

OPUS 2

INTERNATIONAL

London Bridge Inquests

Day 19

June 4, 2019

Opus 2 International - Official Court Reporters

Phone: 0203 008 6619

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Tuesday, 4 June 2019
 2 (10.15 am)
 3 MR HOUGH: Sir, the first witness is Dr Robert Chapman.
 4 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you.
 5 DR ROBERT CHAPMAN (sworn)
 6 THE CHIEF CORONER: Good morning, Dr Chapman. If you wish
 7 to take a seat, please do. Make yourself comfortable.
 8 I think the microphone is now switched on, so if you do
 9 sit down, just pull the microphone closer to you.
 10 A. Okay, thank you. I can stand.
 11 Questions by MR HOUGH QC
 12 MR HOUGH: Sir, before I begin asking questions of
 13 Dr Chapman, may I give the same warning I have given
 14 before the other pathologists have given evidence, that
 15 what will follow will include some distressing evidence,
 16 that it will be necessary to give some graphic details
 17 of injuries and examinations, that we shall be using
 18 body maps to illustrate the injuries which, although
 19 stylised, remain graphic.
 20 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you.
 21 MR HOUGH: Would you please give your full name for the
 22 court?
 23 A. I'm Dr Robert Charles Chapman.
 24 Q. Dr Chapman, I'll ask you questions first on behalf of
 25 the Coroner and then you may receive questions from

1

1 other lawyers; do you understand?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. By profession are you a Home Office forensic
 4 pathologist?
 5 A. Yes, I am.
 6 Q. And would you please give us your relevant
 7 qualifications in brief?
 8 A. Yes, I hold a medical degree, I'm a fellow of the Royal
 9 College of Pathologists, I hold a Diploma in medical
 10 jurisprudence in forensic pathology. I am a fellow of
 11 the Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine.
 12 Q. Thank you very much. In the context of this case did
 13 you perform post mortem examinations and produce reports
 14 concerning James McMullan and Alexandre Pigeard?
 15 A. I did.
 16 Q. You may refer to your reports as you wish. I'm going to
 17 address James first, then you may be asked questions by
 18 others about him and then we shall turn to Alexandre.
 19 A. I understand, yes.
 20 Q. Before performing the post mortem examinations were you
 21 provided with background information about the attack,
 22 the basic facts of the attack?
 23 A. I was.
 24 Q. Did you also have access to CT scans in each case?
 25 A. Yes.

2

1 Q. May we turn, then, first, to James McMullan. Did you
 2 perform the post mortem examination on his body on
 3 7 June 2017?
 4 A. I did.
 5 Q. May we begin by considering your external examination by
 6 reference to the body maps, and if we could have on
 7 screen {PM0099/4}. Looking at your page 5, did you
 8 first of all identify a sharp force injury to the left
 9 front of the chest?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Would you please describe the wound, its size and shape?
 12 A. This is a stab wound, as we see there on the front of
 13 the upper part of the left side of the chest. The upper
 14 outer end of the wound appeared rather square and the
 15 lower inner end more pointed in shape. The wound
 16 measured 6.8 cm in length on the skin surface. It was
 17 possible to follow the track of that wound and find out
 18 where it had gone. It had gone from Mr McMullan's left
 19 to right and backwards, through the skin, the tissues
 20 beneath the skin, and the left third rib, quite close to
 21 the edge of the sternum or breastbone.
 22 Q. Can I pause you there? We can see that, I think, if we
 23 look at page 14 of the body maps {PM0099/14}. Do we see
 24 there the third rib and the sternum body. You were
 25 telling us that the injury had penetrated through the

3

1 third rib near the sternum body; is that right?
 2 A. Yes. Yes. In fact it had actually cut through part of
 3 the breastbone itself, part of the sternum, as well as
 4 the third rib, and thereafter it entered the chest
 5 cavity, passing into the thin membrane around the heart,
 6 the pericardial sac.
 7 Q. We can see that on {PM0099/15}.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Go on, please, doctor.
 10 A. Yes. And then into the right side of the heart, the
 11 right main pumping chamber of the heart, the right
 12 ventricle. Thereafter through the base of the aorta,
 13 the main blood vessel issuing from the left side of the
 14 heart, the main arterial vessel of the body. And then
 15 through part of the left ventricle, the left main
 16 pumping chamber of the heart. The depth of the wound
 17 from the skin to the deepest point of the track that
 18 I could discern was about 13 cm.
 19 Q. To preempt one of your conclusions, was this the fatal
 20 injury?
 21 A. It was.
 22 Q. Was that the only sharp force injury you detected?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. May we move, then, to various blunt force injuries you
 25 identified. First of all, body map page 5, please

4

1 {PM0099/5}. Did you identify here marked 1, 2 and 3
 2 a number of abrasions on the face?
 3 A. Yes, these are abrasions or grazes on the face, as we
 4 see there in the graphic.
 5 Q. Page 6, please {PM0099/6}. Now looking at the chest not
 6 focusing on the major stab wound, but on other minor
 7 injuries did you find a number of minor abrasions and
 8 other wounds to the front torso?
 9 A. Yes, these are all small puncture marks or abrasions or
 10 grazes on the skin in that location.
 11 Q. {PM0099/7}, please. Do we see there an abrasion to the
 12 side above the left hip?
 13 A. Yes, a graze or abrasion on the outside of the hip.
 14 Q. Page {PM0099/8}, please, did you identify abrasions to
 15 the right forearm and elbow?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. {PM0099/9}. Did you identify bruising and abrasions to
 18 the right wrist and back of the right hand, as depicted
 19 here?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. {PM0099/10}. Did you identify an abrasion on the inner
 22 right wrist and another abrasion over the thumb joint?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. {PM0099/11}. Did you identify bruising to the inner
 25 left arm near the armpit?

5

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. What type of injury was this?
 3 A. It is what I might characterise as a grip-type mark.
 4 These are two adjacent oval-shape bruises, suggestive of
 5 that part of the arm having been gripped by a hand.
 6 Q. {PM0099/12}. Did you identify two abrasions to the left
 7 elbow and left forearm?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. {PM0099/13}. On the right leg did you identify
 10 abrasions over the upper right thigh and right knee and
 11 also bruising and abrasion to the front shin?
 12 A. Correct, yes, I did.
 13 Q. Can we move then to your internal examination. We can
 14 take that off screen. Focusing on the front and torso,
 15 what findings did you make of significance?
 16 A. There was some bruising to the front chest wall in
 17 relation to the stab wound track, which I've already
 18 described, injury number 1. There were no other
 19 injuries. I've already described the course of the stab
 20 wound track through the left side of the chest. Inside
 21 the chest there was approximately 1.5 litres of blood in
 22 the left chest space, the left hemothorax, as well as
 23 some clot, some blood clot.
 24 The left lung appeared collapsed as a result of the
 25 bleeding inside the chest wall as a result of that stab

6

1 wound track. There was no evidence of any natural
 2 disease or any other significant feature. The heart
 3 showed no evidence of any natural disease and neither
 4 did either of the lungs.
 5 Q. I think you found that the right hemothorax appeared
 6 dry, so it was only a collection of blood in the left
 7 side of the chest?
 8 A. That's correct.
 9 Q. Did you make any other significant findings in any part
 10 of your internal examination?
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. May we move, then, to your conclusions, and looking at
 13 point 2, what was the means of death?
 14 A. The death had resulted from a single stab wound to the
 15 front of the upper part and left side of the chest,
 16 passing from Mr McMullan's left to right and backwards,
 17 through the chest wall, through the right and the left
 18 sides of his heart and the aorta, and there was
 19 extensive bleeding into the left chest space as a result
 20 of this injury.
 21 Q. Looking point 3, what force was required to inflict this
 22 injury?
 23 A. Pathologists use a very simple grading of force, mild,
 24 moderate and severe. The fatal injury would be, in my
 25 opinion, regarded as a severe force injury on a scale of

7

1 mild, moderate and severe, as it had passed through the
 2 bone of the left third rib and the breastbone.
 3 Q. So a knife strike requiring considerable force?
 4 A. Yes, it's at the upper end of that force scale.
 5 Q. Looking at point 4, what would have been the effects of
 6 the injury and how it led to death?
 7 A. It would have caused immediate and profuse blood loss
 8 from the aorta and from the heart into the space around
 9 the heart, into the left chest space, and of course,
 10 also externally.
 11 Q. So as well as James bleeding from that wound externally,
 12 there would have been profuse bleeding into the chest
 13 cavity, placing pressure on the heart?
 14 A. Yes, it places pressure on the heart and also onto that
 15 left lung which had been collapsed by that collection of
 16 blood.
 17 Q. How, then, would that result in death?
 18 A. The mechanism of death would be largely the result of
 19 blood loss, the loss of circulating blood volume into
 20 the chest and externally, as well as the other effects
 21 we've mentioned, which is the effect on the left lung.
 22 Q. So loss of blood volume would lead to cardiac arrest?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Within what time would you expect collapse and death to
 25 occur?

8

1 A. In my view, collapse is likely to have been rapid and
 2 probably, I would say, within a minute, that sort of
 3 timescale, with death supervening shortly thereafter .
 4 Q. Looking at your point 5, did you find any characteristic
 5 defence injuries?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. We have heard some evidence suggesting that James may
 8 have been assisting someone else called Sara Zelenak and
 9 being caught unawares potentially by an attack. Is the
 10 lack of defence injuries potentially consistent with
 11 that narrative?
 12 A. Yes, it is .
 13 Q. Looking at point 6, you refer there to there being other
 14 blunt injuries on the arms, including the grip-type mark
 15 as you've identified , and also to minor grazes
 16 elsewhere. Are they consistent with any particular
 17 events prior to death?
 18 A. They're fairly non-specific . They're the sort of thing
 19 one sees in a struggle or a collapse onto a hard
 20 surface, those sorts of possible mechanisms.
 21 Q. Using the standard notation, what did you give as the
 22 cause of death?
 23 A. I gave the immediate cause of death as haemorrhage
 24 caused by, under 1B in the formulation, stab wound to
 25 the chest.

9

1 Q. A few further questions, please. All the evidence is
 2 that before the attack James was a fit young man and
 3 I think your conclusions were consistent with that?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. The evidence suggests that James may well have moved for
 6 a time after he was attacked. In your view, could he
 7 have managed movement for a short period after receiving
 8 this injury?
 9 A. Yes, he could.
 10 Q. Are you able to say for how long and how far he could
 11 move?
 12 A. I think it would be relatively short. As I have said,
 13 I think his collapse would have been rapid following the
 14 infliction of the fatal injury to the chest.
 15 Q. I need to present a particular scenario to you because
 16 it's of concern, I know, to his family. Can we put on
 17 screen, please, {MP0009/1}. We see here a plan showing
 18 Borough High Street with a van crashed into some
 19 railings .
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. And below the van, below street level , immediately to
 22 the west, is a courtyard of a restaurant .
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. If you look at the corner immediately adjacent to the
 25 van, that is where James was found, so below the van at

10

1 courtyard level?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. If you bear that in mind, can we then look at
 4 {MP0011/1}, there is some evidence, there are a number
 5 of pieces of evidence, suggesting that James was
 6 attacked around the top of the stone stairs we see
 7 depicted on this overview image?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And there is , therefore , a suggestion that he may have
 10 gone down the steps we see there --
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. -- after receiving his injury , and then through the
 13 archway below, which we can see --
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. -- on this overview, and then if we look at {PH0614/1},
 16 and if we rotate that , please , that James may then have
 17 gone down a passageway about this distance to the corner
 18 below the van which I identified on the plan?
 19 A. Yes, I understand.
 20 Q. So this might have involved him staggering down the
 21 steps and then going a further distance of around 25 to
 22 30 metres or so?
 23 A. Yes. Yes.
 24 Q. Is that a feasible state of affairs ? Do you think he
 25 could have managed that?

11

1 A. Yes, I think that's possible .
 2 Q. Now, the only other hypothesis which has been considered
 3 is that James was somehow thrown or fell over the
 4 railings into the courtyard below. We can see the
 5 distance of the fall if we look at a photograph,
 6 {PH0484/1}. So we can see the distance down from the
 7 street level to the ground level quite clearly on this
 8 photograph. Did you find injuries which were in any way
 9 compatible with such a fall ?
 10 A. I didn't, no.
 11 Q. Would you have expected to?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Are you able, in practical terms, to rule out that James
 14 fell or was thrown that distance?
 15 A. I think I can, yes.
 16 Q. Thank you very much, we can take that off the screen.
 17 A few other questions. The evidence we had from
 18 PC Miah, who was the first person to get to James, was
 19 that he arrived with him by 10.20, around 12 to 13
 20 minutes after James had likely been attacked. He claims
 21 that he saw no sign of life at all from the time he
 22 arrived with James until some time later when James was
 23 pronounced dead.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Another officer called PC Attwood joined in CPR a few

12

1 minutes after PC Miah and said he saw no sign of life
 2 but was holding out hope nevertheless that the CPR might
 3 save James. Do you consider that James likely died
 4 before either of those officers got to him?
 5 A. I do.
 6 Q. Given the time period within which you say death would
 7 have occurred, it's likely, is it, that James did not
 8 suffer for a significant period?
 9 A. I think that's correct.
 10 Q. In your view is there any practicable treatment which
 11 could have been given in the pre-hospital environment
 12 that would or could have saved James?
 13 A. No.
 14 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Those are all my questions.
 15 As I say, there may be some more.
 16 Questions by MR PATTERSON QC
 17 MR PATTERSON: Dr Chapman, I ask questions on behalf of the
 18 family of James McMullan and I'm very grateful to you
 19 for your assistance this morning.
 20 The fatal stab wound, you told us, passed through
 21 the third rib and part of the breastbone --
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. -- into the heart. You described it being from his left
 24 to right. But can you help us to any further degree
 25 with the angle or the trajectory of that knife wound;

13

1 whether it was more or less on a horizontal plane or
 2 pointing upwards or downwards or any sort of detail of
 3 that type, please?
 4 A. I described it as being from his left to right and
 5 backwards, so in other words, fairly horizontally,
 6 there's no pronounced left -- upwards or downwards
 7 direction, if you like.
 8 Q. Right, that was what I was interested in, because one of
 9 the features of this is a consideration of the dynamics
 10 of the attack and, as you know, in a fast-moving
 11 stabbing, both the attacker and the victim will often be
 12 moving at the moments of the attack. So, so far as your
 13 analysis of the pathology is concerned, all you can say
 14 is that it was broadly horizontal?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. As we've heard, there is some evidence that he was
 17 stabbed up at the top or near the top of those stairs.
 18 There were some abrasions that were found, and you
 19 mentioned in dealing with those, abrasions or small
 20 puncture marks, I think were your words?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Is it possible that one or other of those small marks
 23 might have been from the tip of a knife?
 24 A. It's possible, yes. They were very superficial features
 25 on the skin surface, but it's possible, yes.

14

1 Q. So, for example, injury number 4, which was a very small
 2 one to the stomach area?
 3 A. Yes. Yes, I say minor puncture or abrasion just below
 4 the lower left ribcage. That could have been resulting
 5 from the tip of a weapon.
 6 Q. It's at page 5 of the body graphic. If we could have
 7 that, please, back on the screen, {PM0099/5}, please.
 8 On to the next page, please {PM0099/6}. So we've heard
 9 evidence from a witness, Erick Siguenza, who saw what is
 10 believed to be the attack both on a young woman, Sara
 11 Zelenak, who had fallen over in her high-heeled shoes,
 12 and a man coming to her assistance trying to get her
 13 back on to her feet --
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. -- who received a blow to the left upper chest area.
 16 There's nobody else in that area who is believed to have
 17 suffered such a wound other than James McMullan.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. So if injury 4 to his lower chest or stomach area might
 20 be the tip of a knife, that, again, would be consistent
 21 with what the witness was describing in that fast-moving
 22 episode?
 23 A. Yes, it's to the front and the left side of the trunk.
 24 It's a similar area, anatomically.
 25 Q. A little down from the fatal knife injury?

15

1 A. It is, yes.
 2 Q. As for the abrasions to the face and to the right and
 3 left elbows and the right leg, they all could be
 4 consistent with the final collapse to the ground after
 5 he has run or struggled down into that area in the
 6 courtyard where he was found?
 7 A. Yes, they're all on the front surface of the body and
 8 a collapse in that sort of way against something or onto
 9 something could cause those injuries.
 10 Q. Typically elbow grazes or abrasions are found in that
 11 sort of situation, when someone falls to the ground?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Abrasion 6, please, if we go forward to the next page
 14 {PM0099/7}, we heard evidence from one witness who was
 15 trying to provide treatment to James at some stage with
 16 all the debris that had fallen from the railings above,
 17 there was a brick or something underneath his body that
 18 they removed mid-way through giving treatment. Might
 19 that be the explanation for what we see in area 6?
 20 A. Yes, contact with something like a brick could cause
 21 that sort of injury.
 22 Q. If there is chest compression going on for a period of
 23 time?
 24 A. Yes, if there is collapse on to that brick or some
 25 movement of the body for whatever reason against it,

16

1 then that could cause it .
 2 Q. Page 8, so forward two more pages, please, on the body
 3 graphic {PM0099/9}. 10 and 11, they are abrasions, are
 4 they, rather than puncture marks or knife tip marks?
 5 A. Yes, these are described as abrasions or grazes.
 6 Q. What about the bruise at the back of the right forearm
 7 at position 9, might that be a defensive-type injury
 8 that might have been received when he was trying to ward
 9 off an attack?
 10 A. Yes, if that part of the body came into contact with
 11 something firm, in a defensive sort of manoeuvre using
 12 the arm in this sort of way, you could certainly receive
 13 a bruise like that in that location .
 14 Q. But certainly you found no knife tip injuries to the
 15 hands or the forearms?
 16 A. Nothing, that was clearly sharp, if you like , contact
 17 with a sharp blade.
 18 Q. The gripping mark under the armpit or near the armpit,
 19 suggestive, as you've indicated, of a hand grip, we know
 20 that ultimately he was brought up from the courtyard
 21 after a period of time by those who were treating him
 22 trying to find an ambulance and trying to get him help
 23 up on the street?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Might that be have been caused at that stage by those

17

1 trying to carry him up without a stretcher?
 2 A. I would say that's possible . We do sometimes see
 3 bruising like this even in people who are profoundly
 4 collapsed as a result of loss of blood in this sort of
 5 way, so I would say that is a possibility that it
 6 occurred at that stage.
 7 Q. The haemorrhaging or bruising internally can still be
 8 caused?
 9 A. You still get the sort of skin marking and loss of blood
 10 around areas, small areas of damage to the skin like
 11 that, yes.
 12 Q. And you have been asked about the possibility , there's
 13 no positive evidence of an impact from the vehicle or
 14 a fall from above, but you found no vehicle impact-type
 15 injuries anywhere to the body?
 16 A. Nothing that would clearly indicate that, no.
 17 Q. No fractures to the skull or to any of the bones of the
 18 body at all that might have been caused by a fall down
 19 on to that hard ground below?
 20 A. No, I saw no such bony injuries , no.
 21 Q. You described the internal bleeding into the chest space
 22 and those injuries to the aorta and to the heart, to the
 23 left and right ventricles . What treatment can be given
 24 for a stab wound to the heart?
 25 A. It would have required putting -- I imagine putting him

18

1 onto a cardiac bypass and carrying out detailed internal
 2 examination, opening the chest, and attempting to find
 3 those injuries and to treat them, so it would have
 4 required an operating theatre immediately.
 5 Q. So a major surgical operation?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. But even with the best possible treatment, you've
 8 described the speedy loss of blood?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. The injury to the aorta presumably being a very major
 11 injury because of the high pressure blood being pumped
 12 away from the heart?
 13 A. Yes, he has two injuries , one in the left ventricle , a
 14 high pressure chamber, and one in the aorta issuing from
 15 the left ventricle , which would bleed immediately and
 16 very profusely .
 17 Q. And so the mechanism of death, as you have suggested,
 18 was that loss of blood leading to cardiac arrest?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. If there was the injury to the lung alone, presumably
 21 that might be something that could be dealt with, but
 22 was the fatality caused by the injury to the heart and
 23 the blood loss?
 24 A. Yes, that's correct . Even an isolated injury to the
 25 right ventricle might be more amenable to survival, but

19

1 this, in this case, the wound had gone through both
 2 sides of the heart and the aorta, as I said.
 3 Q. Yes. Would he have lost consciousness before death?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. So pain and suffering would have ended at that point?
 6 A. Yes, on what I call collapse, if you like, which is
 7 a loss of consciousness as a result of the blood loss .
 8 Q. And so that would have been within a minute?
 9 A. I say as an estimate within that sort of timescale,
 10 around a minute.
 11 Q. So at or around about the time that he stopped his
 12 movements and collapsed to the ground in that corner of
 13 the courtyard, presumably?
 14 A. I think so.
 15 Q. And given what you have told us about death following
 16 shortly thereafter, are we talking about 2 or 3 minutes,
 17 something like that?
 18 A. That would be my view, yes.
 19 Q. So from the perspective of James' family, you can be
 20 confident, can you, that pain and suffering would have
 21 ended very quickly?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And this death was not in any way a long or drawn out
 24 death?
 25 A. That's correct .

20

1 MR PATTERSON: Dr Chapman, that's very helpful. Thank you
2 for your assistance.

3 Further questions by MR HOUGH QC

4 MR HOUGH: Nobody else has any questions of you concerning
5 James McMullan. May we then turn to Alexandre Pigeard.

6 Did you perform the post mortem examination on his
7 body on 7 June 2017 as well?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. May we begin once again with your external examination,
10 once again by reference to the body maps, and may we
11 begin at {PM0100/4}. I am looking at page 5 of your
12 report. Did you identify, first of all, a sharp force
13 injury to the lower right side of the neck?

14 A. Yes, this is a stab wound, as we see there on the front
15 of the right side of the neck, 4.5 cm in length on the
16 surface of the skin, and it was possible, again, to
17 follow the track of that injury.

18 Q. Would you pause there a moment, and we'll put on the
19 next page {PM0100/5}. Using this diagram, can you
20 describe the track of the wound and the internal
21 injuries inflicted through this knife strike?

22 A. Yes, the track was directed downwards, notching, I say,
23 partially cutting, if you like, the first rib, you see
24 that in green on the graphic representation, passing
25 through the right jugular vein, that's shown in blue,

21

1 this is a major vein bringing blood back from the head
2 and the neck area of the body, and then passing through
3 what's called the brachiocephalic trunk, which is
4 an arterial blood vessel where the right common carotid
5 artery and the right subclavian artery start from the
6 arch of the aorta, so a major arterial blood vessel, the
7 brachiocephalic trunk was cut through. The wound track
8 continued downwards, this time into the apex, the top of
9 the right side of the chest, entering the right chest
10 space, and striking the upper lobe of the right lung.
11 The track was about 7 cm from the skin surface to the
12 deepest point of the track.

13 Q. Thank you. May we now look at {PM0100/6} of the body
14 graphics. Did you identify a second sharp force injury,
15 a stab wound on the outer aspect of the left shoulder.
16 First of all, would you please describe the shape and
17 size of that wound?

18 A. This was a stab wound, 4 cm in length on the skin
19 surface. The back end of the wound was square, the
20 front end more pointed.

21 Q. May we look at {PM0100/7}, and using this graphic, can
22 you please describe for us the track of the wound and
23 the internal injuries inflicted when this knife
24 penetrated?

25 A. Yes, the wound passed from Mr Pigeard's left to right

22

1 horizontally, passing through the main muscle of the
2 front of the arm, the biceps muscle, and then continuing
3 through the upper part of the axilla, we see a circle
4 there, through the tissues of the axilla, into the left
5 side of the chest wall, entering the chest through the
6 space below the left second rib, and causing some injury
7 to the left third rib beneath.

8 The track continued through the thin lining of the
9 chest, the pleural lining, to cause some superficial
10 damage to the upper left lobe of the lung and the track
11 of the wound was about 14 cm from the skin to the injury
12 in the lung.

13 Q. Were you able to discern the alignment of the arm and
14 chest at the time that this knife blow was struck?

15 A. In my view, the track indicated that the left arm had
16 been close to the chest wall at the time of the injury
17 with the arm flexed at the shoulder joint, in other
18 words, if I can show you, in this sort of way
19 (indicates).

20 Q. You're holding your forearm slightly across your chest?

21 A. Yes, the shoulder is being flexed.

22 Q. With your fist up to your opposite shoulder?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Would that suggest a defensive manoeuvre?

25 A. It could, indeed, suggest a defensive manoeuvre, yes.

23

1 Q. Could we have {PM0100/8} of the body graphics on the
2 screen, please. Did you detect here a third stab wound
3 to the upper back just to the right of the spine?

4 A. Yes, a stab wound, as we see, to the back, 1.8 cm in
5 length on the skin surface and directed forwards
6 horizontally for a depth of about 6 cm passing through
7 the right third space, the space below the right third
8 rib, into the chest, but no demonstrable injury to the
9 right lung was present in relation to that wound track,
10 which was about 6 cm in depth from the skin to the
11 internal aspect of the chest.

12 Q. Is it fair to say that this wound would not have been
13 particularly significant to the cause of death?

14 A. I think that's correct, in the context of this case it
15 would not have been particularly significant.

16 Q. Page 9, please {PM0100/9}, did you identify a stab wound
17 to the left buttock?

18 A. Yes, a stab wound 2.5 cm in length on the surface of the
19 skin directed from left to right and slightly upwards,
20 into the muscle of the left buttock for a depth of about
21 6 cm.

22 Q. Did you find any damage to major vessels or structures
23 as a result of this strike?

24 A. No, there was no significant internal injury in relation
25 to that wound track.

24

1 Q. Again, may we discount this as significantly
2 contributing to the cause of death?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. {PMO100/10}. Did you identify a sharp force injury to
5 the left side of the face?
6 A. Yes, this is a cutting wound, if you like, on the left
7 cheek, passing into the -- it's 2.6 cm long on the
8 surface of the skin, passing forwards and downwards into
9 the soft tissues of the face, and the muscle of the left
10 jaw angle, the masseter muscle, for a depth of about 2
11 cm. There were no other major injuries to major blood
12 vessels or other structures in relation to that wound.
13 Q. So another injury that wasn't particularly significant
14 to the cause of death?
15 A. Indeed, yes.
16 Q. {PMO100/11}, please. Did you find a superficial incised
17 wound to the base of the left thumb?
18 A. Yes. Yes.
19 Q. Were there any other significant findings in your
20 external examination?
21 A. No.
22 Q. We can take that off screen now. Turning to your
23 internal examination and focusing on the trunk and
24 torso, what significant findings did you make in that
25 regard?

25

1 A. There was some bruising in association with the stab
2 wound to the back, and of course, there was bruising to
3 the front of the chest associated with the stab wound
4 track passing into the left side of the front.
5 The pleural linings of the chest had been damaged by
6 the stab wound track to the neck, and there was 600 mls
7 of blood and blood clot in the right chest space.
8 Q. You have already referred to wound damage to the lung.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Was there any other abnormality on your internal
11 examination?
12 A. No. No, I could find no other abnormality.
13 Q. So internally the significant injury, is this right, was
14 the injury which damaged those two major vessels, the
15 jugular vein and the brachiocephalic trunk?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Turning to your conclusions and your conclusion 2, what
18 did you determine was the means of death?
19 A. In my opinion death resulted from haemorrhage or blood
20 loss as a result of stab wounds to the neck and chest.
21 Q. Looking at your conclusion 3, what was the effect of the
22 stab wound to the neck?
23 A. In my view, this injury would have bled immediately and
24 profusely, both externally and into the right chest
25 space, and again, I would expect collapse to have been

26

1 rapid as a result of this injury, perhaps within about
2 a minute, and death to have supervened shortly
3 thereafter.
4 Q. Once again, would the mechanism of death from that
5 injury, if considered alone, have been primarily blood
6 loss and that blood loss leading to cardiac arrest?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Would this wound be independently fatal, apart from all
9 the other injuries?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Looking at your conclusion 4, what was the effect of the
12 other significant or serious stab wound to the upper arm
13 passing into the chest?
14 A. I would expect that to have caused some degree of
15 bleeding, both into the space around the left lung and
16 externally.
17 Q. Would you have expected that to be independently fatal
18 had there not been the injury to the neck?
19 A. I would not, no. I think it's unlikely that would have
20 caused death by itself.
21 Q. Now, the evidence we've heard suggests that Alexandre
22 suffered the neck injury, was then able to move down
23 a short passageway, 10 or 15 metres or so, before
24 collapsing, where he was set upon again and further
25 wounds were inflicted. Do you consider that he could

27

1 have moved that kind of distance after receiving the
2 neck injury?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. The evidence is that Alexandre showed no sign of life to
5 PC Attwood who saw him briefly at around 7 minutes after
6 the attack and who then looked at him closely a minute
7 or two later. The evidence is that further, from that
8 point, CPR was attempted for about 4 minutes without any
9 success?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Do you consider that Alexandre had probably died by the
12 time he was first seen, around 7 minutes after the
13 attack, by that officer?
14 A. I think that's likely, yes.
15 Q. Is it fair to say that Alexandre would have lost
16 consciousness at the point of collapse?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. So before death?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And therefore, that he would not have suffered more than
21 about a minute?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Given the damage to the major vessels you've identified,
24 is there any practical treatment which could have been
25 given in a pre-hospital situation that could or would

28

1 have saved Alexandre?
 2 A. In my opinion, no.
 3 Q. Once again, would treatment of those sorts of injuries
 4 have required all the apparatus of an emergency room?
 5 A. Yes, a major intervention, a surgical intervention would
 6 have been required.
 7 Q. Would even such an intervention not have been
 8 a guaranteed success?
 9 A. Certainly not. It would not have been guaranteed.
 10 Q. Your conclusion 5, please, the superficial cutting
 11 injury to the left thumb. Did you form a view as to
 12 what might have been the cause of that?
 13 A. That injury could be attributed to a defensive-type
 14 manoeuvre, an attempt to ward off or even grasp the
 15 blade of a sharp weapon.
 16 Q. Conclusion 6. As you have already told us, did you
 17 conclude that the stab wound to the back wouldn't have
 18 made a significant contribution to death?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. And equally the stab wound to the left buttock?
 21 A. That's also correct, yes.
 22 Q. Did you form a view, looking at your conclusion 8, as to
 23 the force required for the fatal blow?
 24 A. Yes, again, using the three-point pathological scale,
 25 this would be -- the fatal stab wound to the neck would

29

1 be regarded as requiring at least moderate force on that
 2 three-point scale. To give some idea what that means,
 3 it might be equated to the force delivered in a firm
 4 punch, that sort of level of force.
 5 Q. Using the standard notation, what was your conclusion as
 6 to the cause of death?
 7 A. Haemorrhage or blood loss caused by stab wounds to the
 8 neck and chest.
 9 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. If you wait there, there
 10 may be some more questions.
 11 Further questions by MR PATTERSON QC
 12 MR PATTERSON: Dr Chapman, could I have your help, please,
 13 with some questions on behalf of the family of
 14 Alexandre Pigeard.
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. The injury to the neck was a downward track?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. It could be consistent with a dagger-type downward
 19 blow --
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. -- from the knife of that type --
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. -- as I've just demonstrated, or possibly an attacker
 24 who was a little above him on the steps with a degree of
 25 height above Alexandre?

30

1 A. Yes it would certainly present that part of a body to
 2 an attack.
 3 Q. Could you help us with the approximate angle?
 4 A. It has to be a fairly vertical angle coming from that
 5 lower part of the right side of the neck, downwards
 6 towards the upper part of the chest, so it is --
 7 Q. You are demonstrating with your pen, quite a sharp
 8 upwards angle?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 THE CHIEF CORONER: Almost directly vertical by the look of
 11 it?
 12 A. Yes. Yes, sir.
 13 MR PATTERSON: And you described the damage that was caused,
 14 at least moderate, you can't rule out severe force?
 15 A. Correct.
 16 Q. To damage the rib in the way that you have described?
 17 A. Correct.
 18 Q. We've heard evidence that in the seconds that followed,
 19 he was speaking to people. From what you've told us
 20 about consciousness remaining for a short period of time
 21 that that would be possible, presumably?
 22 A. Yes, it would.
 23 Q. Along with moving along the pavement to the point where
 24 he ultimately collapsed?
 25 A. Yes.

31

1 Q. As for the other knife injuries, we can look at the
 2 graphics, but they're all essentially on the left side
 3 of the body, aren't they? We have the slash-type injury
 4 to the left cheek?
 5 A. Yes, we do.
 6 Q. We have the left buttock --
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And that injury to the left buttock. We have the left
 9 shoulder, that horrific injury through and into the wall
 10 of the chest?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. So three significant knife injuries on the left side and
 13 then one injury to the upper back --
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. -- towards the centre of the upper back?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Might all of that be consistent with him having
 18 collapsed and then we've had eyewitness evidence of
 19 a second renewed attack when the attackers were above
 20 him and he was below them, possibly lying on one side.
 21 A. Yes, it would be consistent with that sort of mechanism.
 22 Q. And you've described how the injury to the left shoulder
 23 was consistent with his left arm being forward in
 24 a defensive-type position?
 25 A. Certainly possibly in that sort of way, yes, a shielding

32

1 position, if you like .
 2 Q. And as to whether it was one or more than one of the
 3 attackers stabbing him at that stage, we have injuries
 4 to the face, injuries to the buttock, injuries to the
 5 back, so distinct parts of the body?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. We've heard evidence that quite a few of the casualties
 8 that night who suffered stab wounds to the neck area
 9 managed to survive, but the difficulty with this attack
 10 to the neck was the damage that was caused down into the
 11 arterial vessel that you have described?
 12 A. Yes, the wound had penetrated the chest and the large
 13 blood vessels sitting in the upper part of the chest.
 14 Q. As for those other injuries, in particular, the left
 15 shoulder and the damage to the left side of the chest,
 16 you said that that would be of itself unlikely to cause
 17 death?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. But, again, that would be something that would need to
 20 be treated with a degree of urgency, wouldn't it?
 21 A. Yes, he would have required immediate medical treatment
 22 to survive that injury.
 23 Q. And so as for the overall picture, from what you've
 24 described he would have lost consciousness within 1 or 2
 25 minutes, by the sounds of things; is that correct?

33

1 A. I think that's likely, yes.
 2 Q. Perhaps round about the time that he collapsed at the
 3 stage of the second attack?
 4 A. Yes, I think the collapse marks his loss of
 5 consciousness.
 6 Q. So pain and suffering at that point would have ended --
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. -- from his perspective, and death would have followed
 9 shortly after that within just a few minutes,
 10 presumably?
 11 A. I think so, yes.
 12 Q. And by the time PC Attwood was with him, something like
 13 7 minutes after the attack, death would have come by
 14 then?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 MR PATTERSON: That's very helpful. Thank you very much,
 17 Dr Chapman.
 18 MR HOUGH: Those are all the questions we have for you.
 19 Thank you very much for your evidence, Dr Chapman.
 20 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you very much indeed, Dr Chapman.
 21 Very clear, if I might say so. Thank you very much.
 22 A. Thank you.
 23 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Hough, should we take our break
 24 there?
 25 MR HOUGH: Yes, may I say a couple of words before we do.

34

1 The next witness, Witness M, is a witness for whom you
 2 have made an anonymity order and a special measures
 3 order.
 4 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 5 MR HOUGH: As a result, we're going to reconfigure the
 6 courtroom somewhat.
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 8 MR HOUGH: What we plan is that Witness M should give
 9 evidence from behind me, below the public gallery. The
 10 public gallery should remain open. Court 19 will be
 11 available for the press.
 12 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 13 MR HOUGH: And nobody other than interested persons and
 14 their representatives will be permitted in court.
 15 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 16 MR HOUGH: It is possible that there may be difficulties
 17 with having Witness L behind me technically. If they do
 18 pose a problem, then we shall have to revert to having
 19 Witness M in the witness box and the public gallery
 20 cleared and both press and public in court 19.
 21 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 22 What I'm going to suggest, Mr Hough, is that I rise
 23 and we'll make the arrangements. We'll check it's
 24 working, and I'm conscious that particularly so far as
 25 the press are concerned, that the link to court 19 is

35

1 operational. So we'll test all of that before we then
 2 resume in court, so it may be a slightly longer break
 3 than we would otherwise have, but I'm sure everyone
 4 understands it is important we get the link up and
 5 running and that people who are able to, can hear what
 6 is being said.
 7 (11.05 am)
 8 (A short break)
 9 (11.23 am)
 10 MR HOUGH: Sir, the next witness is a SO15 officer who is
 11 being referred to as Witness M, who has a screening
 12 order and an anonymity order in respect of him.
 13 There is also, importantly, an order under
 14 section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 providing
 15 that neither his name nor identifying details relating
 16 to him can be reported in connection with this case.
 17 So if, for example, anyone were to say his name by
 18 mistake, there would be an order against it being
 19 published.
 20 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 21 MR HOUGH: Perhaps he can be brought to the temporary
 22 witness box.
 23 THE CHIEF CORONER: Just while that is happening, Mr Hough,
 24 I know that we have checked that, in fact, the audio
 25 feed to court 19 is working, and we have had

36

1 confirmation that it is. I know from when we dealt with
2 the previous Inquest there was an occasion where the
3 link went down, but we will hope that we don't have that
4 difficulty but, if we do, we might have to just pause to
5 remedy that.

6 MR HOUGH: Yes.

7 Mr Adamson just wants to make the point for the sake
8 of completeness that the interpreter is present.

9 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.

10 MR HOUGH: I don't think there is any difficulty with that.

11 THE CHIEF CORONER: No difficulty whatsoever.

12 MR ADAMSON: I'm grateful.

13 Witness M (sworn)

14 THE CHIEF CORONER: Please do take a seat because it will
15 make the equipment work rather easier for us, so please
16 just remain seated.

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Questions by MR HOUGH QC

19 MR HOUGH: If I can ask you to keep the microphone as close
20 to your face as possible and speak into it so that the
21 audio feed works properly.

22 A. Certainly.

23 Q. You appreciate that you are being referred to in this
24 case as Witness M?

25 A. That's correct.

37

1 Q. Are you a police officer in SO15, the counter terrorism
2 department.

3 A. That's correct, sir.

4 Q. Have you been in SO15 for 10 years following a period of
5 5 years in Special Branch?

6 A. Yes, that is correct.

7 Q. You appreciate you're giving evidence in these Inquests
8 to inform us about police investigations into the
9 attackers, particularly Khuram Butt, in the period from
10 mid-2015 up to the time of the attack?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. You made a report on these matters, which is {WS5025},
13 to which you may refer as you wish. I believe you're
14 aware that we are to hear next week from a witness from
15 the Security Service, Witness L. If you have any
16 questions which would be better put to him, please say
17 so. Also, we appreciate that you will need to be
18 careful not to say anything that might harm national
19 security, for example, by revealing sensitive
20 information about ongoing investigations or by putting
21 anyone at risk. You should say either you can't answer
22 a question or if you need to consult colleagues before
23 giving an answer, since such consultation could happen
24 during a break; do you understand?

25 A. Yes, I understand.

38

1 Q. And it may well be that you also understand that you
2 can't answer some of my questions.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Hough, I'm getting some messages, in
5 fact, we need to increase the volume, so either a case
6 of moving the microphone slightly closer to you, might
7 be the easiest thing to try, but keeping your voice
8 raised, but you should, if you pull it further towards
9 you, that should work help.

10 MR HOUGH: Don't feel embarrassed about speaking louder than
11 you normally would.

12 A. Do I need a microphone, I'm happy to project my voice?

13 Q. May I begin with some questions about general context of
14 counter terrorist policing. Are you a counter terrorism
15 senior investigating officer?

16 A. Yes, I am, sir.

17 Q. Does that make you responsible for directing counter
18 terrorist operations in partnership with the Security
19 Service MI5?

20 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

21 Q. In particular, do you take responsibility for collecting
22 and presenting evidence to make prosecution decisions?

23 A. Yes, that is my responsibility in the role of CTSIO.

24 Q. And where prosecutions take place, are you responsible
25 for the preparations for trial?

39

1 A. Yes, with the teams that I manage in partnership with
2 the Crown Prosecution Service and counsel, we have that
3 responsibility.

4 Q. Do you also have responsibility for planning a range of
5 other policing events outside of counter terrorism
6 investigations?

7 A. There's generally a nexus to what we do in counter
8 terrorism but will assist the wider policing effort in
9 large-scale public order events and major policing
10 events, yes, sir.

11 Q. In the period we're concerned with, 2015 to 2017, how
12 many operational teams did you run?

13 A. So I was responsible for two operational teams in the
14 Counter Terrorism Command.

15 Q. How many investigation teams and counter terrorism
16 senior investigating officers are there in London?

17 A. So in London there's 16 investigation teams which will
18 have three CTSIOs attached to each pod of four teams, so
19 there's 12 in total.

20 Q. Their work, I think, is also supported by various
21 specialist units?

22 A. Yes, so throughout the Counter Terrorism Command and the
23 counter terrorism network, there's a range of widespread
24 specialist units that will support us in the
25 investigations and operational delivery.

40

1 Q. Turning to your work with MI5, is it right that since
2 the London bombings of 2005 there has been increased
3 integration between your work and that of the Security
4 Service?
5 A. Absolutely, 2005 and the 7/7 bombings were what I would
6 describe as a watershed moment for counter terrorism
7 policing and MI5 which led to the current structures and
8 network that we have in place.
9 Q. In practice, when intelligence is received that is
10 considered to warrant investigation, is an operation
11 first of all launched and assigned to an MI5 team?
12 A. Yes, so in the first instance an intelligence-led
13 operation is, if you like, declared by an MI5 team and
14 they will request the services of a CTSIO be appointed
15 to that particular operation.
16 Q. At that point, is an operation given a codename and
17 a priority grading?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. And are individuals who are specifically under
20 investigation termed "subjects of interest"?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Now, looking at your paragraph 2.7, can you explain
23 briefly the levels of priority grading?
24 A. Well, from the top, so each operation that's declared
25 a priority operation will be assigned a category, so

41

1 a P1 is the highest category that we have to deal with,
2 and that is, I would say, where there is an imminent
3 threat, normally in relation to attack planning from
4 an individual or a network, and then we move down into
5 P2, which is divided into two, so we have P2, which is
6 high-risk investigations for extremist activity that is
7 linked to attack planning. Then we have P2M which are
8 investigations of a medium risk extremist activity but
9 not directly linked to attack planning, so that might
10 be, for instance, someone looking to travel abroad for
11 extremist purposes.
12 P3 is for investigations or network that
13 require further action to determine whether they pose
14 a threat and, lastly, P4 is for individuals that have
15 previously posed a serious threat to national security
16 where it is judged that there is a risk of
17 re-engagement.
18 Q. Very briefly, what's the purpose of giving a grade to
19 an investigation? What does that do?
20 A. Well, very briefly, it will help us determine -- well,
21 the priority that that particular operation is, and the
22 amount of resource that we will allocate to that
23 operation. So it really, in my mind, it will also help
24 me form a position on how much resource I put into
25 an operation and it will help my senior managers as well

42

1 in terms of what level of oversight it attracts in terms
2 of decision-making.
3 Q. Once a police CTSIO has been appointed, do you then have
4 periodic meetings with the MI5 team called joint
5 operational team or JOT meetings?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. What sort of subjects are discussed at those meetings?
8 A. So the JOT process, the joint operational team meeting,
9 is a formal process between us and MI5 where it's
10 an opportunity for both myself or my deputy and my team
11 to sit down with our opposite numbers in the service
12 where we will discuss what threats and risk are
13 associated with the operation on the known intelligence.
14 We'll look at what disruption measures are available at
15 that point in time, what contingency measures we need to
16 put in place around a particular risk or a threat, and
17 then I will purposely explore whether we've got any
18 evidential opportunities that we can exploit, and we
19 will set the strategy for the operation going forward
20 and we will agree on tactical actions or tactical
21 objectives to be achieved.
22 Q. Disruption opportunities, might that include arrests of
23 terrorist suspects on other charges which would divert
24 them from their terrorist activities or potentially take
25 them off the streets?

43

1 A. Absolutely. So disruption is quite a broad church for
2 us, so there's a number of disruption measures we can
3 take against an individual, but it's all case-by-case,
4 it very much depends on the threat or risk that
5 an individual or a group of individuals poses, but
6 criminality is one disruption opportunity that we will
7 look at.
8 Q. Does the regularity of JOT meetings depend on the nature
9 of the investigation, the degree of threat and any
10 disruption activities you have in mind?
11 A. Absolutely. So, I mean, from personal experience I've
12 been involved in operations where we've JOT-ted, met
13 formally twice a day, it very much depends on the
14 activity and the threat and risk of a particular
15 operation.
16 So we would normally meet in response to some
17 identified risks or threat throughout the lifetime of
18 an operation.
19 Q. During the intelligence phase of an operation before
20 there is consideration of disruption or prosecution,
21 which service, you or MI5, takes the lead?
22 A. So the term we use is "executive action" whereby we move
23 into the police space with arrest or another police-led
24 disruption. Prior to that is an intelligence-led
25 operation by MI5 and we will support that both in the

44

1 intelligence space and in the police investigation
 2 space.
 3 Q. Do some investigations reach a threat level such as to
 4 require oversight through something called an Executive
 5 Liaison Group?
 6 A. That's correct. So the other significant meeting that
 7 takes place between the police and MI5 is what we call
 8 the Executive Liaison Group, the ELG, and that is when
 9 the threat has reached such a threshold where there is
 10 a threat to public safety it requires the oversight of
 11 the police senior national coordinator, and throughout
 12 that meeting, there will be decisions made around either
 13 managing the threat or disrupting the threat.
 14 Q. Is it right, however, that many investigations never
 15 involve an Executive Liaison Group being convened?
 16 A. That is correct.
 17 Q. If a decision is made to use police powers, whether to
 18 move to arrest or some other executive action, will your
 19 team, the counter terrorism police team, take the lead
 20 at that stage?
 21 A. That's correct. So if the decision is made at ELG to
 22 move to an executive action, then the roles will reverse
 23 where the police will lead in the executive phase and
 24 effectively MI5 will support us.
 25 Q. Is this fair to say: that it's an exercise of judgment

45

1 in any case whether to take action by, for example,
 2 arresting a subject or not?
 3 A. I think that's fair to say. It's rigorously debated at
 4 the JOT process around whether to take action or not to
 5 take action. It will depend on the nature of the
 6 disruption and what we're trying to achieve in the
 7 intelligence-led operation. The two can quite often go
 8 hand-in-hand.
 9 Q. May you sometimes be faced with a situation where
 10 evidence for any particular prosecution is limited but
 11 public safety dictates that some action be taken?
 12 A. All the time. I mean, from personal experience quite
 13 often the intelligence picture can be extremely rich in
 14 terms of what I would describe as a particular threat,
 15 something we can't mitigate or something we can't
 16 manage, but is such that we will have to take some form
 17 of action to prevent any form of attack.
 18 Q. Now, looking, again, at the prioritising of operations,
 19 is it right that MI5 maintains a grid which shows the
 20 operations of highest priority in order?
 21 A. That is correct. It's a weekly process.
 22 Q. What's the purpose of that grid hierarchy?
 23 A. So the purpose of the grid is primarily around
 24 prioritisation of resources, and it will discuss the
 25 operations deemed to be of the highest threat, and out

46

1 of that meeting will come to the police and MI5,
 2 a hierarchical list in terms of operations that are
 3 deemed to be the more serious and the highest priority.
 4 Q. Is it right to say that the lifespans of operations can
 5 vary greatly?
 6 A. Absolutely. Again, from personal experience I've been
 7 involved in operations that can run over a number of
 8 years or subjects that have been -- we've been
 9 investigating for a number of years, or an operation
 10 could go very quickly, in a matter of weeks.
 11 Q. Looking at your workload, at paragraph 2.15 of your
 12 report, or statement, you tell us that between 2015 and
 13 2017 you were senior investigating officer for 54
 14 priority operations involving around 150 to 200 subjects
 15 of interest; is that right?
 16 A. That's not my full workload, but in terms of the
 17 priority operations that we were managing during that
 18 period, that's the figure.
 19 Q. But is this right as a general proposition: that the
 20 level of intensity of your work varies greatly between
 21 operations depending on what's required of them?
 22 A. Absolutely.
 23 Q. Now, you have referred to prosecution already. If
 24 a decision is taken to move to prosecution, do you then
 25 enter a phase which involves intensive work for your

47

1 team?
 2 A. It will depend on the nature of the prosecution or what
 3 we're investigating, but I suppose as a guide if we're
 4 arresting someone for attack planning or a serious
 5 terrorism offence, we will have someone potentially in
 6 custody for two weeks and that will involve not just my
 7 team but a range of specialist units, and it's all
 8 case-by-case, but it can involve hundreds of officers up
 9 and down the country supporting that initial prosecution
 10 stage.
 11 Q. Now, is this right: against, a terror suspect you may
 12 have evidence to suggest terrorism offences but also
 13 other, perhaps less serious offences?
 14 A. That's correct, and quite frequent.
 15 Q. What's your approach to prioritising your workload
 16 between pursuing somebody for a terrorist offence or
 17 a less serious offence?
 18 A. So we always prioritise our resources against the graver
 19 terrorist offences that we investigate, because for us,
 20 that offers the more long-term disruption opportunity in
 21 terms of imprisonment.
 22 Q. Keep somebody off the street for longer?
 23 A. Absolutely.
 24 Q. During any criminal investigation and indeed, through
 25 any arrest phase, does intelligence-gathering continue

48

1 in parallel?
 2 A. Yes, so there is always a wider intelligence picture, so
 3 even post-arrest material is being assessed in relation
 4 to other operations and what that fuller intelligence
 5 picture might look like.

6 Q. May I now ask you about the wider environment in which
 7 you've worked in recent years and I'm looking now from
 8 paragraph 2.22 of your statement.

9 First of all, from after the London bombings, what
 10 was the general environment of counter terrorism work?

11 A. So casting my mind back, but I would say one or two what
 12 I would describe big plots a year which mainly emanated
 13 from overseas, from a number of countries overseas,
 14 looking at what I call big, spectacular effect, and they
 15 would be intensive but it gave us more opportunity to
 16 intervene and collect the evidence side, and that threat
 17 picture, since my memory, appeared to subside from
 18 around about 2010 and that was until 2012/2013 when we
 19 started to see the rise of the caliphate and the
 20 beginnings of Islamic State.

21 Q. From 2012 another phase involving the rise of the
 22 Islamic State, so-called, in the Middle East. What
 23 effects on domestic counter terrorist investigations and
 24 operations did those world events have?

