3 14:11,22 16:23  
 17:2 22:12,18 38:9  
 44:21 55:16 75:6,8  
 83:8 101:7 104:1  
 110:18 111:7 114:15  
 156:21 160:22 172:20  
 180:4 185:11,23  
 204:22  


---

**Z**  


---

**zero (1)** 134:1  
**zone (5)** 121:23 122:19  
 168:23 169:3 170:20  


---

**1**  


---

**1 (19)** 32:21 34:13,20  
 35:19,21,22 36:1 40:7  
 53:3 151:7 159:15  
 192:23 193:8 198:24  
 199:18,22 200:2  
 207:3,4  
**10 (6)** 41:10 55:6,6  
 57:22 84:2 206:17  
**100 (2)** 6:2 141:10  
**1000 (3)** 84:7 141:11  
 206:19  
**1006 (1)** 1:2  
**104 (1)** 165:5  
**105 (1)** 104:15  
**10minute (1)** 158:11  
**11 (3)** 7:16 9:14 84:1  
**1133 (1)** 57:7  
**1152 (1)** 57:9  
**12 (3)** 148:25 149:1  
 155:4  
**121 (1)** 82:5

**123 (1)** 152:12  
**124 (1)** 83:12  
**127 (1)** 143:2  
**12month (1)** 149:11  
**13 (5)** 4:15,19 163:3  
 168:19 183:1  
**14 (2)** 111:1 113:19  
**14day (1)** 139:15  
**15 (3)** 37:10 40:8 57:6  
**1540 (1)** 53:12  
**158 (1)** 207:6  
**16 (4)** 46:12 94:16  
 133:4,6  
**17 (2)** 5:15 19:25  
**176 (1)** 207:7  
**177 (1)** 207:8  
**18 (4)** 1:1 4:19 49:1  
 203:3  
**180 (1)** 207:9  
**182 (2)** 207:10,12  
**1822 (1)** 53:13  
**19 (3)** 79:25 117:18  
 206:20  
**1990s (1)** 186:10  
**1992 (3)** 3:8 183:15,16  
**1996 (1)** 8:14  


---

**2**  


---

**2 (24)** 5:8 6:23 10:12  
 19:20 32:25 34:21  
 35:15,19 36:3,10 53:4  
 75:8 79:8 84:2 93:14  
 127:16 151:7 156:2  
 192:23 193:8 198:24  
 199:18 200:17,19  
**20 (7)** 30:24 31:3 50:8  
 54:7 57:14 79:15  
 104:8  
**200 (2)** 24:10 113:2  
**20032004 (1)** 59:12  
**2006 (1)** 3:13  
**2007 (1)** 26:14  
**2008 (2)** 26:8,12  
**2010 (1)** 27:5  
**2011 (9)** 7:20 18:9,12  
 25:13,15 164:5,6,7  
 188:3  
**2012 (5)** 29:21 30:23  
 57:21 197:16,17  
**2013 (2)** 31:4 197:20  
**2014 (15)** 18:22,24  
 25:19,20 28:12 32:2  
 38:10 97:8 164:6,14  
 165:23 166:1  
 197:25,25 198:12  
**2015 (3)** 19:6 78:3  
 146:6  
**2016 (20)** 50:8 54:7  
 61:10,16 63:23  
 78:19,25 79:8,10  
 101:14 120:8,9,13  
 143:1 148:24 183:22  
 198:14,15 205:17  
 206:7  
**2017 (41)** 4:1,4,6,20  
 5:10 6:10 15:9 18:9  
 19:9 39:10 46:6 47:2  
 49:8 50:9,11 54:7  
 57:18 58:14 64:14  
 67:15 68:6 71:5  
 80:14,18 81:10 82:10  
 85:10 93:14 118:5  
 139:13 148:23 168:19