25 A. Well, it was a hugely significant change for us in terms

49

1 of volume. It was unprecedented in terms of the number
 2 of individuals that we started to see either travelling
 3 to Syria or Iraq for the purposes of jihad, and those
 4 showing an interest or engaging in terrorist activity
 5 within the UK. So the volume of investigations grew
 6 exponentially and it had an effect on the way we
 7 operationally postured ourselves, so we had to adapt to
 8 this new threat and the amount of people we were dealing
 9 with, and that was coupled with, in my view, probably
 10 the significant change and that was the use of the
 11 internet by extremists and social media. We started to
 12 see propaganda being spread and disseminated in volumes
 13 we'd never seen before, and it was all designed to
 14 inspire and direct terrorist activity, quite a lot
 15 coming from upstream, and also that affected us in the
 16 investigation space, because we were having to evidence
 17 this and not only deal with volume of digital media we
 18 recovered in arrests which sometimes could be quite
 19 significant, but also having to do with encryption and
 20 encryption platforms as well, so there were some really
 21 key technical challenges for us which we had to learn
 22 and adapt very quickly, and then I suppose the third
 23 aspect, as I put in my statement, is we saw effect that
 24 a lot of this propaganda was having on probably some of
 25 the most vulnerable persons in our society, those with

50

1 mental health, those with troubled backgrounds were
 2 being drawn into extremism and being obviously
 3 facilitated out to places like Syria and Iraq.

4 So safeguarding became very much front and centre of
 5 a lot of our operational response and it was just a new
 6 dimension, or it was an increased dimension to the way
 7 we investigated terrorism.

8 Q. Did that last dimension also involve young people being
 9 increasingly drawn into terrorism?

10 A. Absolutely. So I think from a personal level, and if
 11 I look back, in fact, this is still extant today,
 12 involvement with the family court, working with social
 13 services, working with local authorities around
 14 protecting minors from radicalisation, all those who had
 15 been radicalised, was something that increased in our
 16 operational world.

17 Q. From 2012 was there then a change in the numbers and
 18 types of operations?

19 A. So there was a change in terms of volume and there was
 20 a change in terms of the threat and the risk we were
 21 dealing with on a daily basis. I think for us what was
 22 clear, that this wasn't going away soon, and we had to
 23 change in terms of our operational posture, so we had to
 24 be a lot more dynamic, and also we had to change in
 25 terms of the way we engaged across -- not with MI5, but

51

1 across other public bodies, in terms of with the NHS,
 2 education, we had to take a more holistic approach,
 3 because you know, locking people up is not necessarily
 4 the answer to deal with this.

5 Q. Is this right, then: that the threat had changed to be
 6 more unsophisticated but also potentially more diffuse?

7 A. Yes, I think we noticed a huge shift change, especially
 8 with some of the attacks we saw in Europe around the
 9 simplicity of the attacks and the methodology and that's
 10 not to say we still weren't dealing with traditional
 11 threat and attack planning around the acquisition of
 12 firearms, IEDs, et cetera. It did become more diffuse
 13 and became harder to spot and offered us less
 14 opportunity to interdict as well, and for the police,
 15 key is it offered us less evidential opportunities.

16 Q. Looking at paragraph 2.28 of your statement, between
 17 2013 and 2017, did counter terrorist policing efforts
 18 have some considerable success?

19 A. So if I look at that period, and then I look at what was
 20 happening, especially around Europe, we were having
 21 a large degree of success around disrupting plots -- and
 22 I have the figure, 20 plots were disrupted
 23 between October 2013 and March 2017. It felt like, in
 24 comparison to what the threat was, it felt like in
 25 comparison to what we were seeing, especially in Europe

52

1 and globally, we were having a lot of success, and
 2 I attribute that to our working relationship with MI5
 3 and the way we work with local policing, which is not
 4 necessarily replicated through a lot of other countries
 5 in Europe, however, that view changed significantly in
 6 2017.
 7 Q. I think that was 20 specifically Islamist-inspired plots
 8 that were thwarted, is that right?
 9 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. As you have indicated that changed in 2017 with the
 11 attacks in Westminster on 22 March, in Manchester on
 12 22 May, and on London Bridge and Borough Market on
 13 3 June?
 14 A. That's correct.
 15 Q. May I now ask you some questions about ALM,
 16 Al-Muhajiroun. We've heard that's been a proscribed
 17 organisation since 2006; is that right?
 18 A. That's correct.
 19 Q. Is it right that there are offences, criminal offences,
 20 which include being a member of such organisations,
 21 carrying articles associated with them and so on?
 22 A. That's correct, and inviting support for a proscribed
 23 organisation. So that's the three main offences we look
 24 at in respect to organisations that have been proscribed
 25 by the government.

53

1 Q. Does the legislation also permit the proscription to be
 2 extended to new names of the same organisations?
 3 A. Yes, so historically, especially with ALM, we were
 4 playing cat and mouse around, they were just changing
 5 their name and then the government legislated for that,
 6 for any names associated with that group.
 7 It does come with another added evidential challenge
 8 in terms of you still have to prove that the new name is
 9 associated with the name that is proscribed.
 10 Q. Is it right to describe the guiding philosophy of ALM as
 11 being a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam with the
 12 objective of establishing a global caliphate and
 13 overthrowing all other regimes?
 14 A. I don't have an academic's knowledge of ALM, but on very
 15 much the base level, I would say they are their
 16 objectives or their beliefs, yes.
 17 Q. Does ALM avow responsibility for attacks?
 18 A. No, not to my knowledge, and that is one of the key
 19 differences we see in ALM and, say, other proscribed
 20 organisations that would regularly claim responsibility.
 21 Q. We're now looking at paragraph 2.37 of your report. How
 22 many subjects of interest, past and present, have been
 23 linked to ALM?
 24 A. So there's a figure given to me by our thematic
 25 intelligence department, there are 600 individuals that

54

1 we have linked to ALM either historically or presently.
 2 Q. Do you often see social and other associations between
 3 people linked to ALM?
 4 A. Yes, frequently.
 5 Q. The question has already been asked of another officer,
 6 but I'll ask it of you as well. Has there ever been
 7 a charge or a prosecution for membership of ALM?
 8 A. Not to my knowledge. No one has been charged or
 9 prosecuted from ALM. I am aware of a number of
 10 individuals that have been arrested for being members of
 11 ALM, but there's never been any prosecution that has
 12 followed.
 13 Q. The reason may be obvious to you but, for our benefit,
 14 what's the reason that that hasn't happened?
 15 A. Evidence. Quite simply, evidence. So if we had
 16 evidence of an individual being either a member or
 17 supporting or directing ALM, then we would take that
 18 evidence and act on it and look to mount a prosecution.
 19 But historically we've never had that because the very
 20 nature of that group doesn't necessarily present us with
 21 those evidential opportunities.
 22 Q. As it was put by Mr Horwell to another witness,
 23 such organisations don't have a membership lists and
 24 membership cards?
 25 A. That is correct, and I think the other key aspect to ALM

55

1 is there's no branding, no iconography that we would
 2 associate with that group as well, which we see with
 3 other groups.
 4 Q. Can I, a final general topic, ask you about extremist
 5 material?
 6 A. Certainly.
 7 Q. First of all, are there a number of offences which exist
 8 relating to extremist material?
 9 A. Yes, so there's a range of offences we primarily look at
 10 when we come across extremist material. So the first
 11 one, section 58, which I would describe almost like
 12 a standalone offence, having something in their
 13 possession that would be useful for a terrorist, so
 14 a good example of that would be a document with
 15 bomb-making instructions. Moving on from that we will
 16 look at section 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, which
 17 goes towards having publishing material that encourages
 18 an individual to go and commit a CPI of a terrorist
 19 offence or section 2 would be disseminating that
 20 material for the same purposes as well. Possibly that
 21 material would go towards what I would describe as
 22 a training offence, a section 6, and then outside of
 23 that, we would look at whether any of that material
 24 relates to a proscribed organisation on the offences
 25 we've just mentioned.

56

1 That's not the full list . I think there's also
 2 criminality that would come into that, race hate or
 3 material that is extreme material, pornography,
 4 et cetera. So there's a number of offences that we will
 5 look at when we're dealing with extremist material.
 6 Q. Simplifying it, if we may, you have told us that
 7 material which would actually assist in carrying out
 8 terrorist acts, so bomb-making material or material
 9 describing the use of a vehicle as a weapon, either
 10 possession or sharing of that would be a crime? Or
 11 could be?
 12 A. So it depends on context and circumstances. I would
 13 say, you know, in a very black and white view, having
 14 a document that had bomb-making instructions on them
 15 would be caught by section 58. I think when you move
 16 into section 1 and section 2 it's very much dependent on
 17 the context of the sharing or the publishing of that
 18 document.
 19 A bomb-making document would generally be caught by
 20 that legislation, but the vast amount of material we
 21 deal with, a lot of it will be what I describe as
 22 mindset material, so it doesn't reach that threshold.
 23 Q. Material which positively encouraged and directly
 24 encouraged the commission of terrorist acts; it could be
 25 an offence to share that sort of material?

57

1 A. It's all case-by-case, but in -- I would say as
 2 a prima facie case, yes.
 3 Q. Material which demonstrates or encourages extremist
 4 views, for example, describing an organisation like IS
 5 in positive terms, would it be an offence simply to
 6 possess or share that sort of information?
 7 A. It depends on the context. Possibly. But I think
 8 where -- if it's a document that is more political or
 9 theological in nature, generally not, that would not be
 10 caught with it.
 11 Q. So a lecture calling for the western regimes to be
 12 brought down and a global caliphate and sharia law
 13 across the UK, it wouldn't be a criminal offence to
 14 share that?
 15 A. My instinct says not, but I think we would have to
 16 investigate it further to see the context behind that.
 17 If it was accompanied by an email, "read this document,
 18 this is what we are trying to achieve, you need to go
 19 out and do X, Y, Z and this document gives you the basis
 20 to do it", that would be an offence, but sharing
 21 a viewpoint around IS, a political or theological
 22 viewpoint around IS, without any further context,
 23 generally not.
 24 Q. If it was assessed that an offence had been committed
 25 through possession or sharing of material, then

58

1 presumably somebody in your position would consider the
 2 use of police powers against that person?
 3 A. Yes, case-by-case, and in this case in particular it
 4 would depend on what else was going on at the time
 5 whether we decided to act or not to act.
 6 Q. Is this right, finally by way of background questions,
 7 the decision on whether to criminalise possession or
 8 sharing of material which simply expresses toxic views,
 9 is it right that that is a political question ultimately
 10 for government?
 11 A. Sorry, would you mind repeating the question, Mr Hough.
 12 Q. The decision to make criminal simply owning material
 13 which expresses toxic views, theological or political,
 14 that's a question ultimately for government?
 15 A. I would say so.
 16 Q. Can we move, then, to the investigation into Khuram Butt
 17 from page 10 of your statement. Is it right to say that
 18 from mid-2015 until the time of the attack, a counter
 19 terrorist investigation was running into Khuram Butt?
 20 A. That is correct.
 21 Q. Did it involve, in the model you've described, both MI5
 22 and SO15?
 23 A. Yes, that is correct.
 24 Q. What was the name of the operation?
 25 A. I'm not allowed to, for national security reasons give

59

1 you the name. It's been referred to Operation Hawthorn
 2 and that's how I'll refer to it today, and that was the
 3 name given in the David Anderson report.
 4 Q. Thank you. Was that operation still active on the day
 5 of the attack, on 3 June?
 6 A. That is correct.
 7 Q. When and how did counter terrorist police first become
 8 involved?
 9 A. So the -- I would say through the normal process, there
 10 is a system whereby MI5 notify us formally, normally in
 11 the form of a document, saying that they've opened
 12 an intelligence-led operation, and they will give
 13 an outline of the nature of that operation and they will
 14 request a CTSIO, and the associated assets within the
 15 police are appointed to support that operation.
 16 Q. In the case of Butt, had he come to the notice of MI5
 17 under an alias?
 18 A. This may be a question more definitively answered by
 19 MI5, but my understanding is he had featured previously
 20 under that alias -- under a more umbrella-type operation
 21 around ALM.
 22 Q. So he was immediately associated with ALM?
 23 A. That is correct.
 24 Q. Before mid-2015, had Khuram Butt been known to counter
 25 terrorist police either under his real name or under the

60

1 alias?
 2 A. So -- no, is the answer to that. So Khuram Butt and
 3 Abu Zaytoon, the first time they came into the
 4 investigative space was under this operation, operation
 5 Hawthorn.
 6 Q. Now, is this right: that after asking for checks to be
 7 made on the name of Khuram Butt, MI5 told SO15 that they
 8 had initiated a new priority operation concerning him?
 9 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. What was the basis for them having initiated that
 11 priority operation?
 12 A. So the basis for the priority operation was that he was
 13 believed to be involved or looking to commit an attack
 14 within the UK.
 15 Q. Now, was he believed to be intending that alone or with
 16 others?
 17 A. So the operation wasn't just him, there were a number of
 18 associates associated -- so it was a number of
 19 associates within that operation, but I think it's
 20 important to clarify that at that point in time, this
 21 was very embryonic stages of that operation and it was
 22 not known who was involved and whether we had actually
 23 identified all those involved.
 24 Q. Were you shortly afterwards appointed the CTSIO for this
 25 operation?

61

1 A. That's correct. So initially it was -- it went to one
 2 of my colleagues and I took over that position and
 3 inherited that operation, so very much in the early
 4 stages.
 5 Q. What was the initial priority level assigned to this
 6 operation?
 7 A. So it was initially assigned P2H.
 8 Q. P2H, you've told us, is an investigation for high-risk
 9 extremist activity linked to attack planning?
 10 A. That is correct.
 11 Q. It was not given P1 status, an investigation where
 12 there's intelligence of significant or smaller scale
 13 attack planning?
 14 A. Absolutely. The key difference is here we're in what
 15 I would describe as the aspirational space. I think for
 16 a P1 an operation would move up to that level if we
 17 actually -- if we were seeing intelligence that
 18 an attack was in the final stages of preparation or
 19 being prepared.
 20 Q. So we can infer from that that there wasn't intelligence
 21 of immediate attack planning going on?
 22 A. That is correct.
 23 Q. Did the investigation remain at that priority level
 24 until September 2016?
 25 A. Yes, I believe so.

62

1 Q. Was this operation ever subject to Executive Liaison
 2 Group oversight?
 3 A. No, because -- primarily because we didn't have any
 4 either evidence of intelligence that it was -- that Butt
 5 was moving towards an attack.
 6 Q. Would -- and obviously only tell me what you can, but
 7 would ELG oversight normally only occur if there was
 8 intelligence suggesting active attack planning?
 9 A. In the main, ELG will deal with matters that tend to
 10 suggest that an attack is either being prepared or
 11 imminent, but it deals with a range of other issues as
 12 well, aside. So this operation was never subject to ELG
 13 oversight, because we never reached that threshold.
 14 Q. In the early stages, did you have a joint operational
 15 team meeting to discuss the intelligence picture
 16 planning for the operation and its strategy?
 17 A. Yes. So that happens in the very early stages of
 18 an operation.
 19 Q. What were your strategic aims, in brief?
 20 A. Well, so this is the -- it's probably worth clarifying,
 21 so at the JOT process, we will agree what the strategic
 22 objectives are of an operation.
 23 MI5 might be more slightly nuanced towards some of
 24 their objectives around intelligence, but from a police
 25 perspective, I came away and wrote an operational

63

1 investigative strategy with a number of strategic aims,
 2 which I'm happy to read out.
 3 Q. If you can summarise them, please?
 4 A. Okay, so the first one is to protect the public by the
 5 management of identified risks and look at our
 6 contingency planning, so if we did see any kind of
 7 preparatory behaviour we had a response in place that we
 8 could react to; look to identify their involvement in,
 9 or Khuram Butt and others' involvement in commission,
 10 preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, whether
 11 that be in the UK or overseas, and also assessing
 12 whether involved in any criminality and whether that
 13 criminality is related to the plot or terrorist
 14 activity; from the police's perspective, look to secure
 15 and preserve evidence of any offending, and then where
 16 evidence existed, look to arrest and prosecute these
 17 offences and persons identified, and then where that was
 18 not possible, prosecution, to look for other
 19 opportunities to disrupt the terrorists or criminal
 20 activity by the individual's network; also to work with
 21 MI5 around the intelligence picture and the intelligence
 22 side of the operation, try and identify any other
 23 unknown risks, and then, lastly, look to see whether
 24 there was any activity going on that would attract a
 25 Prevent response, so it's worth stating that Prevent is

64

1 part of our, if you like, holistic approach which will
 2 look specifically around anything around radicalisation :
 3 schools, minors or mental health. So we will look at
 4 any of that activity which would possibly involve
 5 Prevent.
 6 Q. Looking now at paragraph 3.10 of your report, did you,
 7 together with MI5, perform a risk assessment in relation
 8 to Khuram Butt at the outset of the investigation?
 9 A. We did. So -- and that risk was -- or the risk of
 10 an imminent attack was assessed to be low at that stage.
 11 Q. You say in your witness statement that that was because
 12 his attack planning was aspirational and he lacked the
 13 capability to carry out an attack?
 14 A. So if I could just deal with the aspirational side. So
 15 to my mind I would put a number of red lines around
 16 attack planning. We would want to see some kind of
 17 activity that crosses those red lines to take it from
 18 the aspirational space into a space where we believe the
 19 attack is possible and real, and the capability to carry
 20 out the attack. So, again, in my mind, and then if I go
 21 back to that time, I would be assessing that that would
 22 be in relation to acquisition of any kind of weaponry or
 23 any kind of hostile reconnaissance.
 24 So I think his capability assessment was based upon
 25 the fact that he didn't have the means at that stage to

65

1 carry out the attack.
 2 I do appreciate that obviously in the context of the
 3 threat picture of that and what I've said already that
 4 to carry out an attack can be relatively simple, as
 5 subsequently we found out, as well.
 6 Q. Was it really realistic to think about whether somebody
 7 who had aspirations had the capability to carry out
 8 an attack when capability could be established on buying
 9 a knife from a supermarket and hiring or using a car?
 10 A. So I think -- so if I deal with the knife, so yes, that
 11 would be a red line for us, if we started to see
 12 acquiring a knife. The vehicle side of it as well, if
 13 it came with contextual intelligence or any kind of
 14 intelligence to suggest that was to be used in
 15 an attack, that would be a red line for us to move
 16 forward, or to move definitely in the direction of
 17 an ELG.
 18 Q. Are you able to say anything more than you have done
 19 about the nature of the attack planning that was
 20 suspected, or should we reserve those questions for
 21 Witness L?
 22 A. Well, so I can't comment on the exact intelligence
 23 around the nature of the attack planning.
 24 Q. Witness L's evidence is that in September 2015, MI5
 25 carried out what's called a potential lone actor

66

1 assessment which assessed Khuram Butt's intent for
 2 an attack as strong. Was that assessment communicated
 3 to you?
 4 A. I ... yes, it was.
 5 Q. Did you agree, based on the intelligence you were aware
 6 of?
 7 A. No reason to disagree, so I think probably the key here
 8 is the police, that is an MI5-owned process, so even
 9 though they will take our information and feed it into
 10 that process, I'm not -- the police aren't directly
 11 involved in the science behind it. So the assessment
 12 that comes out of it, I wouldn't have any reason to
 13 disagree with that.
 14 Q. Certainly, but as an experienced counter terrorism
 15 officer --
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. -- with access to the intelligence at the time, and
 18 I'm not asking you to go into that intelligence, you
 19 agreed that that intelligence suggested a strong intent
 20 to carry out an attack?
 21 A. Yes, knowing what we knew about him and others, having
 22 that extremist mindset, yes, I would agree with that
 23 assessment.
 24 Q. At the start of the investigation did you obtain details
 25 of Butt's criminal record?

67

1 A. Yes, I'm aware he had a caution for an assault prior.
 2 Q. An assault occasioning actual bodily harm?
 3 A. That's correct.
 4 Q. During the latter half of 2015, and I'm now looking at
 5 paragraphs 3.12 to 3.13 of your report, during the
 6 latter half of 2015, did your team work with MI5 to
 7 develop the intelligence picture?
 8 A. Yes, absolutely. So as I've already said, we share
 9 resources and we would support MI5 in the
 10 intelligence-led phase of the operation.
 11 Q. Were a variety of covert means used to gather
 12 information about Khuram Butt?
 13 A. That's correct. I wouldn't feel comfortable going into
 14 the exact techniques, the methodology, that we deploy.
 15 Q. That's not personal comfort: that's national security
 16 reasons for not doing so?
 17 A. Absolutely.
 18 Q. Did any of the monitoring that was being carried out
 19 reveal any attack planning or attack preparation
 20 activity on Khuram Butt's part?
 21 A. So that -- there was no intelligence to suggest that he
 22 was planning an attack at that stage.
 23 Q. Witness L says in his statement, and it's his
 24 paragraph 107 for those following, that during the
 25 summer and autumn of 2015, Butt was known to MI5 to be

68

1 associating with ALM figures, including Anjem Choudary;
 2 did you know that?
 3 A. Yes, I was aware of that.
 4 Q. You, presumably, know that Anjem Choudary was
 5 a leadership figure in ALM?
 6 A. Sorry, excuse me. Yes, I mean Anjem Choudary is someone
 7 that has been very prominent in my world for a number of
 8 years.
 9 Q. Did Butt's association with Anjem Choudary affect your
 10 assessment of the risk or threat he, Butt, posed?
 11 A. It would have been factored in to the overall risk
 12 assessment and the threat he posed, not just Anjem
 13 Choudary but a number of extremists that he was
 14 associating with.
 15 Q. Witness L also states, again in his paragraph 107, that
 16 Khuram Butt accessed extremist material during 2015
 17 which suggested that he was supportive of Islamic State.
 18 Were you, again, aware of that happening?
 19 A. Yes, I was aware of that.
 20 Q. Now, at times during your investigation, this is your
 21 paragraph 3.14, is it right to say that the police
 22 received information that Butt was accessing and sharing
 23 extremist material?
 24 A. That is correct.
 25 Q. At one time in particular was a request made for CPS

69

1 advice on the effects, the criminal effects, of possible
 2 dissemination of that material?
 3 A. That's correct, but, again, it is probably worth me
 4 caveatting, that was based on intelligence, that's not
 5 something we had in the evidential space, and it was
 6 a theoretical request for advice.
 7 Q. Mr Cawthorne of the CPS, from whom we'll be hearing
 8 tomorrow, says that that was in 2015 and in the early
 9 stages of the investigation, and that that was followed
 10 by a formal request for early investigative advice?
 11 A. That is correct.
 12 Q. And he has also said in his statement that a CPS lawyer
 13 advised that the material in question may give rise to
 14 criminal liability if it was distributed by a person
 15 under UK jurisdiction.
 16 A. Absolutely, so an emphasis on the word "may", a lot of
 17 it would depend on the context of how that material was
 18 disseminated.
 19 Q. In simple terms, why did you not, in this early phase of
 20 the investigation, or in the later phases, move to
 21 arrest and charge Butt in relation to possession or
 22 dissemination of extremist material?
 23 A. Well, if I deal with the early stages, we were still
 24 investigating a potential attack plot. I think my view
 25 was, as is now, that had we moved to arresting for

70

1 potential dissemination of extremist material, it was
 2 unlikely to have resulted in a significant disruption
 3 and we were still trying to shed some more light on what
 4 was going on in the wider picture around the attack
 5 plot, so the decision was not to proceed with that move
 6 forward to arrest for that, sharing that material, and
 7 that -- I understand subsequently that no one has ever
 8 been charged with that material.
 9 Q. So nobody has been charged and prosecuted ever for
 10 dissemination of the material shared by Khuram Butt with
 11 others?
 12 A. That is my understanding, from our NITRA database.
 13 Q. Continuing on the chronological story, we know that on
 14 31 July 2015, Khuram Butt joined in a rally in Regent's
 15 Park which later featured on the Jihadis Next Door
 16 programme, and we know that that involved him
 17 associating with Mohammed Shamsuddin and with
 18 Shakil Chapra who were ALM figures and that he expressed
 19 extreme views during the course of the rally.
 20 Were some of the events which later featured in the
 21 programme the Jihadis Next Door captured on videos
 22 posted to YouTube in early August 2015?
 23 A. That is correct.
 24 Q. Did those come to your notice at the time?
 25 A. I believe they came to the team's notice and they were

71

1 reviewed and I viewed them subsequently.
 2 Q. Based on those YouTube videos from mid-2015, was a view
 3 taken as to whether any crime had been committed?
 4 A. Yes, and there was no -- there was no belief by us that
 5 he committed any offences.
 6 Q. Did it affect your team's assessment of the risk and
 7 threat that Butt posed that he was now prepared to
 8 posture and express these extreme views in a very public
 9 space?
 10 A. I think it added to the threat picture we already had
 11 around Mr Butt, but at the same time, we were aware of
 12 (a) his extremist mindset and (b) some of his
 13 associations.
 14 Q. Later in 2015, on 30 September 2015, we know that there
 15 was a call to the Anti-Terrorism Hotline by Usman Darr
 16 who is Khuram Butt's brother-in-law. Are you aware of
 17 that?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Now, in your paragraph 3.24, you recorded details of the
 20 call as follows:
 21 "The caller to the Anti-Terrorism Hotline states
 22 that he has noticed radical changes in the personality
 23 of Khuram Butt. Butt has been distributing anti-Western
 24 texts, WhatsApp and links to jihadi-type sites. He
 25 [Butt] has become increasingly extreme in his views --

72

1 one such message took the caller to the site for Abu
2 Hallmema. [And then a mobile telephone number is given
3 for Butt]. He resides in east London but an unknown
4 address and is married. His mother lives in the
5 Plaistow area of London."

6 And the mobile phone number ended 548.

7 First of all, are there any records of any other
8 reports from the public about Butt other than this one?

9 A. I'm not aware of any other reports that came into us
10 prior to June 3 about Khuram Butt from the public.

11 Q. What happened to this report?

12 A. So, just as a general process, you phone the
13 Anti-Terrorist Hotline, it goes into our 24-hour reserve
14 office, it gets recorded, and this is the exact record
15 of what was said. It would then get passed to our
16 intelligence section for assessment, and where needed,
17 dissemination, and then there will be activity or not on
18 the back of that assessment.

19 Q. Was there any follow-up, any call to Usman Darr to ask
20 him for more information?

21 A. No, there was not.

22 Q. Would it be normal for there to be some sort of
23 follow-up?

24 A. Normal, it would depend on the assessment. Whether
25 there was a call back, it would depend on what the

73

1 assessment of the intelligence was.

2 Q. Was the report from Usman Darr brought to the attention
3 of your team, the Operation Hawthorn team?

4 A. No, it was not. So having looked at the record of what
5 happened to this information, it went in the direction
6 of the ALM thematic desk and it was more focused on
7 Abu Haleema than it was Mr Butt. It did not come to me,
8 or did not come to anyone in my team, and that was
9 a failing.

10 Q. Is there any particular reason that that didn't happen?

11 A. I -- I think the assessment was wrong. So -- and
12 I think having looked at it now and having looked at the
13 process that has come down to a supervision and a
14 process issue which we have tightened up on.

15 Q. So there was a problem with a process rather than
16 an error by an individual; is that right?

17 A. I would say a combination. The focus went in one
18 direction.

19 Q. Would you accept that where you have the situation of
20 a family member calling to express concerns about
21 somebody who happens to be under investigation, it's
22 very unsatisfactory that the investigation team doesn't
23 hear of that report?

24 A. In short, yes. It denied us, really, the option of
25 discussing that information with MI5, and how it fitted

74

1 into the bigger picture, and denied us the option of
2 what action to take subsequently to receiving that
3 information.

4 Q. It may be a difficult question, because everything
5 depends on context, but if this report had come to your
6 attention at the time, would you have wanted to follow
7 it up by speaking to Usman Darr or by making any other
8 inquiries?

9 A. So I think context at the time -- so if I look at that
10 information now, it didn't tell me anything I didn't
11 know or we didn't know at that particular time. I think
12 we would have had to have discussed the motivation or
13 believed motivation around that phone call. I mean, to
14 me one of the things I would like at is, is this a trap?
15 Is someone testing us to see what we know? But we never
16 had that option to discuss it.

17 Q. You can tell me if I'm asking a question you can't
18 answer, but might a call like that, if followed up, give
19 you the opportunity to get more information from that
20 person as time went by?

21 A. Possibly, but there would be a lot of variables in play
22 before we went in that direction.

23 Q. At any event, would it have added to the picture of Butt
24 becoming increasingly radical or extreme that a close
25 family member was prepared to make a call of that kind?

75

1 A. So it is concerning in itself, I agree with that, but
2 the general threat picture around him, his mindset, was
3 already known to us.

4 Q. Presumably it's not every day that you get a close
5 family member informing on somebody?

6 A. So that is ...

7 Q. Let me put it this way: in this case, this may have been
8 the only one?

9 A. In this particular operation, yes.

10 Q. Yes. Surely the fact that somebody is prepared to do
11 this tells you something about the degree of concern
12 that the subject is generating in those around them?

13 A. I agree.

14 Q. May we move on now to early 2016 and the Jihadis Next
15 Door programme. We know the programme was broadcast on
16 19 January 2016. We've seen details from it and a clip
17 from the unbroadcast footage. Did your team review the
18 footage from the programme?

19 A. No, so it was reviewed by one of our sister teams that
20 had the more thematically aligned responsibility towards
21 ALM.

22 Q. Did their information come through to you?

23 A. Not to me personally.

24 Q. But to your team?

25 A. No.

76

1 Q. No.
 2 A. I can't say that definitively , but I wasn't personally
 3 aware. I was aware of the programme but I wasn't --
 4 I wasn't aware of Khuram Butt within that programme, but
 5 I was aware that an assessment had been made around the
 6 programme.
 7 Q. Are you able to tell us what assessment was made around
 8 the programme?
 9 A. So this was a police -- police assessment, so it was
 10 reviewed by the officers who assessed that there were no
 11 criminal offences that required further investigation .
 12 Q. Now, the programme shows that he was associating with
 13 leading ALM figures and with Siddhartha Dhar, someone
 14 who would later travel to fight with extremists. Would
 15 that affect one's view of the risk or threat that
 16 Khuram Butt posed?
 17 A. So it would add to the picture we already had around him
 18 being a risk , but the fact that he was associating with
 19 individuals was already within our knowledge.
 20 Q. Not only with individuals who were leading ALM figures,
 21 but individuals who themselves had the propensity for
 22 violent action?
 23 A. Well, Siddhartha Dhar, subsequently we found out, yes.
 24 Q. Was an assessment made after the June 2017 attack that
 25 the programme didn't justify any criminal charge?

77

1 A. Yes, so -- and, in fact, you're going to hear from David
 2 Cawthorne, so it was resubmitted -- or, sorry, it was
 3 submitted to the CPS for that assessment and that was
 4 the conclusion reached; that there was no criminal
 5 offences.
 6 Q. Given that this programme included a number of ALM
 7 figures and some relatively senior ones, why was it not
 8 submitted to the CPS for consideration at the time?
 9 A. Because the police officers and police staff that
 10 reviewed the programme at the time were content that
 11 there were no criminal offences revealed. I mean,
 12 I have watched the programme and I agree with that
 13 assessment.
 14 Q. We'll ask Mr Cawthorne in more detail about those
 15 matters.
 16 Let me move to the investigation during 2016 which
 17 you deal with at page 15 and 16 of your report. Looking
 18 at paragraph 5.1, overall what was the view of Butt and
 19 the investigation into him at the start of 2016?
 20 A. So, well, so the attack planning was on a downward
 21 trajectory, so there was no intelligence to suggest that
 22 he was actively involved in any attack planning, that he
 23 appeared to be disengaging or associating less with ALM,
 24 and that there was a bit more of a focus, or the
 25 intelligence led us to believe that there was more of

78

1 a focus for him to travel abroad.
 2 Q. Travel abroad for what purpose?
 3 A. To join Islamic State in Syria.
 4 Q. You also said in your report that another possibility
 5 was that he might simply move abroad to learn Arabic?
 6 A. Yes. So there was some slightly contradictory reporting
 7 around his motives for travelling abroad but the focus
 8 for us was the possibility that he might try and join
 9 Islamic State in Syria.
 10 Q. Now, without going into the detail of any intelligence
 11 you can't go into, are you able to say how likely the
 12 prospect of him travelling to fight was judged to be?
 13 A. Well, he was assessed as a possibility and we -- our
 14 response to that was in line with other individuals that
 15 we believed were trying to leave the country to go and
 16 fight for Isis .
 17 Q. Did the possibility that he might be travelling -- that
 18 he might travel to fight with Isis affect the assessment
 19 of the risk he posed domestically. So, for example,
 20 that he if he was frustrated in his travel aspirations ,
 21 he might return his focus to the UK?
 22 A. I ... so that would be a factor in our risk assessment
 23 and if I think back to that time, I think some of the
 24 narrative coming out of Isis was changing as well: if
 25 you can't get here, commit an attack in whatever host

79

1 country you're in as well, so that would have featured
 2 in the general assessment of that individual should he
 3 have been frustrated in terms of not being able to
 4 travel .
 5 It's probably worth mentioning that had he looked to
 6 travel, that would have offered us potentially
 7 a significant disruption in terms of arrest and
 8 prosecution, potentially .
 9 Q. When you learned that he might have that intention to
 10 travel and fight, what was your response in practical
 11 terms, so far as you can say?
 12 A. Well, so far as I can say, so I think, as a CTSIO, or
 13 a police officer, evidentially the best evidence will
 14 come at the point of disembarkation, leaving the UK, so
 15 tactically we would make sure we had the necessary
 16 tripwire coverage in place to identify his travel route
 17 and to stop him travelling at the point of leaving the
 18 country.
 19 So it -- this is not uncommon intelligence that we
 20 get and we will posture ourselves to react to any
 21 activity that suggests that he's leaving the UK.
 22 Q. Take steps to improve the chance of you learning of him
 23 attempting to travel?
 24 A. So we would be looking for the evidential opportunities
 25 around him preparing for travel, and that can take

80

1 a number of forms. Well, I wouldn't really want to go
 2 into some of the forms.
 3 Q. No, I'm not asking you to go further than you are
 4 comfortable.
 5 A. No.
 6 Q. Now, is this right: that the MI5 operation was suspended
 7 between late February and the end of March 2016
 8 following the attacks in Paris?
 9 A. That is correct.
 10 Q. So far as you're aware, and so far as you can say, what
 11 was the reason for the suspension of the investigation?
 12 A. So I think there was -- sort of post-Paris attack,
 13 I would say that was a particularly busy time across
 14 policing and across MI5, the level of attack planning
 15 that was being directed at us was pretty unprecedented,
 16 there had to be a reprioritisation of resources and
 17 focus our resources where the bigger threat was. So the
 18 assessment, clearly, that MI5 came to was that this
 19 would be suspended, and in light of the background
 20 intelligence picture around Mr Butt, which was
 21 diminishing in terms of the attack planning, the
 22 decision was made to suspend that operation for that
 23 period of time.
 24 Q. Was your team consulted on the decision before it was
 25 made?

81

1 A. Not before, but I was aware of it, of the decision.
 2 Q. Do you think as a CT policing officer that you ought to
 3 be consulted before such a decision is made to suspend
 4 an investigation in which you are involved?
 5 A. So that was one of the learning points that came out of
 6 the David Anderson report, which I agree with. I should
 7 caveat that, MI5 have the wider picture around the
 8 intelligence and the threat reporting.
 9 Q. Let me just ask for your response to this: it might be
 10 suggested that it is troubling that an investigation was
 11 suspended when the subject, Khuram Butt, first of all
 12 had attack planning aspirations in mid-2015, which were
 13 thought to indicate a strong intent; that he had been
 14 associating with senior figures in ALM, including in
 15 a very public forum; that he had been disseminating
 16 potentially prosecutable material, and that he was
 17 serious enough about militant Islam to pose a real
 18 prospect of travelling to fight. What would you say to
 19 that suggestion?
 20 A. So probably the first thing to say, that doesn't mean
 21 all activity stops. So we would -- any policing actions
 22 would continue. We would still put in the relevant
 23 tripwire. We would still react to any intelligence that
 24 came in. As an individual, yes, he was of concern, but
 25 the assessment has made by MI5 to take resources from

82

1 him and focus it on other areas of threat or what is
 2 deemed to be individuals that represent more of a threat
 3 than Khuram Butt. So we're dealing with 3,000 plus
 4 individuals that have this mindset, it is for MI5 to
 5 make that decision on where to focus our resources in
 6 the intelligence-led space.
 7 Q. Did the suspension effectively mean that there was no
 8 continued intelligence-gathering whether by MI5 or by
 9 the police during the suspension?
 10 A. No, so there would still -- I can only talk on behalf of
 11 a police perspective, but we would still have measures
 12 in place, we would still react to anything we saw
 13 happening and we had -- our contingencies would still be
 14 extant should we see any activity despite the
 15 suspension.
 16 I suspect if we did see any of that kind of activity
 17 during that period the operation would be unsuspended --
 18 if that's a correct term -- unsuspended, and we would go
 19 back to a live operation.
 20 I can't stress strongly enough, just post-Paris,
 21 what the operating environment was like after that event
 22 within the UK and abroad. It was an unprecedented time
 23 for us and across MI5 and the police.
 24 Q. An incredibly tense period of workload?
 25 A. Post-Paris, again, from my recollection, just threw

83

1 up new attack planning, sustained attack planning, that
 2 was primarily coming overseas and directed towards us.
 3 Yes, it was a very intensive period.
 4 Q. Looking at your paragraph 5.4, is it right to say that
 5 the MI5 investigation was resumed in early April 2016?
 6 A. That is correct.
 7 Q. In that paragraph you tell us that when the
 8 investigation was resumed, its focus shifted to possible
 9 travel planning by Khuram Butt.
 10 A. That is correct, yes.
 11 Q. To the extent you can tell us, what did that shift of
 12 focus mean in practice?
 13 A. Well, I think from a police perspective it made us,
 14 I would say, more alive to any activity and preparation
 15 for travel and we would place contingencies and a
 16 tripwire in place to stop that travel and identify and
 17 collect evidence associated with that travel that we
 18 could use in a prosecution.
 19 Q. We know that in early 2016, Khuram Butt applied to the
 20 Security Industry Association for a licence as a door
 21 supervisor. Did your team become aware of that fact at
 22 the time?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Did you have any concerns about it?
 25 A. So along with the other areas of his employment, it can

84

1 be seen in two ways: so one, is that him stabilising and
 2 going away from the fact that he is looking to travel or
 3 do any other kind of terrorist activity. Is that
 4 a stabilising influence in his life? And 2, unless
 5 there is any layered intelligence that comes with that,
 6 suggests that it is for a terrorist purpose or any kind
 7 of nefarious purpose, then that would not cause us to
 8 act.

9 Q. Did you make any inquiries about what Khuram Butt
 10 intended by making this application?

11 A. I don't have that information but in terms of inquiries
 12 it would have been a discussion point with MI5. But in
 13 terms of priority for inquiries going to the employer,
 14 no.

15 Q. In your witness statement at paragraph 5.6 you say:
 16 "After some inquiries this did not trigger concerns
 17 with me as CTSIO. There was no information that it was
 18 part of any attack agenda."

19 Is that right?

20 A. Sorry, those inquiries would have been with MI5.
 21 We would have looked at the organisation he was joining.
 22 There would have been some kind of assessment whether
 23 there was anything else about the organisation, the
 24 people he was working with, in terms of any kind of
 25 concerns around possible associates. But there was

85

1 nothing to suggest that he was part of any attack agenda
 2 or anything related to terrorist activity.

3 Q. Is there not a general concern that a person who poses
 4 a risk has access to an event space for door security
 5 purposes; for example, the kind of space that was
 6 targeted in the Manchester Arena attack?

7 A. Absolutely always, but it will be on a case-by-case
 8 basis. We have to follow what the intelligence leads us
 9 to believe. If the intelligence does not point us in
 10 the direction that this is being done for a terrorist
 11 purpose, then I think we were content that he continued
 12 down that line.

13 Q. Now, we know that Khuram Butt secured a job on the
 14 London Underground on 16 May 2016 and that he held that
 15 job until the end of September 2016; did your team
 16 become aware of that straightaway?

17 A. I -- we was aware that he was working for TfL and,
 18 again, there was no intelligence to suggest that was for
 19 any kind of terrorist purpose.

20 Q. Did you know he was working on the underground?

21 A. I believe we did, yes.

22 Q. Did you know that one of the stations he was working at
 23 was Westminster?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You said you didn't regard this as a particular threat.

86

1 It might be suggested that here was an extremist with
 2 prior intelligence suggesting attack planning who was
 3 going to be working in high-profile central
 4 London Underground stations including Westminster. The
 5 layman might say surely that is a matter of concern?

6 A. It is a matter of concern. But -- it's a matter of
 7 concern that he is working within that environment, but
 8 it has to come with some kind of surrounding
 9 intelligence as to the purpose of why he is working
 10 interest there in terms of is he doing it for
 11 a terrorist activity?

12 Q. To the extent you can say, would there have been
 13 anything you could have done -- if you didn't have the
 14 means of arresting Khuram Butt would there have been
 15 anything you could have done to stop him working on the
 16 London Underground?

17 A. Yes, is the short answer. So I mean the obvious is
 18 we would speak to TfL, but that does draw us into
 19 a potentially difficult position, with potentially
 20 employment law and employment tribunal, being drawn into
 21 that. I know you have said this, but if we thought it
 22 was for a terrorist purpose, then we would have gone
 23 for arrest.

24 Q. Of course I understand that, but if you have, as here,
 25 intelligence to suggest that somebody is an extremist,

87

1 and then information that they are going into a job of
 2 that kind, you may not have the material to arrest them?

3 A. Absolutely. So ...

4 Q. But you say that one option would have been to speak
 5 to -- to inform TfL that there was a person of concern
 6 who had obtained a job on the underground?

7 A. So if ... so the mechanism for doing that would have been
 8 in place. We didn't go with that option, but that is
 9 a decision we wouldn't take lightly, and it would have
 10 to come with a view that that employment was putting
 11 other people at risk.

12 Q. You mean specific intelligence suggesting that someone
 13 was going to use that for attack planning?

14 A. Absolutely.

15 Q. Now, in July 2016, while Khuram Butt was off work from
 16 London Underground, we know that he was suspected of
 17 falsely claiming refunds on cash withdrawals from three
 18 bank accounts. You, I think, became aware of reason to
 19 suspect that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What -- how did you respond to that information?

22 A. So when we became aware that he was involved in
 23 fraudulent activity, clearly for myself and us and MI5
 24 there was an opportunity to take some kind of activity
 25 there, some kind of disruption. So as a result of that

88

1 information we discussed through the pros and cons of
 2 taking action against Mr Butt in relation to -- Mr Butt
 3 and three others in relation to a fraud.
 4 Q. Did you consider that moving towards an arrest might
 5 antagonise him, might have a dangerous effect?
 6 A. So that would have been one of the unintended
 7 consequences of our activity, and I think we're just
 8 alive to that generally. I think at this particular
 9 point in time there was an option here to have some
 10 direct engagement with Mr Butt, there was an option
 11 there for us to look at the intelligence picture or
 12 reassess the intelligence picture through that
 13 engagement and also deal with the crime.
 14 There was no other surrounding intelligence at that
 15 particular point in time to suggest that he was involved
 16 in anything else --
 17 Q. Could you speak, once again, into the microphone?
 18 A. Sorry. So there was no other surrounding intelligence
 19 to suggest that he was involved in anything else at that
 20 time, so it was an option for us to take some form of
 21 disruptive action against him and others.
 22 Q. In September 2016, as we'll hear in more detail from
 23 Witness L, Operation Hawthorn was downgraded to a P2M
 24 investigation; you're aware of that?
 25 A. Yes.

89

1 Q. And in simple terms that changed it from high-risk
 2 extremist activity in the assessment to medium-risk
 3 extremist activity.
 4 A. That's correct.
 5 Q. Were you aware of the reasons for this change?
 6 A. So the reasons were just the intelligence picture had
 7 changed around him in relation to attack planning and in
 8 relation to travel.
 9 Q. So an assessment was reached that there was a lower risk
 10 that he would engage either in attack planning or travel
 11 for extremist purposes?
 12 A. That is correct.
 13 Q. Did that have any practical effect, so far as you can
 14 say, in terms of downgrading resources or monitoring of
 15 Khuram Butt?
 16 A. So -- absolutely. So he would come, or that operation
 17 would come lower down the pecking order when we made
 18 a request for resources.
 19 Q. Did you agree with the intelligence assessment at the
 20 time?
 21 A. I had no reason to disagree with it.
 22 Q. Was there at this time any positive intelligence, if you
 23 can say, that Khuram Butt had actually given up the idea
 24 of planning for an attack or travel for extremist
 25 purposes, or was there simply an absence of intelligence

90

1 that he was still harbouring those plans?
 2 A. I cannot say that definitively. The assessment at the
 3 time was that he wasn't, and hence the reason we decided
 4 to take some action.
 5 Q. Can we move on, then, to the fraud arrest. Is it right
 6 to say that towards the end of July 2016, your team
 7 began gathering evidence for the bank fraud offences?
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.
 9 Q. In simple terms the facts, as we understand them, are as
 10 follows. First of all, that a Nationwide account was
 11 opened on 19 May with £1,600 in cash and it was closed
 12 on 13 June after Butt reported that he had not received
 13 a card but that £1,350 had been withdrawn.
 14 Now, secondly a Santander account had been opened on
 15 11 July with £1,700 in cash, and some time later Khuram
 16 Butt claimed that the account had been subject to fraud
 17 and £850 withdrawn without his knowledge, and he also
 18 claimed that he hadn't received the card.
 19 Thirdly, on a Halifax account, Khuram Butt stated
 20 that two debits of £1,000 each to Paddy Power
 21 in July 2016 had been made without authorisation; are
 22 you aware of those basic facts --
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. -- of the offences? In simple terms what investigative
 25 action did you take to look into these potential

91

1 offences?
 2 A. So, we -- in very simple terms we assigned an officer to
 3 investigate that, to start looking at those evidential
 4 inquiries around CCTV, inquiries with the banks, and try
 5 and put together an evidential picture of him being
 6 involved in that fraud with others.
 7 Q. As a result of the CCTV inquiries from ATMs involved,
 8 did you confirm that Khuram Butt wasn't captured on CCTV
 9 himself taking out the sums of money?
 10 A. I believe that was the case.
 11 Q. Did you proceed to obtain a search warrant for his
 12 premises?
 13 A. Yes, we did. A decision was made to arrest him and
 14 others and, along with the arrest, a PACE, Police and
 15 Criminal Evidence Act search warrant was granted by
 16 Westminster Magistrates Court on 9 September.
 17 Q. Is this right: he and three others were arrested on
 18 18 October 2016 on suspicion of false reporting of
 19 fraudulent activity?
 20 A. Yes, so there was a delay there but I think that was due
 21 to operational -- that was due to operational pressures
 22 elsewhere.
 23 Q. Was his account in interview basically that his cards
 24 had been intercepted, probably at the communal door of
 25 his block, and also in particular that the Halifax card

92

1 had been missing from his wallet?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. Was he bailed to 16 January 2017 with a reporting
 4 condition?
 5 A. That is correct.
 6 Q. After his initial account in interview was he
 7 re-interviewed but refused to answer further questions?
 8 A. Yes, he subsequently gave a no comment interview.
 9 Q. Did the CPS ultimately advise on 1 June 2017 that there
 10 was insufficient evidence to rebut Khuram Butt's version
 11 of events?
 12 A. There had been some direct discussion with the CPS
 13 around all four suspects and they concluded that there
 14 was not sufficient evidence to prosecute Mr Butt either
 15 as a standalone offence or as a conspiracy.
 16 Q. Paragraph 20 -- page 20, rather, of your report, at
 17 paragraph 8.12, you say this:
 18 "The CPS viewed the case against Butt as
 19 circumstantial. While it accepted that unauthorised
 20 withdrawals on three different accounts within a matter
 21 of months was more than a coincidence, including
 22 withdrawals on the Halifax one that would have required
 23 knowledge of the account PIN, the CPS saw too many
 24 weaknesses in the case to proceed -- the banks had
 25 reimbursed Butt, indicating that they absolved him of

93

1 any fault or participation in a fraud (although Halifax
 2 did take the money back); Santander accepted that it had
 3 sent its bank card to the wrong address; there were no
 4 witnesses or CCTV to show that Butt had defrauded his
 5 own accounts; and the only available cell site evidence
 6 related to one single withdrawal and was not
 7 conclusive."
 8 Is that a summary of CPS' conclusions?
 9 A. Yes, that's a fair summary of what the CPS concluded.
 10 Q. Now, it might be suggested that it was really very
 11 unlikely that Khuram Butt had been subject to a sequence
 12 of frauds in this way, including one which required the
 13 PIN number to be obtained, and that therefore this is
 14 an investigation which really should have been taken
 15 forward to a prosecution; what would you say to that?
 16 A. I think my view and our view at the time, this was the
 17 Crown Prosecution Service conclusions, and it was their
 18 assessments, they are the experts in this field, and
 19 they concluded that it wasn't chargeable and we accepted
 20 that. There were a number of further inquiries that
 21 were pointed out to us but a review, or the
 22 investigation by the inspector and the case officer
 23 concluded that it was unlikely to reveal further
 24 evidence and we accepted the conclusions of the CPS.
 25 Q. Now, we'll hear from Mr Cawthorne, if he says what's in

94

1 his statement, that the CPS consider that if charges had
 2 been pressed, Khuram Butt would have remained on bail;
 3 he wouldn't have been remanded in custody; do you agree
 4 with that assessment?
 5 A. That would be highly likely, yes.
 6 MR HOUGH: Sir, would that be a convenient moment?
 7 THE CHIEF CORONER: It would. We will break there, Mr
 8 Hough, and sit again at 2 o'clock.
 9 (12.58 pm)
 10 (The Luncheon Adjournment)
 11 (2.03 pm)
 12 MR HOUGH: Perhaps Witness M can be brought back into court
 13 and while that's happening, can I just say that I hope
 14 our audio equipment has been somewhat improved.
 15 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 16 MR HOUGH: We have a lot more cabling and I hope that that
 17 translates into much better coverage of sound for the
 18 press and others.
 19 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you.
 20 MR HOUGH: Good afternoon, Witness M, if you could try and
 21 speak into the various microphones that are in front of
 22 you and keep your voice up so far as you can?
 23 A. How's that for a sound test?
 24 Q. I will tell you because I will be told if there is any
 25 problem.

95

1 We had been dealing with the arrest of Khuram Butt
 2 on the fraud charge in October 2016 and what happened to
 3 that. Related to that arrest and the search, were
 4 a number of devices seized from Khuram Butt's home?
 5 I'm looking at paragraph 6.12 on page 18 of your
 6 statement?
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.
 8 Q. I think they included an iPhone, an HTC smartphone,
 9 an HP laptop and a thumb drive?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. Is this right: that the HTC phone and the laptop were
 12 examined at the time but the others were not examined?
 13 A. That is correct.
 14 Q. Is that because the others were considered to belong to
 15 Zahrah Rehman?
 16 A. I believe so, yes.
 17 Q. Would you ever examine items attributed to a spouse on
 18 the basis that valuable information might be gained from
 19 examining a spouse's devices?
 20 A. Well, in this context it's a fraud investigation so we
 21 would only go where -- we'd only examine the devices
 22 that were linked to the suspect who we were
 23 investigating at that time.
 24 Q. So because of the basis, the legal basis of the search
 25 and seizure, you would only be looking at the devices

96

1 which might legitimately support the fraud prosecution?
 2 A. There would be another factor that comes into that, but
 3 the devices that we could attribute to Khuram Butt would
 4 be the ones we would focus on.
 5 Q. Looking at your paragraph 6.13, is it right to say that
 6 24 exhibits were obtained from the phone and laptop, of
 7 which eight were thought valuable to the fraud
 8 investigation and the remainder thought useful?
 9 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. Now, we know that the HTC phone contained numerous files
 11 suggesting extreme Islamist views, including images
 12 suggesting support for Islamic State and its violent
 13 acts, so images of mass executions, an image of a man
 14 with a spade inserted in his face, it contained evidence
 15 of communication between Butt and the radical preacher
 16 Jibril, it contained evidence of Butt applying for work
 17 on the railways and as a bus driver. Would you have
 18 considered any of that sort of material relevant to your
 19 more general investigation and your assessment of the
 20 risk Khuram Butt posed?
 21 A. Yes, of course. So, I mean, within itself it is
 22 concerning, and that would be shared with MI5, the
 23 devices were shared with MI5 and material found on it,
 24 and as a matter of course there would be an assessment
 25 around that material, whether it breached legislation

97

1 and was actionable.
 2 Q. Keep your voice up, please, sorry.
 3 A. We would look at that material with two eyes -- sorry,
 4 we would look at that material with a view to whether it
 5 added anything to the risk picture around Mr Butt in
 6 terms of any kind of violent intent or any indication
 7 that he was looking to commit an attack and then,
 8 secondly, we would look at that material to see whether
 9 it breached any legislation.
 10 Q. Did you conclude that there was anything that provided
 11 a prospect of prosecution?
 12 A. In respect to terrorist ...
 13 Q. Yes, in respect of any terrorist offence?
 14 A. So there was nothing -- so it's probably worth -- before
 15 that it goes through an assessment process and there was
 16 nothing found on there that was considered to be
 17 chargeable under terrorism legislation.
 18 Q. I'm being told that others are having difficulty hearing
 19 you. The microphone can only do so much. If you can
 20 try to keep your voice up, please.
 21 A. Certainly.
 22 Q. Thank you.
 23 Now, you've told us that an assessment would be
 24 performed to decide whether something could give rise to
 25 a charge. Is this because you have a database of

98

1 material which contains indications of whether certain
 2 material can be used as the basis for a charge?
 3 A. Yes. So, as I articulated earlier on in my statement we
 4 have a database which is called NITRA, it is a national
 5 database where we store copies of extremist material on
 6 there, and we use that as a guide and an assessment tool
 7 to see whether something is either the subject of
 8 a previous charge or something potentially of a charge
 9 primarily under section 58, possession of material for
 10 terrorist purposes, or section 1 and 2, the
 11 encouragement or dissemination of material.
 12 Then the third category would be whether it has been
 13 used previously as mindset material in previous
 14 prosecutions.
 15 Q. You have told us that you would -- that your team also
 16 reviewed this material from a general view of looking at
 17 the risk that Khuram Butt posed, and that you shared the
 18 material with MI5?
 19 A. Yes, so both counts are correct, so as a matter of
 20 course we would share that material.
 21 Q. Is this right: the material on this -- on these devices
 22 showed Khuram Butt retaining strong interest in violent
 23 imagery and extremist rhetoric?
 24 A. That would be fair to say.
 25 Q. And also direct contact with a radical preacher?

99

1 A. That is correct to say. That was Jibril, yes.
 2 Q. Which, presumably, suggested a further opportunity for
 3 him to be radicalised even more in the period that
 4 followed?
 5 A. Possibly. So if I recollect, the conversation was
 6 theological in its nature, but it was him clearly taking
 7 some -- what's the best was to describe it? He was
 8 reaching out to Jibril for advice on several matters.
 9 Q. Presumably theological discussions can turn into
 10 something more horribly practical?
 11 A. So we didn't see anything in a practical sense in terms
 12 of going to commit an attack or prepare for an attack.
 13 I would say it was more a rounded conversation about
 14 some of the theological aspects of a jihadi mindset.
 15 Q. But if you see that contact has been established with
 16 a radical preacher such as Jibril, isn't there a risk
 17 that communication continues, unbeknownst to you, which
 18 may further radicalise the subject of interest?
 19 A. That clearly is a risk but that was not something that
 20 we -- well, it's not something that I was aware of or
 21 discovered.
 22 Q. May I now move to another incident, which was
 23 an altercation on 6 July 2016, between Khuram Butt and
 24 an advocate for the anti-extremist organisation,
 25 Quilliam, in Goodmayes Park?

100

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. You deal with this in pages 18 and 19 of your report.
 3 Did this incident lead to Khuram Butt being featured on
 4 the Crimestoppers website in October 2016, 21 October?
 5 A. Yes, that is correct.
 6 Q. Did your team then become aware of the incident?
 7 A. Yes, so my team became aware that he was a suspect in
 8 that allegation of assault.
 9 Q. We also have heard that Khuram Butt was interviewed in
 10 connection with that incident on 17 January 2017. What
 11 view, if you can say, did your team form about the
 12 information concerning this altercation?
 13 A. So our view in terms of what our response was or just
 14 about the actual event?
 15 Q. How did it affect your view of Khuram Butt?
 16 A. So, I mean, it was a relatively minor assault, a scuffle
 17 between two individuals that had opposing views around
 18 Islam. I think it was -- it would also feature in some
 19 of our risk assessment around him. It didn't seem to me
 20 to be significant in terms of any terrorist planning,
 21 but again, showed an indication of what his mindset is
 22 in regards to Islam.
 23 Q. That he might be capable of some spontaneous violence?
 24 A. I don't think ... possibly.
 25 Q. Now, Witness L tells us, and this is his paragraph 115,

101

1 that by the autumn of 2016 there had still been no
 2 evidence of Khuram Butt engaging in attack planning
 3 despite continued extensive coverage; would you agree
 4 with that assessment?
 5 A. I would agree with that assessment.
 6 Q. Witness L also says, his paragraph 116, that Khuram Butt
 7 re-engaged with ALM figures in the second half of 2016
 8 and had the potential to be an inflammatory influence;
 9 would you agree with that assessment based on what you
 10 saw in the intelligence?
 11 A. So I would agree with MI5's assessment around the
 12 engagement.
 13 Q. So re-engagement with ALM --
 14 A. ALM figures.
 15 Q. -- and the potential to be an inflammatory influence?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Following the chronological narrative further, did your
 18 team become aware that Khuram Butt in the latter months
 19 of 2016 began attending the Ummah Fitness Centre?
 20 A. So we were aware of the fact that he was attending that
 21 fitness centre. The significance of that place was we
 22 didn't have any indication that it was for any kind of
 23 terrorist activity, terrorist purpose.
 24 Q. Did you become aware that he was attending that gym
 25 regularly?

102

1 A. I would say some of the coverage indicated that he
 2 frequented that gym on a regular basis.
 3 Q. Witness L says, his paragraph 119 --
 4 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Hough, I'm just going to pause one
 5 moment, because you won't have seen, there's a hand ...
 6 MR HOUGH: Once again, if you can try to keep your voice up,
 7 it is not just a question of speaking into the
 8 microphone, I am afraid it's also a question of speaking
 9 loudly.
 10 A. Okay.
 11 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you.
 12 MR HOUGH: Witness L says in his paragraph 119 that MI5
 13 became aware in early 2017 that Khuram Butt was working
 14 at the Ummah Fitness Centre; was that information passed
 15 on to your team?
 16 A. That's a fact I will have to check. I'm not aware of
 17 that personally.
 18 Q. Did your team appreciate or discover before the attack
 19 that the gym had a connection to Sajeel Shahid?
 20 A. No, I was not aware of that, or we were not aware of
 21 that connection prior to the attack. I believe that's
 22 information we've only become aware of post the attack.
 23 Q. You've just said that that was information that came to
 24 light after the attack?
 25 A. From a police perspective, yes.

103

1 Q. Again, if you can try to keep your voice up, because
 2 I'm told that people couldn't hear.
 3 A. I apologise.
 4 Q. Do you know that Sajeel Shahid is a man who has been
 5 alleged publicly to have been a leadership figure in ALM
 6 in Pakistan and to have run militant training camps?
 7 A. So I've only been made aware of that in the last week,
 8 and my only knowledge around that individual comes from
 9 open source reporting.
 10 Q. Now, only tell me the answer to this question if you are
 11 able to say, but before the attack, was Sajeel Shahid
 12 known to you as a counter terrorist police officer at
 13 all?
 14 A. To me personally?
 15 Q. Yes.
 16 A. No. I can't talk on behalf of the Command, but to me
 17 personally, that was not a name that had featured in our
 18 investigation.
 19 Q. Based on work you have done since the attack, are you
 20 able to say whether Sajeel Shahid was known to counter
 21 terrorism police more generally before the attack?
 22 A. I'm not able to say that and I think my colleague,
 23 Superintendent Riggs, will be more able to answer that
 24 question.
 25 Q. May we take it that you were also unaware of

104

1 Sajeel Shahid's partner, Sophie Rahman, and his son
 2 Ibrahim Sajeel?
 3 A. Again, they are two names that I've become aware of
 4 post June 3, 2017.
 5 Q. Now after the attack a notice on the wall of the gym was
 6 found giving a contact number for Sophie Rahman. Was it
 7 appreciated that somebody called Sophie Rahman was
 8 associated with the gym before the attack?
 9 A. Sorry, no, before the attack, no, we had no information
 10 to that effect.
 11 Q. We know that Mr Shahid's son Ibrahim was listed as
 12 an employee of the gym. Were you aware, whether or not
 13 you knew the significance of Sajeel Shahid, were you
 14 aware that Ibrahim was listed as an employee of the gym
 15 before the attack?
 16 A. That was not a name or an individual that featured in
 17 the investigation before the attack.
 18 Q. Now, the suggestion may be made that it's surprising
 19 that a terrorist suspect can be regularly attending and
 20 working at a gym operated by another extremist figure
 21 without that being discovered. What would you say if
 22 that was suggested?
 23 A. So I agree in those terms it is concerning, but then if
 24 we rewind the clock, the gym didn't have the
 25 significance that we know it has now and that connection

105

1 was never made.
 2 Q. Given that Butt was attending the Ummah Fitness Centre
 3 regularly, frequenting it, as you said, and known by MI5
 4 to be doing voluntary work there, or work there which we
 5 know is voluntary, are you able to say whether any
 6 consideration was given to making overt or covert
 7 inquiries in relation to the gym and Khuram Butt's
 8 activities there?
 9 A. So I'll go back, the gym had no significance for us
 10 prior to June 3, so we did not make any overt inquiries
 11 around that gym.
 12 Q. But you have here a subject of interest --
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. -- in a priority 2 investigation, P2H before September,
 15 P2M after September. He is attending regularly, has
 16 started regularly attending an Islamic gym.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Would you not consider as the senior investigating
 19 officer some value in finding out about this new
 20 location which the subject of interest is regularly
 21 attending?
 22 A. Only if it came with some ancillary intelligence
 23 suggesting that venue was of significance to the
 24 investigation. It did not.
 25 Q. The gym was a location which wouldn't be visible from

106

1 the road outside. The rooms inside would not be visible
 2 from outside; yes?
 3 A. Yes, sir.
 4 Q. Therefore, to that extent, it would have provided some
 5 opportunity for a subject of interest, particularly one
 6 who was surveillance-aware, to meet associates outside
 7 of the view of anyone passing by, wouldn't it?
 8 A. Yes. Entirely.
 9 Q. Wouldn't it for that reason be a place which you as the
 10 SIO should take some interest in?
 11 A. No, I was -- I'm only going to allocate resources to
 12 further inquiries if it comes with some kind of
 13 significance in terms of intelligence and intelligence
 14 or an investigative line of inquiry that needs
 15 developing. There was never at any time any information
 16 that was in the police possession suggesting that venue
 17 was of significance in terms of any kind of terrorist
 18 activity, meeting or planning.
 19 Q. Can I move on to 2017, Witness M, and you deal with this
 20 from section 8 of your report on page 19 onwards.
 21 We know that from early 2017, Khuram Butt was
 22 teaching Koran classes to children at a school on
 23 a regular basis; did you become aware of that?
 24 A. Only post-attack. So post-June 3, 2017.
 25 Q. In your report at paragraph 8.1, you say:

107

1 "SO15 received information in early 2017 that Butt
 2 was teaching Koran classes to children on a regular
 3 basis."
 4 A. Sorry, Mr Hough, your first question, was it in relation
 5 to knowing that he was teaching at Ad-Deen school?
 6 Q. No, I'm not asking about a specific school, I am just
 7 asking whether you knew that he was teaching Koran
 8 classes to children at a school on a regular basis?
 9 A. In that case, I'll rewind. So we were in possession of
 10 some information suggesting that he was teaching Koran
 11 classes to children in the Barking or Ilford area of
 12 London.
 13 Q. Witness L, his paragraph 119, says that MI5 was also
 14 aware of that. You've said that that was known to be in
 15 the Barking and Romford area; did you have any other
 16 information that you can share about the location that
 17 that was happening?
 18 A. So there was further information that pointed us, the
 19 police, in the direction of a number of schools where
 20 that activity might have been taking place.
 21 Q. Were you concerned that, quite apart from any
 22 intelligence opportunities concerning Butt, children
 23 might be radicalised?
 24 A. Of course. So that, on a general level, that's a very
 25 concerning area for us and somewhere we take action

108

1 regularly .
 2 Q. What action did you take?
 3 A. So we followed the intelligence , so we -- on the
 4 schools, the number of schools that are identified , we
 5 made discreet inquiries and we conducted a check around
 6 the Disclosure and Barring Service, whether he had been
 7 granted a certificate to teach, and all those inquiries
 8 came back negative.
 9 Q. Are you able to say how many schools you checked and
 10 over what period?
 11 A. I cannot go into that detail .
 12 Q. Can you not go into that detail because you can't
 13 remember or because there are national security
 14 concerns?
 15 A. Because it relates to intelligence matters.
 16 Q. Are you able to say why the Ad-Deen primary school where
 17 he was in fact teaching wasn't checked?
 18 A. It was not one of the schools that was named.
 19 Q. Did you have reason to believe that it was only one of
 20 the schools on your list that might be the focus of this
 21 teaching?
 22 A. Yes, absolutely. So it was a single piece of
 23 intelligence that was very detailed around the schools
 24 where this activity might be taking place. So we just
 25 followed that intelligence through to its conclusion.

109

1 Q. We know that Khuram Butt was attending the Ad-Deen
 2 school for a period of some months, and there will be
 3 some evidence suggesting that he went practically every
 4 weekday between 2.30 and 4.30; are you aware of that
 5 evidence?
 6 A. I understand that was subsequently found out post the
 7 attack .
 8 Q. Would it have been practicable to keep Butt under
 9 intense surveillance for one or two days in an effort to
 10 identify the school when the initial efforts failed?
 11 A. So my view around that is it was uncorroborated
 12 intelligence . To then take a valuable resource, such as
 13 surveillance , from another area, another priority
 14 operation, place it on some uncorroborated intelligence
 15 which we had followed through, would not have been
 16 either a proportionate or a -- or the correct decision
 17 in relation to that uncorroborated intelligence .
 18 Q. Given the degree of concern that somebody like Butt
 19 might be radicalising children, do you now think it was
 20 right not to dedicate that additional resource to
 21 identifying where he might be going?
 22 A. So I think the decision was right because it was
 23 uncorroborated. We were alive to the fact that he may
 24 be teaching in a school, so if there was any other
 25 intelligence or any other information that came in that

110

1 added to that original intelligence picture, we would
 2 have revisited it, but we didn't. We didn't have any
 3 further intelligence or information that came in.
 4 Q. So despite the fact that Butt was the subject of
 5 intelligence -gathering, if I can put it that way, for
 6 a number of months, that intelligence -gathering failed
 7 to pick up the fact that nearly every weekday, regularly
 8 for two hours, he was teaching at the Ad-Deen school?
 9 A. So I was given no more information around his teaching
 10 activity at the Ad-Deen school.
 11 Q. At the time before the attack, were counter terrorism
 12 police aware of the Ad-Deen school and its proprietor?
 13 A. So this would probably go outside my immediate area into
 14 the world of Prevent and that's something I would have
 15 to go away and check, so I can talk about in my space,
 16 in the investigation space. I was not aware of Ad-Deen
 17 school.
 18 Q. You had no knowledge of the Ad-Deen school or its
 19 proprietor as an investigator?
 20 A. So as part of the investigation and investigation team,
 21 no, that's correct.
 22 Q. When you were making inquiries to identify a school, did
 23 you contact your colleagues who were responsible for
 24 Prevent work to determine whether they might have any
 25 guidance on schools that might be worth checking?

111

1 A. It was Prevent that carried out the inquiries on their
 2 behalf. They have the best links locally. They will
 3 know the relevant people to go and make those inquiries
 4 with.
 5 Q. Thank you very much.
 6 Witness L makes a couple of further points about
 7 MI5's assessment of Butt around this time. At
 8 paragraph 118 of his statement he says that in late 2016
 9 and into 2017, Khuram Butt was associating with ALM
 10 affiliates outside of London and was subject to
 11 increased MI5 coverage. Were you aware of that?
 12 A. I cannot comment on that for national security reasons.
 13 Q. You can't comment on whether Witness L is right in
 14 saying this in his open witness statement?
 15 A. Sorry, sir, would you mind repeating that?
 16 Q. What Witness L says in his open witness statement is
 17 that in late 2016 and in early 2017, Khuram Butt was
 18 associating with ALM affiliates outside of London and
 19 was subject to increased MI5 coverage, and I've quite
 20 carefully used his words. I don't ask you to go any
 21 further than to confirm: were you aware of those facts?
 22 A. My apologies. Yes, I was aware.
 23 Q. In his paragraph 120 he says that in early 2017 a view
 24 was taken that Khuram Butt was accessing extremist
 25 material online and that there had been a growth in his

112

1 own rhetoric. Were you aware of those developments?
 2 A. No, I don't believe I was.
 3 Q. Did Khuram Butt's association with ALM affiliates,
 4 including outside of London, affect your assessment of
 5 Khuram Butt as a risk or threat?
 6 A. No, I -- I mean, our lead still came from MI5 in respect
 7 of this space and this -- so obviously they can see the
 8 wider intelligence picture and the significance of that
 9 association, so I had no reason to doubt their
 10 assessment in relation to those associations.
 11 Q. Now, moving to 7 March 2017. On that date we know there
 12 was a meeting involving Khuram Butt and a number of
 13 others including possibly Rachid Redouane, at the Ummah
 14 Fitness Centre, and that there was a meeting at
 15 Khuram Butt's home that evening which police now
 16 consider was attended by Rachid Redouane and
 17 Youssef Zaghba.
 18 Witness L refers to these two meetings in the
 19 section of his statement concerned with the pre-attack
 20 investigation, paragraph 121, and Witness L says that
 21 the gym meeting was assessed as "at least potentially of
 22 interest". Were your team aware of the meetings at the
 23 time, that's to say March 2017?
 24 A. No, we were not.
 25 Q. Is it, therefore, fair to say that you weren't aware of

113

1 any efforts being made to look into meetings on or
 2 around that date?
 3 A. That is fair to say.
 4 Q. Looking now at paragraph 8.5 of your statement and
 5 onwards, is it right to say that between 21 March and
 6 5 May 2017, Operation Hawthorn, as we're calling it, was
 7 again suspended by MI5?
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.
 9 Q. What, so far as you were aware, were the reasons?
 10 A. I believe the reasons would -- so the reasons for the
 11 suspension were in relation to resourcing constraints.
 12 Q. Was your team consulted at the time before the
 13 suspension was made?
 14 A. No. And -- so as in my previous answer around the
 15 suspension, we were notified afterwards but, again,
 16 that's their assessment, that's their lead and their
 17 decision, and there was no reason for us to disagree or
 18 oppose them.
 19 Q. So based on what you knew at the time, it didn't strike
 20 you that you should be disagreeing with the decision,
 21 that you should be saying to MI5: this investigation
 22 really should not be suspended at this time?
 23 A. No. So in the absence of -- in the absence of any other
 24 intelligence that would have suggested that there was
 25 terrorist activity -- or, sorry, terrorist offending

114

1 ongoing, then no, I wouldn't have any reason to disagree
 2 with that.
 3 Q. If you, as SIO, were told that an investigation was
 4 being suspended and you thought that that was
 5 a dangerous decision, a seriously unwise decision, would
 6 you make those views known to your MI5 colleagues?
 7 A. Yes. But it would have to be quite erroneous
 8 decision-making that took me to that point where I was
 9 disagreeing with MI5 or escalating it up my line
 10 management.
 11 Q. Witness L we can ask the reasons for the suspension in
 12 more detail, but can I just put this to you for your
 13 response because you were the SIO: it might be suggested
 14 that it was troubling that an investigation should be
 15 suspended where you have first of all a subject who had
 16 initially been thought to have a strong intention to
 17 carry out an attack; secondly, he was later thought to
 18 be intending to travel for the purposes of fighting;
 19 thirdly, he had a recent history of both violence and
 20 extremist rhetoric in public, and; fourthly, he was
 21 re-engaging with ALM and his extremist rhetoric was on
 22 the increase.
 23 What would you respond if that was suggested?
 24 A. Well, so firstly that intelligence is over quite
 25 a period of time where two aspects of it had diminished,

115

1 so the attack planning side and the travel side.
 2 Secondly, we had seen a period of where -- the
 3 disengagement and a degree of stabilisation. We had
 4 taken some disruptive action in the form of the fraud,
 5 and that hadn't enriched the intelligence picture or the
 6 evidential picture towards any offending. There was
 7 a wider perspective going on in terms of other threats,
 8 other priority operations. They have made that
 9 assessment based on all of that. None of that, not
 10 having full sight of that wider picture, I would have
 11 disagreed with at that point in time.
 12 I feel like I should caveat that the threat picture
 13 across the operational space was at a very high level
 14 and resources were being allocated to numerous P1 and
 15 attack planning jobs at that time.
 16 Q. This was, of course, over the period following the
 17 Westminster Bridge attack.
 18 A. Throughout the duration.
 19 Q. Mr Patterson says very fairly the decision to suspend
 20 was made the day before --
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. -- but the period of suspension was very largely after
 23 that attack?
 24 A. That's correct.
 25 Q. During the period of suspension, is it right to say that

116

1 intelligence -gathering was either non-existence or
 2 substantially reduced?
 3 A. It's not fair to say it's non-existent, that's not
 4 correct. I think you'd have to speak to MI5 about the
 5 level of intelligence -gathering that it goes back to
 6 when an operation is suspended.
 7 Q. We know that during the period of the suspension on
 8 18 April, Khuram Butt took a trip to Leeds to purchase
 9 a car and he went in his red Corsa to do that. We know
 10 that that was in fact with Rachid Redouane and we know
 11 that that was confirmed by ANPR data and by cell site
 12 data; are you able to say whether you were aware of that
 13 trip at the time or otherwise before the attack?
 14 A. So I don't think I was -- well, I was not aware of that
 15 particular trip; I was aware of the association with the
 16 individuals in Leeds. Not aware that he was travelling
 17 up with Redouane.
 18 Q. If the operation had not been suspended, is it possible,
 19 as far as you're aware, that that trip could have been
 20 considered at the time?
 21 A. Sorry, Mr Hough...
 22 Q. If the operation had not been suspended is it possible
 23 that that trip could have been considered at the time?
 24 A. That is entirely possible but, again, it depends on the
 25 level of coverage that was in place at the time.

117

1 Q. If the operation had not been suspended, is there
 2 a better chance that Redouane, who was on the trip,
 3 would have been identified as an association of
 4 Khuram Butt, if you can say?
 5 A. Arguably, yes, but I think there are other factors that
 6 come into play as well, such as what coverage is in
 7 place at the right time, but being unsuspended there
 8 would be an increased opportunity to have revealed that
 9 trip.
 10 Q. Sorry, you are dropping your voice again. You have just
 11 said that there would have been an increased opportunity
 12 to discover the association with Redouane?
 13 A. And that trip to Leeds, yes. Mr Hough, I feel like it
 14 all depends on what coverage, the type of coverage, and
 15 when it's in place.
 16 Q. Well, you understand why I'm being careful not to talk
 17 about precise forms of coverage, which is why I am
 18 putting the questions in the way that I am, but what
 19 I was really asking you was whether, in practical terms,
 20 knowing what you do, you think that had the operation
 21 not been put into suspension, there would have been
 22 a better chance of identifying Redouane?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And, of course, you understand the significance of that
 25 because Redouane --

118

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. -- was the person who bought the knives --
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. -- and is believed to have made some of the
 5 paraphernalia of the attack?
 6 A. I understand that.
 7 Q. We also know that Khuram Butt was taking regular Sunday
 8 trips to swimming classes at a leisure centre in
 9 Stratford in the two or three months before the attack
 10 and that Redouane and Zaghba were attending those as
 11 well. Are you able to say whether you were aware of
 12 those trips at the time or otherwise before the attack?
 13 A. I -- we were not aware of -- well, we were not aware of
 14 the association between both the three individuals and
 15 the trips to the swimming pool.
 16 Q. Now, we know the following about Khuram Butt's
 17 association with Zaghba and Redouane in the months
 18 before the attack: first of all, we know that we were in
 19 regular phone contact, including using one of Butt's
 20 long-standing telephone numbers. We know that they were
 21 meeting at the Ummah Fitness Centre, probably from
 22 around January 2017. We know that they were taking
 23 regular trips on a Sunday to go swimming together. We
 24 know that Butt was regularly going to the Ad-Deen school
 25 and Zaghba started going there too, and we know that

119

1 there was occasional use of Khuram Butt's red Corsa by
 2 both Redouane and Zaghba.
 3 Based on your answers so far, I take it that those
 4 are all matters that you didn't know about at the time?
 5 A. That is correct.
 6 Q. Now, without going into the detail of intelligence
 7 methods, can I ask you this: a layman might find it
 8 difficult to understand how intensive
 9 intelligence -gathering for a period of months could fail
 10 to identify Redouane and Zaghba as associates of
 11 Khuram Butt based on all of those circumstances. What
 12 would you say in response?
 13 A. Well, I would say intelligence is always imperfect, from
 14 my experience. You are only ever in receive of
 15 fragmentary pieces of intelligence. We were not made
 16 aware of any of this intelligence --
 17 Q. If you can try to keep your voice up, please.
 18 A. We were not made aware of any of that relevant
 19 information within the police. So I can't account for
 20 why it was not picked up.
 21 Q. Looking back, and, again, I'm not asking you to identify
 22 intelligence methods that you can't go into, but looking
 23 back, with all you know, what would you say to
 24 a suggestion that opportunities to identify these
 25 associates and investigate them were missed?

120

1 A. I would say there was nothing that the police had in
2 their possession that was not considered and either
3 acted on or not acted on without justification . That
4 information was not provided to the police , or we did
5 not have that information at the time, and nothing was
6 missed in respect of that -- the information we had.
7 Q. So what you're saying is that the information you
8 actually had didn't give you the means of identifying
9 either Redouane or Zaghba as a significant associate?
10 A. There was nothing within the police possession that
11 identified Redouane or Zaghba as associates of Butt.
12 Q. Now, you have said that it is possible that had the
13 investigation not been suspended, Redouane might have
14 been identified . Based on what you know, is it possible
15 that Zaghba might have been identified if the
16 investigation had not been suspended?
17 A. Possible, but based on what I know, I'm not aware of any
18 information that we had in the police that would have
19 identified Youssef Zaghba and his significance .
20 Q. The whole point of the investigation being suspended is
21 that you were deprived of information; isn't that the
22 case?
23 A. Yes, that is fair to say.
24 Q. And given the degree of association and the various
25 points I've identified , isn't it at least possible that

121

1 the additional intelligence -gathering over that period
2 from 21 March until 5 May would have led you to identify
3 Zaghba as well, and I mean you and MI5 collectively?
4 A. I can't say that conclusively, but it would have been
5 possible.
6 Q. Moving on from the period from 5 May, we know from
7 Witness L's statement, his paragraph 126, that a closure
8 plan was drawn up for the investigation in mid-May of
9 2017, and his account is, in short, that
10 intelligence -gathering was going to be maintained for
11 a period to determine whether to keep the investigation
12 open, change its status or close it ; do you understand?
13 A. Yes, I understand.
14 Q. Were your team consulted on the closure plan?
15 A. We were aware that it was moving towards closure but we
16 hadn't reached the stage where it was -- in the normal
17 course of events we would have a JOT meeting at the end
18 of an operation where we would discuss closure, look at
19 intelligence , other criminal intelligence that we could
20 move out. But we weren't consulted on the closure plan.
21 As I say, I would suggest that would probably be to come
22 at the conclusion, once MI5 have reached that conclusion
23 that they were going to close it .
24 Q. When you became aware that there was a closure plan in
25 consideration, what did you think? Did you think it was

122

1 a good idea, a bad idea or were you neutral?
2 A. In the absence of any other -- in the absence of any
3 intelligence to suggest that there was any offending
4 ongoing, or being planned, then the investigation , or
5 the intelligence -led investigation had run its course,
6 and I agreed with their assessment that it was coming to
7 an end.
8 Q. I'm not going to go through all the various risk factors
9 I've identified so far . There were a series of risk
10 factors identified in relation to Butt --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- and signs in the recent past that his extremist
13 rhetoric was on the increase and that he had been in
14 association with extremist figures?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The investigation had just been suspended, so reducing
17 at least the amount of intelligence coming in for
18 a period of more than a month. Didn't it occur to you
19 that this was not the time to consider closure?
20 A. So, sir, I think you're saying closure in terms of
21 that's the end of the matter in relation to Mr Butt.
22 It's not. He falls out of a priority operation and then
23 goes into a larger pot of what we call closed subjects
24 of interest that still have a level of investigation and
25 intelligence -gathering around that pot.

123

1 So he will fall from the 5,300(?) pot and then go
2 into that wider pot of 20,000, which still attracts some
3 attention . So he's not being closed as in that's it ,
4 he's finished, we're no longer interested in him. He's
5 being closed as a priority operation.
6 Q. We heard in the Westminster Bridge Inquest from
7 Witness L among others about how difficult it can be to
8 maintain any kind of ongoing investigation of the huge
9 number of closed SOIs. Did it not occur to you in
10 mid-May 2017 that putting Khuram Butt into that huge
11 pool of people would be a bad idea given the various
12 risk factors he had evinced?
13 A. In the absence of any other intelligence at that time,
14 and there had been a period where there was no -- this
15 is the wrong word, but positive intelligence that he was
16 committing offences, then no, he would fall out of that
17 pot, fall out of the priority operations into the other
18 pot. I didn't disagree with that, I didn't have access
19 to the wider intelligence picture around this, but that
20 was their assessment, it was intelligence -led and it was
21 moving from one space to another space. Resources were
22 being prioritised elsewhere.
23 Q. Now, on 14 May, the day before Redouane purchased the
24 knives, Khuram Butt hosted a gathering at his home which
25 we now know was an aqeeqah. Witness L again refers to

124

1 this in his discussion of the investigation before the
 2 attack as a gathering hosted by Khuram Butt, and he also
 3 says that one of the attendees is now known,
 4 post-attack, to be Rachid Redouane, and we have
 5 a photograph that confirms that. Witness L says there's
 6 nothing so suggest that this event involved attack
 7 planning and hostile activity, so that's the context.
 8 Were your team aware at this time of this gathering on
 9 14 May?
 10 A. No, we were not.
 11 Q. Therefore can we take it that your team didn't do
 12 anything to investigate any meeting involving Butt
 13 around that time?
 14 A. No, I'm not aware of any investigative activity we took
 15 in relation to that meeting.
 16 Q. Witness L tells us in his paragraph 128 that after the
 17 investigation had been unsuspended, there was a second
 18 potential lone actor assessment exercise in which
 19 Khuram Butt's capability was increased to moderate and
 20 the assessment of his intention was reduced from strong
 21 to moderate. Were you aware of that potential lone
 22 actor assessment?
 23 A. So I'm aware that there was a lone actor assessment
 24 conducted by MI5.
 25 Q. Were you aware of that at the time?

125

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Were your team consulted in that assessment?
 3 A. We wouldn't have been directly consulted but our
 4 information would have fed into that process.
 5 Q. Did you agree with the assessment, both aspects of it?
 6 A. Well, I have no reason to disagree with it, because it
 7 is arguably a scientific process, so I don't know enough
 8 and we're not involved in that process to comment on
 9 what the conclusions are that come out of it, but in,
 10 I suppose, what -- there was no reason to disagree with
 11 what the conclusions were.
 12 Q. I'll ask Witness L about the detail of the exercise, but
 13 if somebody had said to you in May 2017 "Is
 14 Khuram Butt's capability for an attack strong, weak or
 15 moderate", would you have said moderate?
 16 A. Well, considering what it takes to conduct an attack,
 17 then yes.
 18 Q. Would you have said, based on everything you knew, that
 19 his intention was moderate rather than weak or strong?
 20 A. Well, there was no -- there was no intelligence to
 21 suggest that an attack was being planned at that time,
 22 but he still had an extremist mindset, of which
 23 a central tenet of that is around martyrdom and
 24 conducting violent jihad. So yes, I agree.
 25 Q. On 29 May 2017, so the Monday five days before the

126

1 attack, one day before Redouane bought a number of
 2 bottles from Lidl which were to be used as the petrol
 3 bombs, Khuram Butt met with Redouane and Zaghba outside
 4 the Ummah Fitness Centre in the early hours. We know
 5 Redouane dropped his phone and the three then went
 6 walking together. Are you able to say, were your team
 7 aware of that meeting at the time?
 8 A. No, we were -- we were not.
 9 Q. I think you have since then seen the images of that
 10 meeting and you're aware what happened?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. If you had been aware of that meeting, would you have
 13 regarded it as suspicious?
 14 A. The activity of dropping the phone and walking away?
 15 That is suspicious activity.
 16 Q. Meeting with associates and speaking for a long period
 17 of time on a residential street; suspicious?
 18 A. That in itself, not overly. It would come down to their
 19 mannerisms, who they were talking to and time of day,
 20 but in effect just meeting with two associates or
 21 meeting with two individuals and having a conversation
 22 in a street I wouldn't say is suspicious, but if you
 23 ally that with the way they were acting around the
 24 phone, then yes, I would say that was suspicious.
 25 Q. Had you become aware of what happened that night, what

127

1 would you have done, either alone or in concert with
 2 MI5?
 3 A. Well, it would have been in concert with MI5 because it
 4 was still intelligence-led. It would have been
 5 the subject of discussion and as a result of that
 6 discussion we would have either taken some action or not
 7 taken some action.
 8 Q. Looking at your page 20 and paragraph 8.13, is it right
 9 to say that Khuram Butt was due to come back on bail
 10 regarding the fraud charge at 10.00 am on 30 May 2017,
 11 the Tuesday before the attack?
 12 A. That is correct.
 13 Q. Now, is this right: by that time the Crown Prosecution
 14 Service hadn't made a charging decision, so as a result,
 15 Butt was initially rebailed ahead of his appointment
 16 with a view to him returning on 5 September 2017?
 17 A. That is correct.
 18 Q. Now, on 30 May 2017, as far as he knew, Khuram Butt had
 19 to attend the police station.
 20 A. Yes, but I believe, a conversation with the solicitor,
 21 he got his dates mixed up.
 22 Q. So his solicitor told you he had got the dates mixed up,
 23 or told the police that he had got the dates mixed up.
 24 A. That's correct.
 25 Q. Now, in fact, Butt hadn't been committing any offence by

128

1 failing to attend because his return date had been put
 2 back, unbeknownst to him?
 3 A. Yes, I mean, and it was -- I mean, it was all slightly
 4 academic in the end because he was no further actioned,
 5 but there was no offence.
 6 Q. Did you become aware at the time that Khuram Butt had
 7 failed to turn up for a bail appointment?
 8 A. So my team were aware.
 9 Q. Was that a matter of concern to you; was that a red
 10 flag?
 11 A. It wasn't a red flag, no. So there was nothing around
 12 his failure to turn up that suggested it was for any
 13 other reason other than he had got the wrong date and,
 14 as I said, it had all become slightly academic because
 15 it was moving further in the direction of no further
 16 action.
 17 Q. On 2 June 2017, on the night before the attack, shortly
 18 after 10.00, we know Redouane and Zaghba were together
 19 near the gym and we also know that Khuram Butt went to
 20 the gym that night and therefore it's possible there was
 21 a further meeting. You're aware of that, I think?
 22 A. Subsequently.
 23 Q. Yes.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. So you're now aware of that. Were your team at the

129

1 time, so on the 2nd or on the 3rd, aware of any such
 2 meeting?
 3 A. No, we were not.
 4 Q. If you had been aware, would such a late night meeting
 5 have triggered any action on your part?
 6 A. Only if it came with some further layer of intelligence
 7 to suggest that it was significant.
 8 Q. Now, Witness L tells us that live coverage of Butt was
 9 not being maintained at the time of the attack. That's
 10 his paragraph 131. Can we take it that on the day of
 11 the attack your team were not aware of his movements
 12 prior to the attack?
 13 A. That is correct.
 14 Q. We now know that the attackers were together outside
 15 Khuram Butt's block between 4.00 and 4.30 pm and that
 16 Khuram Butt made a series of efforts to call van hire
 17 companies. Did your team become aware at the time, so
 18 before the attack, of him making any efforts to hire a
 19 van or truck?
 20 A. No, we were not aware of that.
 21 Q. If you had become aware at around 4.00/4.30 on the day
 22 of attack, that Khuram Butt was making to hire a van or
 23 truck, would you have taken any particular action?
 24 A. How am I being made aware of this fact?
 25 Q. Suppose you have some form of monitoring -- I'm not

130

1 going into the details of any capabilities -- some form
 2 of monitoring that gives you information which is
 3 brought to your desk that Khuram Butt is right now
 4 trying to hire a large van or a truck. No further
 5 intelligence, just that information on that afternoon.
 6 Are you able to say what you would have done?
 7 I appreciate it is a hypothetical question.
 8 A. So, I mean, the reason is I ask is who is telling me
 9 this because if it was a phone call from MI5 saying this
 10 was happening, I think I would be going in the direction
 11 of looking to take some kind of action, I think I would
 12 be asking if there was any surrounding intelligence
 13 around this -- him hiring a van, but in the absence of
 14 that and what we knew, and in the absence of any other
 15 overarching CT operation that would possibly be
 16 compromised by taking that action, then I would have
 17 taken some -- some form of action.
 18 Q. And just to be clear --
 19 A. And in the context of the overarching threat picture as
 20 well.
 21 Q. -- if you get a reliable piece of evidence that
 22 Khuram Butt on that Saturday afternoon was attempting to
 23 hire vans or trucks --
 24 A. Mm.
 25 Q. -- no reason to assume that the information is

131

1 inaccurate --
 2 A. No.
 3 Q. -- but no surrounding intelligence to say it's
 4 particularly significant, what do you say you would have
 5 done?
 6 A. So I'd like ... if I think about it logically then
 7 I'm being told this for a reason, I would think about
 8 the overarching threat picture at that time, the fact
 9 there's been a number of attacks, Berlin, Nice as well,
 10 the fact that he's an extremist. I would have been
 11 inclined to have had him stopped in that vehicle purely
 12 because it would just be the right side of caution and
 13 there would be nothing to lose by doing that activity,
 14 and that's even without the benefit of hindsight,
 15 I think that would be consistent across our operational
 16 picture.
 17 Q. We also know that from around 5.15 pm to 6.30 pm, the
 18 three men were at B&Q collecting a hire van and also
 19 purchasing a large number of sacks of gravel. If you
 20 had become aware of that information, again, without the
 21 embellishment of some additional intelligence at or
 22 about that time on the evening of the attack, would you
 23 have taken any particular action?
 24 A. Well, that does fit into -- that fits into some of the
 25 known threat we've seen before and some of the

132

1 propaganda that was put out by Islamic State around how
 2 to conduct these type of attacks. So, again, that would
 3 have just added to suspicions.
 4 Q. Presumably once again causing you to take steps to have
 5 him stopped?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. We also know that from just before 9.00 pm, the van
 8 started heading into central London, entering the City
 9 at 9.30 pm and then travelling a circuitous route within
 10 the City.
 11 Now, it may be vanishingly unlikely that you would
 12 have become aware of the movements of the van on a real
 13 time basis, but if you had become aware of this journey
 14 as it was taking place, would you have taken any
 15 particular action?
 16 A. In addition to the two previous bits of information you
 17 have told me?
 18 Q. Knowing simply that they had hired a van and they were
 19 now driving it into the City of London?
 20 A. I would look to ascertain very quickly with MI5 if we
 21 had any explanation around that, that activity, and
 22 again, I am saying this slightly with hindsight, the
 23 fact that he was in a van with two unknown associates
 24 for no known purpose, given his mindset, given what we
 25 know about the threat, given what we have seen about

133

1 previous attacks, given the fact that there wasn't any
 2 overarching CT operation that would be compromised if we
 3 had it stopped, then I would lean towards the direction
 4 of getting that vehicle stopped.
 5 The very fact that I'm getting a phone call out of
 6 hours on a Saturday to tell me this information would
 7 kind of push me in the direction of doing something.
 8 Q. Can I now turn to Redouane and Zaghba whom you address
 9 at pages 21 and 22 of your statement. Is this right:
 10 Redouane wasn't investigated by counter terrorism police
 11 before the attack?
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. And, as you've told us, he wasn't identified in any
 14 police activity against Khuram Butt?
 15 A. Sorry, he wasn't -- he wasn't known to the investigation
 16 team.
 17 Q. You say at paragraph 9.2 that:
 18 "There is a record on SO15 databases of an interview
 19 with Jamel Kasimi on 9 April 2017 after he was stopped
 20 on the Eurostar whilst leaving the country for France.
 21 In it, Kasimi said he used to go to the Ummah Fitness
 22 Centre in the Barking area and mentioned several
 23 friends, including 'Abu Zaitouni' who would often invite
 24 him round for food, and a Moroccan man called 'Rachid'
 25 who now lived in East Ham after separating from his

134

1 wife."
 2 Is that information that became available to your
 3 investigation team?
 4 A. No, so we were not aware of this at the time.
 5 Q. Was it shared by another limb of SO15 with MI5?
 6 A. That's correct.
 7 Q. I'll ask Witness L about his view of this material in
 8 due course, but would you accept it's rather
 9 unsatisfactory that this information didn't come to your
 10 investigation team?
 11 A. So this wasn't known, Kasimi wasn't known to our
 12 investigation at the time. The stop happens and then
 13 what happens afterwards was the appropriate route. It
 14 was passed through to MI5. It did not come out the
 15 other end and back down to the investigation team.
 16 There is an element of me that thinks that once
 17 a link should have been made we should have been
 18 notified, but actually, it would have still taken the
 19 same route for assessment/analysis before coming back
 20 out to us.
 21 THE CHIEF CORONER: I think the question was whether it was
 22 unsatisfactory.
 23 A. No, I don't think it was; I think it took the
 24 appropriate route.
 25 MR HOUGH: This piece of information made reference to

135

1 Abu Zaitouni. We have heard from others that that was
 2 a common alias used by Butt. Did you know that to be
 3 an alias he used?
 4 A. Not of that spelling, but Abu Zaytoon, yes.
 5 Q. A very similar spelling?
 6 A. Very similar, yes.
 7 Q. Once information came in about a name identifiable as
 8 the subject of a priority investigation, shouldn't that
 9 information have gone to the investigation team and its
 10 SIO?
 11 A. If it followed the route to MI5 and if he was assessed
 12 as significant then it should have come out that end, so
 13 that is the route and the process that it takes.
 14 Q. Isn't it unsatisfactory that it doesn't also go from
 15 SO15, from one part of SO15, to the senior investigating
 16 officer who also sits in SO15. Isn't it unsatisfactory
 17 that it has to go through another organisation before
 18 coming back to you?
 19 A. It's an intelligence-led stop and it's still
 20 an intelligence-led investigation.
 21 Is it unsatisfactory that I wasn't notified at the
 22 time? I don't regard it as unsatisfactory. Should we
 23 have been notified at the time? Arguably I would say
 24 yes to that, but I don't think -- it still needed to go
 25 through that route before it would attach any

136

1 significance .

2 Q. If this information had come to you, would you have

3 gained greater interest in this association of Butt

4 called Rachid?

5 A. No, I would only have gained greater interest once it

6 had been through MI5 and there had been some

7 significance attached to that association .

8 Q. You wouldn't have formed your own independent

9 assessment?

10 A. It might have prompted discussion, but without having

11 the ability to see that wider intelligence picture or be

12 involved in that assessment, then no.

13 Q. Would you not have said, had you heard this, to your MI5

14 colleagues: we've got some information as a result of

15 a port stop that links our SOI to somebody I haven't

16 heard of called Rachid. Shouldn't we be making some

17 efforts to investigate that person. Wouldn't that have

18 occurred to you to say?

19 A. No, I don't think overly -- it would have done. So all

20 our subjects of interest have new associations all the

21 time. Unless I'm told that association is particularly

22 significant and the only way, generally, that I'm going

23 to be told that, is if it goes through analysis, through

24 MI5, then it would not be overly concerning to me.

25 Q. Finally, Zaghba. It's right to say, I think, that

137

1 Youssef Zaghba wasn't investigated by counter terrorism

2 police?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Wasn't on any SO15 databases?

5 A. No, he was not known to us prior to June 3.

6 Q. And wasn't identified in any activity against Butt?

7 A. That is correct.

8 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Those are all my

9 questions, M.

10 Sir, would that be a convenient moment for our

11 mid-afternoon break.

12 THE CHIEF CORONER: It is. I was going to suggest we take

13 our break. Mr Adamson, Mr Patterson, again, I know you

14 will be dividing up the work between the two of you.

15 What I intend to do is to sit -- we've got legal

16 issues to resolve in respect of witnesses coming later

17 on. What I suggest we do is we sit to take evidence

18 until about 4.30.

19 MR PATTERSON: Certainly.

20 THE CHIEF CORONER: We'll then pause there, I'll deal with

21 the two matters I've got to deal with, and then we'll

22 pick up with this witness first thing tomorrow. I hope

23 that makes sense.

24 MR PATTERSON: That should be fine we've been discussing

25 amongst ourselves and we see no difficulties about

138

1 tomorrow's timetable.

2 THE CHIEF CORONER: That's fine. I'll rise .

3 (3.13 pm)

4 (A short break)

5 (3.34 pm)

6 Questions by MR PATTERSON QC

7 MR PATTERSON: Officer, before I begin my questions for you

8 this afternoon can I make it plain on behalf of the

9 families that I represent that they of course recognise

10 and are grateful for the work that's done by counter

11 terrorism officers like you and your colleagues, they

12 want that to be publicly recognised and understood, and

13 can I make it plain that the questions that I ask are

14 asked simply out of a desire on their part to understand

15 how it was that Butt and his accomplices weren't

16 detected and to see if any lessons can be learned for

17 the future having regard to general public protection

18 issues.

19 A. Yes, sir, and just on the first point there, it's

20 appreciated.

21 Q. As I understand it, officer, you were asked about the

22 2014 intelligence that MI5 received in relation to Butt,

23 but that wasn't something that you were involved with.

24 It was 2015 before you became involved; is that correct?

25 A. That is correct.

139

1 Q. But at an early stage, you and your team became aware of

2 the links between this person you were investigating and

3 ALM?

4 A. At the early stage of the investigation when it came to

5 me, yes.

6 Q. Yes. And, for example, his meeting with none other than

7 Anjem Choudary himself.

8 A. So we were aware of his connection to Anjem Choudary.

9 Q. And, for example, at least one occasion when he met with

10 him at a home address?

11 A. I'm not able to comment on that.

12 Q. But certainly you were aware at an early stage of

13 meeting with Choudary?

14 A. Sir, I'm aware there was an association with Choudary.

15 Q. Looking back now, in 2019, do you think that there was

16 a period of time when ALM was underestimated by law

17 enforcement in this country?

18 A. So ALM have been the subject of a concerted effort by us

19 and MI5 for, I would say, throughout my duration in

20 counter terrorism. They're well known as being

21 an organisation that is a pathway to radicalisation and

22 there are a number of individuals who have gone on to

23 commit attacks. They've never been underestimated and

24 there's never been anything other than a concerted

25 effort around that organisation.

140

1 Q. I don't know if you were in court the other day when we
2 looked with Mr Jolley at those individuals who had been
3 convicted over the years of terrorist offences, all of
4 whom have links to ALM, a long and rather alarming list
5 that goes back into the 1990s. Were you present in
6 court for the evidence last week?
7 A. No, I wasn't present in court, but I mean, I can talk
8 from my own knowledge around ALM, they have either been
9 a pathway or a touch point on a number of individuals
10 that have gone on to commit attacks.
11 Q. Have you read a transcript of the evidence that
12 Mr Jolley gave?
13 A. I have read most of the transcript.
14 Q. I don't want to take up time by going through documents
15 we looked at with him --
16 A. No.
17 Q. -- but you are familiar with a large number of notorious
18 names and notorious plots in which there were links to
19 ALM?
20 A. Such as?
21 Q. The fertiliser plot, Omar Khyam, the Rigby murder, the
22 London Stock Exchange attack?
23 A. Okay.
24 Q. A large number of significant cases, many of them which
25 were tried in this very building?