180:24 184:4 191:12  
 198:17 200:7,15,21  
 203:13 206:4  
**2018 (2)** 140:13 171:19  
**2019 (4)** 1:1 74:16  
 183:11 206:20  
**205 (1)** 43:22  
**206 (1)** 104:17  
**21 (3)** 39:10 54:7 200:7  
**21st (1)** 186:6  
**22 (8)** 4:16 28:14 40:4  
 61:16 64:14 106:8  
 115:3 118:9  
**2200 (1)** 151:16  
**2211 (1)** 55:4  
**22a (1)** 8:13  
**22nd (1)** 110:15  
**23 (2)** 106:9 118:9  
**24 (7)** 111:1 135:13  
 161:11 180:24 183:17  
 199:24,25  
**247 (1)** 73:23  
**24hour (1)** 83:19  
**25 (2)** 130:14 134:9  
**250 (3)** 40:23 41:23  
 108:6  
**2500 (1)** 133:19  
**26 (1)** 15:4  
**27 (3)** 46:6 171:15  
 183:11  
**28 (7)** 4:16 123:6  
 126:16,20 171:13,18  
 200:21  
**29 (4)** 27:8 80:8 133:4  
 171:21  
**2a (4)** 33:5 35:11,13  
 40:7  
**2b (6)** 33:7 35:4,8,13,16  
 40:7  


---

**3**  


---

**3 (28)** 33:9,24  
 36:15,18,20,24 37:4,9  
 38:13 53:10,12 72:20  
 75:6 76:8 80:24 82:17  
 83:13,15,17 84:2,7  
 105:2 145:7 151:5  
 157:22 165:9 200:1  
 201:1  
**30 (4)** 82:5 85:1 104:4  
 171:25  
**300 (1)** 84:6  
**305 (1)** 28:21  
**306 (2)** 29:4 54:8  
**31 (1)** 200:19  
**32 (1)** 181:10  
**323 (1)** 158:16  
**339 (1)** 158:18  
**34 (1)** 41:9  
**35 (1)** 127:10  
**3a (5)** 36:24,25 37:11  
 38:14 40:8  
**3b (5)** 36:24 37:3  
 38:14,15 40:8  


---

**4**  


---

**4 (8)** 38:19 52:20 53:2  
 54:16 55:4 71:5 79:14  
 140:12  
**40 (1)** 104:4  
**400 (1)** 170:18  
**42 (1)** 168:20

**420 (1)** 101:13  
**43 (1)** 40:7  
**440 (1)** 40:8  
**45 (1)** 31:5  
**450 (1)** 134:8  
**453 (1)** 143:4  
**46 (4)** 94:19 164:4,7  
 171:17  
**463 (1)** 37:10  
**47 (1)** 166:14  
**4x4 (2)** 119:6 134:9  


---

**5**  


---

**5 (7)** 113:7 127:14  
 161:13 163:14,20  
 165:5 182:16  
**50 (1)** 40:7  
**500 (6)** 82:21 151:12  
 152:10 153:1 158:14  
 206:18  
**500metre (2)** 152:11,21  
**537 (1)** 154:12  
**539 (1)** 121:20  
**540 (2)** 121:21 122:6  
**56 (1)** 30:10  
**561 (1)** 143:6  
**571 (1)** 79:2  
**58 (1)** 82:7  


---

**6**  


---

**6 (3)** 5:9 196:7 200:2  
**60 (2)** 32:12 134:10  
**600 (1)** 49:8  
**61 (1)** 33:14  


---

**7**  


---

**7 (5)** 6:7 53:19  
 83:17,19,20  
**70 (1)** 40:6  
**71 (1)** 118:8  
**73 (1)** 137:4  
**77 (1)** 118:2  


---

**8**  


---

**8 (1)** 197:20  
**86 (1)** 63:19  


---

**9**  


---

**9 (2)** 55:6 151:16  
**90 (1)** 207:5  
**900 (1)** 134:11  
**98 (1)** 117:18