141

1 A. Absolutely. The last one I'm not too familiar with, but
2 Omar Khyam and the fertiliser plot, I was aware of, yes.
3 Q. And I will come back to that later in the context of
4 Sajeel Shahid. Can we see on the screen, please,
5 {DC8239/1}. BBC Newsnight looked at this issue of
6 underestimating ALM shortly after the attacks; do you
7 have access there to a screen?
8 A. I have it now, yes.
9 Q. Yes. And that very question that I posed to you was
10 posed in this article by Richard Watson, a very
11 experienced journalist who has been reporting terrorist
12 issues for many years, and if we just scroll through the
13 article, please.
14 A. I'm having a technical failure here.
15 Q. Are you able to see, officer, the screen here?
16 A. Yes, I can see, is that Omar Bakri {DC8239/2}.
17 Q. Absolutely.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And onto the next page {DC8239/3}, Omar Khyam in the
20 middle, down to the bottom of that page, an image of our
21 attack that we're focusing on, Khuram Butt's attack at
22 London Bridge, and over on to the next page, please
23 {DC8239/4}, up to the top if we just scroll up. I want
24 to put to you this quotation from Richard Kemp, who was
25 the chairman of the Cobra Intelligence Group at the time

142

1 of the 7/7 bombings in 2005, he was responsible for
2 coordinating intelligence from the Security Service MI5
3 and MI6, he reported to secret Cobra committee briefings
4 for the government on national security at times of
5 crisis and the quotation was this:
6 "We've been far too tolerant of Al-Muhajiroun ...
7 their use of abusive language and threats was not
8 tackled ...
9 "It was a major failure and we've seen the
10 consequences -- we've seen Lee Rigby murdered by
11 a follower of Al-Muhajiroun, we've seen numerous attacks
12 around the world."
13 It goes on to speak about Kemp who had been a
14 commander of armed forces in Afghanistan saying that
15 there had been a certain amount of complacency about
16 Al-Muhajiroun both in the intelligence community and in
17 successive governments, and he said this:
18 "There was a real failure politically and among the
19 police and intelligence services to understand the way
20 this situation was going to develop."
21 Do you agree with any of that?
22 A. Sir, no, I don't underestimate Al-Muhajiroun and their
23 ability to radicalise individuals, but I work on
24 evidence, I work within a legal framework, and we use
25 every tactic available -- lawful tactic available to us

143

1 to try and confront and deal with not only Al-Muhajiroun
2 but groups like Al-Muhajiroun and the dangers they pose.
3 Q. On more than one occasion you said in your evidence
4 about the difficulties that a police officer like you
5 has in terms of being unable to prosecute when you have
6 material of an extremist nature, but it doesn't amount
7 to a criminal offence?
8 A. That is correct, yes.
9 Q. And you used the term "mindset evidence".
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Which is a term that we're all familiar with from
12 prosecuting terrorist cases where it discloses often
13 a very radicalised set of ideas or ideologies, but it's
14 not a crime to disseminate it or to possess it?
15 A. That is correct, yes.
16 Q. Of course part of the very thrust of the ALM ideology is
17 a desire to see the overthrow of the democratic state
18 that we live in?
19 A. Absolutely. My understanding of ALM and what they stand
20 for, that is overthrowing western democracy in favour of
21 a caliphate, is one of their objectives. But that is
22 within the bounds of freedom of expression.
23 Q. Of course, and nobody wants to suppress freedom of
24 expression. But you'll agree with me, I hope, officer,
25 that it's not a black and white divide, is it, between

144

1 evidence which amounts to a criminal offence on the one
 2 hand and evidence of mindset which is somehow not highly
 3 significant on the other hand?
 4 A. Well, it is significant and it is significant in
 5 prosecutions and we use mindset evidence all the time in
 6 building prosecutions, but as a standalone charge, no,
 7 it doesn't reach that threshold.
 8 Q. What it can include is an expression of a belief that
 9 there's an obligation to fight and kill.
 10 A. It's all about context.
 11 Q. Of course, but typically it can include that, can it
 12 not, that there is a duty to fight in Allah's name for
 13 the cause as they believe it to be?
 14 A. So it can include that, but that may be an offence also,
 15 it depends on the context.
 16 Q. Yes. And ALM and a lot of the propaganda and ideas and
 17 comments coming out of ALM include, as you've agreed,
 18 a desire to see the overthrow of what they would
 19 describe as apostate regimes, non-believer regimes like
 20 the United Kingdom and France and Western Europe and the
 21 United States?
 22 A. Sir, that is part of their rhetoric, yes, I agree.
 23 Q. So this isn't just a bunch of blowhards or hotheads who
 24 can be dismissed as the lunatic fringe; these sorts of
 25 ideas and these sorts of propagandists are encouraging

145

1 acts of terror, aren't they?
 2 A. They have never been part of the lunatic fringe, so they
 3 are an organisation that we look at for providing that
 4 pathway through their rhetoric, through their
 5 propaganda, to radicalise individuals, and where we have
 6 the opportunity to intervene and take some action within
 7 the boundaries of the law, we do.
 8 Q. We had evidence last week from Mr Jolley that one of the
 9 people that his team had spoken to after the attacks
 10 made it plain that Anjem Choudary was being quoted by
 11 Butt as saying "Take their money, take what you can get
 12 from the British state and use it to attack them",
 13 encouraging acts of terror against this country.
 14 A. Okay. So I'm not aware of that before, those
 15 comments -- sorry. Okay. So that was information that
 16 came out after the attack, yes.
 17 Q. But it's not surprising, is it? Those sorts of
 18 sentiments have been unearthed before when investigators
 19 have been dealing with ALM extremists?
 20 A. Yes, and it will be considered and, where possible, we
 21 will take it forward to the CPS for advice on whether it
 22 reaches the threshold for charging.
 23 Q. If I suggested that you attached insufficient weight to
 24 the intelligence about Butt's links to Choudary, would
 25 you accept that?

146

1 A. So in the intelligence space, no, it was significant; in
 2 the evidence space there was never any evidence linking
 3 Mr Choudary to the attack.
 4 Q. And over all these years of protests and demonstrations
 5 and activity by ALM or other named versions of ALM,
 6 there hasn't even been a single attempt to prosecute
 7 anyone for being a member of this group?
 8 A. There's -- so you're correct. I understand no one has
 9 been charged or prosecuted for being a member of ALM.
 10 In fact, Mr Choudary and Rahman, it was in relation to
 11 Islamic State --
 12 Q. Supporting Isis, yes?
 13 A. -- rather than ALM.
 14 Q. Even he hasn't been charged with being a member of the
 15 organisation that he is widely regarded as having led
 16 for many, many years?
 17 A. But given who that individual is and the level of
 18 concern we have about that individual, surely that must
 19 give you an indication of how difficult it is to obtain
 20 that evidence to prosecute these individuals for being a
 21 member of ALM.
 22 Q. Not even an attempt?
 23 A. Sorry?
 24 Q. Not even an attempt?
 25 A. There have been a number of arrests of individuals for

147

1 being part of ALM, a proscribed organisation, and it has
 2 never reached the threshold to charge. So there has
 3 been a concerted effort.
 4 Q. And, of course, from July 2014, the leaders of ALM were
 5 declaring allegiance to Baghdadi, widely regarded as
 6 being the leader of Isis, this extremely violent terror
 7 group active in Syria and Iraq, yes?
 8 A. I'm not aware of that personally.
 9 Q. That's something we see in L's witness statement --
 10 A. Okay.
 11 Q. -- and it is something which featured in the prosecution
 12 of Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman, that they were
 13 publicly supporting Baghdadi and Isis.
 14 A. Okay, yes.
 15 Q. So again, another clear sign that anyone like Butt who
 16 is associating with Choudary is likely to have similar
 17 views about this extremely violent terror group, Isis.
 18 A. Absolutely, and hence the reason he was part of
 19 a proactive priority operation.
 20 Q. So the investigation begins, then, in the middle of
 21 2015?
 22 A. That's correct.
 23 Q. And around about that time we know that there were the
 24 events at the Regent's Park Mosque, which subsequently
 25 featured in the broadcast of the Jihadis Next Door

148

1 programme. Were you aware of those events at the time
 2 or within a few days of those events?
 3 A. Personally, no, but the Command or the investigative
 4 part of the Command, I believe was aware.
 5 Q. So even though you, around that time, were beginning to
 6 investigate Khuram Butt, and even though he had been
 7 present at this ALM-linked demonstration, you yourself
 8 weren't made aware of that in the days or weeks that
 9 followed; is that correct?
 10 A. So we have a lead on ALM in terms of an investigation
 11 team, so four teams had that responsibility for the
 12 thematic lead, ALM, and it went to that team to look at,
 13 that documentary and that incident.
 14 Q. I'll come to the documentary later.
 15 A. I cannot say that I was personally made aware of
 16 Khuram Butt at Regent's Park in that demonstration.
 17 Q. So in the summer of 2015 -- you have watched the
 18 documentary recently, presumably?
 19 A. So I'm saying this from a personal point of view.
 20 I will have to check to see whether the part of my
 21 investigation team were made aware of that, I will have
 22 to check the records.
 23 Q. Because on that day, 31 July, if we watch the
 24 documentary we see police officer after police officer
 25 dealing with this bunch of demonstrators, dealing with

149

1 these extremists.
 2 A. So there's a number of police officers that look to stop
 3 and search those demonstrators in relation to what was
 4 assessed to be the black flag of Isis and there was some
 5 discussion, some quite animated discussion between the
 6 officers and the individuals who were to be searched,
 7 yes.
 8 Q. Yes, but in early August or in September, it didn't come
 9 to you from your colleagues elsewhere in SO15 that Butt
 10 had been there just a few days earlier in this
 11 demonstration, engaging with members of the public,
 12 engaging with police officers?
 13 A. But I'm answering on behalf of myself. I was not
 14 directly aware of that. I will have to check to see
 15 whether the investigating officers on my team were aware
 16 of that. It didn't add anything to what we already knew
 17 in terms of his associations and his mindset.
 18 Q. But isn't this the point I have been seeking to make and
 19 that Richard Kemp was making and BBC Newsnight were
 20 making, that there was a tolerance or a failure to take
 21 sufficiently seriously what was going on around ALM? It
 22 didn't even reach you when you were investigating
 23 Khuram Butt?
 24 A. No, I will come back to the point around ALM. That is
 25 not an organisation that we have not taken seriously

150

1 over a number of years. So the fact that I wasn't
 2 personally notified of that does not mean it didn't come
 3 into our team, it still went to part of our
 4 investigation set up to assess it and to have a look at
 5 it.
 6 Q. Well, if at any stage you or your team can identify
 7 a date when it reached you or your team, obviously
 8 please let us know.
 9 A. Sir, I will have to go away and check.
 10 Q. Yes.
 11 From an early stage you were the CTSIO, you were the
 12 senior investigating officer and the decision-maker in
 13 relation to what was done around Khuram Butt; is that
 14 correct?
 15 A. From a police perspective, sir, I took over that role
 16 approximately two weeks into the opening of that
 17 operation.
 18 Q. And so he is a P2H, he is a high-risk extremist linked
 19 to attack planning, that's how he is categorised?
 20 A. That's correct.
 21 Q. So not medium risk but high risk, and risk is focusing
 22 on risk to the public, presumably? Risk of committing a
 23 terrorist attack?
 24 A. Yes, absolutely.
 25 Q. And the intelligence suggested aspiration by him and

151

1 others, so not just him individually but associated with
 2 other people; is that correct?
 3 A. So the operation did not just concern Khuram Butt.
 4 Q. And so he was possibly planning to act in a group with
 5 others rather than on his own?
 6 A. So that would have been part of the investigative
 7 strategy, to identify the nature of any associates that
 8 might be involved in attack planning.
 9 Q. But at that stage it was an open possibility that it
 10 would be a group attack?
 11 A. It was something that was being considered in line with
 12 all other elements. At that stage it was aspirational,
 13 so we were still -- the overarching aim of that
 14 investigation was to identify if others were involved,
 15 who was involved, and what was the method and what was
 16 the planning in relation to the attack.
 17 Q. Now, Witness L in his statement says that later
 18 intelligence supported the earlier intelligence to the
 19 effect that he had been aspiring to commit a terrorist
 20 attack; were you aware of that? That later intelligence
 21 corroborated or supported the earlier intelligence.
 22 A. What was the date of that?
 23 Q. I don't think we've been given a date, but shortly after
 24 the commencement of the investigation.
 25 A. Sorry, I have no reason to ...

152

1 MR HOUGH: No date has been given for a reason.
 2 MR PATTERSON: I'm grateful. It's paragraph 105 of the
 3 statement of L, that the intelligence relating to his
 4 intentions in mid-2015 appeared to be supported by
 5 additional retrospective information received a number
 6 of months later. So it sounds as though it was later in
 7 2015.
 8 A. Okay.
 9 Q. Did that reach you?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. That corroborative or supportive intelligence?
 12 A. So that would have been a focal point of our discussions
 13 with MI5 in the JOT process.
 14 Q. So it reached you?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And we were told that Butt's intention to mount
 17 an attack was categorised as being strong?
 18 A. So this is through the PLA process --
 19 Q. Correct.
 20 A. -- or SVE process, yes.
 21 Q. So you were aware of that as well?
 22 A. I would have been made aware of that assessment.
 23 Q. So just pausing there and considering. We will go on in
 24 a moment to look at the stage when he was assessed as
 25 being somebody who wanted to travel and fight with Isis

153

1 overseas, but would you agree with this: that as
 2 a general proposition to have intelligence strongly
 3 suggesting that somebody has made up their mind that
 4 they're prepared to carry out a UK terror attack is
 5 a very significant thing, isn't it?
 6 A. Okay, I'm not quite sure if I can comment on that. Was
 7 that the conclusion reached in Witness L's statement
 8 that he was prepared to conduct an attack?
 9 Q. That's what the intelligence was, and would you agree
 10 that it's a very significant step, isn't it, for
 11 somebody to have made up their mind to launch
 12 a terrorist attack in this country?
 13 A. It's my understanding it was aspirational.
 14 Q. Yes, wanting to do it.
 15 A. I think I'm wandering into ground here about the actual
 16 intelligence itself, so my understanding of the attack
 17 planning intelligence, that it was an aspirational
 18 nature. I can't recall it being in those strongest
 19 terms that you have just put them in.
 20 Q. Well, certainly somebody who is aspiring to carry out
 21 a terrorist attack, that's a significant thing to aspire
 22 to do, isn't it?
 23 A. Absolutely, yes, of course.
 24 Q. It may result in their death. It may be a suicidal
 25 attack?

154

1 A. Possibly.
 2 Q. It's likely to result, if they don't die in the process,
 3 in a very lengthy period of imprisonment, probably
 4 a life sentence, typically.
 5 A. If disrupted and prosecuted.
 6 Q. Yes.
 7 A. Typically.
 8 Q. And so in every decision that was made in the months
 9 that followed, you were dealing with somebody who was
 10 assessed strongly to have had that aspiration in 2015?
 11 A. So that is -- so we were dealing with someone who had
 12 an aspirational intent to possibly commit an attack.
 13 Q. Now, we've seen the aims and the strategies that you set
 14 in writing at the beginning of the investigation, and
 15 they included, did they not, identifying others who
 16 might be involved with Khuram Butt?
 17 A. Sorry, sir?
 18 Q. Your aims included identifying those that he might be
 19 involved with?
 20 A. That is correct.
 21 Q. And they also included exploiting available intelligence
 22 opportunities?
 23 A. Yes, so that is consistent with the intelligence-led
 24 approach to this operation.
 25 Q. And, of course, at that stage all he needed to carry out

155

1 an attack essentially was a knife?
 2 A. Possibly. Yes.
 3 Q. So we've seen focus on capability.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And, of course, if somebody is trying to conduct
 6 a highly sophisticated particular type of bombing,
 7 capability is very relevant. But other than that,
 8 capability is easily satisfied, is it not, if somebody
 9 simply needs to lift a large knife from the kitchen and
 10 step out onto the streets of London?
 11 A. I wholeheartedly agree with that, and it offers us less
 12 opportunity to either interdict or get evidential
 13 product in relation to capability and planning.
 14 Q. It also informs the role that you then have to take,
 15 doesn't it, because you have to be alive to --
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. -- and reactive to the possibility that at the drop of
 18 a hat, he can lift a knife and go out and carry out his
 19 terrorist attack?
 20 A. In the truest sense, that is entirely possible, but we
 21 would normally expect to see some kind of run-in to
 22 that, some kind of intelligence or some kind of
 23 indicators that we were moving to that.
 24 Q. Yes.
 25 A. But, and it's a big but, we are alive to that and as far

156

1 as possible we will put in contingencies that will cater
 2 for that.
 3 Q. Yes, but from the very word go this is someone who had
 4 shown himself to be engaging in anti-surveillance
 5 techniques, isn't that right?
 6 A. I don't believe I can comment on that.
 7 Q. It's stated openly in the statement of Witness L, that
 8 he engaged in steps to try to avoid detection?
 9 A. At what stage?
 10 Q. Throughout.
 11 A. So that is something that is uniform across all the
 12 subjects we deal with.
 13 Q. And the Lee Rigby attack, the case of Ziamani who was
 14 stopped stepping out with a large knife or machete,
 15 these are recent examples prior to this of people who
 16 had carried out just that kind of simple but deadly
 17 attack.
 18 A. Absolutely, yes, and if the evidence had indicated we
 19 were moving towards that phase, our coverage and
 20 response would have reflected the threat.
 21 Q. And you said so yourself in your statement and when
 22 answering Mr Hough earlier, that the simplicity of
 23 attacks meant that you had to change and you had to be
 24 more dynamic in how you conduct your investigations?
 25 A. Absolutely, and our processes, the way we engage with

157

1 our firearms command, the way we posture our
 2 surveillance teams has all changed to reflect the change
 3 of the threat picture.
 4 Q. Now, I want to ask you, please, about the Corsa. You've
 5 identified his Corsa at some stage in the investigation,
 6 didn't you?
 7 A. Yes, that's correct. It was Khuram Butt's vehicle.
 8 Q. And, for example, at one stage there was consideration
 9 of a military base but it was something that you were
 10 alive to, that he was using this particular red Corsa
 11 during the period that he was under investigation?
 12 A. Yes, but I believe the military base was a bit of a red
 13 herring.
 14 Q. But it arose at one stage in the investigation?
 15 A. Yes, and it was investigated and appeared to be
 16 coincidence rather than any element of an attack plan.
 17 Q. Now, you were asked about the Anti-Terrorist Hotline and
 18 the report that came from a family member, Usman Darr.
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. And we will be hearing from Mr Darr later in these
 21 hearings. As I understand it, this reached the
 22 terrorist hotline, the information that was provided was
 23 recorded but this never reached you and your team; is
 24 that correct?
 25 A. That is correct.

158

1 Q. So this is intelligence about Khuram Butt; yes?
 2 A. Well, not just Khuram Butt, but yes, the primary
 3 intelligence was about Khuram Butt.
 4 Q. It was identified clearly in the body of the material
 5 that it related to Mr Butt?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. It's not that often, is it, that family members will
 8 report someone in the way that Usman Darr did on this
 9 occasion; would you agree?
 10 A. I can't say -- without doing the analysis I can't say
 11 either way.
 12 Q. And explain the human error: why is it that this
 13 important intelligence didn't reach you?
 14 A. It went in the wrong direction. So it went in the
 15 direction of more thematic ALM rather than making a link
 16 of Khuram Butt and our investigation.
 17 Q. But Khuram Butt was identified in the body of the intel.
 18 A. Yes, absolutely. So ...
 19 Q. Have you spoken to the person who made the error?
 20 A. So that has been subject to a review and, as I said
 21 earlier, that was not satisfactory that it was not
 22 passed to me and it came down to a supervision issue and
 23 some processes we've had to tighten up subsequently.
 24 Q. But, for example, if intelligence comes in dealing with
 25 individuals A, B and C, presumably it should be

159

1 disseminated in the directions of A, B and C. Let's
 2 say, for example, there are different investigations
 3 going on?
 4 A. Yes, and I've said this was not satisfactory. It should
 5 have been shared with the investigation team and MI5.
 6 Q. But, can you help us: how did this individual make the
 7 error and not give you this intelligence about
 8 Khuram Butt coming in from Usman Darr?
 9 A. Well, so I can't account for that individual, but it was
 10 assessed wrongly and went in the wrong direction when it
 11 should have come in my direction and MI5's direction.
 12 Q. It's pretty straightforward to send intel about Butt to
 13 the officer investigating Butt, isn't it?
 14 A. So it's come down to human error and a supervision issue
 15 and that has been noted.
 16 Q. So was there no supervision that picked it up at the
 17 time?
 18 A. So it went in the different direction when it should
 19 have come to us, so it was human error, they'd failed to
 20 make that link with our investigation.
 21 Q. Was there no supervision at the time that picked this
 22 up?
 23 A. So it went through a process, and I've seen that process
 24 that it went through as well, so once the initial link
 25 to Khuram Butt was not identified as part of our

160

1 investigation , it then went in the direction of ALM and
 2 the supervision of that took that initial bit of
 3 information at its word and hence put it in the
 4 direction of a different desk.
 5 Q. So error by the first person, error by the supervising
 6 person?
 7 A. No. So the supervisor, I wouldn't have thought had had
 8 reason to kind of disbelieve or check what that officer
 9 had got wrong and then forward it into the right
 10 direction they saw fit .
 11 Q. And the recipients who did get it , did they not say: oh
 12 gosh, Khuram Butt, the team investigating him might want
 13 to see this intelligence ?
 14 A. No, sir , it wasn't picked up.
 15 Q. We know that the family had become aware that he was
 16 speaking about wanting to travel to Syria to fight for
 17 Isis . This was a missed opportunity, wasn't it , to find
 18 out if this was actually what was going on with
 19 Khuram Butt at that time; would you agree?
 20 A. Sorry, just go back. So the family?
 21 Q. We've heard evidence, and Mr Jolley summarised this to
 22 us --
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. -- that the family had become aware that he was speaking
 25 of wanting to fight jihad , that he was wanting to travel

161

1 to Syria to fight for Isis ?
 2 A. And this is something we found out post-attack.
 3 Q. Absolutely. This was --
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. -- found out after the attack. This was a missed
 6 opportunity, was it not, to pursue Mr Darr as
 7 a potential source of information at that stage prior to
 8 the London Bridge attacks?
 9 A. I think we were denied the opportunity to discuss it
 10 further and come to a course of action in relation to
 11 Mr Darr.
 12 I cannot say to you with any certainty that we would
 13 have gone back to Mr Darr and employed him as
 14 a potential agent.
 15 Q. No, but certainly --
 16 A. There would be a lot of variables that come into play
 17 there before you arrive at that decision.
 18 Q. No, of course, but one possibility would be you could go
 19 back to him and ask him if he has any more information
 20 to give?
 21 A. I agree, but we did not call him back.
 22 Then so on, you know, reading it now, it's still --
 23 we were still in the midst of an intelligence -led
 24 operation around attack planning. That information did
 25 not really tell us -- did not tell me anything that we

162

1 weren't already aware of at that point in time.
 2 Q. As we go through 2015, I think you confirmed that the
 3 YouTube postings appeared in August 2015, Butt's
 4 presence and the link with Regent's Park Mosque became
 5 identified ; is that correct?
 6 A. Not through me personally, but I believe through the
 7 team that assessed it would have been aware of the
 8 YouTube video. I will have to check whether, and as
 9 I said earlier , whether we have a record of that being
 10 linked to Khuram Butt.
 11 Q. So those videos, did they reach your team?
 12 A. I will have to go away and confirm that.
 13 Q. It's dealt with in your report at paragraph 3.17.
 14 THE CHIEF CORONER: Sorry, could I have that paragraph
 15 number again?
 16 MR PATTERSON: 3.17.
 17 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you.
 18 MR PATTERSON: August 2015, he appeared in two videos,
 19 posted on YouTube.
 20 I had rather assumed, officer , that that was
 21 something you were aware of as the investigation
 22 progressed?
 23 A. So I read it as part of the investigation team were
 24 aware of that, yes.
 25 Q. Yes, your team?

163

1 A. My team.
 2 Q. Right.
 3 A. I mean, I would have to go away and check the exact
 4 records when it came in, who looked at it , et cetera .
 5 Q. And over time, and you confirmed this with Mr Hough, you
 6 learned about the meetings with Mr Choudary, you learned
 7 that he was supportive of Isis , and so these were
 8 features of his extremism that were coming in to you and
 9 your team?
 10 A. The association with Choudary?
 11 Q. Yes.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. And the Isis sympathies.
 14 A. Yes, so we were aware he had an extremist mindset that
 15 was -- and showed an interest in Islamic State .
 16 Q. Yes, well you confirm that one possibility , and although
 17 there was conflicting reporting, you confirm that one
 18 possibility was that he would be going to fight for Isis
 19 overseas.
 20 A. So there was nascent intelligence that that might be
 21 a possibility .
 22 Q. And, again, rather like a domestic attack, would you
 23 agree with this: that it's a very significant step for
 24 a person to take to make up their mind that they're
 25 willing to travel and fight with that extremely violent

164

1 group overseas?
 2 A. So do I agree that ...?
 3 Q. That that's a very significant piece of intelligence --
 4 A. Yes, of course.
 5 Q. -- suggesting that he's wanting to join that group,
 6 because of course this is 2015 when the barbarity of
 7 Isis was very well recognised, wasn't it?
 8 A. Absolutely, but there was also contradictory information
 9 about not going to Syria but to another location
 10 overseas.
 11 Q. Yes. But certainly fighting for Isis is something that
 12 would cause you real concern when considering the risks
 13 that this man might pose to the public?
 14 A. Sir, it's something we would seek to prevent and stop,
 15 normally through arrest. Having an individual that is
 16 looking to go and join Isis is concerning, yes.
 17 Q. Efforts were made to monitor his travel and to create
 18 a case for refusing to issue him with a passport,
 19 details that we see in the ISC report. So the
 20 Intelligence and Security Committee parliamentary
 21 report, is that something that you were involved with?
 22 A. Mr Horwell -- is it possible I can just ...
 23 MR PATTERSON: Yes, and can I make it plain, officer, if
 24 there is a sensitivity, of course do pause and consult.
 25 We see this in the ISC report --

165

1 A. I appreciate that.
 2 Q. -- that there were efforts to monitor and to build
 3 a case for refusing to give him a passport.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. So that's the area I want to ask you about.
 6 A. There's one facet of my answer I just need to run past
 7 Mr Horwell.
 8 MR PATTERSON: Of course, I am sure his Lordship will have
 9 no difficulty --
 10 THE CHIEF CORONER: I don't mind at all, Mr Patterson,
 11 because I'm acutely aware, as you have been at pains to
 12 point out, the families don't want to go, as it were, if
 13 one can use a sporting analogy, outside the tramlines
 14 which have been very properly set, so I'm quite
 15 content if Mr Horwell wants --
 16 MR PATTERSON: I'll return to it tomorrow if that would be
 17 easier.
 18 THE CHIEF CORONER: I was going to say, the other thing to
 19 do is to come back to it tomorrow which will give
 20 Mr Horwell a chance perhaps to speak to the witness
 21 without the constraints of doing so here.
 22 MR PATTERSON: Let's do that.
 23 A. Okay.
 24 Q. But certainly in early 2016, his categorisation remained
 25 a high one, didn't it? He remained P2H for quite some

166

1 time, didn't he, before he was downgraded later in the
 2 second half of 2016?
 3 A. That is correct.
 4 Q. And so then we get to the broadcast of the documentary,
 5 the Jihadis Next Door. Just help me with that, please,
 6 officer: why were you not watching that national TV
 7 documentary that was all about ALM figures?
 8 A. I have seen it.
 9 Q. No, but why weren't you watching it at the time? It was
 10 being broadcast in January 2016?
 11 A. I was aware of it at the time, I cannot hand on heart
 12 say I watched it all the way through, but it was taken
 13 on by another investigation team to review at the time.
 14 Q. And so did you get a quick précis or briefing in the
 15 days that followed, 19 January?
 16 A. I cannot recall that.
 17 Q. So you've no memory that you were briefed as to what was
 18 broadcast?
 19 A. No. Sorry, in the days following the broadcast? No.
 20 Q. In the days or weeks following it?
 21 A. Sir, I've been subsequently aware of the broadcast and
 22 what was in it and the individuals in it.
 23 Q. Right. So you were in charge of an investigation into
 24 an ALM-linked investigation into Khuram Butt, Channel 4
 25 broadcast a rather notorious fly-on-the-wall documentary

167

1 on jihadist living next door, and you never watched it in
 2 the months that followed; is that right?
 3 A. So that was being reviewed and assessed by another team
 4 within the counter terrorism operations.
 5 Q. And their assessment was never considered by you in the
 6 weeks and months that followed?
 7 A. No, so I took their assessment at its word, so they
 8 would have gone through it thoroughly looking for any
 9 offences or anything that can assist any of the wider
 10 ranging investigations that we had on at the time, and
 11 there was nothing.
 12 Q. So how did you miss that the man you were investigating,
 13 Khuram Butt, featured on that documentary?
 14 A. Me personally? I don't think we missed it.
 15 Q. So you were aware that he featured?
 16 A. I am aware that he featured. I would have to turn my
 17 mind back to -- the team would have been aware that he
 18 was part of that documentary.
 19 Q. Right. So --
 20 A. There would have been cross-team discussion around that,
 21 not just with our team but a number of other teams.
 22 Q. Just so we're absolutely clear, we are focusing on the
 23 period before the London Bridge attack, okay?
 24 A. Mm-hm.
 25 Q. We're focusing on the weeks and months that followed the

168

1 broadcast of the programme. My question is, you as the
 2 senior officer in charge of investigating Butt, did you
 3 become aware that Butt featured in this programme?
 4 A. Yes, I did become aware before the attack. I did know
 5 that he was on the Jihadis Next Door documentary, and
 6 I was also aware there were no offences.
 7 Q. And did you ask that the unbroadcast footage from all
 8 the months of following this team around was obtained
 9 from Channel 4?
 10 A. So I didn't personally, no, it's the team that were
 11 investigating did -- I would have to check, but they did
 12 not request the unedited footage but then they've
 13 already assessed that there's no offences, that would
 14 have been speculative, and the bar for obtaining
 15 journalistic material is very high and they are unlikely
 16 to have been granted that, which is an assessment that
 17 I agree with.
 18 Q. Did you not think that this was a fruitful area for
 19 learning more about the man that you were investigating?
 20 A. I don't think it would take us any further forward than
 21 what we already knew. And he only features in it for
 22 less than a minute.
 23 Q. Yes, well he is praying behind the black flag which is
 24 used by Isis.
 25 A. But not an offence.

169

1 Q. Well, whether it's an offence or not I suggest it would
 2 have told you an awful lot about the person you were
 3 investigating?
 4 A. It would not have told me anything more than we already
 5 knew at that time.
 6 Q. I mean, one of the remarkable things in it is the way
 7 they react to beheading videos and the fact that they
 8 simply laugh at the fact that people are being shown
 9 being executed by Isis terrorists in these notorious
 10 videos?
 11 A. Yes. That's not Butt, that's --
 12 Q. No, but these are the people he's associating with.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Siddhartha Dhar, the notorious jihadist who was arrested
 15 with Choudary, released on bail, jumped bail, ended up
 16 fighting with Isis in Syria, suspected of being one of
 17 the executioners featuring in some of those notorious
 18 videos wearing a mask over his face, these are the
 19 people that Khuram Butt is linked to, isn't he?
 20 A. Absolutely, and that whole ideology, that extremist
 21 mindset, was well known to us.
 22 Q. Do you not think that the failure to glean what you
 23 could from all of that footage shows a lack of curiosity
 24 about the man that you were investigating?
 25 A. No, not at all. So it didn't tell us anything we didn't

170

1 already know or we weren't aware of.
 2 Q. Well, you say that now with hindsight having now viewed
 3 it all.
 4 A. And the prospect of recovering that unedited footage was
 5 very low. There were no offences disclosed and that was
 6 subsequently confirmed by the CPS assessment after
 7 3 June.
 8 Q. The suspension of the investigation in February, that
 9 was a decision you've told us that wasn't made by you
 10 but was made by MI5.
 11 A. That is correct.
 12 Q. And so at no stage were you asked for your opinion as to
 13 whether or not the investigation should be suspended?
 14 A. No, and that was, or that is a learning point that's --
 15 came out of David Anderson. It's not -- that wasn't
 16 uncommon at that time, around, given what else was going
 17 on, that investigations were being suspended. That is
 18 for MI5 to make that decision. They had the wider optic
 19 on what is going on across the piece and can focus
 20 resources where needed most.
 21 Q. But forgive me, officer, you had a wealth of experience
 22 yourself as a counter terrorism investigated, don't you?
 23 A. Do I? Yes.
 24 Q. You did at the time you were dealing with this?
 25 A. Yes.

171

1 Q. Your team had a wealth of experience, didn't they?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. You had set out strategies and aims for your
 4 investigation which included --
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. -- protecting the public, finding out what he was up to,
 7 finding out what other people next to him were up to,
 8 preventing radicalisation, a whole host of public
 9 interest reasons why this man should be investigated?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. At this stage he is still a high-risk categorisation
 12 with a link to attack planning. He has crossed the line
 13 in terms of made up his mind possibly to launch a UK
 14 attack?
 15 A. Okay, I'm not quite sure where you've --
 16 Q. The aspiration or the intelligence that he aspired to
 17 carry out an attack.
 18 A. I can't comment on the exact nature of that, but that's
 19 your conclusion.
 20 Q. Well, I'm simply reciting what's contained in
 21 Witness L's statement --
 22 A. I understand that.
 23 Q. -- that the intelligence that was supported or
 24 corroborated by later intelligence was that he conspired
 25 to carry out an attack?

172

1 A. An attack.
 2 Q. Yes.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. You have intelligence suggesting that he is possibly
 5 wanting to fight overseas with Isis?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. All of these things together surely made it plain that
 8 this man should not be somebody who should simply be
 9 abandoned in terms of an investigation?
 10 A. Yes, so "abandoned" is the wrong word. So -- because
 11 the investigation is suspended temporarily does not mean
 12 that all activity comes to an absolute halt on that,
 13 there were still mechanisms in place to react to any
 14 intelligence. At that time, the decision was clearly
 15 made, and a decision I respect, by MI5, to refocus and
 16 reprioritise resources based on the threat picture that
 17 was coming out post-Paris, and as I've already pointed
 18 out, it was unprecedented.
 19 Q. But surely at that time when there's an unprecedented
 20 threat to the public, rather than scaling back
 21 investigations, on the contrary, you should be
 22 redoubling your efforts with suspected extremists?
 23 A. I take my lead from MI5 on this matter because they have
 24 that wider -- that ability to make that fuller
 25 assessment at the time. So if that is their decision in

173

1 terms of suspending certain operations at that point in
 2 time, in the absence of any other intelligence that
 3 anything is either imminent or anything is being
 4 planned, then I have no reason to disagree with that.
 5 Q. So what's the concern that David Anderson raised?
 6 A. In terms of consulting the police around closing and
 7 suspending operations?
 8 Q. Yes.
 9 A. So we should be consulted --
 10 Q. Yes, and why is that?
 11 A. Why has he raised that? Well, I think that is some
 12 learning that has come out of this and other operations.
 13 Q. Yes, but it's not rocket science, is it? Presumably the
 14 reason is because the police have a valuable role and
 15 a positive input that they can give --
 16 A. Of course.
 17 Q. -- from their perspective --
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. -- and with their years and years of combined
 20 experience?
 21 A. But it's intelligence-led, so we're working to
 22 an intelligence-led operation here and the intelligence
 23 assessment at that time is that operation could be
 24 suspended and resources, priorities, can be focused
 25 elsewhere.

174

1 Q. If I suggest that it didn't require David Anderson to
 2 question this after the event, but that to somebody like
 3 you at the time --
 4 A. But this is hypothetical. We never had that discussion,
 5 so that was not -- we were not part of that
 6 decision-making process.
 7 Q. Well, when you were told "MI5 want to wrap this up", did
 8 you not think to yourself, "Well, actually I am rather
 9 unhappy about that, this man poses a risk to the
 10 public"?
 11 A. No, no, no. So MI5 did not say "We want to wrap this
 12 up". What they said, they were suspending it
 13 temporarily while we focused on other threats.
 14 Q. Because you will agree with this: that often one
 15 terrorist attack can result in a copycat terrorist
 16 attack in the period that follows?
 17 A. And that is something we are alive to every time.
 18 Q. It happened in 7/7, didn't it? A few weeks later there
 19 was the follow-on attack in London?
 20 A. But that was a plot that was already in existence.
 21 Q. Yes --
 22 A. So, no.
 23 Q. We had just had the Paris attacks, hadn't we,
 24 in November 2015?
 25 A. Yes.

175

1 Q. At the Bataclan, at the bars and restaurants elsewhere
 2 in the centre of Paris, highlighting the danger that was
 3 posed to Western capital cities; yes?
 4 A. Yes, that is correct.
 5 Q. And for resources reasons, MI5 tell you that they are
 6 suspending the investigation into high-risk Khuram Butt.
 7 A. So decisions have to be made, tough decisions have to be
 8 made, and I have to respect their decision-making
 9 process and their analysis on deciding where to divert
 10 resources appropriately.
 11 After the Paris attacks, the level of threat that
 12 was being directed at this country and the inquiries
 13 that came out of that attack around some of those
 14 attackers possibly being in the UK was unprecedented.
 15 Q. Was there any discussion within the Counter Terrorist
 16 Command as to whether the Home Secretary should be asked
 17 to increase the resources to allow these sorts of
 18 investigations into the Khuram Butts of this world to
 19 continue?
 20 A. But that's a continual discussion with the government
 21 around resourcing which is ongoing all the time.
 22 Q. How many other suspensions took place within your
 23 command around that time because of resources?
 24 A. I don't know.
 25 Q. So is the position today, officer, that such suspensions

176

1 will not be made without the police having a say?
 2 A. So that was one of the recommendations that came out of
 3 David Anderson and that's a position we are moving
 4 towards.
 5 Q. Concerns about communication between the police and MI5
 6 aren't new though, are they? There had been concerns
 7 raised after 7/7 about the inadequacies of the
 8 communication between MI5 and the police?
 9 A. So yes, it was raised after 7/7 and that led, then, to
 10 what we have now, the CT Policing Network, and that then
 11 shaped our relationship with the Security Service, which
 12 is -- and this is in my experience a world apart from
 13 where we were on 7/7.
 14 Q. What about more recently and the concerns that were
 15 raised after the Lee Rigby attack about inadequacies in
 16 communication between MI5 and counter terrorism
 17 policing?
 18 A. I don't view our relationship with MI5 as inadequate.
 19 It's -- we have very symbiotic relationship, we talk all
 20 the time, out of hours, at weekends. We don't have
 21 those barriers that existed going back to 7/7. It's
 22 a continuing improving picture. And if you look in
 23 comparison to what we have across Europe and other law
 24 enforcement intelligence relationships, it is -- we're
 25 the world leaders in that respect.

177

1 MR PATTERSON: My Lord, I see the time. I was about to move
 2 on to a different topic, so that would be a convenient
 3 moment.
 4 THE CHIEF CORONER: We'll break there. Mr Patterson, what
 5 I am going to suggest, I know it's happening anyway, but
 6 it might be sensible for you and Mr Horwell to have a
 7 conversation first of all just to see if there are other
 8 topics which you are coming to --
 9 MR PATTERSON: Certainly.
 10 THE CHIEF CORONER: -- because I'm conscious if Mr Horwell
 11 wishes to speak to the witness it is easier to do it in
 12 one fell swoop rather than come back at various times.
 13 So what I will do is I will stay put but I will ask my
 14 usher to take the witness out.
 15 MR PATTERSON: Of course.
 16 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Horwell, I'm content -- are you
 17 interested in the applications I'm going to deal with?
 18 MR HORWELL: I'm always interested, sir, but I'm more than
 19 happy to leave court and discuss this with Mr Patterson.
 20 THE CHIEF CORONER: Thank you very much indeed, we will
 21 resume tomorrow morning with your evidence at
 22 10 o'clock. If you would like to go with my usher now
 23 thank you.
 24 A matter of law
 25 THE CHIEF CORONER: Mr Hough, we have two, I think,

178

1 applications to consider. One relates to purely
 2 an application in respect of special measures for
 3 Haleema Butt.
 4 MR HOUGH: Yes.
 5 THE CHIEF CORONER: And I've got the application in front of
 6 me and I have not seen whether anyone else has put
 7 anything in writing in relation to that.
 8 MR HOUGH: My understanding is that nobody has raised any
 9 response to that at all.
 10 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 11 MR HOUGH: The second, and I think more recent, is the
 12 application of SB, a friend of Youssef Zaghba, for both
 13 anonymity and special measures. Both special measures
 14 applications are for screening.
 15 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 16 MR HOUGH: Sir, may I deal with legal principles briefly.
 17 They are set out in more detail in your ruling of
 18 19 November 2018 paragraph 34, and that ruling is
 19 available on the Inquest website.
 20 Simplifying matters grossly, where an applicant for
 21 anonymity or special measures establishes that they
 22 would face a real risk of death or serious harm if the
 23 application were refused, the application will normally
 24 be readily granted as part of the court's obligations
 25 under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention.

179

1 Otherwise, a balancing exercise is performed by the
 2 court between factors for and against, both as a matter
 3 of common law and very often balancing Article 8 rights
 4 of applicants against Article 10 rights of those wishing
 5 to report upon proceedings.
 6 In that balancing exercise, proper weight is given
 7 to the general interest in open justice and to any
 8 effect upon the quality of the evidence, or any effect
 9 on the inquiry of granting or refusing the applications.
 10 In addition, sir, so far as screening is concerned,
 11 Rule 18 of the Coroners (Inquest) Rules 2013 permits you
 12 to order screening if it would improve the quality of
 13 the evidence or allow the Inquest to proceed more
 14 expediently, and for reasons set out in your ruling,
 15 expediency in this context includes whether screening
 16 would be conducive to the interests of justice more
 17 generally.
 18 With those legal matters by way of background, let
 19 me deal with the two applications in turn.
 20 Haleema Butt has, from the outset, made no
 21 application for anonymity: she has always acknowledged
 22 that her name is in the public domain and has not sought
 23 anonymity. The application for screening is in order to
 24 dispel a real anxiety this witness would otherwise feel
 25 in giving evidence, and thus also to improve the quality

180

1 of the evidence she would give.
 2 Sir, without going into detail, there is clear,
 3 positive evidence annexed to the application of the
 4 degree of stress and anxiety this witness would feel --
 5 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.
 6 MR HOUGH: -- about giving evidence without special
 7 measures.
 8 Granting special measures would have a limited
 9 effect on open justice, as Haleema Butt would still be
 10 seen by interested persons. She would still be heard by
 11 all. She would give evidence in her own name and
 12 without restriction on its content. There would, in our
 13 submission, be no adverse effect on the quality of the
 14 inquiry. We also note that there has been no objection
 15 or reason given by anyone for this application not to be
 16 granted and therefore we would encourage you to make the
 17 screening order and associated orders, for example
 18 a Section 11 order, in relation to Haleema Butt.
 19 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes. Well certainly that was my
 20 intention, to make the order. It seems to me it's
 21 an application which is well founded on the material
 22 that's been provided.
 23 MR HOUGH: Before I move on to SB, would it be sensible just
 24 for me to look around to see if anyone has anything to
 25 say on that application? I see a shaking of heads.

181

1 THE CHIEF CORONER: That special measures application is
 2 granted.
 3 MR HOUGH: We will make sure that Haleema Butt's
 4 representatives are told.
 5 The application by SB is for both anonymity and
 6 special measures, and his reasons are as follows: first
 7 of all, SB stresses that he was only ever friends with
 8 Youssef Zaghba for a period of time and is not a major
 9 figure in the narrative. He expresses great concern
 10 that if he were to give evidence in his own name, and
 11 particularly if he were also to give evidence
 12 unscreened, he would attract guilt by association with
 13 Youssef Zaghba and he, in his evidence in support of the
 14 application, refers to the reactions of others after the
 15 attack to support the proposition that he would come
 16 under guilt by association.
 17 He draws attention to the concerns he had at the
 18 time of the attack which caused him to experience
 19 anxiety and depression, leaving him, he says, in a very
 20 desperate state. I don't go into further detail, but
 21 his evidence goes into that.
 22 THE CHIEF CORONER: I've got the statement, in fact,
 23 a four-page statement in front of me, so I've read the
 24 detail of it, Mr Hough.
 25 MR HOUGH: Yes, I'm summarising these so that they are on

182

1 the record and so that the applicant knows that we are
 2 considering them conscientiously.

3 He expresses concern also about the effects of his
 4 name being revealed on his future career progression.
 5 He points out that his name is unusual and expresses
 6 real concern that future employers would be deterred
 7 from employing him if they became aware that he was
 8 someone associated with Youssef Zaghba.

9 Sir, our response to this application is that
 10 special measures should be ordered in the form of
 11 screening, but not anonymity. Our reasons are as
 12 follows: first, that the concerns which he expresses
 13 about guilt by association are those which almost any of
 14 those associated with the attackers would face. He is
 15 in no special category by comparison with many friends
 16 and associates of the attackers whose names were
 17 revealed last week, for example, in Mr Jolley's
 18 evidence.

19 But we do not, in the way that some reports do,
 20 we do not anonymise everyone associated with the
 21 attackers. We do not anonymise proceedings in this
 22 court more generally because to do so would deprive the
 23 evidence of a considerable amount of its human interest
 24 dimension, and that has been recognised by the courts as
 25 being a legitimate public interest in the administration

183

1 and open administration of justice.

2 Secondly, that the fact of his limited involvement
 3 should prevent any right-thinking person holding him
 4 guilty by association. It is very unlikely that he will
 5 be severely criticised when he comes to give evidence
 6 here later this week. It is very unlikely that there
 7 will be significant criticism of him in the press.
 8 We need only take Mr Atebaa as an example, somebody who
 9 gave evidence as an associate of Rachid Redouane with
 10 limited association, limited connection to him. Nobody
 11 in this court suggested to him that he was guilty by
 12 association and there was no suggestion to that effect
 13 in the press.

14 Thirdly, anonymising this witness would be
 15 inconsistent with the general approach that you have
 16 taken with regards to friends and associates of the
 17 attackers and which you have explained and justified in
 18 your ruling. Now, of course, a departure from the
 19 approach you've taken would be justified if there were
 20 some exceptional circumstances.

21 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes. Every case needs to be looked at
 22 on its individual merits. But, as you say, certainly on
 23 my reading, Mr Hough, there's nothing which stands out
 24 as being, as it were, a key reason as to why I should
 25 depart from the approach I've taken with others.

184

1 MR HOUGH: Yes. It would, we submit, intrude upon open
2 justice to a significant extent without sufficient cause
3 to start anonymising those who merely knew the
4 attackers.

5 Fourthly, sir, the screening would be an appropriate
6 and measured response. It would improve the quality of
7 evidence without a serious adverse effect on those
8 seeking to view and report upon the proceedings.

9 So for those reasons we submit that the anonymity
10 application should be refused but special measures in
11 the form of screening and associated orders should be
12 granted.

13 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes. Well, again, it may help if
14 I indicate that my ruling is likely to be that I will
15 grant special measures, but I'm against the application
16 so far as it relates to anonymity, I don't know if
17 anyone wants to say anything further on that point.

18 MR HOUGH: I see shakes of heads. Sir, SB has not sent
19 a lawyer to court. He was made aware of his ability to
20 do so.

21 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.

22 MR HOUGH: He was told that you would carefully consider the
23 content of his application, as I know you have. I've
24 gone through it this evening so that it's clear to
25 anybody reading the transcript that you have done so, or

185

1 we have done so, and we will, of course, convey to him
2 the result of your decision.

3 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes. Well, for the reasons which you
4 have very helpfully summarised, Mr Hough, I will grant
5 the order so far as it relates to the special measures
6 but I refuse the application so far as it relates to
7 anonymity in his case.

8 Thank you. So the plan of action for tomorrow is
9 that we will pick up on where we have got to with
10 Witness M, and I think we've then got two other
11 witnesses coming.

12 MR HOUGH: Yes, we have Mr Cawthorne, who I anticipate will
13 be quite a short witness.

14 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes.

15 MR HOUGH: And then we have Charisse O'Leary, the estranged
16 wife of Rachid Redouane, who will be a little longer but
17 who we need to finish tomorrow for her sake.

18 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes and, again, I know that parties are
19 aware of my desire that we keep to the timetable,
20 particularly in the situation of a witness such
21 a Charisse O'Leary, and bearing in mind the fact that
22 she has, I suspect, still got significant childcare
23 commitments apart from other things, and so if we can
24 stick to the timetable as far as she's concerned.
25 I know that Mr Patterson is not in court but I know that

186

1 Mr Adamson and he will be in conversation. But the
2 timetable looks fine for tomorrow, I think is the short
3 point.

4 MR ADAMSON: I agree, and I think I am permitted to speak on
5 behalf of Mr Patterson on this point: I think he agrees
6 too that the timetable should not be jeopardised
7 tomorrow.

8 THE CHIEF CORONER: Yes. Thank you. We will resume at
9 10 o'clock in the morning.
10 (4.42 pm)

11 (The court adjourned until 10.00 am on
12 Wednesday, 5 June 2019)

187

1	INDEX	
2		PAGE
3	DR ROBERT CHAPMAN (sworn)	1
4		
	Questions by MR HOUGH QC	1
5		
	Questions by MR PATTERSON QC	13
6		
	Further questions by MR HOUGH QC	21
7		
	Further questions by MR PATTERSON QC	30
8		
	Witness M (sworn)	37
9		
	Questions by MR HOUGH QC	37
10		
	Questions by MR PATTERSON QC	139
11		
	A matter of law	178
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

188

189

<p>A</p> <p>abandoned (2) 173:9,10</p> <p>ability (4) 137:11</p> <p>143:23 173:24 185:19</p> <p>able (22) 10:10 12:13</p> <p>23:13 27:22 36:5</p> <p>66:18 77:7 79:11 80:3</p> <p>104:11,20,22,23 106:5</p> <p>109:9,16 117:12</p> <p>119:11 127:6 131:6</p> <p>140:11 142:15</p> <p>abnormality (2)</p> <p>26:10,12</p> <p>above (6) 5:12 16:16</p> <p>18:14 30:24,25 32:19</p> <p>abrasion (7)</p> <p>5:11,13,21,22 6:11</p> <p>15:3 16:13</p> <p>abrasions (14)</p> <p>5:2,3,7,9,14,17 6:6,10</p> <p>14:18,19 16:2,10</p> <p>17:3,5</p> <p>abroad (6) 42:10</p> <p>79:1,2,5,7 83:22</p> <p>absence (9) 90:25</p> <p>114:23,23 123:2,2</p> <p>124:13 131:13,14</p> <p>174:2</p> <p>absolute (1) 173:12</p> <p>absolutely (29) 41:5</p> <p>44:1,11 47:6,22 48:23</p> <p>51:10 62:14 68:8,17</p> <p>70:16 86:7 88:3,14</p> <p>90:16 109:22 142:1,17</p> <p>144:19 148:18 151:24</p> <p>154:23 157:18,25</p> <p>159:18 162:3 165:8</p> <p>168:22 170:20</p> <p>absolved (1) 93:25</p> <p>abu (6) 61:3 73:1 74:7</p> <p>134:23 136:1,4</p> <p>abusive (1) 143:7</p> <p>academic (2) 129:4,14</p> <p>academics (1) 54:14</p> <p>accept (3) 74:19 135:8</p> <p>146:25</p> <p>accepted (4) 93:19</p> <p>94:2,19,24</p> <p>access (5) 2:24 67:17</p> <p>86:4 124:18 142:7</p> <p>accessed (1) 69:16</p> <p>accessing (2) 69:22</p> <p>112:24</p> <p>accompanied (1) 58:17</p> <p>accomplices (1) 139:15</p> <p>account (10)</p> <p>91:10,14,16,19 92:23</p> <p>93:6,23 120:19 122:9</p> <p>160:9</p> <p>accounts (3) 88:18</p> <p>93:20 94:5</p> <p>achieve (2) 46:6 58:18</p> <p>achieved (1) 43:21</p> <p>acknowledged (1)</p> <p>180:21</p> <p>acquiring (1) 66:12</p> <p>acquisition (2) 52:11</p> <p>65:22</p> <p>across (13) 23:20 51:25</p> <p>52:1 56:10 58:13</p> <p>81:13,14 83:23 116:13</p> <p>132:15 157:11 171:19</p> <p>177:23</p>	<p>acted (2) 121:3,3</p> <p>acting (1) 127:23</p> <p>action (31) 42:13 44:22</p> <p>45:18,22</p> <p>46:1,4,5,11,17 75:2</p> <p>77:22 89:2,21 91:4,25</p> <p>108:25 109:2 116:4</p> <p>128:6,7 129:16</p> <p>130:5,23 131:11,16,17</p> <p>132:23 133:15 146:6</p> <p>162:10 186:8</p> <p>actionable (1) 98:1</p> <p>actioned (1) 129:4</p> <p>actions (2) 43:20 82:21</p> <p>active (3) 60:4 63:8</p> <p>148:7</p> <p>actively (1) 78:22</p> <p>activities (3) 43:24</p> <p>44:10 106:8</p> <p>activity (43) 42:6,8</p> <p>44:14 50:4,14 62:9</p> <p>64:14,20,24 65:4,17</p> <p>68:20 73:17 80:21</p> <p>82:21 83:14,16 84:14</p> <p>85:3 86:2 87:11</p> <p>88:23,24 89:7 90:2,3</p> <p>92:19 102:23 107:18</p> <p>108:20 109:24 111:10</p> <p>114:25 125:7,14</p> <p>127:14,15 132:13</p> <p>133:21 134:14 138:6</p> <p>147:5 173:12</p> <p>actor (4) 66:25</p> <p>125:18,22,23</p> <p>acts (6) 57:8,24 64:10</p> <p>97:13 146:1,13</p> <p>actual (3) 68:2 101:14</p> <p>154:15</p> <p>actually (9) 4:2 57:7</p> <p>61:22 62:17 90:23</p> <p>121:8 135:18 161:18</p> <p>175:8</p> <p>acutely (1) 166:11</p> <p>adamson (5) 37:7,12</p> <p>138:13 187:1,4</p> <p>adapt (2) 50:7,22</p> <p>add (2) 77:17 150:16</p> <p>added (6) 54:7 72:10</p> <p>75:23 98:5 111:1</p> <p>133:3</p> <p>addeen (9) 108:5</p> <p>109:16 110:1</p> <p>111:8,10,12,16,18</p> <p>119:24</p> <p>addition (2) 133:16</p> <p>180:10</p> <p>additional (4) 110:20</p> <p>122:1 132:21 153:5</p> <p>address (5) 2:17 73:4</p> <p>94:3 134:8 140:10</p> <p>adjacent (2) 6:4 10:24</p> <p>adjourned (1) 187:11</p> <p>adjournment (1) 95:10</p> <p>administration (2)</p> <p>183:25 184:1</p> <p>adverse (2) 181:13</p> <p>185:7</p> <p>advice (5) 70:1,6,10</p> <p>100:8 146:21</p> <p>advise (1) 93:9</p> <p>advised (1) 70:13</p> <p>advocate (1) 100:24</p> <p>affairs (1) 11:24</p>	<p>affect (6) 69:9 72:6</p> <p>77:15 79:18 101:15</p> <p>113:4</p> <p>affected (1) 50:15</p> <p>affiliates (3) 112:10,18</p> <p>113:3</p> <p>afghanistan (1) 143:14</p> <p>afraid (1) 103:8</p> <p>after (40) 10:6,7 11:12</p> <p>12:20 13:1 16:4 17:21</p> <p>28:1,5,12 34:9,13 49:9</p> <p>61:6 77:24 83:21</p> <p>85:16 91:12 93:6</p> <p>103:24 105:5 106:15</p> <p>116:22 125:16 129:18</p> <p>134:19,25 142:6</p> <p>146:9,16 149:24</p> <p>152:23 162:5 171:6</p> <p>175:2 176:11</p> <p>177:7,9,15 182:14</p> <p>afternoon (4) 95:20</p> <p>131:5,22 139:8</p> <p>afterwards (3) 61:24</p> <p>114:15 135:13</p> <p>again (41) 15:20</p> <p>21:9,10,16 25:1 26:25</p> <p>27:4,24 29:3,24 33:19</p> <p>46:18 47:6 65:20</p> <p>69:15,18 70:3 83:25</p> <p>86:18 89:17 95:8</p> <p>101:21 103:6 104:1</p> <p>105:3 114:7,15 117:24</p> <p>118:10 120:21 124:25</p> <p>132:20 133:2,4,22</p> <p>138:13 148:15 163:15</p> <p>164:22 185:13 186:18</p> <p>against (16) 16:8,25</p> <p>36:18 44:3 48:11,18</p> <p>59:2 89:2,21 93:18</p> <p>134:14 138:6 146:13</p> <p>180:2,4 185:15</p> <p>agenda (2) 85:18 86:1</p> <p>agent (1) 162:14</p> <p>agree (31) 43:20 63:21</p> <p>67:5,22 76:1,13 78:12</p> <p>82:6 90:19 95:3</p> <p>102:3,5,9,11 105:23</p> <p>126:5,24 143:21</p> <p>144:24 145:22 154:1,9</p> <p>156:11 159:9 161:19</p> <p>162:21 164:23 165:2</p> <p>169:17 175:14 187:4</p> <p>agreed (3) 67:19 123:6</p> <p>145:17</p> <p>agrees (1) 187:5</p> <p>ahead (1) 128:15</p> <p>aim (1) 152:13</p> <p>aims (5) 63:19 64:1</p> <p>155:13,18 172:3</p> <p>alarming (1) 141:4</p> <p>alexandre (10) 2:14,18</p> <p>21:5 27:21 28:4,11,15</p> <p>29:1 30:14,25</p> <p>alias (5) 60:17,20 61:1</p> <p>136:2,3</p> <p>aligned (1) 76:20</p> <p>alignment (1) 23:13</p> <p>alive (7) 84:14 89:8</p> <p>110:23 156:15,25</p> <p>allege (1) 93:9</p> <p>allahs (1) 145:12</p> <p>allegation (1) 101:8</p> <p>alleged (1) 104:5</p>	<p>allegiance (1) 148:5</p> <p>allocate (2) 42:22</p> <p>107:11</p> <p>allocated (1) 116:14</p> <p>allow (2) 176:17 180:13</p> <p>allowed (1) 59:25</p> <p>ally (1) 127:23</p> <p>alm (60) 53:15</p> <p>54:3,10,14,17,19,23</p> <p>55:1,3,7,9,11,17,25</p> <p>60:21,22 69:1,5 71:18</p> <p>74:6 76:21 77:13,20</p> <p>78:6,23 82:14</p> <p>102:7,13,14 104:5</p> <p>112:9,18 113:3 115:21</p> <p>140:3,16,18</p> <p>141:4,8,19 142:6</p> <p>144:16,19 145:16,17</p> <p>146:19</p> <p>147:5,5,9,13,21</p> <p>148:4 149:10,12</p> <p>150:21,24 159:15</p> <p>161:1 167:7</p> <p>almlinked (2) 149:7</p> <p>167:24</p> <p>almost (3) 31:10 56:11</p> <p>183:13</p> <p>almuhajiroun (7) 53:16</p> <p>143:6,11,16,22</p> <p>144:1,2</p> <p>alone (4) 19:20 27:5</p> <p>61:15 128:1</p> <p>along (4) 31:23,23</p> <p>84:25 92:14</p> <p>already (20) 6:17,19</p> <p>26:8 29:16 47:23 55:5</p> <p>66:3 68:8 72:10 76:3</p> <p>77:17,19 150:16 163:1</p> <p>169:13,21 170:4 171:1</p> <p>173:17 175:20</p> <p>also (53) 2:24 6:11</p> <p>8:10,14 9:15 29:21</p> <p>36:13 38:17 39:1</p> <p>40:4,20 42:23 48:12</p> <p>50:15,19 51:8,24 52:6</p> <p>54:1 57:1 64:11,20</p> <p>69:15 70:12 79:4</p> <p>89:13 91:17 92:25</p> <p>99:15,25 101:9,18</p> <p>102:6 103:8 104:25</p> <p>108:13 119:7 125:2</p> <p>129:19 132:17,18</p> <p>133:7 136:14,16</p> <p>145:14 155:21 156:14</p> <p>165:8 169:6 180:25</p> <p>181:14 182:11 183:3</p> <p>altercation (2) 100:23</p> <p>101:12</p> <p>although (3) 1:18 94:1</p> <p>164:16</p> <p>always (6) 48:18 49:2</p> <p>86:7 120:13 178:18</p> <p>180:21</p> <p>ambulance (1) 17:22</p> <p>amenable (1) 19:25</p> <p>among (2) 124:7 143:18</p> <p>amongst (1) 138:25</p> <p>amount (7) 42:22 50:8</p> <p>57:20 123:17 143:15</p> <p>144:6 183:23</p> <p>amounts (1) 145:1</p> <p>analogy (1) 166:13</p> <p>analysis (4) 14:13</p> <p>137:23 159:10 176:9</p> <p>anatomically (1) 15:24</p> <p>ancillary (1) 106:22</p> <p>anderson (6) 60:3 82:6</p> <p>171:15 174:5 175:1</p> <p>177:3</p> <p>angle (5) 13:25 25:10</p> <p>31:3,4,8</p> <p>animated (1) 150:5</p> <p>anjem (9) 69:1,4,6,9,12</p> <p>140:7,8 146:10 148:12</p> <p>annexed (1) 181:3</p> <p>anonymise (2)</p> <p>183:20,21</p> <p>anonymising (2) 184:14</p> <p>185:3</p> <p>anonymity (11) 35:2</p> <p>36:12 179:13,21</p> <p>180:21,23 182:5</p> <p>183:11 185:9,16 186:7</p> <p>another (21) 5:22 12:25</p> <p>25:13 44:23 49:21</p> <p>54:7 55:5,22 79:4 97:2</p> <p>100:22 105:20</p> <p>110:13,13 124:21</p> <p>135:5 136:17 148:15</p> <p>165:9 167:13 168:3</p> <p>anpr (1) 117:11</p> <p>answer (12) 38:21,23</p> <p>39:2 52:4 61:2 75:18</p> <p>87:17 93:7 104:10,23</p> <p>114:14 166:6</p> <p>answered (1) 60:18</p> <p>answering (2) 150:13</p> <p>157:22</p> <p>answers (1) 120:3</p> <p>antagonise (1) 89:5</p> <p>anticipate (1) 186:12</p> <p>antiextremist (1)</p> <p>100:24</p> <p>antisurveillance (1)</p> <p>157:4</p> <p>antiterrorism (2)</p> <p>72:15,21</p> <p>antiterrorist (2) 73:13</p> <p>158:17</p> <p>antiwestern (1) 72:23</p> <p>anxiety (3) 180:24</p> <p>181:4 182:19</p> <p>anybody (1) 185:25</p> <p>anyone (10) 36:17</p> <p>38:21 74:8 107:7</p> <p>147:7 148:15 179:6</p> <p>181:15,24 185:17</p> <p>anything (26) 38:18</p> <p>65:2 66:18 75:10</p> <p>83:12 85:23 86:2</p> <p>87:13,15 89:16,19</p> <p>98:5,10 100:11 125:12</p> <p>140:24 150:16 162:25</p> <p>168:9 170:4,25</p> <p>174:3,3 179:7 181:24</p> <p>185:17</p> <p>anyway (1) 178:5</p> <p>anywhere (1) 18:15</p> <p>aorta (8) 4:12 7:18 8:8</p> <p>18:22 19:10,14 20:2</p> <p>22:6</p> <p>apart (4) 27:8 108:21</p> <p>177:12 186:23</p> <p>apex (1) 22:8</p> <p>apologies (1) 112:22</p> <p>apologise (1) 104:3</p>	<p>apostate (1) 145:19</p> <p>apparatus (1) 29:4</p> <p>appeared (9) 3:14 6:24</p> <p>7:5 49:17 78:23 153:4</p> <p>158:15 163:3,18</p> <p>applicant (2) 179:20</p> <p>183:1</p> <p>applicants (1) 180:4</p> <p>application (20) 85:10</p> <p>179:2,5,12,23,23</p> <p>180:21,23</p> <p>181:3,15,21,25</p> <p>182:1,5,14 183:9</p> <p>185:10,15,23 186:6</p> <p>applications (5) 178:17</p> <p>179:1,14 180:9,19</p> <p>applied (1) 84:19</p> <p>applying (1) 97:16</p> <p>appointed (4) 41:14</p> <p>43:3 60:15 61:24</p> <p>appointment (2) 128:15</p> <p>129:7</p> <p>appreciate (7) 37:23</p> <p>38:7,17 66:2 103:18</p> <p>131:7 166:1</p> <p>appreciated (2) 105:7</p> <p>139:20</p> <p>approach (7) 48:15 52:2</p> <p>65:1 155:24</p> <p>184:15,19,25</p> <p>appropriate (3)</p> <p>135:13,24 185:5</p> <p>appropriately (1)</p> <p>176:10</p> <p>approximate (1) 31:3</p> <p>approximately (2) 6:21</p> <p>151:16</p> <p>april (3) 84:5 117:8</p> <p>134:19</p> <p>aqeeqah (1) 124:25</p> <p>arabic (1) 79:5</p> <p>arch (1) 22:6</p> <p>archway (1) 11:13</p> <p>area (18)</p> <p>15:2,15,16,19,24</p> <p>16:5,19 22:2 33:8 73:5</p> <p>108:11,15,25 110:13</p> <p>111:13 134:22 166:5</p> <p>169:18</p> <p>areas (4) 18:10,10 83:1</p> <p>84:25</p> <p>arena (1) 86:6</p> <p>arent (4) 32:3 67:10</p> <p>146:1 177:6</p> <p>arguably (3) 118:5</p> <p>126:7 136:23</p> <p>arm (9) 5:25 6:5 17:12</p> <p>23:2,13,15,17 27:12</p> <p>32:23</p> <p>armed (1) 143:14</p> <p>armpit (3) 5:25</p> <p>17:18,18</p> <p>arms (1) 9:14</p> <p>arose (1) 158:14</p> <p>around (91) 4:5 8:8</p> <p>11:6,21 12:19 18:10</p> <p>20:10,11 27:15</p> <p>28:5,12 43:16 45:12</p> <p>46:4,23 47:14 49:18</p> <p>51:13 52:8,11,20,21</p> <p>54:4 58:21,22 60:21</p> <p>63:24 64:21 65:2,2,15</p> <p>66:23 71:4 72:11</p>	<p>75:13 76:2,12</p> <p>77:5,7,17 79:7 80:25</p> <p>81:20 82:7 85:25 90:7</p> <p>92:4 93:13 97:25 98:5</p> <p>101:17,19 102:11</p> <p>104:8 106:11 109:5,23</p> <p>110:11 111:9 112:7</p> <p>114:2,14 119:22</p> <p>123:25 124:19 125:13</p> <p>126:23 127:23 129:11</p> <p>130:21 131:13 132:17</p> <p>133:1,21 140:25 141:8</p> <p>143:12 148:23 149:5</p> <p>150:21,24 151:13</p> <p>162:24 168:20 169:8</p> <p>171:16 174:6</p> <p>176:13,21,23 181:24</p> <p>arrangements (1) 35:23</p> <p>arrest (19) 8:22 19:18</p> <p>27:6 44:23 45:18</p> <p>48:25 64:16 70:21</p> <p>71:6 80:7 87:23 88:2</p> <p>89:4 91:5 92:13,14</p> <p>96:1,3 165:15</p> <p>arrested (3) 55:10</p> <p>92:17 170:14</p> <p>arresting (4) 46:2 48:4</p> <p>70:25 87:14</p> <p>arrests (3) 43:22 50:18</p> <p>147:25</p> <p>arrive (1) 162:17</p> <p>arrived (2) 12:19,22</p> <p>arterial (4) 4:14 22:4,6</p> <p>33:11</p> <p>artery (2) 22:5,5</p> <p>article (4) 142:10,13</p> <p>180:3,4</p> <p>articles (2) 53:21</p> <p>179:25</p> <p>articulated (1) 99:3</p> <p>ascertain (1) 133:20</p> <p>aside (1) 63:12</p> <p>ask (22) 1:24 13:17</p> <p>37:19 49:6 53:15 55:6</p> <p>56:4 73:19 78:14 82:9</p> <p>112:20 115:11 120:7</p> <p>126:12 131:8 135:7</p> <p>139:13 158:4 162:19</p> <p>166:5 169:7 178:13</p> <p>asked (8) 2:17 18:12</p> <p>55:5 139:14,21 158:17</p> <p>171:12 176:16</p> <p>asking (10) 1:12 61:6</p> <p>67:18 75:17 81:3</p> <p>108:6 7:118:19 120:21</p> <p>131:12</p> <p>aspect (4) 22:15 24:11</p> <p>50:23 55:25</p> <p>aspects (3) 100:14</p> <p>115:25 126:5</p> <p>aspiration (3) 151:25</p> <p>155:10 172:16</p> <p>aspirational (8) 62:15</p> <p>65:12,14,18 152:12</p> <p>154:13,17 155:12</p> <p>aspirations (3) 66:7</p> <p>79:20 82:12</p> <p>aspire (1) 154:21</p> <p>aspired (1) 172:16</p> <p>aspiring (2) 152:19</p> <p>154:20</p> <p>assault (4) 68:1,2</p> <p>101:8,16</p>
---	--	--	---	---	--

<p>assess (1) 151:4</p> <p>assessed (15) 49:3 58:24 65:10 67:1 77:10 79:13 113:21 136:11 150:4 153:24 155:10 160:10 163:7 168:3 169:13</p> <p>assessing (2) 64:11 65:21</p> <p>assessment (63) 65:7,24 67:1,2,11,23 69:10,12 72:6 73:16,18,24 74:1,11 77:5,7,9,24 78:3,13 79:18,22 80:2 81:18 82:25 85:22 90:2,9,19 91:2 95:4 97:19,24 98:15,23 99:6 101:19 102:4,5,9,11 112:7 113:4,10 114:16 116:9 123:6 124:20 125:18,20,22,23 126:2,5 137:9,12 153:22 168:5,7 169:16 171:6 173:25 174:23</p> <p>assessmentanalysis (1) 135:19</p> <p>assessments (1) 94:18</p> <p>assets (1) 60:14</p> <p>assigned (5) 41:11,25 62:5,7 92:2</p> <p>assist (3) 40:8 57:7 168:9</p> <p>assistance (3) 13:19 15:12 21:2</p> <p>assisting (1) 9:8</p> <p>associate (3) 56:2 121:9 184:9</p> <p>associated (16) 26:3 43:13 53:21 54:6,9 60:14,22 61:18 84:17 105:8 152:1 181:17 183:8,14,20 185:11</p> <p>associates (13) 61:18,19 85:25 107:6 120:10,25 121:11 127:16,20 133:23 152:7 183:16 184:16</p> <p>associating (11) 69:1,14 71:17 77:12,18 78:23 82:14 112:9,18 148:16 170:12</p> <p>association (23) 26:1 69:9 84:20 113:3,9 117:15 118:3,12 119:14,17 121:24 123:14 137:3,7,21 140:14 164:10 182:12,16 183:13 184:4,10,12</p> <p>associations (5) 55:2 72:13 113:10 137:20 150:17</p> <p>assume (1) 131:25</p> <p>assumed (1) 163:20</p> <p>atebaa (1) 184:8</p> <p>atms (1) 92:7</p> <p>attach (1) 136:25</p> <p>attached (3) 40:18 137:7 146:23</p> <p>attack (154) 2:21,22 9:9 10:2 14:10,12 15:10 17:9 28:6,13</p>	<p>31:2 32:19 33:9 34:3,13 38:10 42:3,7,9 46:17 48:4 52:11 59:18 60:5 61:13 62:9,13,18,21 63:5,8,10 65:10,12,13,16,19,20 66:1,4,8,15,19,23 67:2,20 68:19,19,22 70:24 71:4 77:24 78:20,22 79:25 81:12,14,21 82:12 84:1,1 85:18 86:1,6 87:2 88:13 90:7,10,24 98:7 100:12,12 102:2 103:18,21,22,24 104:11,19,21 105:5,8,9,15,17 110:7 111:11 115:17 116:1,15,17,23 117:13 119:5,9,12,18 125:2,6 126:14,16,21 127:1 128:11 129:17 130:9,11,12,18,22 132:22 134:11 141:22 142:21,21 146:12,16 147:3 151:19,23 152:8,10,16,20 153:17 154:4,8,12,16,21,25 155:12 156:1,19 157:13,17 158:16 162:5,24 164:22 168:23 169:4 172:12,14,17,25 173:1 175:15,16,19 176:13 177:15 182:15,18</p> <p>attacked (3) 10:6 11:6 12:20</p> <p>attacker (2) 14:11 30:23</p> <p>attackers (10) 32:19 33:3 38:9 130:14 176:14 183:14,16,21 184:17 185:4</p> <p>attacks (17) 52:8,9 53:11 54:17 81:8 132:9 133:2 134:1 140:23 141:10 142:6 143:11 146:9 157:23 162:8 175:23 176:11</p> <p>attempt (4) 29:14 147:6,22,24</p> <p>attempted (1) 28:8</p> <p>attempting (3) 19:2 80:23 131:22</p> <p>attend (2) 128:19 129:1</p> <p>attended (1) 113:16</p> <p>attendees (1) 125:3</p> <p>attending (10) 102:19,20,24 105:19 106:2,15,16,21 110:1 119:10</p> <p>attention (4) 74:2 75:6 124:3 182:17</p> <p>attract (2) 64:24 182:12</p> <p>attracts (2) 43:1 124:2</p> <p>attribute (2) 53:2 97:3</p> <p>attributed (2) 29:13 96:17</p> <p>atwood (3) 12:25 28:5 34:12</p> <p>audio (3) 36:24 37:21 95:14</p>	<p>august (4) 71:22 150:8 163:3,18</p> <p>authorisation (1) 91:21</p> <p>authorities (1) 51:13</p> <p>autumn (2) 68:25 102:1</p> <p>available (8) 35:11 43:14 94:5 135:2 143:25,25 155:21 179:19</p> <p>avoid (1) 157:8</p> <p>avow (1) 54:17</p> <p>aware (125) 38:14 55:9 67:5 68:1 69:3,18,19 72:11,16 73:9 77:3,3,4,5 81:10 82:1 84:21 86:16,17 88:18,22 89:24 90:5 91:22 100:20 101:6,7 102:18,20,24 103:13,16,20,20,22 104:7 105:3,12,14 107:23 108:14 110:4 111:12,16 112:11,21,22 113:1,22,25 114:9 117:12,14,15,16,19 119:11,13,13 120:16,18 121:17 122:15,24 125:8,14,21,23,25 127:7,10,12,25 129:6,8,21,25 130:1,4,11,17,20,21,24 132:20 133:12,13 135:4 140:1,8,12,14 142:2 146:14 148:8 149:1,4,8,15,21 150:14,15 152:20 153:21,22 161:15,24 163:1,7,21,24 164:14 166:11 167:11,21 168:15,16,17 169:3,4,6 171:1 183:7 185:19 186:19</p> <p>away (9) 19:12 51:22 63:25 85:2 111:15 127:14 151:9 163:12 164:3</p> <p>awful (1) 170:2</p> <p>axilla (2) 23:3,4</p>	<p>bad (2) 123:1 124:11</p> <p>baghdadi (2) 148:5,13</p> <p>bail (5) 95:2 128:9 129:7 170:15,15 187:5</p> <p>bailed (1) 93:3</p> <p>bakri (1) 142:16</p> <p>balancing (3) 180:1,3,6</p> <p>bank (3) 88:18 91:7 94:3</p> <p>banks (2) 92:4 93:24</p> <p>bar (1) 169:14</p> <p>barbarity (1) 165:6</p> <p>barking (3) 108:11,15 134:22</p> <p>barriers (1) 177:21</p> <p>barring (1) 109:6</p> <p>bars (1) 176:1</p> <p>base (5) 4:12 25:17 54:15 158:9,12</p> <p>based (14) 65:24 67:5 70:4 72:2 102:9 104:19 114:19 116:9 120:3,11 121:14,17 126:18 173:16</p> <p>basic (2) 2:22 91:22</p> <p>basically (1) 92:23</p> <p>basis (14) 51:21 58:19 61:10,12 86:8 96:18,24,24 99:2 103:2 107:23 108:3,8 133:13</p> <p>bataclan (1) 176:1</p> <p>bbc (2) 142:5 150:19</p> <p>bear (1) 11:3</p> <p>bearing (1) 186:21</p> <p>became (12) 51:4 52:13 88:18,22 101:7 103:13 122:24 135:2 139:24 140:1 163:4 183:7</p> <p>become (23) 52:12 60:7 72:25 84:21 86:16 101:6 102:18,24 103:22 105:3 107:23 127:25 129:6,14 130:17,21 132:20 133:12,13 161:15,24 169:3,4</p> <p>becoming (1) 75:24</p> <p>before (56) 1:12,14 2:20 10:2 13:4 20:3 27:23 28:18 34:25 36:1 38:22 44:19 50:13 60:24 75:22 81:24 82:1,3 98:14 103:18 104:11,21 105:8,9,15,17 106:14 111:11 114:12 116:20 117:13 119:9,12,18 124:23 125:1 126:25 127:1 128:11 129:17 130:18 132:25 133:7 134:11 135:19 136:17,25 139:7,24 146:14,18 162:17 167:1 168:23 169:4 181:23</p> <p>began (2) 91:7 102:19</p> <p>begin (6) 1:12 3:5 21:9,11 39:13 139:7</p> <p>beginning (2) 149:5 155:14</p> <p>beginnings (1) 49:20</p> <p>begins (1) 148:20</p>	<p>behalf (9) 1:24 13:17 30:13 83:10 104:16 112:2 139:8 150:13 187:5</p> <p>behaviour (1) 64:7</p> <p>beheading (1) 170:7</p> <p>behind (5) 35:9,17 58:16 67:11 169:23</p> <p>being (74) 9:9,13 13:23 14:4 19:10,11 23:21 32:23 36:6,11,18 37:23 45:15 49:3 50:12 51:2,2,8 53:20 54:11 55:10,16 62:19 63:10 68:18 77:18 80:3 81:15 86:10 87:20 92:5 98:18 101:3 105:21 114:1 115:4 116:14 118:7,16 121:20 123:4 124:3,5,22 126:21 130:9,24 132:7 140:20 144:5 146:10 147:7,9,14,20 148:1,6 152:11 153:17,25 154:18 163:9 167:10 168:3 170:8,9,16 171:17 174:3 176:12,14 183:4,25 184:24</p> <p>belief (2) 72:4 145:8</p> <p>beliefs (1) 54:16</p> <p>believe (19) 38:13 62:25 65:18 71:25 78:25 86:9,21 92:10 96:16 103:21 109:19 113:2 114:10 128:20 145:13 149:4 157:6 158:12 163:6</p> <p>believed (7) 15:10,16 61:13,15 75:13 79:15 119:4</p> <p>belong (1) 96:14</p> <p>below (12) 10:21,21,25 11:13,18 12:4 15:3 18:19 23:6 24:7 32:20 35:9</p> <p>beneath (2) 3:20 23:7 132:14</p> <p>berlin (1) 132:9</p> <p>best (4) 19:7 80:13 100:7 112:2</p> <p>better (4) 38:16 95:17 118:2,22</p> <p>between (25) 41:3 43:9 45:7 47:12,20 48:16 52:16,23 55:2 81:7 97:15 100:23 101:17 110:4 114:5 119:14 130:15 138:14 140:2 144:25 150:5 177:5,8,16 180:2</p> <p>biceps (1) 23:2</p> <p>big (3) 49:12,14 156:25</p> <p>bigger (2) 75:1 81:17</p> <p>bit (3) 78:24 158:12 161:2</p> <p>bits (1) 133:16</p> <p>black (4) 57:13 144:25 150:4 169:23</p> <p>blade (2) 17:17 29:15</p> <p>bled (1) 26:23</p>	<p>bleed (1) 19:15</p> <p>bleeding (6) 6:25 7:19 8:11,12 18:21 27:15</p> <p>blood (27) 4:13 6:21,23 33:13 7:6 8:7,16,19,19,22 18:4,9 19:8,11,18,23 20:7 22:1,4,6 25:11 26:7,7,19 27:5,6 30:7 33:13</p> <p>blow (4) 15:15 23:14 29:23 30:19</p> <p>blowhards (1) 145:23</p> <p>blue (1) 21:25</p> <p>blunt (2) 4:24 9:14</p> <p>bodies (1) 52:1</p> <p>bodily (1) 68:2</p> <p>body (26) 1:18 3:2,6,23,24 4:1,14,25 15:6 16:7,17,25 17:2,10 18:15,18 21:7,10 22:2,13 24:1 31:1 32:3 33:5 159:4,7</p> <p>bombing (1) 156:6</p> <p>bombings (4) 41:2,5 49:9 143:1 bunmaking (4) 56:15 57:8,14,19</p> <p>bombs (1) 127:3</p> <p>bone (1) 8:2</p> <p>bones (1) 18:17</p> <p>bone (1) 18:20</p> <p>borough (2) 10:18 53:12</p> <p>both (19) 14:11 15:10 20:1 26:24 27:15 35:20 43:10 44:25 59:21 99:19 115:19 119:14 120:2 126:5 143:16 179:12,13 180:2 182:5</p> <p>bottles (1) 127:2</p> <p>bottom (1) 142:20</p> <p>bought (2) 119:2 127:1</p> <p>boundaries (1) 146:7</p> <p>bounds (1) 144:22</p> <p>box (2) 35:19 36:22</p> <p>bq (1) 132:18</p> <p>brachiocephalic (3) 22:3,7 26:15</p> <p>branch (1) 38:5</p> <p>branding (1) 56:1</p> <p>breached (2) 97:25 98:9</p> <p>break (9) 34:23 36:2,8 38:24 95:7 138:11,13 139:4 178:4</p> <p>breastbone (4) 3:21 4:3 8:2 13:21</p> <p>brick (3) 16:17,20,24</p> <p>bridge (6) 53:12 116:17 124:6 142:22 162:8 168:23</p> <p>brief (2) 2:7 63:19</p> <p>briefed (1) 167:17</p> <p>briefing (1) 167:14</p> <p>briefings (1) 143:3</p> <p>briefly (5) 28:5 41:23 42:18,20 179:16</p> <p>bringing (1) 22:1</p> <p>british (1) 146:12</p> <p>broad (1) 44:1</p> <p>broadcast (9) 76:15</p>	<p>148:25 167:4,10,18,19,21,25 169:1</p> <p>broadly (1) 14:14</p> <p>brotherinlaw (1) 72:16</p> <p>brought (6) 17:20 36:21 58:12 74:2 95:12 131:3</p> <p>bruise (2) 17:6,13</p> <p>bruises (1) 6:4</p> <p>bruising (8) 5:17,24 6:11,16 18:3,7 26:1,2</p> <p>build (1) 166:2</p> <p>building (2) 141:25 145:6</p> <p>bunch (2) 145:23 149:25</p> <p>bus (1) 97:17</p> <p>busy (1) 81:13</p> <p>butt (148) 38:9 59:16,19 60:16,24 61:2,7 63:4 64:9 65:8 68:12,25 69:10,16,22 70:21 71:10,14 72:7,11,23,23,25 73:3,8,10 74:7 75:23 77:4,16 78:18 81:20 82:11 83:3 84:9,19 85:9 86:13 87:14 88:15 89:2,2,10 90:15,23 91:12,16,19 92:8 93:14,18,25 94:4,11 95:2 96:1 97:3,15,16,20 98:5 99:17,22 100:23 101:3,9,15 102:2,6,18 103:13 106:2 107:21 108:1,12 110:1,8,18 111:4 112:7,9,17,24 113:5,12 117:8 118:4 119:7,24 120:11 121:11 123:10,21 124:10,24 125:2,12 127:3 128:9,15,18,25 129:6,19 130:8,16,22 131:3,22 134:14 136:2 137:3 138:6 139:15,22 146:11 148:15 149:6,16 150:9,23 151:13 152:3 155:16 159:1,2,3,5,16,17 160:8,12,13,25 161:12,19 163:10 167:24 168:13 169:2,3 170:11,19 176:6 179:3 180:20 181:9,18</p> <p>buttock (6) 24:17,20 29:20 32:6,8 33:4</p> <p>butts (23) 67:1,25 68:20 69:9 72:16 93:10 96:4 106:7 113:3,15 119:16,19 120:1 125:19 126:14 130:15 142:21 146:24 153:16 158:7 163:3 176:18 182:3</p> <p>buying (1) 66:8</p> <p>bypass (1) 19:1</p>
B						
<p>b (3) 72:12 159:25 160:1</p> <p>back (45) 5:18 15:7,13 17:6 22:1,19 24:3,4 26:2 29:17 32:13,15 33:5 49:11 51:11 65:21 73:18,25 79:23 83:19 94:2 95:12 106:9 109:8 117:5 120:21,23 128:9 129:2 135:15,19 136:18 140:15 141:5 142:3 150:24 161:20 162:13,19,21 166:19 168:17 173:20 177:21 178:12</p> <p>background (4) 2:21 59:6 81:19 180:18</p> <p>backgrounds (1) 51:1</p> <p>backwards (3) 3:19 7:16 14:5</p>	<p>bad (2) 123:1 124:11</p> <p>baghdadi (2) 148:5,13</p> <p>bail (5) 95:2 128:9 129:7 170:15,15 187:5</p> <p>bailed (1) 93:3</p> <p>bakri (1) 142:16</p> <p>balancing (3) 180:1,3,6</p> <p>bank (3) 88:18 91:7 94:3</p> <p>banks (2) 92:4 93:24</p> <p>bar (1) 169:14</p> <p>barbarity (1) 165:6</p> <p>barking (3) 108:11,15 134:22</p> <p>barriers (1) 177:21</p> <p>barring (1) 109:6</p> <p>bars (1) 176:1</p> <p>base (5) 4:12 25:17 54:15 158:9,12</p> <p>based (14) 65:24 67:5 70:4 72:2 102:9 104:19 114:19 116:9 120:3,11 121:14,17 126:18 173:16</p> <p>basic (2) 2:22 91:22</p> <p>basically (1) 92:23</p> <p>basis (14) 51:21 58:19 61:10,12 86:8 96:18,24,24 99:2 103:2 107:23 108:3,8 133:13</p> <p>bataclan (1) 176:1</p> <p>bbc (2) 142:5 150:19</p> <p>bear (1) 11:3</p> <p>bearing (1) 186:21</p> <p>became (12) 51:4 52:13 88:18,22 101:7 103:13 122:24 135:2 139:24 140:1 163:4 183:7</p> <p>become (23) 52:12 60:7 72:25 84:21 86:16 101:6 102:18,24 103:22 105:3 107:23 127:25 129:6,14 130:17,21 132:20 133:12,13 161:15,24 169:3,4</p> <p>becoming (1) 75:24</p> <p>before (56) 1:12,14 2:20 10:2 13:4 20:3 27:23 28:18 34:25 36:1 38:22 44:19 50:13 60:24 75:22 81:24 82:1,3 98:14 103:18 104:11,21 105:8,9,15,17 106:14 111:11 114:12 116:20 117:13 119:9,12,18 124:23 125:1 126:25 127:1 128:11 129:17 130:18 132:25 133:7 134:11 135:19 136:17,25 139:7,24 146:14,18 162:17 167:1 168:23 169:4 181:23</p> <p>began (2) 91:7 102:19</p> <p>begin (6) 1:12 3:5 21:9,11 39:13 139:7</p> <p>beginning (2) 149:5 155:14</p> <p>beginnings (1) 49:20</p> <p>begins (1) 148:20</p>	<p>behalf (9) 1:24 13:17 30:13 83:10 104:16 112:2 139:8 150:13 187:5</p> <p>behaviour (1) 64:7</p> <p>beheading (1) 170:7</p> <p>behind (5) 35:9,17 58:16 67:11 169:23</p> <p>being (74) 9:9,13 13:23 14:4 19:10,11 23:21 32:23 36:6,11,18 37:23 45:15 49:3 50:12 51:2,2,8 53:20 54:11 55:10,16 62:19 63:10 68:18 77:18 80:3 81:15 86:10 87:20 92:5 98:18 101:3 105:21 114:1 115:4 116:14 118:7,16 121:20 123:4 124:3,5,22 126:21 130:9,24 132:7 140:20 144:5 146:10 147:7,9,14,20 148:1,6 152:11 153:17,25 154:18 163:9 167:10 168:3 170:8,9,16 171:17 174:3 176:12,14 183:4,25 184:24</p> <p>belief (2) 72:4 145:8</p> <p>beliefs (1) 54:16</p> <p>believe (19) 38:13 62:25 65:18 71:25 78:25 86:9,21 92:10 96:16 103:21 109:19 113:2 114:10 128:20 145:13 149:4 157:6 158:12 163:6</p> <p>believed (7) 15:10,16 61:13,15 75:13 79:15 119:4</p> <p>belong (1) 96:14</p> <p>below (12) 10:21,21,25 11:13,18 12:4 15:3 18:19 23:6 24:7 32:20 35:9</p> <p>beneath (2) 3:20 2</p>				

<p>caliphate (4) 49:19 54:12 58:12 144:21</p> <p>call (15) 20:6 45:7 49:14 72:15,20 73:19,25 75:13,18,25 123:23 130:16 131:9 134:5 162:21</p> <p>called (11) 9:8 12:25 22:3 43:4 45:4 66:25 99:4 105:7 134:24 137:4,16</p> <p>caller (2) 72:21 73:1</p> <p>calling (3) 58:11 74:20 114:6</p> <p>came (25) 17:10 61:3 63:25 66:13 71:25 73:9 81:18 82:5,24 103:23 106:22 109:8 110:25 111:3 113:6 130:6 136:7 140:4 146:16 158:18 159:22 164:4 171:15 176:13 177:2</p> <p>camp (1) 104:6</p> <p>cannot (7) 91:2 109:11 112:12 149:15 162:12 167:11,16</p> <p>cant (22) 31:14 38:21 39:2 46:15,15 66:22 75:17 77:2 79:11,25 83:20 104:16 109:12 112:13 120:19,22 122:4 154:18 159:10,10 160:9 172:18</p> <p>capabilities (1) 131:1</p> <p>capability (11) 65:13,19,24 66:7,8 125:19 126:14 156:3,7,8,13</p> <p>capable (1) 101:23</p> <p>capital (1) 176:3</p> <p>captured (2) 71:21 92:8</p> <p>car (2) 66:9 117:9</p> <p>card (4) 91:13,18 92:25 94:3</p> <p>cardiac (4) 8:22 19:1,18 27:6</p> <p>cards (2) 55:24 92:23</p> <p>career (1) 183:4</p> <p>careful (2) 38:18 118:16</p> <p>carefully (2) 112:20 185:22</p> <p>carotid (1) 22:4</p> <p>carried (4) 66:25 68:18 112:1 157:16</p> <p>carry (14) 18:1 65:13,19 66:1,4,7 67:20 115:17 154:4,20 155:25 156:18 172:17,25</p> <p>carrying (3) 19:1 53:21 57:7</p> <p>casebycase (5) 44:3 48:8 58:1 59:3 86:7</p> <p>cases (2) 141:24 144:12</p> <p>cash (3) 88:17 91:11,15</p> <p>casting (1) 49:11</p> <p>casualties (1) 33:7</p> <p>cat (1) 54:4</p> <p>categorisation (2) 166:24 172:11</p> <p>categorised (2) 151:19 153:17</p>	<p>category (4) 41:25 42:1 99:12 183:15</p> <p>cater (1) 157:1</p> <p>caught (4) 9:9 57:15,19 58:10</p> <p>cause (16) 9:22,23 16:9,20 17:1 23:9 24:13 25:2,14 29:12 30:6 33:16 85:7 145:13 165:12 185:2</p> <p>caused (12) 8:7 9:24 17:25 18:8,18 19:22 27:14,20 30:7 31:13 33:10 182:18</p> <p>causing (2) 23:6 133:4</p> <p>caution (2) 68:1 132:12</p> <p>caveat (2) 82:7 116:12</p> <p>caveatting (1) 70:4</p> <p>cavity (2) 4:5 8:13</p> <p>cawthorne (5) 70:7 78:2,14 94:25 186:12</p> <p>cctv (4) 92:4,7,8 94:4</p> <p>cell (2) 94:5 117:11</p> <p>central (3) 87:3 126:23 133:8</p> <p>centre (12) 32:15 51:4 102:19,21 103:14 106:2 113:14 119:8,21 127:4 134:22 176:2</p> <p>certain (3) 99:1 143:15 174:1</p> <p>certainty (1) 162:12</p> <p>certificate (1) 109:7</p> <p>cetera (3) 52:12 57:4 164:4</p> <p>chairman (1) 142:25</p> <p>challenge (1) 54:7</p> <p>challenges (1) 50:21</p> <p>chamber (3) 4:11,16 19:14</p> <p>chance (4) 80:22 118:2,22 166:20</p> <p>change (12) 49:25 50:10 51:17,19,20,23,24 52:7 90:5 122:12 157:23 158:2</p> <p>changed (6) 52:5 53:5,10 90:1,7 158:2</p> <p>changes (1) 72:22</p> <p>changing (2) 54:4 79:24</p> <p>channel (2) 167:24 169:9</p> <p>chapman (13) 1:3,5,6,13,23,24 13:17 21:1 30:12 34:17,19,20 188:3</p> <p>chapra (1) 71:18</p> <p>characterise (1) 6:3</p> <p>characteristic (1) 9:4</p> <p>charge (13) 55:7 70:21 77:25 96:2 98:25 99:2,8,8 128:10 145:6 148:2 167:23 169:2</p> <p>chargeable (2) 94:19 98:17</p> <p>charged (5) 55:8 71:8,9 147:9,14</p> <p>charges (2) 43:23 95:1</p> <p>charging (2) 128:14 146:22</p> <p>charisse (2) 186:15,21</p> <p>charles (1) 1:23</p>	<p>check (12) 35:23 103:16 109:5 111:15 149:20,22 150:14 151:9 161:8 163:8 164:3 169:11</p> <p>checked (3) 36:24 109:9,17</p> <p>checking (1) 111:25</p> <p>checks (1) 61:6</p> <p>cheek (2) 25:7 32:4</p> <p>chest (45) 3:9,13 4:4 5:5 6:16,20,21,22,25 7:7,15,17,19 8:9,12,20 9:25 10:14 15:15,19 16:22 18:21 19:2 22:9,9 23:5,5,9,14,16,20 24:8,11 26:3,5,7,20,24 27:13 30:8 31:6 32:10 33:12,13,15</p> <p>chief (49) 1:4,6,20 31:10 34:20,23 35:4,7,12,15,21 36:20,23 37:9,11,14 39:4 95:7,15,19 103:4,11 135:21 138:12,20 139:2 163:14,17 166:10,18 178:4,10,16,20,25 179:5,10,15 181:5,19 182:1,22 184:21 185:13,21 186:3,14,18 187:8</p> <p>childcare (1) 186:22</p> <p>children (6) 107:22 108:2,8,11,22 110:19</p> <p>choudary (18) 69:1,4,6,9,13 140:7,8,13,14 146:10,24 147:3,10 148:12,16 164:6,10 170:15</p> <p>chronological (2) 71:13 102:17</p> <p>church (1) 44:1</p> <p>circle (1) 23:3</p> <p>circuitous (1) 133:9</p> <p>circulating (1) 8:19</p> <p>circumstances (3) 57:12 120:11 184:20</p> <p>circumstantial (1) 93:19</p> <p>cities (1) 176:3</p> <p>city (3) 133:8,10,19</p> <p>claimed (2) 91:16,18</p> <p>claiming (1) 88:17</p> <p>claims (1) 12:20</p> <p>clarify (1) 61:20</p> <p>clarifying (1) 63:20</p> <p>classes (5) 107:22 108:2,8,11 119:8</p> <p>clear (7) 34:21 51:22 131:18 148:15 168:22 181:2 185:24</p> <p>cleared (1) 35:20</p> <p>clearly (9) 12:7 17:16 18:16 81:18 88:23 100:6,19 159:4 173:14</p> <p>clip (1) 76:16</p> <p>clock (1) 105:24</p> <p>close (7) 3:20 23:16 37:19 75:24 76:4 122:12,23</p> <p>closed (5) 91:11 123:23</p>	<p>124:3,5,9</p> <p>closely (1) 28:6</p> <p>closer (2) 1:9 39:6</p> <p>closing (1) 174:6</p> <p>closure (8) 122:7,14,15,18,20,24 123:19,20</p> <p>clot (3) 6:23,23 26:7 22:11,18 23:11 24:4,6,10,18,21 25:7,11</p> <p>cobra (2) 142:25 143:3</p> <p>codename (1) 41:16</p> <p>coincidence (2) 93:21 158:16</p> <p>collapse (11) 8:24 9:1,19 10:13 16:4,8,24 20:6 26:25 28:16 34:4</p> <p>collapsed (7) 6:24 8:15 18:4 20:12 31:24 32:18 34:2</p> <p>collapsing (1) 27:24</p> <p>colleague (1) 104:22</p> <p>colleagues (7) 38:22 62:2 111:23 115:6 137:14 139:11 150:9</p> <p>collect (2) 49:16 84:17 132:18</p> <p>collection (2) 7:6 8:15</p> <p>collectively (1) 122:3</p> <p>college (1) 2:9</p> <p>combination (1) 74:17</p> <p>combined (1) 174:19</p> <p>come (40) 34:13 47:1 54:7 56:10 57:2 60:16 71:24 74:7,8,13 75:5 76:22 80:14 87:8 88:10 90:16,17 118:6 122:21 126:9 127:18 128:9 135:9,14 136:12 137:2 142:3 149:14 150:8,24 151:2 160:11,14,19 162:10,16 166:19 174:12 178:12 182:15</p> <p>comes (8) 67:12 85:5 97:2 104:8 107:12 159:24 173:12 184:5</p> <p>comfort (1) 68:15</p> <p>comfortable (3) 1:7 68:13 81:4</p> <p>coming (16) 15:12 31:4 50:15 79:24 84:2 123:6,17 135:19 136:18 138:16 145:17 160:8 164:8 173:17 178:8 186:11</p> <p>command (8) 40:14,22 104:16 149:3,4 158:1 176:16,23</p> <p>commander (1) 143:14</p> <p>commencement (1) 152:24</p> <p>comment (9) 66:22 93:8 112:12,13 126:8 140:11 154:6 157:6 172:18</p> <p>comments (2) 145:17 146:15</p> <p>commission (2) 57:24 64:9</p>	<p>commit (9) 56:18 61:13 79:25 98:7 100:12 140:23 141:10 152:19 155:12</p> <p>commitments (1) 186:23</p> <p>committed (3) 58:24 72:3,5</p> <p>committee (2) 143:3 165:20</p> <p>committing (3) 124:16 128:25 151:22</p> <p>common (3) 22:4 136:2 180:3</p> <p>communal (1) 92:24</p> <p>communicated (1) 67:2</p> <p>communication (5) 97:15 100:17 177:5,8,16</p> <p>community (1) 143:16</p> <p>companies (1) 130:17</p> <p>comparison (4) 52:24,25 177:23 183:15</p> <p>compatible (1) 12:9</p> <p>complacency (1) 143:15</p> <p>completeness (1) 37:8</p> <p>compression (1) 16:22 131:16 134:2</p> <p>concern (17) 10:16 76:11 82:24 86:3 87:5,6,7 88:5 110:18 129:9 147:18 152:3 165:12 174:5 182:9 183:3,6</p> <p>concerned (7) 14:13 35:25 40:11 108:21 113:19 180:10 186:24</p> <p>concerning (11) 2:14 21:4 61:8 76:1 97:22 101:12 105:23 108:22,25 137:24 165:16</p> <p>concerns (10) 74:20 84:24 85:16,25 109:14 177:5,6,14 182:17 183:12</p> <p>concert (2) 128:1,3</p> <p>concerted (3) 140:18,24 148:3</p> <p>conclude (2) 29:17 98:10</p> <p>concluded (4) 93:13 94:9,19,23</p> <p>conclusion (13) 26:17,21 27:11 29:10,16,22 30:5 78:4 109:25 122:22,22 154:7 172:19</p> <p>conclusions (9) 4:19 7:12 10:3 26:17 94:8,17,24 126:9,11</p> <p>conclusive (1) 94:7</p> <p>conclusively (1) 122:4</p> <p>condition (1) 93:4</p> <p>conductive (1) 180:16</p> <p>conduct (5) 126:16 133:2 154:8 156:5 157:24</p> <p>conducted (2) 109:5 125:24</p> <p>conducting (1) 126:24</p>	<p>confident (1) 20:20</p> <p>confirm (5) 92:8 112:21 163:12 164:16,17</p> <p>confirmation (1) 37:1</p> <p>confirmed (4) 117:11 163:2 164:5 171:6</p> <p>confirms (1) 125:5</p> <p>conflicting (1) 164:17</p> <p>confront (1) 144:1</p> <p>connection (7) 36:16 101:10 103:19,21 105:25 140:8 184:10</p> <p>cons (1) 89:1</p> <p>conscientiously (1) 183:2</p> <p>conscious (2) 35:24 178:10</p> <p>consciousness (6) 20:3,7 28:16 31:20 33:24 34:5</p> <p>consequences (2) 89:7 143:10</p> <p>consider (11) 13:3 27:25 28:11 59:1 89:4 95:1 106:18 113:16 123:19 179:1 185:22</p> <p>considerable (3) 8:3 52:18 183:23</p> <p>consideration (6) 14:9 44:20 78:8 106:6 122:25 158:8</p> <p>considered (12) 12:2 27:5 41:10 96:14 97:18 98:16 117:20,23 121:2 146:20 152:11 168:5</p> <p>considering (5) 3:5 126:16 153:23 165:12 183:2</p> <p>consistent (11) 9:10,16 10:3 15:20 16:4 30:18 32:17,21 132:15 155:23</p> <p>conspiracy (1) 93:15</p> <p>conspired (1) 172:24</p> <p>constraints (2) 114:11 166:21</p> <p>consult (2) 38:22 165:24</p> <p>consultation (1) 38:23</p> <p>consulted (8) 81:24 82:3 114:12 122:14,20 126:2,3 174:9</p> <p>consulting (1) 174:6</p> <p>contact (8) 16:20 17:10,16 99:25 100:15 105:6 111:23 119:19</p> <p>contained (4) 97:10,14,16 172:20</p> <p>contains (1) 99:1</p> <p>contempt (1) 36:14</p> <p>content (6) 78:10 86:11 166:15 178:16 181:12 185:23</p> <p>context (19) 2:12 24:14 39:13 57:12,17 58:7,16,22 66:2 70:17 75:5,9 96:20 125:7 131:19 142:3 145:10,15 180:15</p> <p>contextual (1) 66:13</p> <p>contingencies (3) 83:13 84:15 157:1</p>	<p>contingency (2) 43:15 64:6</p> <p>continual (1) 176:20</p> <p>continue (3) 48:25 82:22 176:19</p> <p>continued (5) 22:8 23:8 83:8 86:11 102:3</p> <p>continues (1) 100:17</p> <p>continuing (3) 23:2 71:13 177:22</p> <p>contradictory (2) 79:6 165:8</p> <p>contrary (1) 173:21</p> <p>contributing (1) 25:2</p> <p>contribution (1) 29:18</p> <p>convened (1) 45:15</p> <p>convenient (3) 95:6 138:10 178:2</p> <p>convention (1) 179:25</p> <p>conversation (6) 100:5,13 127:21 128:20 178:7 187:1</p> <p>convey (1) 186:1</p> <p>convicted (1) 141:3</p> <p>coordinating (1) 143:2</p> <p>coordinator (1) 45:11</p> <p>copies (1) 99:5</p> <p>copycat (1) 175:15</p> <p>corner (3) 10:24 11:17 20:12</p> <p>coroner (50) 1:4,6,20,25 31:10 34:20,23 35:4,7,12,15,21 36:20,23 37:9,11,14 39:4 95:7,15,19 103:4,11 135:21 138:12,20 139:2 163:14,17 166:10,18 178:4,10,16,20,25 179:5,10,15 181:5,19 182:1,22 184:21 185:13,21 186:3,14,18 187:8</p> <p>coroners (1) 180:11</p> <p>correct (94) 6:12 7:8 13:9 19:24 20:25 24:14 26:16 28:22 29:19,21 31:15,17 33:25 37:25 38:3,6 39:20 41:18,21 43:6 45:6,16,21 46:21 48:14 53:9,14,18,22 55:25 59:20,23 60:6,23 61:9 62:1,10,22 68:3,13 69:24 70:3,11 71:23 81:9 83:18 84:6,10 90:4,12 91:8 93:2,5 96:7,10,13 97:9 99:19 100:1 101:5 110:16 111:21 114:8 116:24 117:4 120:5 128:12,17,24 130:13 134:12 135:6 138:3,7 139:24,25 144:8,15 147:8 148:22 149:9 151:14,20 152:2 153:19 155:20 158:7,19,24,25 163:5 167:3 171:11 176:4</p> <p>corroborated (2) 152:21 172:24</p> <p>corroborative (1)</p>
--	--	--	--	---	---	---

153:11
corsa (5) 117:9 120:1
 158:4,5,10
couldnt (1) 104:2
counsel (1) 40:2
counter (30) 38:1
 39:14,14,17
 40:5,7,14,15,22,23
 41:6 45:19 49:10,23
 52:17 59:18 60:7,24
 67:14 104:12,20
 111:11 134:10 138:1
 139:10 140:20 168:4
 171:22 176:15 177:16
countries (2) 49:13 53:4
country (9) 48:9 79:15
 80:1,18 134:20 140:17
 146:13 154:12 176:12
counts (1) 99:19
couple (2) 34:25 112:6
coupled (1) 50:9
course (32) 6:19 8:9
 26:2 71:19 87:24
 97:21,24 99:20 108:24
 116:16 118:24 122:17
 123:5 135:8 139:9
 144:16,23 145:11
 148:4 154:23 155:25
 156:5 162:10,18
 165:4,6,24 166:8
 174:16 178:15 184:18
 186:1
courtroom (1) 35:6
courts (2) 179:24
 183:24
courtyard (6) 10:22
 11:1 12:4 16:6 17:20
 20:13
coverage (13) 80:16
 95:17 102:3 103:1
 112:11,19 117:25
 118:6,14,14,17 130:8
 157:19
covert (2) 68:11 106:6
cpi (1) 56:18
cpr (3) 12:25 13:2 28:8
cps (15) 69:25 70:7,12
 78:3,8 93:9,12,18,23
 94:8,9,24 95:1 146:21
 171:6
crashed (1) 10:18
create (1) 165:17
crime (4) 57:10 72:3
 89:13 144:14
crimestoppers (1) 101:4
criminal (16) 48:24
 53:19 58:13 59:12
 64:19 67:25 70:1,14
 77:11,25 78:4,11
 92:15 122:19 144:7
 145:1
criminalise (1) 59:7
criminality (4) 44:6
 57:2 64:12,13
crisis (1) 143:5
criticised (1) 184:5
criticism (1) 184:7
crossed (1) 172:12
crosses (1) 65:17
crosteamer (1) 168:20
crown (3) 40:2 94:17
 128:13
ct (5) 2:24 82:2 131:15

134:2 177:10
ctsis (8) 39:23 41:14
 43:3 60:14 61:24
 80:12 85:17 151:11
ctsius (1) 40:18
curiosity (1) 170:23
current (1) 41:7
custody (2) 48:6 95:3
cut (2) 4:2 22:7
cutting (3) 21:23 25:6
 29:10

D

daggertype (1) 30:18
daily (1) 51:21
damage (9) 18:10 23:10
 24:22 26:8 28:23
 31:13,16 33:10,15
damaged (2) 26:5,14
danger (1) 176:2
dangerous (2) 89:5
 115:5
dangers (1) 144:2
darr (11) 72:15 73:19
 74:2 75:7 158:18,20
 159:8 160:8
 162:6,11,13
data (2) 117:11,12
database (4) 71:12
 98:25 99:4,5
databases (2) 134:18
 138:4
date (8) 113:11 114:2
 129:1,13 151:7
 152:22,23 153:1
dates (3) 128:21,22,23
david (7) 60:3 78:1 82:6
 171:15 174:5 175:1
 177:3
day (11) 44:13 60:4
 76:4 116:20 124:23
 127:1,19 130:10,21
 141:1 149:23
days (8) 110:9 126:25
 149:2,8 150:10
 167:15,19,20
dc82391 (1) 142:5
dc82392 (1) 142:16
dc82393 (1) 142:19
dc82394 (1) 142:23
dead (1) 12:23
deadly (1) 157:16
deal (19) 42:1 50:17
 52:4 57:21 63:9 65:14
 66:10 70:23 78:17
 89:13 101:2 107:19
 138:20,21 144:1
 157:12 178:17 179:16
 180:19
dealing (14) 14:19 50:8
 51:21 52:10 57:5 83:3
 96:1 146:19 149:25,25
 155:9,11 159:24
 171:24
deals (1) 63:11
dealt (3) 19:21 37:1
 163:13
death (32) 7:13,14
 8:6,17,18,24
 9:3,17,22,23 13:6
 19:17 20:3,15,23,24
 24:13 25:2,14
 26:18,19 27:2,4,20

28:18 29:18 30:6
 33:17 34:8,13 154:24
 179:22
debated (1) 46:3
debits (1) 91:20
debris (1) 16:16
decide (1) 98:24
decided (2) 59:5 91:3
deciding (1) 176:9
decision (29) 45:17,21
 47:24 59:7,12 71:5
 81:22,24 82:1,3 83:5
 88:9 92:13 110:16,22
 114:17,20 115:5,5
 116:19 128:14 155:8
 162:17 171:9,18
 173:14,15,25 186:2
decisionmaker (1)
 151:12
decisionmaking (4) 43:2
 115:8 175:6 176:8
decisions (4) 39:22
 45:12 176:7,7
declared (2) 41:13,24
declaring (1) 148:5
dedicate (1) 110:20
deemed (3) 46:25 47:3
 83:2
deepest (2) 4:17 22:12
defensive (3) 17:11
 23:24,25
defensivetype (3) 17:7
 29:13 32:24
definitely (1) 66:16
definitively (3) 60:18
 77:2 91:2
defrauded (1) 94:4
degree (12) 2:8 13:24
 27:14 30:24 33:20
 44:9 52:21 76:11
 110:18 116:3 121:24
 181:4
delay (1) 92:20
delivered (1) 30:3
delivery (1) 40:25
democracy (1) 144:20
democratic (1) 144:17
demonstrable (1) 24:8
demonstrated (1) 30:23
demonstrates (1) 58:3
demonstrating (1) 31:7
demonstration (3)
 149:7,16 150:11
demonstrations (1)
 147:4
demonstrators (2)
 149:25 150:3
denied (3) 74:24 75:1
 162:9
depart (1) 184:25
department (2) 38:2
 54:25
departure (1) 184:18
depend (7) 44:8 46:5
 48:2 59:4 70:17
 73:24,25
dependent (1) 57:16
depending (1) 47:21
depends (8) 44:4,13
 57:12 58:7 75:5
 117:24 118:14 145:15
depicted (2) 5:18 11:7
deploy (1) 68:14

depression (1) 182:19
deprive (1) 183:22
deprived (1) 121:21
depth (5) 4:16
 24:6,10,20 25:10
deputy (1) 43:10
describe (14) 3:11
 21:20 22:16,22 41:6
 46:14 49:12 54:10
 56:11,21 57:21 62:15
 100:7 145:19
described (13) 6:18,19
 13:23 14:4 17:5 18:21
 19:8 31:13,16 32:22
 33:11,24 59:21
describing (3) 15:21
 57:9 58:4
designed (1) 50:13
desire (4) 139:14
 144:17 145:18 186:19
desk (3) 74:6 131:3
 161:4
desperate (1) 182:20
despite (3) 83:14 102:3
 111:4
detail (13) 14:2 78:14
 79:10 89:22 109:11,12
 115:12 120:6 126:12
 179:17 181:2
 182:20,24
detailed (2) 19:1 109:23
details (7) 1:16 36:15
 67:24 72:19 76:16
 131:1 165:19
detect (1) 24:2
detected (2) 4:22
 139:16
detection (1) 157:8
determine (5) 26:18
 42:13,20 111:24
 122:11
deterred (1) 183:6
develop (2) 68:7 143:20
developing (1) 107:15
developments (1) 113:1
devices (7)
 96:4,19,21,25 97:3,23
 99:21
dhar (3) 77:13,23
 170:14
diagram (1) 21:19
dictates (1) 46:11
didnt (39) 12:10 63:3
 65:25 74:10
 75:10,10,11 77:25
 86:25 87:13 88:8
 100:11 101:19 102:22
 105:24 111:2,2 114:19
 120:4 121:8 123:18
 124:18,18 125:11
 135:9 150:8,16,22
 151:2 158:6 159:13
 166:25 167:1 169:10
 170:25,25 172:1
 175:1,18
die (1) 155:2
died (2) 13:3 28:11
difference (1) 62:14
differences (1) 54:19
different (5) 93:20
 160:2,18 161:4 178:2
difficult (5) 75:4 87:19
 120:8 124:7 147:19

difficulties (3) 35:16
 138:25 144:4
difficulty (6) 33:9
 37:4,10,11 98:18
 166:9
diffuse (2) 52:6,12
digital (1) 50:17
dimension (4) 51:6,6,8
 183:24
diminished (1) 115:25
diminishing (1) 81:21
diploma (1) 2:9
direct (4) 50:14 89:10
 93:12 99:25
directed (6) 21:22
 24:5,19 81:15 84:2
 176:12
directing (2) 39:17
 55:17
direction (20) 14:7
 66:16 74:5,18 75:22
 86:10 108:19 129:15
 131:10 134:3,7
 159:14,15
 160:10,11,11,18
 161:1,4,10
directions (1) 160:1
directly (6) 31:10 42:9
 57:23 67:10 126:3
 150:14
disagree (9) 67:7,13
 90:21 114:17 115:1
 124:18 126:6,10 174:4
disagreed (1) 116:11
disagreeing (2) 114:20
 115:9
disbelieve (1) 161:8
discern (2) 4:18 23:13
disclosed (1) 171:5
discloses (1) 144:12
disclosure (1) 109:6
discount (1) 25:1
discover (2) 103:18
 118:12
discovered (2) 100:21
 105:21
discreet (1) 109:5
discuss (7) 43:12 46:24
 63:15 75:16 122:18
 162:9 178:19
discussed (3) 43:7
 75:12 89:1
discussing (2) 74:25
 138:24
discussion (12) 85:12
 93:12 125:1 128:5,6
 137:10 150:5,5 168:20
 175:4 176:15,20
discussions (2) 100:9
 153:12
disease (2) 7:2,3
disembarkation (1)
 80:14
disengagement (1)
 116:3
disengaging (1) 78:23
dismissed (1) 145:24
dispel (1) 180:24
disrupt (1) 64:19
disrupted (2) 52:22
 155:5
disrupting (2) 45:13
 52:21

disruption (13) 43:14,22
 44:1,2,6,10,20,24 46:6
 48:20 71:2 80:7 88:25
disruptive (2) 89:21
 116:4
disseminate (1) 144:14
disseminated (3) 50:12
 70:18 160:1
disseminating (2) 56:19
 82:15
dissemination (6)
 70:2,22 71:1,10 73:17
 99:11
distance (6) 11:17,21
 12:5,6,14 28:1
distinct (1) 33:5
distressing (1) 1:15
distributed (1) 70:14
distributing (1) 72:23
divert (2) 43:23 176:9
divide (1) 144:25
divided (1) 42:5
dividing (1) 138:14
doctor (1) 4:9
document (8) 56:14
 57:14,18,19
 58:8,17,19 60:11
documentary (10)
 149:13,14,18,24
 167:4,7,25 168:13,18
 169:5
documents (1) 141:14
does (12) 39:17 42:19
 44:8 48:25 54:1,7,17
 86:9 87:18 132:24
 151:2 173:11
doesnt (8) 55:20 57:22
 74:22 82:20 136:14
 144:6 145:7 156:15
doing (8) 68:16 87:10
 88:7 106:4 132:13
 134:7 159:10 166:21
domain (1) 180:22
domestic (2) 49:23
 164:22
domestically (1) 79:19
done (13) 66:18 86:10
 87:13,15 104:19 128:1
 131:6 132:5 137:19
 139:10 151:13 185:25
 186:1
dont (31) 37:3,10 39:10
 54:14 55:23 85:11
 101:24 112:20 113:2
 117:14 126:7 135:23
 136:22,24 137:19
 141:1,14 143:22
 152:23 155:2 157:6
 166:10,12 168:14
 169:20 171:22 176:24
 177:18,20 182:20
 185:16
door (10) 71:15,21
 76:15 84:20 86:4
 92:24 148:25 167:5
 168:1 169:5
doubt (1) 113:9
down (23) 1:9
 11:10,17,20 12:6
 15:25 16:5 18:18
 27:22 33:10 37:3 42:4
 43:11 48:9 58:12
 74:13 86:12 90:17

127:18 135:15 142:20
 159:22 160:14
downgraded (2) 89:23
 167:1
downgrading (1) 90:14
downward (3) 30:16,18
 78:20
downwards (6) 14:2,6
 21:22 22:8 25:8 31:5
dr (13) 1:3,5,6,13,23,24
 13:17 21:1 30:12
 34:17,19,20 188:3
draw (1) 87:18
drawn (5) 20:23 51:2,9
 87:20 122:8
draws (1) 182:17
drive (1) 96:9
driver (1) 97:17
driving (1) 133:19
drop (1) 156:17
dropped (1) 127:5
dropping (2) 118:10
 127:14
dry (1) 7:6
due (4) 92:20,21 128:9
 135:8
duration (2) 116:18
 140:19
during (16) 38:24 44:19
 47:17 48:24 68:4,5,24
 69:16,20 71:19 78:16
 83:9,17 116:25 117:7
 158:11
duty (1) 145:12
dynamic (2) 51:24
 157:24
dynamics (1) 14:9

E

earlier (7) 99:3 150:10
 152:18,21 157:22
 159:21 163:9
early (23) 62:3 63:14,17
 70:8,10,19,23 71:22
 76:14 84:5,19 103:13
 107:21 108:1
 112:17,23 127:4
 140:1,4,12 150:8
 151:11 166:24
easier (3) 37:15 166:17
 178:11
easiest (1) 39:7
easily (1) 156:8
east (3) 49:22 73:3
 134:25
edge (1) 3:21
education (1) 52:2
effect (17) 8:21 26:21
 27:11 49:14 50:6,23
 89:5 90:13 105:10
 127:20 152:19 180:8,8
 181:9,13 184:12 185:7
effectively (2) 45:24
 83:7
effects (6) 8:5,20 49:23
 70:1,1 183:3
effort (5) 40:8 110:9
 140:18,25 148:3
efforts (9) 52:17 110:10
 114:1 130:16,18
 137:17 165:17 166:2
 173:22
eight (1) 97:7

either (25) 7:4 13:4 38:21 39:5 45:12 50:2 55:1,16 57:9 60:25 63:4,10 90:10 93:14 99:7 110:16 117:1 121:2,9 128:1,6 141:8 156:12 159:11 174:3	episode (1) 15:22 equally (1) 29:20 equated (1) 30:3 equipment (2) 37:15 95:14 erick (1) 15:9 erroneous (1) 115:7 error (8) 74:16 159:12,19 160:7,14,19 161:5,5 escalating (1) 115:9 especialy (4) 52:7,20,25 54:3 essentially (2) 32:2 156:1 established (2) 66:8 100:15 establishes (1) 179:21 establishing (1) 54:12 estimate (1) 20:9 estranged (1) 186:15 et (3) 52:12 57:4 164:4 europe (6) 52:8,20,25 53:5 145:20 177:23 european (1) 179:25 eurostar (1) 134:20 even (16) 18:3 19:7,24 29:7,14 49:3 67:8 100:3 132:14 147:6,14,22,24 149:5,6 150:22 evening (3) 113:15 132:22 185:24 event (6) 75:23 83:21 86:4 101:14 125:6 175:2 events (11) 9:17 40:5,9,10 49:24 71:20 93:11 122:17 148:24 149:1,2 ever (7) 55:6 63:1 71:7,9 96:17 120:14 182:7 every (7) 76:4 110:3 111:7 143:25 155:8 175:17 184:21 everyone (2) 36:3 183:20 everything (2) 75:4 126:18 evidence (82) 1:14,15 7:1,3 9:7 10:1,5 11:4,5 12:17 14:16 15:9 16:14 18:13 27:21 28:4,7 31:18 32:18 33:7 34:19 35:9 38:7 39:22 46:10 48:12 49:16 50:16 55:15,16,18 63:4 64:15,16 66:24 80:13 84:17 91:7 92:15 93:10,14 94:5,24 97:14,16 102:2 110:3,5 131:21 138:17 141:6,11 143:24 144:3,9 145:1,2,5 146:8 147:2,2,20 157:18 161:21 178:21 180:8,13,25 181:1,3,6,11 182:10,11,13,21 183:18,23 184:5,9 185:7	evidential (10) 43:18 52:15 54:7 55:21 70:5 80:24 92:3,5 116:6 156:12 evidentially (1) 80:13 evinced (1) 124:12 exact (5) 66:22 68:14 73:14 164:3 172:18 examination (10) 3:2,5 6:13 7:10 19:2 21:6,9 25:20,23 26:11 examinations (3) 1:17 2:13,20 examine (2) 96:17,21 examined (2) 96:12,12 examining (1) 96:19 example (16) 15:1 36:17 38:19 46:1 56:14 58:4 79:19 86:5 140:6,9 158:8 159:24 160:2 181:17 183:17 184:8 examples (1) 157:15 exceptional (1) 184:20 exchange (1) 141:22 excuse (1) 69:6 executed (1) 170:9 executioners (1) 170:17 executions (1) 97:13 executive (8) 44:22 45:4,8,15,18,22,23 63:1 exercise (5) 45:25 125:18 126:12 180:1,6 exhibits (1) 97:6 exist (1) 56:7 existed (2) 64:16 177:21 existence (1) 175:20 expect (4) 8:24 26:25 27:14 156:21 expected (2) 12:11 27:17 expediency (1) 180:15 expediently (1) 180:14 experience (9) 44:11 46:12 47:6 120:14 171:21 172:1 174:20 177:12 182:18 experienced (2) 67:14 142:11 experts (1) 94:18 explain (2) 41:22 159:12 explained (1) 184:17 explanation (2) 16:19 133:21 exploit (1) 43:18 exploiting (1) 155:21 explore (1) 43:17 exponentially (1) 50:6 express (2) 72:8 74:20 expressed (1) 71:18 expresses (6) 59:8,13 182:9 183:3,5,12 expression (3) 144:22,24 145:8 extant (2) 51:11 83:14 extended (1) 54:2 extensive (2) 7:19 102:3 extent (4) 84:11 87:12 107:4 185:2 external (3) 3:5 21:9	25:20 externally (5) 8:10,11,20 26:24 27:16 extreme (6) 57:3 71:19 72:8,25 75:24 97:11 extremely (4) 46:13 148:6,17 164:25 extremism (2) 51:2 164:8 extremist (35) 42:6,8,11 56:4,8,10 57:5 58:3 62:9 67:22 69:16,23 70:22 71:1 72:12 87:1,25 90:2,3,11,24 99:5,23 105:20 112:24 115:20,21 123:12,14 126:22 132:10 144:6 151:18 164:14 170:20 extremists (6) 50:11 69:13 77:14 146:19 150:1 173:22 eyes (1) 98:3 eyewitness (1) 32:18	<hr/> F <hr/>	25:20 180:10 185:16 186:5,6,24 fastmoving (2) 14:10 15:21 fatal (9) 4:19 7:24 10:14 13:20 15:25 27:8,17 29:23,25 fatality (1) 19:22 fault (1) 94:1 favour (1) 144:20 feasible (1) 11:24 feature (2) 7:2 101:18 featured (13) 60:19 71:15,20 80:1 101:3 104:17 105:16 148:11,25 168:13,15,16 169:3 features (4) 14:9,24 164:8 169:21 featuring (1) 170:17 february (2) 81:7 171:8 fed (1) 126:4 feed (3) 36:25 37:21 67:9 feel (6) 39:10 68:13 116:12 118:13 180:24 181:4 feet (1) 15:13 fell (3) 12:3,14 178:12 fellow (2) 2:8,10 felt (2) 52:23,24 183:14 fertiliser (2) 141:21 142:2 few (8) 10:1 12:17,25 33:7 34:9 149:2 150:10 175:18 field (1) 94:18 fight (15) 77:14 79:12,16,18 80:10 82:18 145:9,12 153:25 161:16,25 162:1 164:18,25 173:5 fighting (3) 115:18 165:11 170:16 figure (7) 47:18 52:22 54:24 69:5 104:5 105:20 182:9 figures (10) 69:1 71:18 77:13,20 78:7 82:14 102:7,14 123:14 167:7 files (1) 97:10 final (3) 16:4 56:4 62:18 finally (2) 59:6 137:25 find (11) 3:17 5:7 9:4 12:8 17:22 19:2 24:22 25:16 26:12 120:7 161:17 finding (3) 106:19 172:6,7 findings (4) 6:15 7:9 25:19,24 fine (3) 138:24 139:2 187:2 finish (1) 186:17 finished (1) 124:4 firearms (2) 52:12 158:1 firm (2) 17:11 30:3 first (32) 1:3,24 2:17 3:1,8 4:25 12:18 21:12,23 22:16 28:12 41:11,12 49:9 56:7,10 60:7 61:3 64:4 73:7 82:11,20 91:10 108:4	115:15 119:18 138:22 139:19 161:5 178:7 182:6 183:12 firstly (1) 115:24 fist (1) 23:22 fit (3) 10:2 132:24 161:10 fitness (8) 102:19,21 103:14 106:2 113:14 119:21 127:4 134:21 fits (1) 132:24 fitted (1) 74:25 five (1) 126:25 flag (4) 129:10,11 150:4 169:23 flexed (2) 23:17,21 flyonthewall (1) 167:25 focal (1) 153:12 focus (14) 74:17 78:24 79:1,7,21 81:17 83:1,5 84:8,12 97:4 109:20 156:3 171:19 focused (3) 74:6 174:24 175:13 focusing (7) 5:6 6:14 25:23 142:21 151:21 168:22,25 follow (5) 1:15 3:17 21:17 75:6 86:8 followed (16) 31:18 34:8 55:12 70:9 75:18 100:4 109:3,25 110:15 136:11 149:9 155:9 167:15 168:2,6,25 follower (1) 143:11 following (11) 10:13 20:15 38:4 68:24 81:8 102:17 116:16 119:16 167:19,20 169:8 followon (1) 175:19 follows (5) 72:20 91:10 175:16 182:6 183:12 followup (2) 73:19,23 food (1) 134:24 footage (6) 76:17,18 169:7,12 170:23 171:4 force (16) 3:8 4:22,24 7:21,23,25 8:3,4 21:12 22:14 25:4 29:23 30:1,3,4 31:14 forces (1) 143:14 forearm (4) 5:15 6:7 17:6 23:20 forearms (1) 17:15 forensic (3) 2:3,10,11 forgive (1) 171:21 form (14) 29:11,22 42:24 46:16,17 60:11 89:20 101:11 116:4 130:25 131:1,17 183:10 185:11 formal (2) 43:9 70:10 formally (2) 44:13 60:10 formed (1) 137:8 forms (3) 81:1,2 118:17 formulation (1) 9:24 forum (1) 82:15 forward (10) 16:13 17:2 32:23 43:19 66:16 71:6 94:15 146:21 161:9 169:20 forwards (2) 24:5 25:8 found (15) 7:5 10:25	14:18 16:6,10 17:14 18:14 66:5 77:23 97:23 98:16 105:6 110:6 162:2,5 founded (1) 181:21 four (3) 40:18 93:13 149:11 fourpage (1) 182:23 fourthly (2) 115:20 185:5 fractures (1) 18:17 fragmentary (1) 120:15 framework (1) 143:24 france (2) 134:20 145:20 fraud (12) 89:3 91:5,7,16 92:6 94:1 96:2,20 97:1,7 116:4 128:10 frauds (1) 94:12 fraudulent (2) 88:23 92:19 freedom (2) 144:22,23 frequent (1) 48:14 frequented (1) 103:2 frequenting (1) 106:3 frequently (1) 55:4 friends (4) 134:23 182:7 183:15 184:16 fringe (2) 145:24 146:2 front (18) 3:9,12 5:8 6:11,14,16 7:15 15:23 16:7 21:14 22:20 23:2 26:3,4 51:4 95:21 179:5 182:23 fruitful (1) 169:18 frustrated (2) 79:20 80:3 full (4) 1:21 47:16 57:1 116:10 fuller (2) 49:4 173:24 fundamentalist (1) 54:11 further (36) 10:1 11:21 13:24 21:3 27:24 28:7 30:11 39:8 42:13 58:16,22 77:11 81:3 93:7 94:20,23 100:2,18 102:17 107:12 108:18 111:3 112:6,21 129:4,15,15,21 130:6 131:4 162:10 169:20 182:20 185:17 188:6,7 future (3) 139:17 183:4,6
---	---	---	---	----------------------	---	--	--

generally (9) 40:7 57:19 58:9,23 89:8 104:21 137:22 180:17 183:22	granting (2) 180:9 181:8	95:13 108:17 131:10 178:5	46:20,25 47:3	175:4	importantly (1) 36:13	102:8,15
generating (1) 76:12	graphic (7) 1:16,19 5:4 15:6 17:3 21:24 22:21	happens (4) 63:17 74:21 135:12,13	highheeled (1) 15:11		imprisonment (2) 48:21 155:3	inform (2) 38:8 88:5
get (16) 12:18 15:12 17:22 18:9 36:4 73:15 75:19 76:4 79:25 80:20 131:21 146:11 156:12 161:11 167:4,14	graphics (3) 22:14 24:1 32:2	happy (3) 39:12 64:2 178:19	highlighting (1) 176:2	ibrahim (3) 105:2,11,14	improve (4) 80:22 180:12,25 185:6	information (61) 2:21 38:20 58:6 67:9 68:12 69:22 73:20 74:5,25 75:3,10,19 76:22 85:11,17 88:1,21 89:1 96:18 101:12 103:14,22,23 105:9 107:15 108:1,10,16,18 110:25 111:3,9 120:19 121:4,5,6,7,18,21 126:4 131:2,5,25 132:20 133:16 134:6 135:2,9,25 136:7,9 137:2,14 146:15 153:5 158:22 161:3 162:7,19,24 165:8
gets (1) 73:14	grasp (1) 29:14	harbouring (1) 91:1	highly (3) 95:5 145:2 156:6	id (1) 132:6	improved (1) 95:14	informing (1) 76:5
getting (3) 39:4 134:4,5	grateful (4) 13:18 37:12 139:10 153:2	hard (2) 9:19 18:19	highprofile (1) 87:3	idea (5) 30:2 90:23 123:1,1 124:11	improving (1) 177:22	informs (1) 156:14
give (24) 1:13,16,21 2:6 9:21 30:2 35:8 59:25 60:12 70:13 75:18 98:24 121:8 147:19 160:7 162:20 166:3,19 174:15 181:1,11 182:10,11 184:5	gravel (1) 132:19	harder (1) 52:13	highrisk (6) 42:6 62:8 90:1 151:18 172:11 176:6	ideas (3) 144:13 145:16,25	inaccurate (1) 132:1 177:7,15	inherited (1) 62:3
given (31) 1:13,14 13:6,11 18:23 20:15 28:23,25 41:16 54:24 60:3 62:11 73:2 78:6 90:23 106:2,6 110:18 111:9 121:24 124:11 133:24,24,25 134:1 147:17 152:23 153:1 171:16 180:6 181:15	graver (1) 48:18	harm (3) 38:18 68:2 179:22	himself (3) 92:9 140:7 157:4	identifiable (1) 136:7	inadequacies (2) 177:7,15	informs (1) 156:14
gives (2) 58:19 131:2	graze (1) 5:13	hasnt (3) 55:14 147:6,14	hindsight (3) 132:14 133:22 171:2	identified (24) 4:25 9:15 11:18 28:23 44:17 61:23 64:5,17 109:4 118:3 121:11,14,15,19,25 123:9,10 134:13 138:6 158:5 159:4,17 160:25 163:5	inadequate (1) 177:18	informs (1) 156:14
giving (7) 16:18 38:7,23 42:18 105:6 180:25 181:6	grazes (5) 5:3,10 9:15 16:10 17:5	hat (1) 156:18	hip (2) 5:12,13	identify (25) 3:8 5:1,14,17,21,24 6:6,9 21:12 22:14 24:16 25:4 64:8,22 80:16 84:16 110:10 111:22 120:10,21,24 122:2 151:6 152:7,14	included (6) 78:6 96:8 155:15,18,21 172:4	informs (1) 156:14
glean (1) 170:22	grew (1) 50:5	hate (1) 57:2	hire (6) 130:16,18,22 131:4,23 132:18	historically (3) 54:3 55:1,19	includes (1) 180:15	informs (1) 156:14
global (2) 54:12 58:12	grid (3) 46:19,22,23	havent (1) 137:15	hired (1) 133:18	history (1) 115:19	including (11) 9:14 69:1 82:14 87:4 93:21 94:12 97:11 113:4,13 119:19 134:23	informs (1) 156:14
globally (1) 53:1	grip (1) 17:19	having (27) 6:5 32:17 35:17,18 50:16,19,24 52:20 53:1 56:12,17 57:13 61:10 67:21 74:4,12,12 98:18 116:10 127:21 137:10 139:17 142:14 147:15 165:15 171:2 177:1	hire (6) 130:16,18,22 131:4,23 132:18	hold (2) 2:8,9	inconsistent (1) 184:15	informs (1) 156:14
goes (9) 56:17 73:13 98:15 117:5 123:23 137:23 141:5 143:13 182:21	gripped (1) 6:5	hawkthorn (5) 60:1 61:5 74:3 89:23 114:6	hiring (2) 66:9 131:13	holding (3) 13:2 23:20 184:3	increase (4) 39:5 115:22 123:13 176:17	informs (1) 156:14
going (48) 2:16 11:21 16:22 35:5,22 43:19 51:22 59:4 62:21 64:24 68:13 71:4 78:1 79:10 85:2,13 87:3 88:1,13 100:12 103:4 107:11 110:21 116:7 119:24,25 120:6 122:10,23 123:8 131:1,10 137:22 138:12 141:14 143:20 150:21 160:3 161:18 164:18 165:9 166:18 171:16,19 177:21 178:5,17 181:2	griptide (2) 6:3 9:14	head (1) 22:1	historically (3) 54:3 55:1,19	holistic (2) 52:2 65:1	incredibly (1) 83:24	informs (1) 156:14
gone (12) 3:18,18 11:10,17 20:1 87:22 136:9 140:22 141:10 162:13 168:8 185:24	grossly (1) 179:20	head (1) 22:1	home (6) 2:3 96:4 113:15 124:24 140:10 176:16	home (6) 2:3 96:4 113:15 124:24 140:10 176:16	increasingly (3) 51:9 72:25 75:24	informs (1) 156:14
good (4) 1:6 56:14 95:20 123:1	ground (6) 12:7 16:4,11 18:19 20:12 154:15	heads (2) 181:25 185:18	hope (6) 13:2 37:3 95:13,16 138:22 144:24	horizontally (3) 14:5 23:1 24:6	independently (2) 27:8,17	informs (1) 156:14
goodmayes (1) 100:25	group (16) 44:5 45:5,8,15 54:6 55:20 56:2 63:2 142:25 147:7 148:7,17 152:4,10 165:1,5	health (2) 51:1 65:3	horizontally (3) 14:5 23:1 24:6	horribly (1) 100:10	index (1) 188:1	informs (1) 156:14
gosh (1) 161:12	groups (2) 56:3 144:2	hear (7) 36:5 38:14 74:23 78:1 89:22 94:25 104:2	horrific (1) 32:9	horribly (1) 100:10	indicate (3) 18:16 82:13 185:14	informs (1) 156:14
government (6) 53:25 54:5 59:10,14 143:4 176:20	growth (1) 112:25	heard (15) 9:7 14:16 15:8 16:14 27:21 31:18 33:7 53:16 101:9 124:6 136:1 137:13,16 161:21 181:10	horwulf (9) 55:22 165:22 166:7,15,20 178:6,10,16,18	horribly (1) 100:10	indicated (5) 17:19 23:15 53:10 103:1 157:18	informs (1) 156:14
governments (1) 143:17	guidance (1) 111:25	hearing (3) 70:7 98:18 158:20	host (2) 79:25 172:8	horribly (1) 100:10	indicates (1) 23:19	informs (1) 156:14
grade (1) 42:18	guide (2) 48:3 99:6	hearings (1) 158:21	hosted (2) 124:24 125:2	horribly (1) 100:10	indicating (1) 93:25	informs (1) 156:14
grading (3) 7:23 41:17,23	guiding (1) 54:10	heart (18) 4:5,10,11,14,16 7:2,18 8:8,9,13,14 13:23 18:22,24 19:12,22 20:2 167:11	hostile (2) 65:23 125:7	horribly (1) 100:10	indication (4) 98:6 101:21 102:22 147:19	informs (1) 156:14
grant (2) 185:15 186:4	guilt (3) 182:12,16 183:13	heart (18) 4:5,10,11,14,16 7:2,18 8:8,9,13,14 13:23 18:22,24 19:12,22 20:2 167:11	hotheaded (1) 145:23	horribly (1) 100:10	indications (1) 99:1	informs (1) 156:14
granted (7) 92:15 109:7 169:16 179:24 181:16 182:2 185:12	guilty (2) 184:4,11	height (1) 30:25	hotline (5) 72:15,21 73:13 158:17,22	horribly (1) 100:10	indicators (1) 156:23	informs (1) 156:14
	gym (17) 102:24 103:2,19 105:5,8,12,14,20,24 106:7,9,11,16,25 113:21 129:19,20	held (1) 86:14	hough (62) 1:3,11,12,21 13:14 21:3,4 30:9 34:18,23,25 35:5,8,13,16,22 36:10,21,23 37:6,10,18,19 39:4,10 59:11 95:6,8,12,16,20 103:4,6,12 108:4 117:21 118:13 135:25 138:8 153:1 157:22 164:5 178:25 179:4,8,11,16 181:6,23 182:3,24,25 184:23 185:1,18,22 186:4,12,15 188:4,6,9	horribly (1) 100:10	individual (16) 42:4 44:3,5 55:16 56:18 74:16 80:2 82:24 104:8 105:16 147:17,18 160:6,9 165:15 184:22	informs (1) 156:14
	hadnt (6) 91:18 116:5 122:16 128:14,25 175:23	help (11) 13:24 17:22 30:12 31:3 39:9 42:20,23,25 160:6 167:5 185:13	hours (4) 111:8 127:4 134:6 177:20	horribly (1) 100:10	individually (1) 152:1	informs (1) 156:14
	haemorrhage (3) 9:23 26:19 30:7	helpful (2) 21:1 34:16	however (2) 45:14 53:5	horribly (1) 100:10	individuals (27) 41:19 42:14 44:5 50:2 54:25 55:10 64:20 77:19,20,21 79:14 83:2,4 101:17 117:16 119:14 127:21 140:22 141:2,9 143:23 146:5 147:20,25 150:6 159:25 167:22	informs (1) 156:14
	haemorrhaging (1) 18:7	helpfully (1) 186:4	hows (1) 95:23	horribly (1) 100:10	industry (1) 84:20	informs (1) 156:14
	haleema (6) 74:7 179:3 180:20 181:9,18 182:3	hemothorax (2) 6:22 7:5	hp (1) 96:9	horribly (1) 100:10	infer (1) 62:20	informs (1) 156:14
	half (4) 68:4,6 102:7 167:2	hence (3) 91:3 148:18 161:3	htc (3) 96:8,11 97:10	horribly (1) 100:10	inflammatory (2) 102:8,15	informs (1) 156:14
	halifax (4) 91:19 92:25 93:22 94:1	here (17) 5:1,19 10:17 24:2 62:14 67:7 79:25 87:1,24 89:9 106:12 142:14,15 154:15 166:21 174:22 184:6	huge (3) 52:7 124:8,10	horribly (1) 100:10	inflict (1) 7:21	informs (1) 156:14
	hallmema (1) 73:2	herring (1) 158:13	hugely (1) 49:25	horribly (1) 100:10	inflicted (3) 21:21 22:23 27:25	informs (1) 156:14
	halt (1) 173:12	hes (7) 80:21 124:3,4,4 132:10 165:5 170:12	human (4) 159:12 160:14,19 183:23	horribly (1) 100:10	infliction (1) 10:14	informs (1) 156:14
	ham (1) 134:25	hierarchial (1) 47:2	hundreds (1) 48:8	horribly (1) 100:10	influence (3) 85:4	informs (1) 156:14
	hand (7) 5:18 6:5 17:19 103:5 145:2,3 167:11	hierarchy (1) 46:22	hypothesis (1) 12:2	horribly (1) 100:10		informs (1) 156:14
	handinhand (1) 46:8	high (7) 10:18 19:11,14 116:13 151:21 166:25 169:15	hypothetical (2) 131:7	horribly (1) 100:10		informs (1) 156:14
	hands (1) 17:15	highest (4) 42:1		horribly (1) 100:10		informs (1) 156:14
	happen (2) 38:23 74:10			horribly (1) 100:10		informs (1) 156:14
	happened (7) 55:14 73:11 74:5 96:2 127:10,25 175:18			horribly (1) 100:10		informs (1) 156:14
	happening (8) 36:23 52:20 69:18 83:13			horribly (1) 100:10		informs (1) 156:14

H

43:13 44:19 45:1	22:23 24:11,24 25:23	159:16 160:5,20 161:1	118:15 122:12	june (15) 1:1 3:3 21:7	17:4,14 21:21 22:23	152:17,20 153:6,6
46:13 49:2,4 54:25	26:10	163:21,23	123:5,22 129:20 132:3	53:13 60:5 73:10	23:14 30:21 32:1,12	158:20 167:1 172:24
62:12,17,20	internally (2) 18:7 26:13	167:13,23,24 171:8,13	135:8 136:9,19,19	77:24 91:12 93:9	66:9,10,12 156:1,9,18	175:18 184:6
63:4,8,15,24 64:21,21	internet (1) 50:11	172:4 173:9,11 176:6	137:25 139:19	105:4 106:10 129:17	157:14	latter (3) 68:4,6 102:18
66:13,14,22	interpretation (1) 54:11	investigations (17)	144:13,25 145:10	138:5 171:7 187:12	knives (2) 119:2 124:24	laugh (1) 170:8
67:5,17,18,19 68:7,21	interpreter (1) 37:8	38:8,20 40:6,25	146:17 153:2	jurisdiction (1) 70:15	know (71) 10:16 14:10	launch (2) 154:11
70:4 73:16 74:1	intervene (2) 49:16	42:6,8,12 45:3,14	154:10,13 155:2	jurisprudence (1) 2:10	17:19 36:24 37:1 52:3	172:13
78:21,25 79:10 80:19	146:6	49:23 50:5 157:24	156:25 157:7 159:7	justification (1) 121:3	57:13 69:2,4 71:13,16	launched (1) 41:11
81:20 82:8,23 85:5	intervention (3)	160:2 168:10 171:17	160:12,14 161:3	justified (2) 184:17,19	72:14 75:11,11,15	lawful (1) 143:25
86:8,9,18 87:2,9,25	29:5,5,7	173:21 176:18	162:22 163:13 164:23	justify (1) 77:25	76:15 84:19	lawyer (2) 70:12 185:19
88:12 89:11,12,14,18	interview (4) 92:23	investigative (8) 61:4	165:14 168:7 169:10		86:13,20,22 87:21	lawyers (1) 2:1
90:6,19,22,25 102:10	93:6,8 134:18	64:1 70:10 91:24	170:1 171:15	K	88:16 97:10 104:4	layer (1) 130:6
106:22 107:13,13	interviewed (1) 101:9	107:14 125:14 149:3	174:13,21 177:19,21	kasimi (3) 134:19,21	105:11,25 106:5	layered (1) 85:5
108:22 109:3,15,23,25	into (92) 4:5 10 7:19	152:6	178:5 181:12,20	135:11	107:21 110:1 112:3	layman (2) 87:5 120:7
110:12,14,17,25	8:8,9,12,19 10:18 12:4	investigator (1) 111:19	183:23 184:22 185:24	keep (11) 37:19 48:22	113:11 117:7,9,10	lead (10) 8:22 44:21
111:1,3 113:8 114:24	13:23 16:5 17:10	investigators (1) 146:18	itself (7) 4:3 27:20	95:22 98:2,20 103:6	119:7,16,18,20,22,24,25	45:19,23 101:3 113:6
115:24 116:5	18:21 22:8 23:4	invite (1) 134:23	33:16 76:1 97:21	104:1 110:8 120:17	120:4,23 121:14,17	114:16 149:10,12
120:6,13,15,16,22	24:8,20 25:7,8 26:4,24	inviting (1) 53:22	127:18 154:16	122:11 186:19	122:6 124:25 126:7	173:23
122:19,19 123:3,17	27:13,15 32:9 33:10	involve (6) 45:15 48:6,8	ive (22) 6:17,19 30:23	keeping (1) 39:7	127:4 129:18,19	leader (1) 148:6
124:13,15,19 126:20	37:20 38:8 42:4,5,24	51:8 59:21 65:4	44:11 47:6 66:3 68:8	kemp (3) 142:24 143:13	130:14 132:17	leaders (2) 148:4
130:6 131:5,12	44:23 51:2,9 57:2,16	involved (28) 11:20	104:7 105:3 112:19	150:19	133:7,25 136:2 138:13	177:25
132:3,21 137:11	59:16,19 61:3 65:18	44:12 47:7 60:8	121:25 123:9 138:21	key (7) 50:21 52:15	141:1 148:23 151:8	leadership (2) 69:5
139:22 142:25	67:9,18 68:13 73:9,13	61:13,22,23 64:12	160:4,23 167:21	54:18 55:25 62:14	161:15 162:22 169:4	104:5
143:2,16,19 146:24	75:1 78:19 79:10,11	67:11 71:16 78:22	173:17 179:5	67:7 184:24	171:1 176:24 178:5	leading (4) 19:18 27:6
147:1 151:25	81:2 87:18,20 88:1	82:4 88:22 89:15,19	182:22,23 184:25	khuram (104) 38:9	185:16,23	77:13,20
152:18,18,20,21	89:17 91:25	92:6,7 125:6 126:8	185:23	59:16,19 60:24 61:2,7	186:18,25,25	leads (1) 86:8
153:3,11	95:12,17,21 97:2	137:12 139:23,24		64:9 65:8 67:1	knowing (4) 67:21	lean (1) 134:3
154:2,9,16,17 155:21	100:9 103:7 109:11,12	152:8,14,15 155:16,19	J	68:12,20 69:16	108:5 118:20 133:18	learn (2) 50:21 79:5
156:22 159:1,3,13,24	111:13 112:9 114:1	165:21	jamel (1) 134:19	71:10,14 72:16,23	knowledge (9) 54:14,18	learned (4) 80:9 139:16
160:7 161:13 164:20	118:6,21 120:6,22	involvement (4) 51:12	james (25) 2:14,17 3:1	73:10 77:4,16 82:11	55:8 77:19 91:17	164:6,6
165:3,20 172:16,23,24	123:23 124:2,10,17	64:8,9 184:2	8:11 9:7 10:2,5,25	83:3 84:9,19 85:9	93:23 104:8 111:18	learning (5) 80:22 82:5
173:4,14 174:2,22	126:4 131:1 132:24,24	involves (1) 47:25	11:5,16	86:13 87:14 88:15	141:8	169:19 171:14 174:12
intelligencegathering (10) 48:25 83:8	133:8,19 141:5	involving (4) 47:14	12:3,13,18,20,22,22	90:15,23 91:15,19	known (19) 43:13 60:24	least (6) 30:1 31:14
111:5,6 117:1,5 120:9	151:3,16 154:15 161:9	49:21 113:12 125:12	13:3,3,7,12,18 15:17	92:8 93:10 94:11 95:2	61:22 68:25 76:3	113:21 121:25 123:17
122:1,10 123:25	162:16 167:23,24	iphone (1) 96:8	16:15 20:19 21:5	96:1,4 97:3,20	104:12,20 106:3	140:9
intelligenceled (15)	176:6,18 181:2	iraq (3) 50:3 51:3 148:7	january (6) 76:16 93:3	99:17,22 100:23	108:14 115:6 125:3	leave (2) 79:15 178:19
41:12 44:24 46:7	intrude (1) 185:1	isc (2) 165:19,25	101:10 119:22	101:3,9,15 102:2,6,18	132:25 133:24 134:15	leaving (5) 80:14,17,21
60:12 68:10 83:6	investigate (7) 48:19	147:12 148:6,13,17	167:10,15	118:4 119:7,16	135:11,11 138:5	134:20 182:19
123:5 124:20 128:4	58:16 92:3 120:25	150:4 153:25 161:17	jaw (1) 25:10	120:1,11 124:10,24	140:20 170:21	lecture (1) 58:11
136:19,20 155:23	125:12 137:17 149:6	162:1 164:7,13,18	jeopardised (1) 187:6	125:2,19 126:14 127:3	knows (1) 183:1	led (6) 8:6 41:7 78:25
162:23 174:21,22	investigated (6) 51:7	165:7,11,16 169:24	jibril (4) 97:16	128:9,18 129:6,19	koran (4) 107:22	122:2 147:15 177:9
intend (1) 138:15	134:10 138:1 158:15	170:9,16 173:5	100:1,8,16	130:15,16,22 131:3,22	108:2,7,10	lee (3) 143:10 157:13
intended (1) 85:10	171:22 172:9	islam (4) 54:11 82:17	ji had (3) 50:3 126:24	134:14 142:21		177:15
intending (2) 61:15	investigating (21) 39:15	101:18,22	161:25	149:6,16 150:23	L	leeds (3) 117:8,16
115:18	40:16 47:9,13 48:3	islamic (10) 49:20,22	ji hadi (1) 100:14	151:13 152:3 155:16	l (27) 35:17 38:15 66:21	118:13
intense (1) 110:9	70:24 96:23 106:18	69:17 79:3,9 97:12	ji hadis (7) 71:15,21	158:7 159:1,2,3,16,17	68:23 69:15 89:23	left (62) 3:8,13,18,20
intensity (1) 47:20	136:15 140:2	106:16 133:1 147:11	76:14 148:25 167:5	160:8,25 161:12,19	101:25 102:6 103:3,12	4:13,15,15 5:12,25
intensive (4) 47:25	150:15,22 151:12	164:15	168:1 169:5	163:10 167:24 168:13	108:13 112:6,13,16	6:6,7,20,22,22,24
49:15 84:3 120:8	160:13 161:12 168:12	islamist (1) 97:11	ji hadist (1) 170:14	170:19 176:6,18	113:18,20 115:11	7:6,15,16,17,19
intent (5) 67:1,19 82:13	169:2,11,19 170:3,24	islamistinspired (1) 53:7	ji hadtype (1) 72:24	khayam (3) 141:21	124:7,25 125:5,16	8:2,9,15,21 13:23
98:6 155:12	investigation (92)	isnt (13) 100:16	job (4) 86:13,15 88:1,6	142:2,19	126:12 130:8 135:7	14:4,6 15:4,15,23 16:3
intention (6) 80:9	40:15,17 41:10,20	121:21,25 136:14,16	jobs (1) 116:15	kill (1) 145:9	152:17 153:3 157:7	18:23 19:13,15
115:16 125:20 126:19	42:19 44:9 45:1 48:24	145:23 150:18	join (4) 79:3,8 165:5,16	kind (30) 28:1 64:6	lack (2) 9:10 170:23	22:15,25
153:16 181:20	50:16 59:16,19	154:5,10,22 157:5	joined (2) 12:25 71:14	65:16,22,23 66:13	lacked (1) 65:12	23:4,6,7,10,15
intentions (1) 153:4	62:8,11,23 65:8 67:24	160:13 170:19	joining (1) 85:21	75:25 83:16	language (1) 143:7	24:17,19,20
intercepted (1) 92:24	69:20 70:9,20	isolated (1) 19:24	joint (5) 5:22 23:17	85:3,6,22,24 86:5,19	laptop (3) 96:9,11 97:6	25:5,6,9,17 26:4 27:15
interdict (2) 52:14	74:21,22 77:11	issues (4) 63:11 138:16	43:4,8 63:14	87:8 88:2,24,25 98:6	large (8) 33:12 52:21	29:11,20
156:12	78:16,19 81:11	139:18 142:12	jolley (4) 141:2,12	102:22 107:12,17	131:4 132:19	32:2,4,6,8,8,12,22,23
interest (21) 41:20	82:4,10 84:5,8 89:24	issuing (2) 4:13 19:14	146:8 161:21	124:8 131:11 134:7	141:17,24 156:9	33:14,15
47:15 50:4 54:22	94:14,22 96:20	items (1) 96:17	jolleys (1) 183:17	156:21,22,22 157:16	157:14	leg (2) 6:9 16:3
87:10 99:22 100:18	97:8,19 104:18 105:17	its (89) 3:11 8:4 10:16	jot (7) 43:5,8 44:8 46:4	161:8	largely (2) 8:18 116:22	legal (6) 2:11 96:24
106:12,20 107:5,10	106:14,24	13:7 14:24,25	63:21 122:17 153:13	kingdom (1) 145:20	larger (1) 123:23	138:15 143:24 179:16
113:22 123:24	111:16,20,20 113:20	15:6,23,24 25:7 27:19	jotted (1) 44:12	kitchen (1) 156:9	largescale (1) 40:9	180:18
137:3,5,20 164:15	114:21 115:3,14	35:23 43:9 44:3 45:25	journalist (1) 142:11	knee (1) 6:10	last (6) 51:8 104:7	legislated (1) 54:5
172:9 180:7 183:23,25	121:13,16,20 122:8,11	46:3,21 48:7 57:16	journalistic (1) 169:15	knew (11) 67:21 105:13	141:6 142:1 146:8	legislation (5) 54:1
interested (6) 14:8	123:4,5,16,24 124:8	58:1,8 60:1 61:19	journey (1) 133:13	108:7 114:19 126:18	183:17	57:20 97:25 98:9,17
35:13 124:4 178:17,18	125:1,17 134:15	63:16,20 64:25 68:23	judged (2) 42:16 79:12	128:18 131:14 150:16	lastly (2) 42:14 64:23	legitimate (1) 183:25
181:10	135:3,10,12,15	74:21 76:4 80:5 84:8	judgment (1) 45:25	169:21 170:5 185:3	late (4) 81:7 112:8,17	legitimately (1) 97:1
interests (1) 180:16	136:8,9,20 140:4	98:14 100:6,20 103:8	jugular (2) 21:25 26:15	knife (20) 8:3 13:25	130:4	leisure (1) 119:8
internal (10) 6:13 7:10	148:20 149:10,21	105:18 109:25	july (8) 71:14 88:15	14:23 15:20,25	70:20 71:15,20 72:14	lengthy (1) 155:3
18:21 19:1 21:20	151:4 152:14,24	111:12,18 117:3,3	91:6,15,21 100:23		77:14 91:15 115:17	less (8) 14:1 48:13,17
	155:14 158:5,11,14		148:4 149:23		138:16 142:3 149:14	
			jumped (1) 170:15			

52:13,15 78:23 156:11
169:22
lessons (1) 139:16
let (5) 76:7 78:16 82:9
151:8 180:18
lets (2) 160:1 166:22
level (21) 10:21 11:1
12:7,7 30:4 43:1 45:3
47:20 51:10 54:15
62:5,16,23 81:14
108:24 116:13
117:5,25 123:24
147:17 176:11
levels (1) 41:23
liability (1) 70:14
liaison (4) 45:5,8,15
63:1
licence (1) 84:20
lidl (1) 127:2
life (5) 12:21 13:1 28:4
85:4 155:4
lifespans (1) 47:4
lifetime (1) 44:17
lift (2) 156:9,18
light (3) 71:3 81:19
103:24
lightly (1) 88:9
like (35) 14:7 16:20
17:13,16 18:3,10
20:6,17 21:23 25:6
33:1 34:12 41:13 49:5
51:3 52:23,24 56:11
58:4 65:1 75:14,18
83:21 110:18 116:12
118:13 132:6 139:11
144:2,4 145:19 148:15
164:22 175:2 178:22
likely (11) 9:1 12:20
13:3,7 28:14 34:1
79:11 95:5 148:16
155:2 185:14
limb (1) 135:5
limited (5) 46:10 181:8
184:2,10,10
line (8) 66:11,15 79:14
86:12 107:14 115:9
152:11 172:12
lines (2) 65:15,17
lining (2) 23:8,9
linings (1) 26:5
link (9) 35:25 36:4 37:3
135:17 159:15
160:20,24 163:4
172:12
linked (10) 42:7,9 54:23
55:1,3 62:9 96:22
151:18 163:10 170:19
linking (1) 147:2
links (7) 72:24 112:2
137:15 140:2 141:4,18
146:24
list (4) 47:2 57:1 109:20
141:4
listed (2) 105:11,14
lists (1) 55:23
litres (1) 6:21
little (3) 15:25 30:24
186:16
live (3) 83:19 130:8
144:18
lived (1) 134:25
lives (1) 73:4
living (1) 168:1

lobe (2) 22:10 23:10
local (2) 51:13 53:3
locally (1) 112:2
location (6) 5:10 17:13
106:20,25 108:16
165:9
locking (1) 52:3
logically (1) 132:6
london (23) 40:16,17
41:2 49:9 53:12 73:3,5
86:14 87:4,16 88:16
108:12 112:10,18
113:4 133:8,19 141:22
142:22 156:10 162:8
168:23 175:19
lone (4) 66:25
125:18,21,23
long (5) 10:10 20:23
25:7 127:16 141:4
longer (4) 36:2 48:22
124:4 186:16
longstanding (1) 119:20
longterm (1) 48:20
look (45) 3:23 10:24
11:3,15 12:5 22:13,21
31:10 32:1 43:14 44:7
49:5 51:11 52:19,19
53:23 55:18
56:9,16,23 57:5
64:5,8,14,16,18,23
65:2,3 75:9 89:11
91:25 98:3,4,8 114:1
122:18 133:20 146:3
149:12 150:2 151:4
153:24 177:22 181:24
looked (11) 28:6
74:4,12,12 80:5 85:21
141:2,15 142:5 164:4
184:21
looking (40) 3:7 5:5
7:12,21 8:5 9:4,13
21:11 26:21 27:11
29:22 41:22 42:10
46:18 47:11 49:7,14
52:16 54:21 61:13
65:6 68:4 78:17 80:24
84:4 85:2 92:3 96:5,25
97:5 98:7 99:16 114:4
120:21,22 128:8
131:11 140:15 165:16
168:8
looks (1) 187:2
lordship (1) 166:8
lose (1) 132:13
loss (16) 8:7,19,19,22
18:4,9 19:8,18,23
20:7,7 26:20 27:6,6
30:7 34:4
lost (3) 20:3 28:15
33:24
lot (13) 50:14,24
51:5,24 53:1,4 57:21
70:16 75:21 95:16
145:16 162:16 170:2
louder (1) 39:10
loudly (1) 103:9
low (2) 65:10 171:5
lower (7) 3:15 15:4,19
21:13 31:5 90:9,17
ls (5) 66:24 122:7 148:9
154:7 172:21
lunatic (2) 145:24 146:2
luncheon (1) 95:10

lung (10) 6:24 8:15,21
19:20 22:10 23:10,12
24:9 26:8 27:15
lungs (1) 7:4
lying (1) 32:20

M

m (12) 35:1,8,19 36:11
37:13,24 95:12,20
107:19 138:9 186:10
188:8
machete (1) 157:14
magistrates (1) 92:16
main (7) 4:11,13,14,15
23:1 53:23 63:9
mainly (1) 49:12
maintain (1) 124:8
maintained (2) 122:10
130:9
maintains (1) 46:19
major (14) 5:6 19:5,10
22:1,6 24:22 25:11,11
26:14 28:23 29:5 40:9
143:9 182:8
makes (2) 112:6 138:23
making (10) 75:7 85:10
106:6 111:22
130:18,22 137:16
150:19,20 159:15
man (12) 10:2 15:12
97:13 104:4 134:24
165:13 168:12 169:19
170:24 172:9 173:8
175:9
manage (2) 40:1 46:16
managed (3) 10:7 11:25
33:9
management (2) 64:5
115:10
managers (1) 42:25
managing (2) 45:13
47:17
manchester (2) 53:11
86:6
mannerisms (1) 127:19
manoeuvre (4) 17:11
23:24,25 29:14
many (12) 40:12,15
45:14 54:22 93:23
109:9 141:24 142:12
147:16,16 176:22
183:15
map (1) 4:25
maps (4) 1:18 3:6,23
21:10
march (7) 52:23 53:11
81:7 113:11,23 114:5
122:2
mark (3) 6:3 9:14 17:18
marked (1) 5:1
market (1) 53:12
marking (1) 18:9
marks (6) 5:9 14:20,22
17:4,4 34:4
married (1) 73:4
martyrdom (1) 126:23
mask (1) 170:18
mass (1) 97:13
masseter (1) 25:10
material (56) 49:3
56:5,8,10,17,20,21,23
57:3,3,5,7,8,8,20,22,23,25
58:3,25 59:8,12

69:16,23
70:2,13,17,22
71:1,6,8,10 82:16 88:2
97:18,23,25 98:3,4,8
99:1,2,5,9,11,13,16,18,20,22
112:25 135:7 144:6
159:4 169:15 181:21
matter (13) 47:10
87:5,6,6 93:20 97:24
99:19 123:21 129:9
173:23 178:24 180:2
188:11
matters (9) 38:12 63:9
78:15 100:8 109:15
120:4 138:21 179:20
180:18
mcmullan (5) 2:14 3:1
13:18 15:17 21:5
mcmullans (2) 3:18
7:16
mean (22) 44:11 46:12
69:6 75:13 78:11
82:20 83:7 84:12
87:17 88:12 97:21
101:16 113:6 122:3
129:3,3 131:8 141:7
151:2 164:3 170:6
173:11
means (7) 7:13 26:18
30:2 65:25 68:11
87:14 121:8
meant (1) 157:23
measured (2) 3:16
185:6
measures (17) 35:2
43:14,15 44:2 83:11
179:2,13,13,21
181:7,8 182:1,6
183:10 185:10,15
186:5
mechanism (5) 8:18
19:17 27:4 32:21 88:7
mechanisms (2) 9:20
173:13
media (2) 50:11,17
medical (3) 2:8,9 33:21
medicine (1) 2:11
medium (2) 42:8 151:21
mediumrisk (1) 90:2
meet (2) 44:16 107:6
meeting (24) 43:8
45:6,12 47:1 63:15
107:18 113:12,14,21
119:21 122:17
125:12,15
127:7,10,12,16,20,21
129:21 130:2,4
140:6,13
meetings (8) 43:4,5,7
44:8 113:18,22 114:1
164:6
member (10) 53:20
55:16 74:20 75:25
76:5 147:7,9,14,21
158:18
members (3) 55:10
150:11 159:7
membership (3)
55:7,23,24
membrane (1) 4:5
memory (2) 49:17
167:17
men (1) 132:18

mental (2) 51:1 65:3
mentioned (4) 8:21
14:19 56:25 134:22
mentioning (1) 80:5
mentally (1) 185:3
merits (1) 184:22
message (1) 73:1
messages (1) 39:4
met (3) 44:12 127:3
140:9
method (1) 152:15
methodology (2) 52:9
68:14
methods (2) 120:7,22
metres (2) 11:22 27:23
mi5 (83) 39:19
41:1,7,11,13 43:4,9
44:21,25 45:7,24
46:19 47:1 51:25 53:2
59:21 60:10,16,19
61:7 63:23 64:21 65:7
66:24 68:6,9,25 74:25
81:6,14,18 82:7,25
83:4,8,23 84:5
85:12,20 88:23
97:22,23 99:18 103:12
106:3 108:13
112:11,19 113:6
114:7,21 115:6,9
117:4 122:3,22 125:24
128:2,3 131:9 133:20
135:5,14 136:11
137:6,13,24 139:22
140:19 143:2 153:13
160:5 171:10,18
173:15,23 175:7,11
176:5 177:5,8,16,18
mi5owned (1) 67:8
mi5s (3) 102:11 112:7
160:11
mi6 (1) 143:3
miah (2) 12:18 13:1
microphone (8) 1:8,9
37:19 39:6,12 89:17
98:19 103:8
microphones (1) 95:21
mid2015 (6) 38:10
59:18 60:24 72:2
82:12 153:4
midafternoon (1)
138:11
middle (3) 49:22 142:20
148:20
midmay (2) 122:8
124:10
midst (1) 162:23
midway (1) 16:18
might (59) 6:3 11:20
13:2 14:23 15:19
16:18 17:7,8,25 18:18
19:21,25 29:12 30:3
32:17 34:21 37:4
38:18 39:6 42:9 43:22
49:5 63:23 75:18
79:5,8,17,18,21 80:9
82:9 87:1,5 89:4,5
94:10 96:18 97:1
101:23 108:20,23
109:20,24 110:19,21
111:24,25 115:13
120:7 121:13,15
137:10 152:8
155:16,18 161:12

164:20 165:13 178:6
mind (2) 7:23 8:1
militant (2) 82:17 104:6
military (2) 158:9,12
mind (15) 11:3 42:23
44:10 49:11 59:11
65:15,20 112:15
154:3,11 164:24
166:10 168:17 172:13
186:21
mindset (16) 57:22
67:22 72:12 76:2 83:4
99:13 100:14 101:21
126:22 133:24 144:9
145:2,5 150:17 164:14
170:21
minor (5) 5:6,7 9:15
15:3 101:16
minors (2) 51:14 65:3
minute (7) 9:2 20:8,10
27:2 28:6,21 169:22
minutes (9) 12:20 13:1
20:16 28:5,8,12 33:25
34:9,13
miss (1) 168:12
missed (5) 120:25 121:6
161:17 162:5 168:14
missing (1) 93:1
mistake (1) 36:18
mitigate (1) 46:15
mixed (3) 128:21,22,23
mizanur (1) 148:12
mils (1) 26:6
mm (1) 131:24
mmhm (1) 168:24
mobile (2) 73:2,6
model (1) 59:21
moderate (9) 7:24 8:1
30:1 31:14 125:19,21
126:15,15,19
mohammed (1) 71:17
moment (7) 21:18 41:6
95:6 103:5 138:10
153:24 178:3
moments (1) 14:12
monday (1) 126:25
money (3) 92:9 94:2
146:11
monitor (2) 165:17
166:2
monitoring (4) 68:18
90:14 130:25 131:2
month (1) 123:18
months (13) 93:21
102:18 110:2 111:6
119:9,17 120:9 153:6
155:8 168:2,6,25
169:8
more (57) 3:15 13:15
14:1 17:2 19:25 22:20
28:20 30:10 33:2 47:3
48:20 49:15 51:24
52:2,6,6,12 58:8
60:18,20 63:23 66:18
71:3 73:20 74:6 75:19
76:20 78:14,24,25
83:2 84:14 89:22
93:21 95:16 97:19
100:3,10,13 104:21,23
111:9 115:12 123:18
144:3 157:24 159:15
162:19 169:19 170:4
177:14 178:18

179:11,17 180:13,16
183:22
morning (4) 1:6 13:19
178:21 187:9
moroccan (1) 134:24
mortem (4) 2:13,20 3:2
21:6
mosque (2) 148:24
163:4
most (3) 50:25 141:13
171:20
mother (1) 73:4
motivation (2) 75:12,13
motives (1) 79:7
mount (2) 55:18 153:16
mouse (1) 54:4
move (26) 4:24 6:13
7:12 10:11 27:22 42:4
44:22 45:18,22 47:24
57:15 59:16 62:16
66:15,16 70:20 71:5
76:14 78:16 79:5 91:5
100:22 107:19 122:20
178:1 181:23
moved (3) 10:5 28:1
70:25
movement (2) 10:7
16:25
movements (3) 20:12
130:11 133:12
moving (14) 14:12
31:23 39:6 56:15 63:5
89:4 113:11 122:6,15
124:21 129:15 156:23
157:19 177:3
mp00091 (1) 10:17
mp00111 (1) 11:4
much (20) 2:12 12:16
13:14 30:9
34:16,19,20,21 42:24
44:4,13 51:4 54:15
57:16 62:3 95:17
98:19 112:5 138:8
178:20
murder (1) 141:21
murdered (1) 143:10
muscle (5) 23:1,2 24:20
25:9,10
must (1) 147:18
myself (3) 43:10 88:23
150:13

N

name (20) 1:21
36:15,17 54:5,8,9
59:24 60:1,3,25 61:7
104:17 105:16 136:7
145:12 180:22 181:11
182:10 183:4,5
named (2) 109:18 147:5
names (5) 54:2,6 105:3
141:18 183:16
narrative (4) 9:11 79:24
102:17 182:9
nascent (1) 164:20
national (10) 38:18
42:15 45:11 59:25
68:15 99:4 109:13
112:12 143:4 167:6
nationwide (1) 91:10
natural (2) 7:1,3
nature (13) 44:8 46:5
48:2 55:20 58:9 60:13

66:19,23 100:6 144:6
 152:7 154:18 172:18
near (5) 4:1 5:25 14:17
 17:18 129:19
nearly (1) 111:7
necessarily (3) 52:3
 53:4 55:20
necessary (2) 1:16
 80:15
neck (15) 21:13,15 22:2
 26:6,20,22 27:18,22
 28:2 29:25 30:8,16
 31:5 33:8,10
need (11) 10:15 33:19
 38:17,22 39:5,12
 43:15 58:18 166:6
 184:8 186:17
needed (4) 73:16
 136:24 155:25 171:20
needs (3) 107:14 156:9
 184:21
nefarious (1) 85:7
negative (1) 109:8
neither (2) 7:3 36:15
network (6) 40:23 41:8
 42:4,12 64:20 177:10
neutral (1) 123:1
never (18) 45:14 50:13
 55:11,19 63:12,13
 75:15 106:1 107:15
 140:23,24 146:2 147:2
 148:2 158:23 168:1,5
 175:4
nevertheless (1) 13:2
newsnight (2) 142:5
 150:19
next (16) 15:8 16:13
 21:19 35:1 36:10
 38:14 71:15,21 76:14
 142:19,22 148:25
 167:5 168:1 169:5
 172:7
nexus (1) 40:7
nhs (1) 52:1
nice (1) 132:9
night (5) 33:8 127:25
 129:17,20 130:4
nitra (2) 71:12 99:4
nobody (7) 15:16 21:4
 35:13 71:9 144:23
 179:8 184:10
nonbeliever (1) 145:19
none (2) 116:9 140:6
nonexistence (1) 117:1
nonexistent (1) 117:3
non-specific (1) 9:18
nor (1) 36:15
normal (4) 60:9
 73:22,24 122:16
normally (8) 39:11 42:3
 44:16 60:10 63:7
 156:21 165:15 179:23
notation (2) 9:21 30:5
noticing (1) 21:22
note (1) 181:14
noted (1) 160:15
nothing (13) 17:16
 18:16 86:1 98:14,16
 121:1,5,10 125:6
 129:11 132:13 168:11
 184:23
notice (4) 60:16
 71:24,25 105:5

noticed (2) 52:7 72:22
notified (5) 114:15
 135:18 136:21,23
 151:2
notify (1) 60:10
notorious (6) 141:17,18
 167:25 170:9,14,17
november (2) 175:24
 179:18
nuanced (1) 63:23
number (45) 5:2,7 6:18
 11:4 15:1 44:2 47:7,9
 49:13 50:1 55:9 56:7
 57:4 61:17,18 64:1
 65:15 69:7,13 73:2,6
 78:6 81:1 94:13,20
 96:4 105:6 108:19
 109:4 111:6 113:12
 124:9 127:1 132:9,19
 140:22 141:9,17,24
 147:25 150:2 151:1
 153:5 163:15 168:21
numbers (3) 43:11
 51:17 119:20
numerous (3) 97:10
 116:14 143:11

O

objection (1) 181:14
objective (1) 54:12
objectives (5) 43:21
 54:16 63:22,24 144:21
obligation (1) 145:9
obligations (1) 179:24
obtain (3) 67:24 92:11
 147:19
obtained (4) 88:6 94:13
 97:6 169:8
obtaining (1) 169:14
obvious (2) 55:13 87:17
obviously (5) 51:2 63:6
 66:2 113:7 151:7
occasion (4) 37:2 140:9
 144:3 159:9
occasional (1) 120:1
occasioning (1) 68:2
occur (4) 8:25 63:7
 123:18 124:9
occurred (3) 13:7 18:6
 137:18
oclock (3) 95:8 178:22
 187:9
october (5) 52:23 92:18
 96:2 101:4,4
offence (20) 48:5,16,17
 56:12,19,22 57:25
 58:5,13,20,24 93:15
 98:13 128:25 129:5
 144:7 145:1,14 169:25
 170:1
offences (24)
 48:12,13,19
 53:19,19,23 56:7,9,24
 57:4 64:17 72:5 77:11
 78:5,11 91:7,24 92:1
 124:16 141:3 168:9
 169:6,13 171:5
offending (4) 64:15
 114:25 116:6 123:3
offered (3) 52:13,15
 80:6
offers (2) 48:20 156:11
office (2) 2:3 73:14

officer (31) 12:25 28:13
 36:10 38:1 39:15
 47:13 55:5 67:15
 80:13 82:2 92:2 94:22
 104:12 106:19 136:16
 139:7,21 142:15
 144:4,24 149:24,24
 151:12 160:13 161:8
 163:20 165:23 167:6
 169:2 171:21 176:25
officers (10) 13:4 40:16
 48:8 77:10 78:9
 139:11 150:2,6,12,15
often (9) 14:11 46:7,13
 55:2 134:23 144:12
 159:7 175:14 180:3
oh (1) 161:11
okay (13) 1:10 64:4
 103:10 141:23
 146:14,15 148:10,14
 153:8 154:6 166:23
 168:23 172:15
oleary (2) 186:15,21
omar (4) 141:21
 142:2,16,19
once (13) 21:9,10 27:4
 29:3 43:3 89:17 103:6
 122:22 133:4 135:16
 136:7 137:5 160:24
ones (3) 77:15 78:7
 97:4
ongoing (5) 38:20 115:1
 123:4 124:8 176:21
online (1) 112:25
onto (6) 8:14 9:19 16:8
 19:1 142:19 156:10
onwards (2) 107:20
 114:5
open (10) 35:10 104:9
 112:14,16 122:12
 152:9 180:7 181:9
 184:1 185:1
opened (3) 60:11
 91:11,14
opening (2) 19:2 151:16
openly (1) 157:7
operated (1) 105:20
operating (2) 19:4
 83:21
operation (71) 19:5
 41:10,13,15,16,24,25
 42:21,23,25 43:13,19
 44:15,18,19,25 46:7
 47:9 59:24
 60:1,4,12,13,15,20
 61:4,4,8,11,12,17,19,21,25
 62:3,6,16
 63:1,12,16,18,22
 64:22 68:10 74:3 76:9
 81:6,22 83:17,19
 89:23 90:16 110:14
 114:6 117:6,18,22
 118:1,20 122:18
 123:22 124:5 131:15
 134:2 148:19 151:17
 152:3 155:24 162:24
 174:22,23
operational (15) 36:1
 40:12,13,25 43:5,8
 51:5,16,23 63:14,25
 92:21,21 116:13
 132:15
operationally (1) 50:7

operations (20) 39:18
 44:12 46:18,20,25
 47:2,4,7,14,17,21
 49:4,24 51:18 116:8
 124:17 168:4
 174:1,7,12
opinion (4) 7:25 26:19
 29:2 171:12
opportunities (9)
 43:18,22 52:15 55:21
 64:19 80:24 108:22
 120:24 155:22
opportunity (16) 43:10
 44:6 48:20 49:15
 52:14 75:19 88:24
 100:2 107:5 118:8,11
 146:6 156:12 161:17
 162:6,9
oppose (1) 114:18
opposing (1) 101:17
opposite (2) 23:22
 43:11
optic (1) 171:18
option (8) 74:24
 75:1,16 88:4,8
 89:9,10,20
order (15) 35:2,3
 36:12,12,13,18 40:9
 46:20 90:17 180:12,23
 181:17,18,20 186:5
ordered (1) 183:10
orders (2) 181:17
 185:11
organisation (14)
 53:17,23 56:24 58:4
 85:21,23 100:24
 136:17 140:21,25
 146:3 147:15 148:1
 150:25
organisations (5)
 53:20,24 54:2,20
 55:23
original (1) 111:1
others (23) 2:18 61:16
 64:9 67:21 71:11
 89:3,21 92:6,14,17
 95:18 96:12,14 98:18
 113:13 124:7 136:1
 152:1,5,14 155:15
 182:14 184:25
otherwise (5) 36:3
 117:13 119:12
 180:1,24
ought (1) 82:2
ourselves (3) 50:7 80:20
 138:25
outer (2) 3:14 22:15
outline (1) 60:13
outset (2) 65:8 180:20
outside (13) 5:13 40:5
 56:22 107:1,2,6
 111:13 112:10,18
 113:4 127:3 130:14
 166:13
ovalshape (1) 6:4
over (17) 5:22 6:10
 12:3 15:11 47:7 62:2
 109:10 115:24 116:16
 122:1 141:3 142:22
 147:4 151:1,15 164:5
 170:18
overall (3) 33:23 69:11
 78:18

overarching (5)
 131:15,19 132:8 134:2
 152:13
overly (3) 127:18
 137:19,24
overseas (9) 49:13,13
 64:11 84:2 154:1
 164:19 165:1,10 173:5
oversight (6) 43:1
 45:4,10 63:2,7,13
overt (2) 106:6,10
overthrow (2) 144:17
 145:18
overthrowing (2) 54:13
 144:20
overview (2) 11:7,15
own (7) 94:5 113:1
 137:8 141:8 152:5
 181:11 182:10
owning (1) 59:12

P

p1 (4) 42:1 62:11,16
 116:14
p2 (2) 42:5,5
p2h (5) 62:7,8 106:14
 151:18 166:25
p2m (3) 42:7 89:23
 106:15
p3 (1) 42:12
p4 (1) 42:14
pace (1) 92:14
paddy (1) 91:20
pages (3) 17:2 101:2
 134:9
pain (3) 20:5,20 34:6
pains (1) 166:11
pakistan (1) 104:6
paragraph (37) 41:22
 47:11 49:8 52:16
 54:21 65:6 68:24
 69:15,21 72:19 78:18
 84:4,7 85:15 93:16,17
 96:5 97:5 101:25
 102:6 103:3,12 107:25
 108:13 112:8,23
 113:20 114:4 122:7
 125:16 128:8 130:10
 134:17 153:2
 163:13,14 179:18
paragraphs (1) 68:5
parallel (1) 49:1
paraphernalia (1) 119:5
paris (4) 81:8 175:23
 176:2,11
park (5) 71:15 100:25
 148:24 149:16 163:4
parliamentary (1)
 165:20
part (36) 3:13 4:2,3,15
 6:5 7:9,15 13:21 17:10
 23:3 31:1,5,6 33:13
 65:1 68:20 85:18 86:1
 111:20 130:5 136:15
 139:14 144:16 145:22
 146:2 148:1,18
 149:4,20 151:3 152:6
 160:25 163:23 168:18
 175:5 179:24
partially (1) 21:23
participation (1) 94:1
particular (25) 9:16
 10:15 33:14 39:21

41:15 42:21 43:16
 44:14 46:10,14 59:3
 69:25 74:10 75:11
 76:9 86:25 89:8,15
 92:25 117:15 130:23
 132:23 133:15 156:6
 158:10
particularly (11)
 24:13,15 25:13 35:24
 38:9 81:13 107:5
 132:4 137:21 182:11
 186:20
parties (1) 186:18
partner (1) 105:1
partnership (2) 39:18
 40:1
parts (1) 33:5
passageway (2) 11:17
 27:23
passed (7) 8:1 13:20
 22:25 73:15 103:14
 135:14 159:22
passing (11) 4:5 7:16
 21:24 22:2 23:1 24:6
 25:7,8 26:4 27:13
 107:7
passport (2) 165:18
 166:3
past (3) 54:22 123:12
 166:6
pathological (1) 29:24
pathologist (1) 2:4
pathologists (3) 1:14
 2:9 7:23
pathology (2) 2:10
 14:13
pathway (3) 140:21
 141:9 146:4
patterson (31) 13:16,17
 21:1 30:11,12 31:13
 34:16 116:19
 138:13,19,24 139:6,7
 153:2 163:16,18
 165:23 166:8,10,16,22
 178:1,4,9,15,19
 186:25 187:5
 188:5,7,10
pause (6) 3:22 21:18
 37:4 103:4 138:20
 165:24
pausing (1) 153:23
pavement (1) 31:23
pc (5) 12:18,25 13:1
 28:5 34:12
pecking (1) 90:17
pen (1) 31:7
penetrated (3) 3:25
 22:24 33:12
people (19) 18:3 31:19
 36:5 50:8 51:8 52:3
 55:3 85:24 88:11
 104:2 112:3 124:11
 146:9 152:2 157:15
 170:8,12,19 172:7
perform (4) 2:13 3:2
 21:6 65:7
performed (2) 98:24
 180:1
performing (1) 2:20
perhaps (6) 27:1 34:2
 36:21 48:13 95:12
 166:20
pericardial (1) 4:6

period (37) 10:7 13:6,8
 16:22 17:21 31:20
 38:4,9 40:11 47:18
 52:19 81:23 83:17,24
 84:3 100:3 109:10
 110:2 115:25
 116:2,16,22,25 117:7
 120:9 122:1,6,11
 123:18 124:14 127:16
 140:16 155:3 158:11
 168:23 175:16 182:8
periodic (1) 43:4
permit (1) 54:1
permits (1) 180:11
permitted (2) 35:14
 187:4
person (15) 12:18 59:2
 70:14 75:20 86:3 88:5
 119:2 137:17 140:2
 159:19 161:5,6 164:24
 170:2 184:3
personal (6) 44:11
 46:12 47:6 51:10
 68:15 149:19
personality (1) 72:22
personally (12) 76:23
 77:2 103:17 104:14,17
 148:8 149:3,15 151:2
 163:6 168:14 169:10
persons (4) 35:13 50:25
 64:17 181:10
perspective (10) 20:19
 34:8 63:25 64:14
 83:11 84:13 103:25
 116:7 151:15 174:17
petrol (1) 127:2
ph04841 (1) 12:6
ph06141 (1) 11:15
phase (8) 44:19 45:23
 47:25 48:25 49:21
 68:10 70:19 157:19
phases (1) 70:20
philosophy (1) 54:10
phone (12) 73:6,12
 75:13 96:11 97:6,10
 119:19 127:5,14,24
 131:9 134:5
photograph (3) 12:5,8
 125:5
pick (3) 111:7 138:22
 186:9
picked (4) 120:20
 160:16,21 161:14
picture (36) 33:23
 46:13 49:2,5,17 63:15
 64:21 66:3 68:7 71:4
 72:10 75:1,23 76:2
 77:17 81:20 82:7
 89:11,12 90:6 92:5
 98:5 111:1 113:8
 116:5,6,10,12 124:19
 131:19 132:8,16
 137:11 158:3 173:16
 177:22
piece (5) 109:22 131:21
 135:25 165:3 171:19
pieces (2) 11:5 120:15
pigeard (3) 2:14 21:5
 30:14
pigeards (1) 22:25
pin (2) 93:23 94:13
pla (1) 153:18
place (21) 39:24 41:8

43:16 45:7 64:7 80:16
 83:12 84:15,16 88:8
 102:21 107:9 108:20
 109:24 110:14 117:25
 118:7,15 133:14
 173:13 176:22
places (2) 8:14 51:3
placing (1) 8:13
plain (5) 139:8,13
 146:10 165:23 173:7
plaistow (1) 73:5
plan (9) 10:17 11:18
 35:8 122:8,14,20,24
 158:16 186:8
plane (1) 14:1
planned (3) 123:4
 126:21 174:4
planning (45) 40:4
 42:3,7,9 48:4 52:11
 62:9,13,21 63:8,16
 64:6 65:12,16
 66:19,23 68:19,22
 78:20,22 81:14,21
 82:12 84:1,1,9 87:2
 88:13 90:7,10,24
 101:20 102:2 107:18
 116:1,15 125:7 151:19
 152:4,8,16 154:17
 156:13 162:24 172:12
plans (1) 91:1
platforms (1) 50:20
play (3) 75:21 118:6
 162:16
playing (1) 54:4
please (38) 1:7,21 2:6
 3:11 4:9,25 5:5,11,14
 10:1,17 11:16 14:3
 15:7,8 16:13 17:2
 22:16,22 24:2,16
 25:16 29:10 30:12
 37:14,15 38:16 64:3
 98:2,20 120:17
 142:4,13,22 151:8
 158:4 167:5
pleural (2) 23:9 26:5
plot (6) 64:13 70:24
 71:5 141:21 142:2
 175:20
plots (5) 49:12 52:21,22
 53:7 141:18
plus (1) 83:3
pm (10) 95:9,11 130:15
 132:17,17 133:7,9
 139:3,5 187:10
pm009910 (1) 5:21
pm009911 (1) 5:24
pm009912 (1) 6:6
pm009913 (1) 6:9
pm009914 (1) 3:23
pm009915 (1) 4:7
pm00994 (1) 3:7
pm00995 (2) 5:1 15:7
pm00996 (2) 5:5 15:8
pm00997 (2) 5:11 16:14
pm00998 (1) 5:14
pm00999 (2) 5:17 17:3
pm010010 (1) 25:4
pm010011 (1) 25:16
pm01004 (1) 21:11
pm01005 (1) 21:19
pm01006 (1) 22:13
pm01007 (1) 22:21
pm01008 (1) 24:1

pm01009 (1) 24:16
pod (1) 40:18
pointed (5) 3:15 22:20
 94:21 108:18 173:17
pointing (1) 14:2
points (4) 82:5 112:6
 121:25 183:5
police (59) 38:1,8 43:3
 44:23
 45:1,7,11,17,19,23
 47:1 52:14 59:2
 60:7,15,25 63:24
 67:8,10 69:21 77:9,9
 78:9,9 80:13
 83:9,11,23 84:13
 92:14 103:25
 104:12,21 107:16
 108:19 111:12 113:15
 120:19 121:1,4,10,18
 128:19,23 134:10,14
 138:2 143:19 144:4
 149:24,24 150:2,12
 151:15 174:6,14
 177:1,5,8
policed (1) 44:23
policies (1) 64:14
policing (12) 39:14
 40:5,8,9 41:7 52:17
 53:3 81:14 82:2,21
 177:10,17
political (4) 58:8,21
 59:9,13
politically (1) 143:18
pool (2) 119:15 124:11
pornography (1) 57:3
port (1) 137:15
pose (5) 35:18 42:13
 82:17 144:2 165:13
posed (11) 42:15
 69:10,12 72:7 77:16
 79:19 97:20 99:17
 142:9,10 176:3
poses (3) 44:5 86:3
 175:9
position (9) 17:7 32:24
 33:1 42:24 59:1 62:2
 87:19 176:25 177:3
positive (6) 18:13 58:5
 90:22 124:15 174:15
 181:3
positively (1) 57:23
possess (2) 58:6 144:14
possession (10) 56:13
 57:10 58:25 59:7
 70:21 99:9 107:16
 108:9 121:2,10
possibility (12) 18:5,12
 79:4,8,13,17 152:9
 156:17 162:18
 164:16,18,21
possible (30) 3:17 9:20
 12:1 14:22,24,25 18:2
 19:7 21:16 31:21
 35:16 37:20 64:18
 65:19 70:1 84:8 85:25
 117:18,22,24
 121:12,14,17,25 122:5
 129:20 146:20 156:20
 157:1 165:22
possibly (18) 30:23
 32:20,25 56:20 58:7
 65:4 75:21 100:5
 101:24 113:13 131:15

152:4 155:1,12 156:2
 172:13 173:4 176:14
post (7) 2:13,20 3:2
 21:6 103:22 105:4
 110:6
postarrest (1) 49:3
postattack (3) 107:24
 125:4 162:2
posted (2) 71:22 163:19
postings (1) 163:3
postjune (1) 107:24
postparis (4) 81:12
 83:20,25 173:17
posture (4) 51:23 72:8
 80:20 158:1
postured (1) 50:7
pot (6) 123:23,25
 124:1,2,17,18
potential (10) 66:25
 70:24 71:1 91:25
 102:8,15 125:18,21
 162:7,14
potentially (12) 9:9,10
 43:24 48:5 52:6 80:6,8
 82:16 87:19,19 99:8
 113:21
power (1) 91:20
powers (2) 45:17 59:2
practicable (2) 13:10
 110:8
practical (7) 12:13
 28:24 80:10 90:13
 100:10,11 118:19
practically (1) 110:3
practice (2) 41:9 84:12
praying (1) 169:23
prcis (1) 167:14
preacher (3) 97:15
 99:25 100:16
preattack (1) 113:19
precise (1) 118:17
preempt (1) 4:19
prehospital (2) 13:11
 28:25
premises (1) 92:12
preparation (4) 62:18
 64:10 68:19 84:14
preparations (1) 39:25
preparatory (1) 64:7
prepare (1) 100:12
prepared (7) 62:19
 63:10 72:7 75:25
 76:10 154:4,8
preparing (1) 80:25
presence (1) 163:4
present (9) 10:15 24:9
 31:1 37:8 54:22 55:20
 141:5,7 149:7
presenting (1) 39:22
presently (1) 55:1
preserve (1) 64:15
press (6) 35:11,20,25
 95:18 184:7,13
pressed (1) 95:2
pressure (4) 8:13,14
 19:11,14
pressures (1) 92:21
presumably (15)
 19:10,20 20:13 31:21
 34:10 59:1 69:4 76:4
 100:2,9 133:4 149:18
 151:22 159:25 174:13
pretty (2) 81:15 160:12

prevent (9) 46:17
 64:25,25 65:5
 111:14,24 112:1
 165:14 184:3
preventing (1) 172:8
previous (6) 37:2
 99:8,13 114:14 133:16
 134:1
previously (3) 42:15
 60:19 99:13
prima (1) 58:2
primarily (6) 27:5 46:23
 56:9 63:3 84:2 99:9
primary (2) 109:16
 159:2
principles (1) 179:16
prior (11) 9:17 44:24
 68:1 73:10 87:2
 103:21 106:10 130:12
 138:5 157:15 162:7
priorities (1) 174:24
prioritisation (1) 46:24
prioritise (1) 48:18
prioritised (1) 124:22
prioritising (2) 46:18
 48:15
priority (22)
 41:17,23,25 42:21
 46:20 47:3,14,17
 61:8,11,12 62:5,23
 85:13 106:14 110:13
 116:8 123:22 124:5,17
 136:8 148:19
proactive (1) 148:19
probably (15) 9:2 28:11
 50:9,24 63:20 67:7
 70:3 80:5 82:20 92:24
 98:14 111:13 119:21
 122:21 155:3
problem (3) 35:18
 74:15 95:25
proceed (4) 71:5 92:11
 93:24 180:13
proceedings (3) 180:5
 183:21 185:8
process (25) 43:8,9
 46:4,21 60:9 63:21
 67:8,10 73:12
 74:13,14,15 98:15
 126:4,7,8 136:13
 153:13,18,20 155:2
 160:23,23 175:6 176:9
processes (2) 157:25
 159:23
produce (1) 2:13
product (1) 156:13
profession (1) 2:3
profoundly (1) 18:3
profuse (2) 8:7,12
profusely (2) 19:16
 26:24
programme (17)
 71:16,21 76:15,15,18
 77:3,4,6,8,12,25
 78:6,10,12 149:1
 169:1,3
progressed (1) 163:22
progression (1) 183:4
project (1) 39:12
prominent (1) 69:7
prompted (1) 137:10
pronounced (2) 12:23
 14:6

propaganda (5)
 50:12,24 133:1 145:16
 146:5
propagandists (1)
 145:25
propensity (1) 77:21
proper (1) 180:6
properly (2) 37:21
 166:14
proportionate (1)
 110:16
proposition (3) 47:19
 154:2 182:15
proprietor (2) 111:12,19
pros (1) 89:1
proscribed (7)
 53:16,22,24 54:9,19
 56:24 148:1
proscription (1) 54:1
prosecutable (1) 82:16
prosecute (5) 64:16
 93:14 144:5 147:6,20
prosecuted (4) 55:9
 71:9 147:9 155:5
prosecuting (1) 144:12
prosecution (20) 39:22
 40:2 44:20 46:10
 47:23,24 48:2,9
 55:7,11,18 64:18 80:8
 84:18 94:15,17 97:1
 98:11 128:13 148:11
prosecutions (4) 39:24
 99:14 145:5,6
prospect (4) 79:12
 82:18 98:11 171:4
protect (1) 64:4
protecting (2) 51:14
 172:6
protection (1) 139:17
protests (1) 147:4
prove (1) 54:8
provide (1) 16:15
provided (6) 2:21 98:10
 107:4 121:4 158:22
 181:22
providing (2) 36:14
 146:3
public (24)
 35:9,10,19,20 40:9
 45:10 46:11 52:1 64:4
 72:8 73:8,10 82:15
 115:20 139:17 150:11
 151:22 165:13 172:6,8
 173:20 175:10 180:22
 183:25
publicly (3) 104:5
 139:12 148:13
published (1) 36:19
publishing (2) 56:17
 57:17
pull (2) 1:9 39:8
pumped (1) 19:11
pumping (2) 4:11,16
punch (1) 30:4
puncture (4) 5:9 14:20
 15:3 17:4
purchase (1) 117:8
purchased (1) 124:23
purchasing (1) 132:19
purely (2) 132:11 179:1
purpose (12) 42:18
 46:22,23 79:2 85:6,7
 86:11,19 87:9,22

102:23 133:24
purposely (1) 43:17
purposes (8) 42:11 50:3
 56:20 86:5 90:11,25
 99:10 115:18
pursue (1) 162:6
pursuing (1) 48:16
push (1) 134:7
putting (6) 18:25,25
 38:20 88:10 118:18
 124:10

Q

q (694) 1:24
 2:3,6,12,16,20,24
 3:1,5,11,22
 4:7,9,19,22,24
 5:5,11,14,17,21,24
 6:2,6,9,13 7:5,9,12,21
 8:3,5,11,17,22,24
 9:4,7,13,21
 10:1,5,10,15,21,24
 11:3,9,12,15,20,24
 12:2,11,13,16,25
 13:6,10,23 14:8,16,22
 15:1,6,15,19,25
 17:2,6,14,18,25
 18:7,12,17,21
 19:5,7,10,17,20
 20:3,5,8,11,15,19,23
 21:9,18 22:13,21
 23:13,20,22,24
 24:1,12,16,22
 25:1,4,13,16,19,22
 26:8,10,13,17,21
 27:4,8,11,17,21
 28:4,11,15,18,20,23
 29:3,7,10,16,20,22
 30:5,16,18,21,23
 31:3,7,16,18,23
 32:1,6,8,12,15,17,22
 33:2,7,14,19,23
 34:2,6,8,12 37:23
 38:1,4,7,12
 39:1,13,17,21,24
 40:4,11,15,20
 41:1,9,16,19,22 42:18
 43:3,7,22 44:8,19
 45:3,14,17,25
 46:9,18,22
 47:4,11,19,23
 48:11,15,22,24
 49:6,21 51:8,17
 52:5,16 53:7,10,15,19
 54:1,10,17,21
 55:2,5,13,22 56:4,7
 57:6,23 58:3,11,24
 59:6,12,16,21,24
 60:4,7,16,22,24
 61:6,10,15,24
 62:5,8,11,20,23
 63:1,6,14,19 64:3
 65:6,11 66:6,18,24
 67:5,14,17,24
 68:2,4,11,15,18,23
 69:4,9,15,20,25
 70:7,12,19 71:9,13,24
 72:2,6,14,19
 73:11,19,22
 74:2,10,15,19
 75:4,17,23
 76:4,7,10,14,22,24

77:1,7,12,20,24
 78:6,14 79:2,4,10,17
 80:9,22 81:3,6,10,24
 82:2,9 83:7,24
 84:4,7,11,19,24
 85:9,15
 86:3,13,20,22,25
 87:12,24
 88:4,12,15,21
 89:4,17,22
 90:1,5,9,13,19,22
 91:5,9,24
 92:7,11,17,23
 93:3,6,9,16 94:10,25
 95:24
 96:8,11,14,17,24
 97:5,10
 98:2,10,13,18,22
 99:15,21,25
 100:2,9,15,22
 101:2,6,9,15,23,25
 102:6,13,15,17,24
 103:3,18,23
 104:1,4,10,15,19,25
 105:5,11,18
 106:2,12,14,18,25
 107:4,9,19,25
 108:6,13,21
 109:2,9,12,16,19
 110:1,8,18
 111:4,11,18,22
 112:5,13,16,23
 113:3,11,25
 114:4,9,12,19
 115:3,11
 116:16,19,22,25
 117:7,18,22
 118:1,10,16,24
 119:2,4,7,16
 120:6,17,21
 121:7,12,20,24
 122:6,14,24
 123:8,12,16 124:6,23
 125:11,16,25
 126:2,5,12,18,25
 127:9,12,16,25
 128:8,13,18,22,25
 129:6,9,17,23,25
 130:4,8,14,21,25
 131:18,21,25 132:3,17
 133:4,7,18
 134:8,13,17 135:5,7
 136:5,7,14
 137:2,8,13,25 138:4,6
 139:21
 140:1,6,9,12,15
 141:1,11,14,17,21,24
 142:3,9,15,17,19
 144:3,9,11,16,23
 145:8,11,16,23
 146:8,17,23
 147:4,12,14,22,24
 148:4,9,11,15,20,23
 149:5,14,17,23
 150:8,18
 151:6,10,18,21,25
 152:4,9,17,23
 153:9,11,14,16,19,21,23
 154:9,14,20,24
 155:2,6,8,13,18,21,25
 156:3,5,14,17,24
 157:3,7,10,13,21
 158:4,8,14,17,20

159:1,4,7,12,17,19,24
 160:6,12,16,21
 161:5,11,15,21,24
 162:3,5,15,18
 163:2,11,13,25
 164:2,5,11,13,16,22
 165:3,5,11,17
 166:2,5,24
 167:4,9,14,17,20,23
 168:5,12,15,19,22,25
 169:7,18,23
 170:1,6,12,14,22
 171:2,8,12,21,24
 172:1,3,6,11,16,20,23
 173:2,4,7,19
 174:5,8,10,13,17,19
 175:1,7,14,18,21,23
 176:1,5,15,22,25
 177:5,14
qc (12) 1:11 13:16 21:3
 30:11 37:18 139:6
 188:4,5,6,7,9,10
qualifications (1) 2:7
quality (5) 180:8,12,25
 181:13 185:6
question (19) 38:22
 55:5 59:9,11,14 60:18
 70:13 75:4,17 103:7,8
 104:10,24 108:4 131:7
 135:21 142:9 169:1
 175:2
questions (35)
 1:11,12,24,25 2:17
 10:1 12:17
 13:14,16,17 21:3,4
 30:10,11,13 34:18
 37:18 38:16 39:2,13
 53:15 59:6 66:20 93:7
 118:18 138:9
 139:6,7,13
 188:4,5,6,7,9,10
quick (1) 167:14
quickly (4) 20:21 47:10
 50:22 133:20
quilliam (1) 100:25
quite (21) 3:20 12:7
 31:7 33:7 44:1 46:7,12
 48:14 50:14,18 55:15
 108:21 112:19
 115:7,24 150:5 154:6
 166:14,25 172:15
 186:13
quotation (2) 142:24
 143:5
quoted (1) 146:10

R

railings (3) 10:19 12:4
 16:16
railways (1) 97:17
raised (7) 39:8 174:5,11
 177:7,9,15 179:8
rally (2) 71:14,19
range (5) 40:4,23 48:7
 56:9 63:11
ranging (1) 168:10
rapid (3) 9:1 10:13 27:1
rather (18) 3:14 17:4
 37:15 74:15 93:16
 126:19 135:8 141:4
 147:13 152:5 158:16
 159:15 163:20 164:22
 167:25 173:20 175:8
 178:12
reach (7) 45:3 57:22
 145:7 150:22 153:9
 159:13 163:11
reached (12) 45:9 63:13
 78:4 90:9 122:16,22
 148:2 151:7 153:14
 154:7 158:21,23
reaches (1) 146:22
reaching (1) 100:8
react (6) 64:8 80:20
 82:23 83:12 170:7
 173:13
reactions (1) 182:14
reactive (1) 156:17
read (6) 58:17 64:2
 141:11,13 163:23
 182:23
readily (1) 179:24
reading (3) 162:22
 184:23 185:25
real (9) 60:25 65:19
 82:17 133:12 143:18
 165:12 179:22 180:24
 183:6
realistic (1) 66:6
really (10) 42:23 50:20
 66:6 74:24 81:1
 94:10,14 114:22
 118:19 162:25
reason (29) 16:25
 55:13,14 67:7,12
 74:10 81:11 88:18
 90:21 91:3 107:9
 109:19 113:9 114:17
 115:1 126:6,10 129:13
 131:8,25 132:7 148:18
 152:25 153:1 161:8
 174:4,14 181:15
 184:24
reasons (16) 59:25
 68:16 90:5,6 112:12
 114:9,10,10 115:11
 172:9 176:5 180:14
 182:6 183:11 185:9
 186:3
reassess (1) 89:12
rebailed (1) 128:15
rebut (1) 93:10
recall (2) 154:18 167:16
receive (3) 1:25 17:12
 120:14
received (9) 15:15 17:8
 41:9 69:22 91:12,18
 108:1 139:22 153:5
receiving (4) 10:7 11:12
 28:1 75:2

recent (5) 49:7 115:19
 123:12 157:15 179:11
recently (2) 149:18
 177:14
recipients (1) 161:11
reciting (1) 172:20
recognise (1) 139:9
recognised (3) 139:12
 165:7 183:24
recollect (1) 100:5
recollection (1) 83:25
recommendations (1)
 177:2
reconfigure (1) 35:5
reconnaissance (1)
 65:23
record (6) 67:25 73:14
 74:4 134:18 163:9
 183:1
recorded (3) 72:19
 73:14 158:23
records (3) 73:7 149:22
 164:4
recovered (1) 50:18
recovering (1) 171:4
red (10) 65:15,17
 66:11,15 117:9 120:1
 129:9,11 158:10,12
redouane (25)
 113:13,16 117:10,17
 118:2,12,22,25
 119:10,17 120:2,10
 121:9,11,13 124:23
 125:4 127:1,3,5
 129:18 134:8,10 184:9
 186:16
redoubling (1) 173:22
reduced (2) 117:2
 125:20
reducing (1) 123:16
reengaged (1) 102:7
reengagement (2)
 42:17 102:13
reengaging (1) 115:21
refer (4) 2:16 9:13
 38:13 60:2
reference (3) 3:6 21:10
 135:25
referred (5) 26:8 36:11
 37:23 47:23 60:1
refers (3) 113:18 124:25
 182:14
reflect (1) 158:2
reflected (1) 157:20
refocus (1) 173:15
refunds (1) 88:17
refuse (1) 186:6
refused (3) 93:7 179:23
 185:10
refusing (3) 165:18
 166:3 180:9
regard (4) 25:25 86:25
 136:22 139:17
regarded (5) 7:25 30:1
 127:13 147:15 148:5
regarding (1) 128:10
regards (2) 101:22
 184:16
regents (4) 71:14
 148:24 149:16 163:4
regimes (4) 54:13 58:11
 145:19,19
regular (7) 103:2 107:23

108:2,8 119:7,19,23
regularity (1) 44:8
regularly (10) 54:20
 102:25 105:19
 106:3,15,16,20 109:1
 111:7 119:24
rehman (1) 96:15
reimbursed (1) 93:25
reinterviewed (1) 93:7
related (5) 64:13 86:2
 94:6 96:3 159:5
relates (6) 56:24 109:15
 179:1 185:16 186:5,6
relating (3) 36:15 56:8
 153:3
relation (30) 6:17
 24:9,24 25:12 42:3
 49:3 65:7,22 70:21
 89:2,3 90:7,8 106:7
 108:4 110:17 113:10
 114:11 123:10,21
 125:15 139:22 147:10
 150:3 151:13 152:16
 156:13 162:10 179:7
 181:18
relationship (4) 53:2
 177:11,18,19
relationships (1) 177:24
relatively (4) 10:12 66:4
 78:7 101:16
released (1) 170:15
relevant (6) 2:6 82:22
 97:18 112:3 120:18
 156:7
reliable (1) 131:21
remain (4) 1:19 35:10
 37:16 62:23
remainder (1) 97:8
remained (3) 95:2
 166:24,25
remaining (1) 31:20
remanded (1) 95:3
remarkable (1) 170:6
remedy (1) 37:5
remember (1) 109:13
removed (1) 16:18
renewed (1) 32:19
repeating (2) 59:11
 112:15
reported (1) 53:4
report (26) 21:12 38:12
 47:12 54:21 60:3 65:6
 68:5 73:11 74:2,23
 75:5 78:17 79:4 82:6
 93:16 101:2 107:20,25
 158:18 159:8 163:13
 165:19,21,25 180:5
 185:8
reported (3) 36:16
 91:12 143:3
reporting (7) 79:6 82:8
 92:18 93:3 104:9
 142:11 164:17
reports (5) 2:13,16
 73:8,9 183:19
represent (2) 83:2 139:9
representation (1)
 21:24
representatives (2)
 35:14 182:4
reprioritisation (1)
 81:16
reprioritise (1) 173:16

request (7) 41:14 60:14
 69:25 70:6,10 90:18
 169:12
require (3) 42:13 45:4
 175:1
required (11) 7:21
 18:25 19:4 29:4,6,23
 33:21 47:21 77:11
 93:22 94:12
requires (1) 45:10
requiring (2) 8:3 30:1
reserve (2) 66:20 73:13
residential (1) 127:17
resides (1) 73:3
resolve (1) 138:16
resource (4) 42:22,24
 110:12,20
resources (19) 46:24
 48:18 68:9 81:16,17
 82:25 83:5 90:14,18
 107:11 116:14 124:21
 171:20 173:16 174:24
 176:5,10,17,23
resourcing (2) 114:11
 176:21
respect (11) 36:12
 53:24 98:12,13 113:6
 121:6 138:16 173:15
 176:8 177:25 179:2
respond (2) 88:21
 115:23
response (14) 44:16
 51:5 64:7,25 79:14
 80:10 82:9 101:13
 115:13 120:12 157:20
 179:9 183:9 185:6
responsibility (8)
 39:21,23 40:3,4
 54:17,20 76:20 149:11
responsible (5) 39:17,24
 40:13 111:23 143:1
restaurant (1) 10:22
restaurants (1) 176:1
restriction (1) 181:12
resubmitted (1) 78:2
result (20) 6:24,25 7:19
 8:17,18 18:4 20:7
 24:23 26:20 27:1 35:5
 88:25 92:7 128:5,14
 137:14 154:24 155:2
 175:15 186:2
resulted (3) 7:14 26:19
 71:2
resulting (1) 15:4
resume (3) 36:2 178:21
 187:8
resumed (2) 84:5,8
retaining (1) 99:22
retrospective (1) 153:5
return (3) 79:21 129:1
 166:16
returning (1) 128:16
reveal (2) 68:19 94:23
revealed (4) 78:11
 118:8 183:4,17
revealing (1) 38:19
reverse (1) 45:22
revert (1) 35:18
review (4) 76:17 94:21
 159:20 167:13
reviewed (6) 72:1 76:19
 77:10 78:10 99:16
 168:3

revisited (1) 111:2
rewind (2) 105:24 108:9
rhetoric (7) 99:23 113:1
 115:20,21 123:13
 145:22 146:4
rib (11) 3:20,24 4:1,4
 8:2 13:21 21:23 23:6,7
 24:8 31:16
ribcage (1) 15:4
rich (1) 46:13
richard (3) 142:10,24
 150:19
rigby (4) 141:21 143:10
 157:13 177:15
riggs (1) 104:23
rights (2) 180:3,4
rightthinking (1) 184:3
rigorously (1) 46:3
rise (6) 35:22 49:19,21
 70:13 98:24 139:2
risk (38) 38:21 42:8,16
 43:12,16 44:4,14
 51:20 65:7,9,9
 69:10,11 72:6
 77:15,18 79:19,22
 86:4 88:11 90:9 97:20
 98:5 99:17 100:16,19
 101:19 113:5 123:8,9
 124:12
 151:21,21,21,22,22
 175:9 179:22
risks (4) 44:17 64:5,23
 165:12
road (1) 107:1
robert (4) 1:3,5,23
 188:3
rocket (1) 174:13
role (4) 39:23 151:15
 156:14 174:14
roles (1) 45:22
romford (1) 108:15
room (1) 29:4
rooms (1) 107:1
rotate (1) 11:16
round (2) 34:2 134:24
rounded (1) 100:13
route (8) 80:16 133:9
 135:13,19,24
 136:11,13,25
royal (1) 2:8
rules (1) 180:11
ruling (5) 179:17,18
 180:14 184:18 185:14
run (6) 16:5 40:12 47:7
 104:6 123:5 166:6
runin (1) 156:21
running (2) 36:5 59:19

S

sac (1) 4:6
sacks (1) 132:19
safeguarding (1) 51:4
safety (2) 45:10 46:11
sajeel (8) 103:19
 104:4,11,20
 105:1,2,13 142:4
sake (2) 37:7 186:17
same (5) 1:13 54:2
 56:20 72:11 135:19
santander (2) 91:14
 94:2
sara (2) 9:8 15:10
satisfactory (2) 159:21
 160:4
satisfied (1) 156:8
saturday (2) 131:22
 134:6
save (1) 13:3
saved (2) 13:12 29:1
saw (11) 12:21 13:1
 15:9 18:20 28:5 50:23
 52:8 83:12 93:23
 102:10 161:10
saying (10) 60:11
 112:14 114:21 121:7
 123:20 131:9 133:22
 143:14 146:11 149:19
sb (5) 179:12 181:23
 182:5,7 185:18
scale (5) 7:25 8:4 29:24
 30:2 62:12
scaling (1) 173:20
scans (1) 2:24
scenario (1) 10:15
school (15) 107:22
 108:5,6,8 109:16
 110:2,10,24
 111:8,10,12,17,18,22
 119:24
schools (9) 65:3 108:19
 109:4,4,9,18,20,23
 111:25
science (2) 67:11
 174:13
scientific (1) 126:7
screen (10) 3:7 6:14
 10:17 12:16 15:7 24:2
 25:22 142:4,7,15
screening (10) 36:11
 179:14
 180:10,12,15,23
 181:17 183:11
 185:5,11
scroll (2) 142:12,23
scuffle (1) 101:16
search (5) 92:11,15
 96:3,24 150:3
searched (1) 150:6
seat (2) 1:7 37:14
seated (1) 37:16
second (8) 22:14 23:6
 12:19 34:3 102:7
 32:17 167:2 179:11
secondly (5) 91:14 98:8
 115:17 116:2 184:2
seconds (1) 31:18
secret (1) 143:3
secretary (1) 176:16
section (14) 36:14
 56:11,16,19,22
 57:15,16,16 73:16
 99:10 107:20 113:19
 181:18
secure (1) 64:14
secured (1) 86:13
security (15) 38:15,19
 39:18 41:3 42:15
 59:25 68:15 84:20
 86:4 109:13 112:12
 143:2,4 165:20 177:11
see (58) 3:12,22,23 4:7
 5:4,11 10:17
 11:6,10,13 12:4,6
 16:19 18:2 21:14,23
 23:3 24:4 49:19

50:2,12 54:19 55:2	shaking (1) 181:25	106:9,23 107:13,17	134:18 135:5	39:10 75:7 103:7,8	status (2) 62:11 122:12	47:8,14 54:22 123:23
56:2 58:16 64:6,23	shall (3) 1:17 2:18	113:8 118:24 121:19	136:15,15,16 138:4	127:16 161:16,24	stay (1) 178:13	137:20 157:12
65:16 66:11 75:15	35:18	137:1,7	150:9	special (15) 35:2 38:5	step (3) 154:10 156:10	submit (2) 185:1,9
83:14,16 98:8 99:7	shamshuddin (1) 71:17	significant (39) 7:2,9	social (3) 50:11 51:12	179:2,13,13,21	164:23	submitted (2) 78:3,8
100:11,15 113:7	shape (3) 3:11,15 22:16	13:8 24:13,15,24	55:2	181:6,8 182:1,6	stepping (1) 157:14	subsequently (12) 66:5
137:11 138:25 139:16	shaped (1) 177:11	25:13,19,24 26:13	society (1) 50:25	183:10,15 185:10,15	steps (6) 11:10,21 30:24	71:7 72:1 75:2 77:23
142:4,15,16 144:17	share (6) 57:25 58:6,14	27:12 29:18 32:12	soft (1) 25:9	186:5	80:22 133:4 157:8	93:8 110:6 129:22
145:18 148:9	68:8 99:20 108:16	45:6 49:25 50:10,19	soi (1) 137:15	specialist (3) 40:21,24	sternum (4) 3:21,24	148:24 159:23 167:21
149:20,24 150:14	shared (6) 71:10	62:12 71:2 80:7	sois (1) 124:9	48:7	4:1,3	171:6
156:21 161:13	97:22,23 99:17 135:5	101:20 121:9 130:7	solicitor (2) 128:20,22	specific (2) 88:12 108:6	stick (1) 186:24	subside (1) 49:17
165:19,25 178:1,7	160:5	132:4 136:12 137:22	somebody (22)	specifically (3) 41:19	still (33) 18:7,9 51:11	substantially (1) 117:2
181:24,25 185:18	sharia (1) 58:12	141:24 145:3,4,4	48:16,22 59:1 66:6	53:7 65:2	52:10 54:8 60:4 70:23	success (5) 28:9 29:8
seeing (2) 52:25 62:17	sharing (7) 57:10,17	147:1 154:5,10,21	74:21 76:5,10 87:25	spectacular (1) 49:14	71:3 82:22,23	52:18,21 53:1
seek (1) 165:14	58:20,25 59:8 69:22	164:23 165:3 184:7	105:7 110:18 126:13	speculative (1) 169:14	83:10 11,12,13 91:1	successful (1) 143:17
seeking (2) 150:18	71:6	185:2 186:22	137:15 153:25	speedy (1) 19:8	102:1 113:6 123:24	suffer (1) 13:8
185:8	sharp (9) 3:8 4:22	significantly (2) 25:1	154:3,11,20 155:9	spelling (2) 136:4,5	124:2 126:22 128:4	suffered (4) 15:17 27:22
seem (1) 101:19	17:16,17 21:12 22:14	53:5	156:5,8 173:8 175:2	spine (1) 24:3	135:18 136:19,24	28:20 33:8
seems (1) 181:20	25:4 29:15 31:7	signs (1) 123:12	184:8	spoken (2) 146:9 159:19	151:3 152:13	suffering (3) 20:5,20
seen (18) 28:12 50:13	shed (1) 71:3	siguenza (1) 15:9	somehow (2) 12:3 145:2	spontaneous (1) 101:23	162:22,23 172:11	34:6
76:16 85:1 103:5	shes (1) 186:24	similar (4) 15:24	someone (13) 9:8 16:11	sporting (1) 166:13	173:13 181:9,10	sufficient (2) 93:14
116:2 127:9 132:25	shielding (1) 32:25	136:5,6 148:16	42:10 48:4,5 69:6	spot (1) 52:13	186:22	185:2
133:25 143:9,10,11	shift (2) 52:7 84:11	simple (8) 7:23 66:4	75:15 77:13 88:12	spouse (1) 96:17	stock (1) 141:22	sufficiently (1) 150:21
155:13 156:3 160:23	shifted (1) 84:8	70:19 90:1 91:9,24	155:11 157:3 159:8	spouses (1) 96:19	stomach (2) 15:2,19	suggest (23) 23:24,25
167:8 179:6 181:10	shin (1) 6:11	92:2 157:16	183:8	spread (1) 50:12	stone (1) 11:6	35:22 48:12 63:10
sees (1) 9:19	shoes (1) 15:11	simplicity (2) 52:9	something (36)	square (2) 3:14 22:19	stop (8) 80:17 84:16	66:14 68:21 78:21
seized (1) 96:4	short (11) 10:7,12	157:22	16:8,9,17,20 17:11	stab (27) 3:12 5:6	87:15 135:12 136:19	86:1,18 87:25
seizure (1) 96:25	27:23 31:20 36:8	simplifying (2) 57:6	19:21 20:17 33:19	6:17,19,25 7:14 9:24	137:15 150:2 165:14	89:15,19 122:21 123:3
send (1) 160:12	74:24 87:17 122:9	179:20	34:12 45:4 46:15,15	13:20 18:24 21:14	stopped (7) 20:11	125:6 126:21 130:7
senior (11) 39:15 40:16	139:4 186:13 187:2	since (6) 38:23 41:1	51:15 56:12 70:5	22:15,18 24:2,4,16,18	132:11 133:5	138:12,17 170:1 175:1
42:25 45:11 47:13	shortly (8) 9:3 20:16	49:17 53:17 104:19	76:11 98:24 99:7,8	26:1,3,6,20,22 27:12	134:3,4,19 157:14	178:5
78:7 82:14 106:18	27:2 34:9 61:24	127:9	100:10,19,20 111:14	29:17,20,25 30:7 33:8	stops (1) 82:21	suggested (15) 19:17
136:15 151:12 169:2	129:17 142:6 152:23	single (4) 7:14 94:6	134:7 139:23 148:9,11	stabbed (1) 14:17	store (1) 99:5	67:19 69:17 82:10
sense (3) 100:11 138:23	should (39) 34:23	109:22 147:6	152:11 157:11 158:9	stabbing (2) 14:11 33:3	story (1) 71:13	87:1 94:10 100:2
156:20	35:8,10 38:21 39:8,9	sio (4) 107:10 115:3,13	162:2 163:21	stabilisation (1) 116:3	straightaway (1) 86:16	105:22 114:24
sensible (2) 178:6	66:20 80:2 82:6 83:14	136:10	165:11,14,21 175:17	stabilising (2) 85:1,4	straightforward (1)	115:13,23 129:12
181:23	94:14 107:10	sir (33) 1:3,12 31:12	sometimes (3) 18:2	staff (1) 78:9	160:12	146:23 151:25 184:11
sensitive (1) 38:19	114:20,21,22 115:14	36:10 37:17 38:3,11	46:9 50:18	stage (27) 16:15 17:25	strategic (3) 63:19,21	suggesting (14) 9:7
sensitivity (1) 165:24	116:12 135:17,17	39:3,16,20 40:10 95:6	somewhat (2) 35:6	18:6 33:3 34:3 45:20	64:1	11:5 63:8 87:2 88:12
sent (2) 94:3 185:18	136:12,22 138:24	107:3 112:15 123:20	95:14	48:10 65:10,25 68:22	strategies (2) 155:13	97:11,12 106:23
sentence (1) 155:4	159:25 160:4,11,18	138:10 139:19 140:14	somewhere (1) 108:25	122:16 140:1,4,12	172:3	107:16 108:10 110:3
sentiments (1) 146:18	171:13 172:9	143:22 145:22	son (2) 105:1,11	151:6,11 152:9,12	strategy (4) 43:19	154:3 165:5 173:4
separating (1) 134:25	173:8,8,21 174:9	151:9,15 155:17	soon (1) 51:22	153:24 155:25 157:9	63:16 64:1 152:7	suggestion (5) 11:9
september (10) 62:24	176:16 183:10	161:14 165:14 167:21	sophie (3) 105:1,6,7	158:5,8,14 162:7	stratford (1) 119:9	82:19 105:18 120:24
66:24 72:14 86:15	184:3,24 185:10,11	178:18 179:16 180:10	sophisticated (1) 156:6	171:12 172:11	street (7) 10:18,21 12:7	184:12
89:22 92:16 106:14,15	187:6	181:2 183:9 185:5,18	sort (21) 9:2,18 14:2	stages (7) 61:21 62:4,18	17:23 48:22 127:17,22	suggestive (2) 6:4 17:19
128:16 150:8	shoulder (7) 22:15	sister (1) 76:19	16:8,11,21 17:11,12	63:14,17 70:9,23	streets (2) 43:25 156:10	suggests (4) 10:5 27:21
sequence (1) 94:11	23:17,21,22 32:9,22	sit (5) 1:9 43:11 95:8	18:4,9 20:9 23:18 30:4	staggering (1) 11:20	stress (2) 83:20 181:4	80:21 85:6
series (2) 123:9 130:16	33:15	138:15,17	32:21,25 43:7 57:25	stairs (2) 11:6 14:17	stresses (1) 182:7	suicidal (1) 154:24
serious (9) 27:12 42:15	shouldnt (2) 136:8	site (3) 73:1 94:5	58:6 73:22 81:12	stand (2) 1:10 144:19	stretcher (1) 18:1	summarise (1) 64:3
47:3 48:4,13,17 82:17	137:16	117:11	97:18	standalone (3) 56:12	strike (4) 8:3 21:21	summarised (2) 161:21
179:22 185:7	show (2) 23:18 94:4	sites (1) 72:24	sorts (6) 9:20 29:3	93:15 145:6	24:23 114:19	186:4
seriously (3) 115:5	showed (5) 7:3 28:4	sits (1) 136:16	145:24,25 146:17	standard (2) 9:21 30:5	striking (1) 22:10	summarising (1) 182:25
150:21,25	99:22 101:21 164:15	sitting (1) 33:13	176:17	stands (1) 184:23	strong (9) 67:2,19 82:13	summary (2) 94:8,9
service (11) 38:15 39:19	showing (2) 10:17 50:4	situation (6) 16:11	sought (1) 180:22	start (5) 22:5 67:24	99:22 115:16 125:20	summer (2) 68:25
40:2 41:4 43:11 44:21	shown (3) 21:25 157:4	28:25 46:9 74:19	sound (2) 95:17,23	78:19 92:3 185:3	126:14,19 153:17	149:17
94:17 109:6 128:14	170:8	143:20 186:20	sounds (2) 33:25 153:6	started (7) 49:19	strongest (1) 154:18	sums (1) 92:9
143:2 177:11	shows (3) 46:19 77:12	size (2) 3:11 22:17	source (2) 104:9 162:7	50:2,11 66:11 106:16	strongly (3) 83:20 154:2	sunday (2) 119:7,23
services (3) 41:14 51:13	170:23	skin (16) 3:16,19,20	space (33) 6:22 7:19	119:25 133:8	155:10	superficial (4) 14:24
143:19	siddhartha (3) 77:13,23	4:17 5:10 14:25	8:8,9 18:21 22:10 23:6	stated (2) 91:19 157:7	struck (1) 23:14	23:9 25:16 29:10
set (9) 27:24 43:19	170:14	18:9,10 21:16	22:11,18 23:11	statement (28) 47:12	structures (3) 24:22	superintendent (1)
144:13 151:4 155:13	side (26) 3:13 4:10,13	24:5,10,19 25:8	44:23 45:1,2 50:16	49:8 50:23 52:16	25:12 41:7	104:23
166:14 172:3 179:17	5:12 6:20 7:7,15 15:23	21:13,15 22:9 23:5	61:4 62:15 65:18,18	59:17 65:11 68:23	struggle (1) 9:19	supermarket (1) 66:9
180:14	21:13,15 22:9 23:5	skull (1) 18:17	70:5 72:9 83:6 86:4,5	70:12 85:15 95:1 96:6	struggled (1) 16:5	supervened (1) 27:2
several (2) 100:8 134:22	25:5 26:4 31:5	slashtype (1) 32:3	111:15,16 113:7	99:3 112:8,14,16	stylised (1) 1:19	supervising (1) 9:3
severe (4) 7:24,25 8:1	32:2,12,20 33:15	slightly (9) 23:20 24:19	116:13 124:21,21	113:19 114:4 122:7	subclavian (1) 22:5	supervision (1) 161:5
31:14	49:16 64:22 65:14	36:2 39:6 63:23 79:6	147:1,2	134:9 148:9 152:17	subject (20) 46:2	supervision (6) 74:13
severely (1) 184:5	66:12 116:1,1 132:12	129:3,14 133:22	spade (1) 97:14	153:3 154:7 157:7,21	63:1,12 76:12 82:11	159:22 160:14,16,21
shahid (6) 103:19	sides (2) 7:18 20:2	small (5) 5:9 14:19,22	speak (10) 37:20 87:18	172:21 182:22,23	91:16 94:11 99:7	161:2
104:4,11,20 105:13	sight (1) 116:10	15:1 18:10	88:4 89:17 95:21	states (3) 69:15 72:21	100:18 106:12,20	supervisor (2) 84:21
142:4	sign (4) 12:21 13:1 28:4	smaller (1) 62:12	117:4 143:13 166:20	145:21	107:5 111:4 112:10,19	161:7
shahids (2) 105:1,11	148:15	smartphone (1) 96:8	178:11 187:4	stating (1) 64:25	115:15 128:5 136:8	support (10) 40:24
shakes (1) 185:18	significance (13) 6:15	so15 (13) 36:10 38:1,4	speaking (8) 31:19	station (1) 128:19	140:18 159:20	44:25 45:24 53:22
shakil (1) 71:18	102:21 105:13,25	59:22 61:7 108:1		stations (2) 86:22 87:4	140:18 159:20	60:15 68:9 97:1,12

182:13,15
supported (5) 40:20
 152:18,21 153:4
 172:23
supporting (4) 48:9
 55:17 147:12 148:13
supportive (3) 69:17
 153:11 164:7
suppose (4) 48:3 50:22
 126:10 130:25
suppress (1) 144:23
sure (6) 36:3 80:15
 154:6 166:8 172:15
 182:3
surely (5) 76:10 87:5
 147:18 173:7,19
surface (10) 3:16 9:20
 14:25 16:7 21:16
 22:11,19 24:5,18 25:8
surgical (2) 19:5 29:5
surprising (2) 105:18
 146:17
surrounding (5) 87:8
 89:14,18 131:12 132:3
surveillance (3)
 110:9,13 158:2
surveillanceaware (1)
 107:6
survival (1) 19:25
survive (2) 33:9,22
suspect (7) 48:11 83:16
 88:19 96:22 101:7
 105:19 186:22
suspected (4) 66:20
 88:16 170:16 173:22
suspects (2) 43:23
 93:13
suspend (3) 81:22 82:3
 116:19
suspended (19) 81:6,19
 82:11 114:7,22
 115:4,15 117:6,18,22
 118:1 121:13,16,20
 123:16 171:13,17
 173:11 174:24
suspending (4) 174:1,7
 175:12 176:6
suspension (13) 81:11
 83:7,9,15
 114:11,13,15 115:11
 116:22,25 117:7
 118:21 171:8
suspensions (2)
 176:22,25
suspicion (1) 92:18
suspicious (1) 133:3
suspicious (5)
 127:13,15,17,22,24
sustained (1) 84:1
sve (1) 153:20
swimming (3)
 119:8,15,23
switched (1) 1:8
swop (1) 178:12
sworn (4) 1:5 37:13
 188:3,8
sybiotic (1) 177:19
sympathies (1) 164:13
syria (9) 50:3 51:3
 79:3,9 148:7 161:16
 162:1 165:9 170:16
system (1) 60:10

T

tackled (1) 143:8
tactic (2) 143:25,25
tactical (2) 43:20,20
tactically (1) 80:15
taken (18) 46:11 47:24
 72:3 94:14 112:24
 116:4 128:6,7 130:23
 131:17 132:23 133:14
 135:18 150:25 167:12
 184:16,19,25
takes (4) 44:21 45:7
 126:16 136:13
taking (9) 89:2 92:9
 100:6 108:20 109:24
 119:7,22 131:16
 133:14
talk (6) 83:10 104:16
 111:15 118:16 141:7
 177:19
talking (2) 20:16 127:19
targeted (1) 86:6
teach (1) 109:7
teaching (10) 107:22
 108:2,5,7,10
 109:17,21 110:24
 111:8,9
team (71) 41:11,13
 43:4,5,8,10 45:19,19
 48:1,7 63:15 68:6
 74:3,3,8,22 76:17,24
 81:24 84:21 86:15
 91:6 99:15 101:6,7,11
 102:18 103:15,18
 111:20 113:22 114:12
 122:14 125:8,11 126:2
 127:6 129:8,25
 130:11,17 134:16
 135:3,10,15 136:9
 140:1 146:9
 149:11,12,21 150:15
 151:3,6,7 158:23
 160:5 161:12
 163:7,11,23,25
 164:1,9 167:13
 168:3,17,21 169:8,10
 172:1
teams (12)
 40:1,12,13,15,17,18
 71:25 72:6 76:19
 149:11 158:2 168:21
technical (2) 50:21
 142:14
technically (1) 35:17
techniques (2) 68:14
 175:5
telephone (2) 73:2
 119:20
telling (2) 3:25 131:8
tells (4) 76:11 101:25
 125:16 130:8
temporarily (2) 173:11
 175:13
temporary (1) 36:21
tend (1) 63:9
tenet (1) 126:23
tense (1) 83:24
term (4) 44:22 83:18
 144:9,11
termed (1) 41:20
terms (48) 12:13 43:1,1
 46:14 47:2,16 48:21
 49:25 50:1
 51:19,20,23,25 52:1

54:8 58:5 70:19
 80:3,7,11 81:21
 85:11,13,24 87:10
 90:1,14 91:9,24 92:2
 98:6 100:11 101:13,20
 105:23 107:13,17
 116:7 118:19 123:20
 144:5 149:10 150:17
 154:19 172:13 173:9
 174:1,6
terror (6) 48:11
 146:1,13 148:6,17
 154:4
terrorism (28) 38:1
 39:14
 40:5,8,14,15,22,23
 41:6 45:19 48:5,12
 49:10 51:7,9 56:16
 64:10 67:14 98:17
 104:21 111:11 134:10
 138:1 139:11 140:20
 168:4 171:22 177:16
terrorist (48) 39:14,18
 43:23,24 48:16,19
 49:23 50:4,14 52:17
 56:13,18 57:8,24
 59:19 60:7,25 64:13
 85:3,6 86:2,10,19
 87:11,22 98:12,13
 99:10 101:20
 102:23,23 104:12
 105:19 107:17
 114:25,25 141:3
 142:11 144:12 151:23
 152:19 154:12,21
 156:19 158:22
 175:15,15 176:15
terrorists (2) 64:19
 170:9
test (2) 36:1 95:23
testing (1) 75:15
texts (1) 72:24
tfl (3) 86:17 87:18 88:5
thank (25) 1:4,10,20
 2:12 12:16 13:14 21:1
 22:13 30:9
 34:16,19,20,21,22
 60:4 95:19 98:22
 103:11 112:5 138:8
 163:17 178:20,23
 186:8 187:8
thats (92) 7:8 12:1 13:9
 18:2 19:24 20:25
 21:1,25 24:14 26:16
 28:14,22 29:19,21
 34:1,16 37:25 38:3
 41:18,24 43:6 45:6,21
 46:3 47:16,18 48:14
 52:9
 53:9,14,16,18,22,23
 57:1 59:14 60:2 61:9
 62:1 68:3,13,15,15
 70:3,4 83:18 90:4 91:8
 93:2 94:9 95:13
 96:7,10 97:9
 103:16,21 108:24
 111:14,21 113:23
 114:8,16,16 116:24
 117:3 123:21 124:3
 125:7 128:24 130:9
 132:14 134:12 135:6
 139:2,10 148:9,22
 151:19,20 154:9,21

158:7,19 165:3 166:5
 170:11,11 171:14
 172:18 176:20 177:3
 181:22
theatre (1) 19:4
thematic (4) 54:24 74:6
 149:12 159:15
thematically (1) 76:20
themselves (1) 77:21
theological (6) 58:9,21
 59:13 100:6,9,14
theoretical (1) 70:6
thereafter (5) 4:4,12
 9:3 20:16 27:3
therefore (8) 11:9 28:20
 94:13 107:4 113:25
 125:11 129:20 181:16
theres (26) 14:6 15:16
 18:12 40:7,17,19,23
 44:2 54:24 55:11
 56:1,9 57:1,4 62:12
 103:5 125:5 132:9
 140:24 145:9 147:8
 150:2 166:6 169:13
 173:19 184:23
theyd (1) 160:19
theyre (7) 9:18,18 16:7
 32:2 140:20 154:4
 164:24
theyve (3) 60:11 140:23
 169:12
thigh (1) 6:10
thin (2) 4:5 23:8
thing (7) 9:18 39:7
 82:20 138:22 154:5,21
 166:18
thinks (1) 135:16
third (12) 3:20,24 4:1,4
 8:2 13:21 23:7
 24:2,7,7 50:22 99:12
thirdly (3) 91:19 115:19
 184:14
thoroughly (1) 168:8
though (5) 67:9 149:5,6
 153:6 177:6
thought (8) 82:13 87:21
 97:7,8 115:4,16,17
 161:7
threat (44) 42:3,14,15
 43:16 44:9,14,17
 45:3,9,10,13,13
 46:14,25 49:16 50:8
 51:20 52:5,11,24 66:3
 69:10,12 72:7,10 76:2
 77:15 81:17 82:8
 83:1,2 86:25 113:5
 116:12 131:19
 132:8,25 133:25
 157:20 158:3
 173:16,20 176:11
threats (4) 43:12 116:7
 143:7 175:13
three (11) 32:12 40:18
 53:23 88:17 89:3
 92:17 93:20 119:9,14
 127:5 132:18
threepoint (2) 29:24
 30:2
threshold (6) 45:9
 57:22 63:13 145:7
 146:22 148:2
threw (1) 83:25
through (56) 3:19,25

4:2,12,15 6:20 7:17,17
 8:1 11:12 13:20 16:18
 20:1 21:21,25 22:2,7
 23:1,3,4,5,8 24:6 32:9
 45:4 48:24 53:4 58:25
 60:9 76:22 89:1,12
 98:15 109:25 110:15
 123:8 135:14
 136:17,25 137:6,23,23
 141:14 142:12 146:4,4
 153:18 160:23,24
 163:2,6,6 165:15
 167:12 168:8 185:24
throughout (6) 40:22
 44:17 45:11 116:18
 140:19 157:10
thrown (2) 12:3,14
thrust (1) 144:16
thumb (4) 5:22 25:17
 29:11 96:9
thus (1) 180:25
thwarted (1) 53:8
tighten (1) 159:23
tightened (1) 74:14
time (121) 8:24 10:6
 12:21,22 13:6 16:23
 17:21 20:11 22:8
 23:14,16 28:12 31:20
 34:2,12 38:10 43:15
 46:12 59:4,18 61:3,20
 65:21 67:17 69:25
 71:24 72:11
 75:6,9,11,20 78:8,10
 79:23 81:13,23 83:22
 84:22 89:9,15,20
 90:20,22 91:3,15
 94:16 96:12,23 107:15
 111:11 112:7 113:23
 114:12,19,22 115:25
 116:11,15
 117:13,20,23,25 118:7
 119:12 120:4 121:5
 123:19 124:13
 125:8,13,25 126:21
 127:7,17,19 128:13
 129:6 130:1,9,17
 132:8,22 133:13
 135:4,12 136:22,23
 137:21 140:16 141:14
 142:25 145:5 148:23
 149:1,5 160:17,21
 161:19 163:1 164:5
 167:1,9,11,13 168:10
 170:5 171:16,24
 173:14,19,25 174:2,23
 175:3,17 176:21,23
 177:20 178:1 182:8,18
times (3) 69:20 143:4
 178:12
timescale (2) 9:3 20:9
timetable (5) 139:1
 186:19,24 187:2,6
tip (5) 14:23 15:5,20
 17:4,14
tissues (3) 3:19 23:4
 25:9
today (3) 51:11 60:2
 176:25
together (7) 65:7 92:5
 119:23 127:6 129:18
 130:14 173:7
told (27) 13:20 20:15
 29:16 31:19 57:6 61:7

62:8 95:24 98:18,23
 99:15 104:2 115:3
 128:22,23 132:7
 133:17 134:13
 137:21,23 153:16
 170:2,4 171:9 175:7
 182:4 185:22
tolerance (1) 150:20
tolerant (1) 143:6
tomorrow (9) 70:8
 138:22 166:16,19
 178:21 186:8,17
 187:2,7
tomorrows (1) 139:1
too (5) 93:23 119:25
 142:1 143:6 187:6
took (10) 62:2 73:1
 115:8 117:8 125:14
 135:23 151:15 161:2
 168:7 176:22
tool (1) 99:6
topic (2) 56:4 178:2
topics (1) 178:8
torso (3) 5:8 6:14 25:24
total (1) 40:19
touch (1) 141:9
tough (1) 176:7
towards (16) 31:6 32:15
 39:8 56:17,21 63:5,23
 76:20 84:2 89:4 91:6
 116:6 122:15 134:3
 157:19 177:4
toxic (2) 59:8,13
track (20) 3:17 4:17
 6:17,20 7:1
 21:17,20,22
 22:7,11,12,22
 23:8,10,15 24:9,25
 26:4,6 30:16
traditional (1) 52:10
training (2) 56:22 104:6
trajectory (2) 13:25
 78:21
tramlines (1) 166:13
transcript (3) 141:11,13
 185:25
translates (1) 95:17
trap (1) 75:14
travel (27) 42:10 77:14
 79:1,2,18,20
 80:4,6,10,16,23,25
 84:9,15,16,17 85:2
 90:8,10,24 115:18
 116:1 153:25
 161:16,25 164:25
 165:17
travelling (8) 50:2
 79:7,12,17 80:17
 82:18 117:16 133:9
treat (1) 19:3
treated (1) 33:20
treating (1) 17:21
treatment (8) 13:10
 16:15,18 18:23 19:7
 28:24 29:3 33:21
trial (1) 39:25
tribunal (1) 87:20
tried (1) 141:25
trigger (1) 85:16
triggered (1) 130:5
trip (8)
 117:8,13,15,19,23
 118:2,9,13

trips (4) 119:8,12,15,23
tripwire (3) 80:16 82:23
 84:16
troubled (1) 51:1
troubling (2) 82:10
 115:14
truck (3) 130:19,23
 131:4
trucks (1) 131:23
truest (1) 156:20
trunk (5) 15:23 22:3,7
 25:23 26:15
try (11) 39:7 64:22 79:8
 92:4 95:20 98:20
 103:6 104:1 120:17
 144:1 157:8
trying (12) 15:12 16:15
 17:8,22,22 18:1 46:6
 58:18 71:3 79:15
 131:4 156:5
tuesday (2) 1:1 128:11
turn (9) 2:18 3:1 21:5
 100:9 129:7,12 134:8
 168:16 180:19
turning (3) 25:22 26:17
 41:1
tv (1) 167:6
twice (1) 44:13
type (6) 6:2 14:3 30:21
 118:14 133:2 156:6
types (1) 51:18
typically (4) 16:10
 145:11 155:4,7

U

uk (12) 50:5 58:13
 61:14 64:11 70:15
 79:21 80:14,21 83:22
 154:4 172:13 176:14
ultimately (5) 17:20
 31:24 59:9,14 93:9
umbrellatype (1) 60:20
ummah (7) 102:19
 103:14 106:2 113:13
 119:21 127:4 134:21
unable (1) 144:5
unauthorised (1) 93:19
unaware (1) 104:25
unawares (1) 9:9
unbeknownst (2)
 100:17 129:2
unbroadcast (2) 76:17
 169:7
uncommon (2) 80:19
 171:16
uncorroborated (4)
 110:11,14,17,23
underestimate (1)
 143:22
underestimated (2)
 140:16,23
underestimating (1)
 142:6
underground (6)
 86:14,20 87:4,16
 88:6,16
underneath (1) 16:17
understand (22) 2:1,19
 11:19 38:24,25 39:1
 71:7 87:24 91:9 110:6
 118:16,24 119:6 120:8
 122:12,13 139:14,21

143:19 147:8 158:21
172:22
understanding (6)
60:19 71:12 144:19
154:13,16 179:8
understands (1) 36:4
understood (1) 139:12
unearthed (1) 146:18
unedited (2) 169:12
171:4
unhappy (1) 175:9
uniform (1) 157:11
unintended (1) 89:6
united (2) 145:20,21
units (3) 40:21,24 48:7
unknown (3) 64:23 73:3
133:23
unless (2) 85:4 137:21
unlikely (9) 27:19 33:16
71:2 94:11,23 133:11
169:15 184:4,6
unprecedented (6) 50:1
81:15 83:22 173:18,19
176:14
unsatisfactory (7) 74:22
135:9,22
136:14,16,21,22
unscreened (1) 182:12
unsophisticated (1)
52:6
unsuspended (4)
83:17,18 118:7 125:17
until (8) 12:22 49:18
59:18 62:24 86:15
122:2 138:18 187:11
unusual (1) 183:5
unwise (1) 115:5
upon (6) 27:24 65:24
180:5,8 185:1,8
upper (15) 3:13,13 6:10
7:15 8:4 15:15 22:10
23:3,10 24:3 27:12
31:6 32:13,15 33:13
upstream (1) 50:15
upwards (4) 14:2,6
24:19 31:8
urgency (1) 33:20
used (11) 66:14 68:11
99:2,13 112:20 127:2
134:21 136:2,3 144:9
169:24
useful (2) 56:13 97:8
usher (2) 178:14,22
using (10) 1:17 9:21
17:11 21:19 22:21
29:24 30:5 66:9
119:19 158:10
usman (7) 72:15 73:19
74:2 75:7 158:18
159:8 160:8

V

valuable (4) 96:18 97:7
110:12 174:14
value (1) 106:19
van (15) 10:18,21,25,25
11:18 130:16,19,22
131:4,13 132:18
133:7,12,18,23
vanishingly (1) 133:11
vans (1) 131:23
variables (2) 75:21
162:16

varies (1) 47:20
variety (1) 68:11
various (7) 4:24 40:20
95:21 121:24 123:8
124:11 178:12
vary (1) 47:5
vast (1) 57:20
vehicle (7) 18:13,14
57:9 66:12 132:11
134:4 158:7
vein (3) 21:25 22:1
26:15
ventricle (5) 4:12,15
19:13,15,25
ventricles (1) 18:23
venue (2) 106:23
107:16
version (1) 93:10
versions (1) 147:5
vertical (2) 31:4,10
vessel (5) 4:13,14
22:4,6 33:11
vessels (5) 24:22 25:12
26:14 28:23 33:13
victim (1) 14:11
video (1) 163:8
videos (7) 71:21 72:2
163:11,18 170:7,10,18
viewed (3) 72:1 93:18
171:2
viewpoint (2) 58:21,22
views (10) 58:4 59:8,13
71:19 72:8,25 97:11
101:17 115:6 148:17
violence (2) 101:23
115:19
violent (8) 77:22 97:12
98:6 99:22 126:24
148:6,17 164:25
visible (2) 106:25 107:1
voice (9) 39:7,12 95:22
98:2,20 103:6 104:1
118:10 120:17
volume (7) 8:19,22 39:5
50:1,5,17 51:19
volumes (1) 50:12
voluntary (2) 106:4,5
vulnerable (1) 50:25

W

wait (1) 30:9
walking (2) 127:6,14
wall (7) 6:16,25 7:17
23:5,16 32:9 105:5
wallet (1) 93:1
wandering (1) 154:15
wanting (6) 154:14
161:16,25,25 165:5
173:5
wants (4) 37:7 144:23
166:15 185:17
ward (2) 17:8 29:14
warning (1) 1:13
warrant (3) 41:10
92:11,15
wasnt (31) 25:13 51:22
61:17 62:20 77:2,3,4
91:3 92:8 94:19
109:17 129:11
134:1,10,13,15,15
135:11,11 136:21
138:1,4,6 139:23

141:7 151:1 161:14,17
165:7 171:9,15
watch (1) 149:23
watched (4) 78:12
149:17 167:12 168:1
watching (2) 167:6,9
watershed (1) 41:6
watson (1) 142:10
way (28) 12:8 16:8
17:12 18:5 20:23
23:18 31:16 32:25
50:6 51:6,25 53:3 59:6
76:7 94:12 111:5
118:18 127:23 137:22
143:19 157:25 158:1
159:8,11 167:12 170:6
180:18 183:19
ways (1) 85:1
weak (2) 126:14,19
weaknesses (1) 93:24
wealth (2) 171:21 172:1
weapon (3) 15:5 29:15
57:9
weaponry (1) 65:22
wearing (1) 170:18
website (2) 101:4
179:19
wed (2) 50:13 96:21
wednesday (1) 187:12
week (6) 38:14 104:7
141:6 146:8 183:17
184:6
weekday (2) 110:4
111:7
weekends (1) 177:20
weekly (1) 46:21
weeks (8) 47:10 48:6
149:8 151:16 167:20
168:6,25 175:18
weight (2) 146:23 180:6
went (19) 37:3 62:1
74:5,17 75:20,22
110:3 117:9 127:5
129:19 149:12 151:3
159:14,14
160:10,18,23,24 161:1
werent (8) 52:10 113:25
122:20 139:15 149:8
163:1 167:9 171:1
west (1) 10:22
western (4) 58:11
144:20 145:20 176:3
westminster (6) 53:11
86:23 87:4 92:16
116:17 124:6
weve (29) 8:21 14:16
15:8 27:21 31:18
32:18 33:7 43:17
44:12 47:8 53:16
55:19 56:25 76:16
103:22 132:25 137:14
138:15,24
143:6,9,10,11 152:23
155:13 156:3 159:23
161:21 186:10
whatever (2) 16:25
79:25
whats (11) 22:3 42:18
46:22 47:21 48:15
55:14 66:25 94:25
100:7 172:20 174:5
whatsapp (1) 72:24
whatsoever (1) 37:11

whereby (2) 44:22
60:10
whilst (1) 134:20
white (2) 57:13 144:25
whole (3) 121:20
170:20 172:8
wholeheartedly (1)
156:11
whom (4) 35:1 70:7
134:8 141:4
whose (1) 183:16
widely (2) 147:15 148:5
wider (14) 40:8 49:2,6
71:4 82:7 113:8
116:7,10 124:2,19
137:11 168:9 171:18
173:24
widespread (1) 40:23
wife (2) 135:1 186:16
willing (1) 164:25
wish (3) 1:6 2:16 38:13
wishes (1) 178:11
wishing (1) 180:4
wishy (1) 94:6
withdrawals (3) 88:17
93:20,22
withdrawn (2) 91:13,17
witness (66) 1:3
15:9,21 16:14
35:1,1,1,8,17,19,19
36:10,11,22 37:13,24
38:14,15 55:22 65:11
66:21,24 68:23 69:15
85:15 89:23 95:12,20
101:25 102:6 103:3,12
107:19 108:13
112:6,13,14,16,16
113:18,20 115:11
122:7 124:7,25
125:5,16 126:12 130:8
135:7 138:22 148:9
152:17 154:7 157:7
166:20 172:21
178:11,14 180:24
181:4 184:14
186:10,13,20 188:8
witnesses (3) 94:4
138:16 186:11
wold (1) 77:14
woman (1) 15:10
won (1) 103:5
work (21) 37:15 39:9
40:20 41:1,3 47:20,25
49:10 53:3 64:20 68:6
88:15 97:16 104:19
106:4,4 111:24 138:14
139:10 143:23,24
worked (1) 49:7
working (16) 35:24
36:25 51:12,13 53:2
85:24 86:17,20,22
87:3,7,9,15 103:13
105:20 174:21
workload (4) 47:11,16
48:15 83:24
works (1) 37:21
world (8) 49:24 51:16
69:7 111:14 143:12
176:18 177:12,25
worth (6) 63:20 64:25
70:3 80:5 98:14
111:25
wouldnt (17) 29:17

33:20 58:13 67:12
68:13 81:1 88:9 95:3
106:25 107:7,9 115:1
126:3 127:22 137:8,17
161:7
wound (49)
3:11,12,14,15,17 4:16
5:6 6:17,20 7:1,14
8:11 9:24 13:20,25
15:17 18:24 20:1
21:14,20
22:7,15,17,18,19,22,25
23:11
24:2,4,9,12,16,18,25
25:6,12,17
26:2,3,6,8,22 27:8,12
29:17,20,25 33:12
wounds (5) 5:8 26:20
27:25 30:7 33:8
wrap (2) 175:7,11
wrist (2) 5:18,22
writing (2) 155:14 179:7
wrong (8) 74:11 94:3
124:15 129:13 159:14
160:10 161:9 173:10
wrongly (1) 160:10
wrote (1) 63:25
ws025 (1) 38:12

X

x (1) 58:19

Y

y (1) 58:19
year (1) 49:12
years (13) 38:4,5 47:8,9
49:7 69:8 141:3
142:12 147:4,16 151:1
174:19,19
you (1) 117:4
youll (1) 144:24
young (3) 10:2 15:10
51:8
youre (14) 23:20
38:7,13 78:1 80:1
81:10 89:24 117:19
121:7 123:20 127:10
129:21,25 147:8
yourself (5) 1:7 149:7
157:21 171:22 175:8
youssef (7) 113:17
121:19 138:1 179:12
182:8,13 183:8
youtube (5) 71:22 72:2
163:3,8,19
youve (20) 9:15 17:19
19:7 28:23 31:19
32:22 33:23 49:7
59:21 62:8 98:23
103:23 108:14 134:13
145:17 158:4 167:17
171:9 172:15 184:19
182:8,13 183:8

Z

z (1) 58:19
zagha (20) 113:17
119:10,17,25 120:2,10
121:9,11,15,19 122:3
127:3 129:18 134:8
137:25 138:1 179:12
182:8,13 183:8

zahrah (1) 96:15
zaitouni (2) 134:23
136:1
zaytoon (2) 61:3 136:4
zelenak (2) 9:8 15:11
ziamani (1) 157:13

1

1 (9) 5:1 6:18 33:24
56:16 57:16 93:9
99:10 188:3,4
10 (7) 17:3 27:23 38:4
59:17 178:22 180:4
187:9
1000 (4) 91:20 128:10
129:18 187:11
1015 (1) 1:2
1020 (1) 12:19
105 (1) 153:2
107 (2) 68:24 69:15
11 (4) 17:3 36:14 91:15
181:18
1105 (1) 36:7
1123 (1) 36:9
115 (1) 101:25
116 (1) 102:6
118 (1) 112:8
119 (3) 103:3,12 108:13
12 (2) 12:19 40:19
120 (1) 112:23
121 (1) 113:20
1258 (1) 95:9
126 (1) 122:7
128 (1) 125:16
13 (4) 4:18 12:19 91:12
188:5
131 (1) 130:10
1350 (1) 91:13
139 (1) 188:10
14 (4) 3:23 23:11
124:23 125:9
15 (3) 6:21 27:23 78:17
150 (1) 47:14
16 (4) 40:17 78:17
86:14 93:3
1600 (1) 91:11
17 (1) 101:10
1700 (1) 91:15
178 (1) 188:11
18 (6) 24:4 92:18 96:5
101:2 117:8 180:11
19 (10) 35:10,20,25
36:25 76:16 91:11
101:2 107:20 167:15
179:18
1981 (1) 36:14
1990s (1) 141:5
1b (1) 9:24

2

2 (15) 5:1 7:13 20:16
25:10 26:17 33:24
56:16,19 57:16 85:4
95:8 99:10 106:14
129:17 179:25
20 (5) 52:22 53:7
93:16,16 128:8
200 (1) 47:14
20000 (1) 124:2
2005 (3) 41:2,5 143:1
2006 (2) 53:17 56:16
2010 (1) 49:18

2012 (2) 49:21 51:17
20122013 (1) 49:18
2013 (3) 52:17,23
180:11
2014 (2) 139:22 148:4
2015 (22) 40:11 47:12
66:24 68:4,6,25 69:16
70:8 71:14,22
72:14,14 139:24
148:21 149:17 153:7
155:10 163:2,3,18
165:6 175:24
2016 (26) 62:24
76:14,16 78:16,19
81:7 84:5,19 86:14,15
88:15 89:22 91:6,21
92:18 96:2 100:23
101:4 102:1,7,19
112:8,17 166:24
167:2,10
2017 (34) 3:3 21:7
40:11 47:13 52:17,23
53:6,10 77:24 93:3,9
101:10 103:13 105:4
107:19,21,24 108:1
112:9,17,23 113:11,23
114:6 119:22 122:9
124:10 126:13,25
128:10,16,18 129:17
134:19
2018 (1) 179:18
2019 (3) 1:1 140:15
187:12
203 (1) 95:11
21 (5) 101:4 114:5
122:2 134:9 188:6
215 (1) 47:11
22 (3) 53:11,12 134:9
222 (1) 49:8
228 (1) 52:16
230 (1) 110:4
237 (1) 54:21
24 (1) 97:6
24hour (1) 73:13
25 (2) 11:21 24:18
26 (1) 25:7
27 (1) 41:22
29 (1) 126:25
2nd (1) 130:1

3

3 (13) 5:1 7:21 20:16
26:21 53:13 60:5
73:10 105:4 106:10
107:24 138:5 171:7
179:25
30 (5) 11:22 72:14
128:10,18 188:7
3000 (1) 83:3
31 (2) 71:14 149:23
310 (1) 65:6
312 (1) 68:5
313 (2) 68:5 139:3
314 (1) 69:21
317 (2) 163:13,16
324 (1) 72:19
334 (1) 139:5
34 (1) 179:18
37 (2) 188:8,9
3rd (1) 130:1

4

4 (9) 1:1 8:5 15:1,19
22:18 27:11 28:8
167:24 169:9
400 (1) 130:15
400430 (1) 130:21
430 (3) 110:4 130:15
138:18
442 (1) 187:10
45 (1) 21:15

5

5 (12) 3:7 4:25 9:4 15:6
21:11 29:10 38:5
114:6 122:2,6 128:16
187:12
51 (1) 78:18
515 (1) 132:17
5300 (1) 124:1
54 (2) 47:13 84:4
548 (1) 73:6
56 (1) 85:15
58 (3) 56:11 57:15 99:9

6

6 (10) 5:5 9:13 16:13,19
24:6,10,21 29:16
56:22 100:23
600 (2) 26:6 54:25
612 (1) 96:5
613 (1) 97:5
630 (1) 132:17
68 (1) 3:16

7

7 (7) 3:3 21:7 22:11
28:5,12 34:13 113:11
77 (7) 41:5 143:1
175:18 177:7,9,13,21

8

8 (4) 17:2 29:22 107:20
180:3
81 (1) 107:25
812 (1) 93:17
813 (1) 128:8
85 (1) 114:4
850 (1) 91:17

9

9 (4) 17:7 24:16 92:16
134:19
900 (1) 133:7
92 (1) 134:17
930 (1) 133:9